



*The Origins of
Palestinian
Nationalism*



Muhammad Y. Muslih

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The Institute for Palestine Studies Series

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**New York
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS**

Columbia University Press

New York Guildford, Surrey

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Date

Muslih, Muhammad Y.

The origins of Palestinian nationalism.

(Institute for Palestine Studies series)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Palestinian Arabs--Politics and government.

2. Palestine--History--1799-1917.

3. Nationalism--Palestine.

4. Nationalism--Arab countries.

5. Jewish-Arab relations. I. Title. II. Series.

DS125.M87

1988

956.94'03

87-24995

ISBN 0-231-06508-6

ISBN 0-231-06509-4 (pbk.)

p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Printed in the United States of America

Clothbound editions of Columbia University Press
are Smyth-sewn and printed on permanent and durable
acid-free paper

The publication of this book was made possible in part
by a grant from the Institute for Palestine Studies.

TO ALIA AND YOUSEF

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Preface

This study of the origins of Palestinian nationalism covers the political elites of Palestine and their ideology from 1856 until December 1920, when the third Palestinian Arab Congress was held in Haifa to decide the future of Palestine. This congress was held after the institution of a civilian administration headed by a Zionist Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel, on July 1, 1920, and the termination of Faysal ibn al-Husayn's Arab rule in Damascus by the French army at the end of the same month.

The study focuses on the politics of the Palestinian notable families which played a leadership role in Palestinian society as a result of Ottoman modernization and centralization after 1856. Chapters 1 and 2 explore how Ottoman reforms, European economic penetration, and the economic upswing in Palestine in the latter half of the nineteenth century led to the enhancement of the economic, social, and political position of the great notable families of Palestine, and their emergence as an aristocracy of service in the Ottoman state. As such, dominant members of this class of landowners and senior bureaucrats subscribed to Ottomanism, or the belief that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was the best means of defending Islam against the encroachments of the European powers, and remained loyal supporters of the sultan until 1918.

Although this leadership remained in control until

the final collapse of the empire in 1918, it faced competition from members who came from within its ranks. The competition found expression in reformist terms after the Young Turk coup of 1908, and the Turkification policies pursued by the Young Turks. It was the estranged group of Palestinian upper-class family members who took part in the development of the challenging ideology, Arabism, proclaiming that the Arabs were entitled to autonomy within the empire. Chapters 4 through 8 focus on the process, and on how the Arabists, many of whom turned to the cause of Arab nationalism during World War I, used their ideology as a tool to challenge the Ottomanists, advance themselves as political leaders, and struggle for the establishment of a united Syria.

By situating Palestinian politics within the larger context of the Arab nationalist movement, the study tries to offer a new explanation for the development of Palestinian nationalism. It is my argument that the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist groups in Faysal's Arab government in Damascus between 1918 and 1920 was a major factor which significantly contributed to the split of the Arab nationalist movement along provincial lines in 1920. This fragmentation tipped the scale in favor of the older generation of Palestinian urban notables, who first subscribed to Ottomanism, then to local Palestinian autonomy after the war. Although Palestinian nationalism was encouraged by the threat of Zionism, it was ushered into its own independent existence mainly as a result of the chaos and disarray of the larger Arab nationalist movement.

Unpublished Arab documents and memoirs deposited in Beirut, Damascus, and Amman provided indispensable information for my research. These Arabic materials include important evidence on the interaction among different Arab personalities and organizations, in addition to details on secret Arab meetings and activities that shed light on the politics under review. I also used the documents in the Public Record Office in London, primarily

correspondence between British officials in Palestine and London, memoranda submitted by Palestinian Arab politicians, and interviews with those politicians. No less helpful were the records of the Palestine government and of Palestinian Arab organizations and personalities deposited in the Israel State Archives and the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem.

These materials were supplemented by the Arabic official documents and private papers kept in private homes, and in the Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center and the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, and newspapers and Arabic-language books at the American University of Beirut. I interviewed several Palestinian Arabs who were active in the movement; their names are given in the bibliography.

To J. C. Hurewitz, former director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, who supervised my research from the beginning, and who procured for me an institute fellowship for the preparation of the greater part of this study, I am most grateful. I am also grateful to Richard W. Bulliet, director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, for his support and helpful advice. I also owe my gratitude to Lewis Edinger, who supervised the first draft of this study, and to Howard Wriggins and George Saliba for their useful comments. I am especially indebted to Walid Khalidi for his inspiring comments and the assistance he extended to me at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, to Dr. Samih al-'Alami for his encouragement and help, and to the Diana Tamari Sabbagh foundation and the Kamil 'Abd al-Rahman Education Fund in Beirut for the grants they offered for the completion of this work.

I also wish to thank Akram Zu'aytir for the many and long interviews he granted me, the private papers he made available to me, and his generous counsel. I am especially thankful to the late Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, who, despite his age and failing health, granted me eight full days of interviews and allowed me to photocopy his typed and handwritten

memoirs in their entirety. Given the sensitive information on Arab personalities, I seriously doubt that these memoirs will ever be published in their original form. I wish to express my gratitude to the staffs of the Israel State Archives, the Central Zionist Archives, the Institute for Palestine Studies, and the Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center. Without their assistance and cooperation, this study would not have been completed. I must also thank all those who granted me interviews or gave me access to their private papers. These have helped me recreate and better understand the period with which I have dealt.

I reserve a debt of gratitude to Rashid Khalidi, Layla al-Khalidi, and Philip Khoury. While in Beirut, Rashid personally introduced me to family members for interviews and allowed me access to unpublished family memoirs. I also benefited from the kind advice of Rashid, who gave generously of his time and expertise. Layla personally introduced me to old Palestinian families and provided a copy of the unpublished memoirs of her father, Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi. Philip kindly read part of this work and provided me with segments of his doctoral dissertation on the politics of nationalism in Syria during the French mandate. His masterly work *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism* was an invaluable source of information on the politics of Damascus from the latter part of the nineteenth century up until 1920.

I am grateful, moreover, to Philip Mattar for his help and thoughtful suggestions and to Laurie Brand and Linda Butler for their comments. I am also thankful to Lisa Anderson, Mahmud Haddad, and Reeva Simon for reading the manuscript and providing useful comments on it. I reserve special thanks to Jody Jaffe for help in proofreading the manuscript and for sharing his thoughts with me. Kate Wittenberg was there from the day the manuscript was in its raw form, and I want to express my gratitude and appreciation.

This study has also profited from some PRO papers collected and thematically organized by Ann Mosely Lesch, and from data on Palestinian families collected by Bayan

Nuwayhid al-Hut. Much of the credit for whatever merit this work may have goes to the above-mentioned individuals. Needless to say, I bear sole responsibility for any of the flaws or omissions that this study may have.

Above all, I am most deeply obligated to my wife, Souhaila, whose devotion, patience, and support made this study possible.

Note on Transcription

In the transliteration of Arabic words, personal names, and place names, I have been sparing in the use of diacritical marks and have used them only when it was absolutely essential. Otherwise commonly accepted English forms are used, especially for Arabic place names. In titles of books and articles and in quotations, I kept the transliteration of the original sources intact.

Special Abbreviations

C.O.	Colonial Office
C.Z.A.	Central Zionist Archives
F.O.	Foreign Office
I.P.S.	Institute for Palestine Studies
I.S.A.	Israel State Archives
P.L.O.	Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center

The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism

Introduction

Political studies on Palestine abound. Insofar as these studies deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict they must discuss the emergence of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement during the British rule (1917-1948), or Arab politics in Palestine just before World War I. Very few studies, however, explore the social forces which shaped Palestinian nationalism. Fewer still attempt to situate Palestinian nationalism within the social and political milieu in which it grew, namely Arab nationalism. This study attempts to fill this gap.

It focuses on one social class in Palestine. This class, which I call the "officeholding urban notables," started to become the dominant political force after 1856, as a result of the Ottoman reforms, trade and agricultural expansion, and the land tenure system. It is my thesis that the aristocratic families of this class produced a disproportionate number of leading Ottomanists (1856-1918), Arabists (1908-1914), Arab nationalists (1914-1920), and Palestinian nationalists (1918-1920). Four points must be outlined here to clarify the meaning of these terms as they are used in this study.

First, Ottomanism remained the dominant ideology in the Arab territories which lay to the east of Suez until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. This ideology proclaimed that the unity of the Ottoman Empire was the

best way to defend Islam against the steady political, economic, and cultural penetration of Europe. Ottomanism was maintained in the Arab territories east of Suez until 1918 largely because dominant notable families, in cities like Damascus, Jerusalem, and Nablus, consolidated their positions of local power through occupying high posts in the Ottoman government.

Second, Arabism had the same central goal of Ottomanism, that is it aimed at defending the civilization of Islam and the Arabs from Western threats and ambitions. Although many of its adherents hailed from an urban landowning and office-based class, few of them were as successful as the Ottomanists in securing senior posts in the imperial bureaucracy of the Ottoman state.¹ Prior to 1914, this estranged class demanded greater Arab autonomy within the larger framework of the Ottoman Empire as an alternative to the centralization and "Turkification" policies of the central government. Despite the fact that the Arabist views of this class appealed to a growing number of literate and politically active Arabs, Arabism was until 1914 a minority position in the Arab lands east of Suez. Arabism did not seek independence from the Ottoman state before 1914. Its advocates were from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Many of the prewar Arabists became Arab nationalists during World War I.

Third, Arab nationalism had become by 1919 the reigning political ideology in Syria. As used in this study, the term Arab nationalist refers to those Arab individuals or political societies that sought separation of the Arab territories from the fold of the Ottoman state and the creation of an independent Arab nation, with Greater Syria as its nucleus, within defined boundaries. This position, which was by no means universal when it first emerged during the war years, did not constitute an ideology with a guide to action. Rather, it was a general separatist idea that was presented as an alternative to the dominant ideology of Ottomanism during World War I.

The Arabs who originally championed Arab nationalism comprised a small revolutionary movement that was weak,

unfortunate, and very much dependent upon England and France. Britain needed the assistance of this movement to fight the Ottoman army, to sever the Arabic-speaking territories from the empire, to counter pan-Islamism, as well as to occupy Palestine and whatever territories it deemed necessary to the protection of the Suez Canal. France, too, needed the Arab nationalist movement to counter British influence in the Arab territories, and muster the requisite support for French ambitions in the Syrian interior. The Arab nationalists, in their turn, hesitatingly sought British and French help during the war in the hollow hope that the two European powers would help them in achieving their goal of Arab independence and unity, as well as in protecting Palestine from the colonial threat of Zionism.

Fourth, the main concern of the Palestinian nationalists in the period 1918-1920 was preventing the implantation of an alien Zionist entity in Palestine. They believed that the first political priority of the Palestinians was securing the independence of Palestine. As far as they were concerned, the idea of unity with Syria should be addressed after Palestinian independence had been achieved.

It may be useful at this point to suggest that nationalism, or a strong sense of communion with the specific country that one inhabits, was only beginning to take root in the loyalties and sentiments of the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent immediately after the disintegration of the Ottoman state. Long accustomed to an *imperial* identity and existence during which political allegiance belonged to a "universal" Islamic state, the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent could not automatically develop a sense of *national* identity after the fall of the last Islamic empire in 1918. The process was gradual, and what ultimately prevailed was a sense of separate territorial nationality (*wataniyya*), despite the fact that the "universalism" of Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya*) was embraced by a group of Muslim and Christian Arabs who hailed from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and elsewhere.

But even though local nationalisms have prevailed since

1920, the Arabs did not coin a name for these nationalisms. Until this date, there is no Arabic name for Palestinian nationalism, or Syrian nationalism, or any other form of state nationalism in the Arab world. Arabic does not lack a name for nationalism. In fact, the word *wataniyya* means state nationalism, but it is simply used as an adjective to modify a movement, a party, or a trend. Terms such as *al-wataniyya al-Filastiniyya* (Palestinian nationalism) or *al-wataniyya al-Suriyya* (Syrian nationalism) have been rarely used, despite the fact that these terms are grammatically and idiomatically correct in Arabic. On the other hand, the exponents of Arab nationalism had come up with the term *al-qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya* (Arab nationalism), for their pan-Arab ideology.

A tentative explanation for this phenomenon can be stated as follows: Arab nationalism, an ideology which was strongly influenced by the Western European concept of the territorial and political nation, emerged as a reaction to pan-Turanianism, or the belief in the cultural and racial superiority of the Turks. Although the exact meaning of this new idea of nationalism was not always clear, it was the only viable and legitimate ideology that could inherit the dying ideology of Ottomanism after the war. At the heart of Arab nationalism lay the belief in the cultural, ethnic, and political unity of the Arabs. The self-image which active Arab nationalists tried to instill in the mind of the Arab was the image of his belonging to the larger Arab entity, or the greater Arab homeland (*al-watan al-'Arabi al-kabir*). In the years following the dismemberment of geographic Syria, it was perfectly legitimate for the people of the newly severed territories to struggle against the "foreign imperialist" (*al-musta'mir al-ajnabi*) in order to achieve independence.

Advocates of Arab nationalism welcomed this kind of struggle hoping that independence along state lines would ultimately lead to the victory of pan-Arabism. The struggle for local independence was therefore viewed as compatible with the long-range goals of Arab nationalism.

However, the formulation of an ideology of local nationalism was never welcomed or encouraged. So even though local nationalisms were gradually consolidated in the territories severed from geographic Syria, the nationalist writers, publicists, and activists of these territories refrained from coming up with a term which would contradict the ideological terminology of Arab nationalism. To devise a term such as *al-wataniyya al-Filastiniyya* would have probably made many Palestinian nationalists uneasy, because it would raise a false antithesis between Arab culture, to which every Arab is irrevocably bound, and the distinct character and interests of the different Arab regions (*aqtar*), to which the Arabs inhabiting any one of those regions were more faithfully and more strongly committed.

Since the leadership of Ottomanism, Arabism, Arab nationalism, and Palestinian nationalism was to a great degree in the hands of urban notable families, it is important to dwell briefly on the formation of the class of urban notables. Before doing that, however, we must define the meaning of "notable."

According to Albert Hourani, a notable in the Arabic-speaking lands in the latter part of the nineteenth century was someone who could act as intermediary between government and people. He played this role because he had an independent base of social power, and as such the government needed him to apply its new reforming program of centralization which was expected to arouse local opposition. Moreover, the local population needed the notable to intervene with the government on its behalf in matters of conscription, new laws, new ways of assessing and collecting taxes, and the establishment of government offices in small towns.² Hence the concept of a "notable" is used here in a political sense. In other words, a notable was someone whom the government recruited from a locally rooted aristocracy for the implementation of a certain political program, believing that his independent social power makes him an accepted leader in his local society.

In the case of Palestine, the position of the notable was greatly enhanced after 1856, nearly at the expense of all other

classes, for reasons I shall discuss in the next chapter. What is more to our purpose here is the following: What is the heuristic value of the term "notable," first as a tool for understanding the evolution of Palestinian nationalism, and second, what is its significance as a focus of group identification. Let me examine each of the two points in turn.

Heuristic Value of the Concept of Notables

A notable recruited to act as intermediary between government and people must be a political leader, otherwise he will be of no use to the government. Here we must keep in mind that traditionally the city was the locus of political power in Palestine and the Middle East in general. From time immemorial, the Middle Eastern city has relied on the rural hinterland for its food supplies, and the rural hinterland in its turn has benefited from the goods produced in the city. As Hourani has suggested, this urban-rural interdependence may also be analyzed in terms of two interdependent actors, government and society. The rural hinterland could not have at least some stability without a ruler who had an army and bureaucracy to protect the hinterland from nomadic raids; the town, too, could not secure its food supplies and maintain its laws and private interests without a ruler who had prestige, strength, and local power. Similarly, the government needed the city to meet the needs of the palace, the bureaucracy, and the army.³

Hence there existed a mutuality of interest between the government and those elements in the city which needed stability for their own prosperity: traders, craftsmen, 'ulama (religious scholars), and, above all, landowners. This harmony of interest was reinforced in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the growth of urban development and urban economies, and by the gradual reinvigoration of the Ottoman

central authority. Now the city needed more than ever before the power of the central government to protect existing harbors, roads, railways, and trade routes, and to even create new ones in view of the fact that the economic life of the town centered on trade as was the case with Nablus, pilgrims as was the case with Jerusalem, and both trade and pilgrims as was the case with Jaffa.

Two major aspects of the process are of direct concern to the present study: 1) the interdependence between the Ottoman government and the notable families of the cities played a critical role in their subscription to Ottomanism and their acceptance of the sultan as the embodiment of Islam; 2) the growth of the Turkish national element in the Ottoman state after 1908, together with the expansion of aristocratic families in the geographic Syria of Ottoman days, led to the exclusion of certain members of those families from senior government posts. Gradually, the excluded members evolved into what C. Ernest Dawn refers to as the "dissident faction" of the Arab elite.⁴ By this is meant the faction which felt estranged from the Ottoman system and proposed as alternatives, first, administrative reform and decentralization within the context of Ottoman unity, then Arab independence and the creation of a unitary Arab nation after the outbreak of World War I. On the other hand, the dominant political leadership of urban notables continued to be an aristocracy of service and to identify with Ottomanism until the final defeat of the empire in 1918.

Hence a study of the politics of urban notables should help us understand the social origins of Arabism, Arab nationalism, and Palestinian nationalism. As I shall demonstrate in more detail later, it was mainly the dissident members of the aristocratic class who articulated the idea of Arab nationalism and reinforced the Arab nationalist context of Palestinian nationalism after the war. Moreover, the interaction between Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi advocates of Arab nationalism on the one hand, and be-

tween these Arab nationalists and the previously dominant urban notables who were on the margin of Faysal's Arab government (1918-1920) in Damascus was a major factor that gave rise to the idea of a geographically defined Syria, Iraq, and Palestine.

Notables As a Focus of Group Identification

Now let us move to the second question, that is the usefulness of the concept of "urban notables" as a tool to explain group identification. At this point, we must keep two factors equally in view: first, the interconnection between government and urban notables discussed above; second, the economic development of Palestine during the period of European penetration into the Middle East from the end of the Crimean War in 1856 onward. As a result of European penetration, the Middle East became tied to the European traders as a plantation economy, producing the raw materials which the European industry needed and importing European manufactured goods.⁵ During this period, Palestine marketed agricultural surplus in Egypt, Lebanon, and Europe. The impact of this development on the local social groups was as follows: the economic strength of old Muslim merchants and craftsmen was weakened in the face of machine-manufactured goods; the importance of the camel for transport declined as a result of the introduction of more sophisticated methods of transport, and as such the economy of the nomads suffered a serious setback; there emerged a new group of landed businessmen or entrepreneurs who lived on the import-export trade with neighboring countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon, or, increasingly, with Europe. Members of this class acquired land through grants by the Ottoman rulers, or cash loans to the cultivators, or by outright purchases for cultivation purchases.⁶

What concerns us most here are three main characteris-

tics of the new class of landed businessmen. First, this class consisted mainly of Palestinian and Lebanese Christians, Jews, and Europeans whose activities were concentrated in the coastal towns and Jerusalem. Second, because they were largely composed of minorities, the landed businessmen did not lead to the emergence of a class of Palestinian bourgeoisie, in other words a middle class which included merchants, tradesmen, landowners, professionals, bureaucrats, and employees of private enterprise. Third, the few Muslim members of this class (such as al-Shak'a and al-Masri families in Nablus) could not, by the very nature of their size, constitute an independent group having its own sources of strength, its own manufacturing enterprises, its own employees, and above all its own class-conditioned interests and inclinations. No wonder therefore that the Muslim landed businessmen had a passive class feeling,⁷ that is the little strength they had did not inspire them to challenge the local hegemony of the traditional urban notables. They rather did exactly the opposite by becoming close allies of the notables.

Thus, with the economic strength of the old Muslim merchants and craftsmen on the decline, the economy of the nomads shrunken, and the class of entrepreneurs exogenous or having no vitality of its own, the officeholding urban notables were the most effective channel of politics in Palestine during the period under survey. It was within this class that political groups emerged, and through it that local demands were formulated and represented to the Ottoman sultan's court and to the British authorities after the capitulation of the empire.

Therefore a study of the politics of urban notables should point out basic lines of cohesion and conflict within the Palestinian political elites and should be highly useful as a tool to explain group identification, because these notables constituted the political leadership of the Palestinian Arabs.

1.

The Ottoman Background of Palestinian Politics

Before the end of World War I, Palestine formed part of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman regime (1517-1918), there was no political unit known as Palestine. In fact, the country was better known by its Arab-Muslim name of *al-Ard al-Muqadassa* (the Holy Land).¹ Palestine was also referred to as *Surya al-Janubiyya* (Southern Syria), because it was part of geographical Syria, namely the land mass that incorporated present-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan.

According to the Wilayat Law of 1864, the Ottoman Empire was divided from an administrative point of view into *wilayat* (provinces), which in turn were divided into *sanajiq* (districts), and these into *aqdiya* (subdistricts). Each of these administrative units was headed by a senior official who was subject to the central government in Istanbul. The main purpose of the Ottoman government in instituting this administrative arrangement was to centralize its authority throughout the empire.

Some of the information used to construct the analytic framework of this chapter has been taken from the works of Owen, Schölch, Shimoni, and Hourani listed in the notes and bibliography.

After the enactment of the Wilayat Law, Palestine was divided as follows: In the south, the Jerusalem *sanjaq* (singular of *sanajiq*) included Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Bir al-Sab' (Beersheba), and al-Hafir. Due to the special religious status of Jerusalem, this *sanjaq* was established in 1887 as an independent administrative unit and was made directly responsible to Istanbul.

In the north, the *sanjaq* of Acre (which comprised Acre, Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, and Marj Ibn 'Amir, i.e., the Plain of Esdraelon), and that of al-Balqa' (which comprised Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm), belonged to the *wilaya* (singular of *wilayat*) of Beirut. On the other hand, the central areas belonged to the *wilaya* of Damascus. Transjordan, which was divided into the *sanjaqs* of Hauran in the north and Amman in the south, was also placed under the supervision of the *wilaya* of Damascus.²

Despite these administrative divisions, however, Palestine maintained close relations with the rest of Syria, relations which provided an important channel for the dissemination of various ideas, including the idea of Arab nationalism. In the first place, Palestinian merchants had strong trading links with the merchants of such inland trade centers as Aleppo and Damascus and with the merchants who lived in seaports such as Alexandretta, Latakia, Beirut, and Sidon. Similarly, the merchants of these trade centers had close links with Palestinian cities, especially Nablus, and with the Palestinian seaports of Acre and Jaffa.

Second, by virtue of being the starting-point of the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, Damascus acted as a meeting place for all Muslim pilgrims coming from all parts of the Ottoman Empire. These pilgrims, some of whom were merchants and intellectuals, sold goods and exchanged ideas. Moreover, Russian and Armenian Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem and Bethlehem took the land route to Aleppo, and the sea routes from the Greek islands to Jaffa.³ These communal and pilgrimage activities, it should be noted, were supported by a well-integrated net-

work of main routes and internal highways, including a modern railroad system and other communications networks in the last few decades of Ottoman rule.

Third, there were cultural links between Palestine and the other parts of Syria. Educated Palestinians read books and articles which were published in Damascus and Beirut, and some wealthy Palestinian families sent their sons to study abroad, especially to the American University of Beirut. In addition, the circulation of dailies and magazines as well as books on various subjects in the last few years of Ottoman rule encouraged a cultural give and take among such important cities as Beirut, Damascus, Tripoli, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Nablus.

Fourth, there was *musahara* or intermarriage, mainly between upper-class Palestinian families and upper-class Syrian but more particularly Lebanese families, such as between some members of the al-Khalidi family in Jerusalem and the Salam family in Beirut, and between Nashashibis and Sulhs and 'Alamis and Jabiris.

Fifth, the Palestinians and Syrians developed local political bonds among themselves, through the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul when Syrian delegates joined the strong Palestinian campaign against Zionist immigration and the transfer of land to Zionists in Palestine, and through the Arab political societies that emerged in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.⁴

The total land area of what later came to be known as Palestine was estimated at 26.3 million dunums (one dunum equals 1,000 square meters), two-thirds of which were areas unsuitable for cultivation.⁵ By the middle of the nineteenth century, Palestine had a population of nearly one-half million, of whom more than 80 percent were Muslims, about 10 percent Christians, and 5 to 7 percent Jews.⁶ However, during the period 1880-1914, the population increased to about 690,000. Of these, about 400,000 resided in the southern region, including Jaffa and Jerusalem, 154,000 in the district of Nablus, and 137,000 in the district of Acre. The Arabs remained the predominant component of the

population, with the Jews numbering no more than 60,000 in 1904,⁷ and nearly 85,000 ten years later, or about 12 percent of the overall population. Among the Arabs, some 89 percent were Muslims, 10 percent Christians, and 1 percent Druze. Nearly 50 percent of the Christians were Greek Orthodox, about 40 percent were Roman Catholic, and the other 10 percent adhered to Eastern or Uniate churches.⁸

As elsewhere in the Arab provinces—that is the Arabic-speaking territories lying to the east of the Suez Canal—the population increase in Palestine was partly due to better security, better nutrition, better public health, and a steady economic growth, as well as Jewish immigration. It should be pointed out that Jewish immigration was the most significant factor because through immigration the Jewish population of Palestine expanded by more than 74,000 between 1839 and 1914.

The destination of most Jewish immigrants was the city of Jerusalem, which is why the population of the city dramatically increased. In 1865, only half of the Jerusalem population of about 18,000 was Jewish, while the rest was predominantly Arab. By 1884, the population of the city was nearly 35,000, about two-thirds of whom were Jews. Of course, the Jewish immigrants were not attracted just to Jerusalem; many others went to the other holy cities of Tiberias, Safad, and Hebron. Still others, primarily the more secular Jews, preferred to settle in rural areas. They lived and worked on large areas of land bought by Zionist organizations mostly from absentee Arab landlords after 1901.

As for the population growth of the large towns in Palestine from 1860 to 1922, table 1.1 summarizes estimates reached on the basis of the works of Western travelers, surveyors, and researchers.⁹

With respect to the treatment of their non-Muslim subjects, the Ottomans adopted the millet system (from the word *milla* in Arabic which means religious community). This system, inherited from the Arabs and Mamluks, granted the Christians and Jews a large measure of religious, cultural, and

Table 1.1

City	1860	1880	1922
Jerusalem	19,000	30,000	62,500
Acre	10,000	8,500	6,400
Haifa	3,000	6,000	24,600
Jaffa	6,520	10,000	47,700
Ramla	3,000	3,500	7,400
Gaza	15,000	19,000	17,500
Hebron	7,500	10,000	16,600
Bethlehem	3,570	4,750	6,600
Nablus	9,500	12,500	16,000
Nazareth	4,000	6,000	7,500
Tiberias	2,500	3,000	7,000
Safad	6,500	7,500	8,800
Total	90,000	120,750	228,600

SOURCE: Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine During the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century According to Western Sources," in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine*, p. 68.

legal authority. As a result of this, the Jews and Christians living in the Ottoman Empire were divided into separate communities, each administered locally by its religious leaders and represented at Istanbul by an official spokesman. The same applied to the Druzes, even though the Ottomans regarded them as a schismatic Muslim sect.¹⁰ Thus, identity in the Ottoman Empire was defined along religious lines. However, the political identity of all the inhabitants of the empire, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, was Ottoman. This was at variance with the idea of nationality and the nation-state the way it was developed in Western Europe in the nineteenth century and the way we understand it today.¹¹

The Ottoman State

The Ottoman Empire can be viewed as a framework which held together Western Asia, the Balkans, Egypt, and the coast of

North Africa. In this framework there were different ethnic communities, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews. These groups and communities comprised different social orders, including city-dwellers, peasant, and nomads, and different religious sects, e.g., Sunnis and Shi'is among Muslims, and Orthodox, Coptic, Maronite, and others among Christians.

As a political system, the empire approached the ancient ideal of the absolute monarchy. Some historians argue that this ideal is partly derived from a Persian theory of kingship and partly from Plato's model of the philosopher king, a king who stands apart from his subjects and keeps each subject in his proper place as determined by his ability so as to enable him to live in harmony and contribute to the good of society at large.¹² Others assert that the ideal incorporated a "monolithic military form" allied to the 'ulama (1517-1718); powerful provincial governors and local groups in the eighteenth century and roughly the first half of the nineteenth century; and again a despotic sultan in the person of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), who ruled through a centralized and modern police apparatus, the ideology of pan-Islamism, and modern forms of communication.¹³

From the standpoint of both perspectives, final power rested generally in the hands of the monarch or the Ottoman sultan. As the wielder of power and the instrument of social order, the sultan commanded the loyalty of all his subjects, at least until the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Since the Ottoman Empire was a family state ruled by the descendants of Osman, the family as a whole claimed sovereignty.¹⁴ As for statecraft, it possessed two sanctions: the authority of the sultan who was Sunni Muslim and the *shari'a* (Islamic law).¹⁵ The 'ulama, who were under the control of the state, brought the *shari'a* into the center of government life.¹⁶ The *shari'a* was the base upon which the political and social superstructure of the state was built. The state, which the Ottomans ruled for a period of

about six centuries, was Turkish. The Ottomans claimed descent from the Seljuq dynasties whose rule extended at their heyday over large portions of western and central Asia from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Turkish was the language of government institutions. It was also a requisite for entering the Ottoman bureaucracy.¹⁷

By making Turkish the official language of the empire, the Ottomans helped preserve the Turkish character of their state. In this they were different from other Turkic dynasties that preceded them, such as the Seljuqs who used Persian and the Mamluks who used Arabic. Until the last ten years of the empire, the Ottoman state was not Turkish in an exclusive racial sense. It was rather Turkish in a linguistic and cultural sense. As one historian has explained, an Ottoman subject who spoke Turkish did not necessarily identify himself as a Turk. He was rather an Ottoman subject, even though he would racially be Greek, Serb, Bulgar, Rumanian, Turk, Arab, Kurd, or Armenian.¹⁸

If we look at the Ottoman state in the light of these characteristics, as a Turkish-Islamic empire that included different religious and ethnic groups, we shall find that loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland had to be maintained to prevent the disintegration of the empire. Loyalty could be preserved until westernization began to infiltrate the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century.

Salim III (1789-1807), who is considered to be the father of westernization in the Ottoman state, was interested in the various aspects of Western civilization, notably the military, administration, and technological advances. Salim III introduced into the empire European weapons, sciences, uniforms, and training procedures. Even though his main motive for reform was the containment of the Russians who were threatening Istanbul after their conquest of the land north of the Black Sea, he created in Ottoman society what one historian called "a sense of the necessity for rapid and progressive change."¹⁹ The process of westernization initiated by Salim was continued by Sultan Mahmud III (1809-1839), Sultan 'Abdulmajid (1839-

1861), Sultan 'Abdul 'Aziz (1861-1876), and Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909).

Insofar as the unity of the empire was concerned, the most challenging aspect of westernization was the advent, in the first half of the nineteenth century, of such new European concepts as nation, homeland, freedom, and equality. Through commerce, Ottoman ambassadors abroad, students studying in Europe, European instructors teaching in Ottoman schools, these concepts were picked up not only by some members of the religious and ethnic groups that comprised the empire, but also by certain members of the Ottoman elite.²⁰

During the early part of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had to face the Serbian revolt (1815-1817), the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830), and the wars of Muhammad 'Ali (1832-1848), the rebellious ruler of Egypt who marched up to Anatolia, overrunning Syria and Palestine. In the latter part of the century and thereafter, the empire had to cope with many uprisings, including the Armenian uprising (1894), the Cretan revolt (1896-1897), the Albanian revolt (1910), and the Arab revolt (1916).²¹

If we look at the relations between the Arabs and their Ottoman rulers, we find them to be complex and distinctive. In the first place, the great majority of Arabs were Muslims, and in theory at least, all Muslims were entitled to the highest offices of the Islamic state. In practice, however, very few Arabs became provincial governors or ambassadors, let alone ministers or grand viziers. Arabs hailing from ancient notable families could be found occupying posts in the religious hierarchy, or working as bureaucrats in the administrative or fiscal system, or in extremely rare cases in the household of the sultan, such as Fakhr al-Din, the prince of Lebanon, in the seventeenth century.²²

Although some of the posts held by Arabs in the Ottoman service were senior, these posts did not carry direct executive power. In a society which was divided into two major classes, *'asakir* (literally the "military," but in prac-

tice officers, civil servants, and 'ulama who exercised religious or political power), and *ra'aya* (all other Muslim and non-Muslim subjects),²³ the *ra'aya* were not allowed to exercise direct political power. By and large, this power was the exclusive prerogative of Ottoman Turkish rulers.

This system allowed the Arab notables or *a'yan* to fit into the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy, not as sovereign actors, but as intermediaries between the official household of the palace and the society of their local city or district. A post in the imperial bureaucracy usually fulfilled a major purpose for both the sultan and the notables. As for the sultan, it helped maintain loyalty to his person and to the larger framework of the Ottoman state; and for the notables it helped them preserve and expand their position of local dominance.

Second, the Ottoman occupation of Egypt, Syria, the Hijaz, and Iraq between 1516 and 1638 brought the Ottomans into direct contact with the Islamic heartland, and made them the rulers and protectors of the holy cities of Islam, including Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem, Najaf, and Karbala. By expanding into these Arab lands, the Ottomans also took control of the pilgrimage routes.

The Significance of Palestine

Palestine was high on the list of Ottoman priorities. So was Syria and the Hijaz. Several factors accounted for the critical significance of these territories. On the one hand, the legitimacy of Ottoman authority was, in Muslim eyes, bound up with the sultan's control of the Islamic holy cities and the routes of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

The cities of Jerusalem, Damascus, and Mecca were important religious centers. Jerusalem's sanctity in Islam as the site of Muhammad's ascent to Heaven and the city which

houses the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque made the city the focus of every Muslim leader. Damascus was the place through which Muslims from the north and east passed to make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The Hijaz was the birthplace of Islam and had the holy cities of Mecca and Madina.

Hence the control of Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz meant the control of the nerve centers of the Muslim world, and no Ottoman sultan would have legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslims without exercising authority over these cities. Here it is pertinent to note that from a religious standpoint, Palestine was more important than Damascus and Aleppo due to its sanctity and to the special relationship that Muslims expressed to it in the form of mosques, pilgrimages (*ziyarat*), academics, and a variety of Islamic pious foundations.²⁴

On the other hand, the cities of Palestine and Syria, especially Damascus and Aleppo, were important sources of tax revenue for the Ottoman government. They were also of great commercial significance. In addition to their trade with Europe, Damascus and Aleppo derived their commercial wealth from pilgrimage and from their trade with Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Persia, and the Gulf. Palestine also had trade connections with Europe and with the markets of Egypt, Lebanon, and other neighboring countries. In this sense, Syria and Palestine were important for the economic development of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵

It was for these two reasons, particularly the religious one, that the Ottoman government had to impose real authority on Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz. This is the reason why we here find, as one historian has suggested, the politics of notables "in their purest form." Unlike North Africa where local forces took over the government and chose their successors, and unlike Egypt where local leaders such as Muhammad 'Ali could put the country on the path of independence from the Ottoman state, decisive authority was not allowed to fall in the hands of any local group in Palestine, Syria, or the Hijaz.²⁶

Whenever a local family or group tried to assert its inde-

pendence, as was the case with the 'Azm family in Damascus and Hama in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman government stepped in to impose its control, either militarily, or by pitting one local leader against another, or through co-optation: a top provincial or imperial post was always an attraction to members of locally dominant families.

This explains the role of notables as brokers for the government and the urban population which they lead. It also provides a context for understanding the ideologies of Ottomanism and Arabism. It was largely against the background of the rivalry between and within urban notable families, and the interference of the Ottoman government in the politics of these families to maintain loyalty for the sultan, that the aforesaid ideologies fought out their battle for political dominance in the early part of the twentieth century.

Land Tenure

Between 1839 and 1876, the Ottoman government launched a sustained program of reform (Tanzimat) that encompassed the main branches of government, including the administration of justice, finance, and security. The aim of the program was to centralize the various instruments of government, differentiate their functions on the basis of rational principles of justice, and apply these principles equally to all Ottoman citizens.²⁷

Insofar as they were applied, the reforms could not be implemented completely. In Istanbul, Cairo, and the provinces of Arab Asia, the real purpose of the reforms was frustrated by such factors as the rise of Muhammad 'Ali as an absolute ruler in Egypt, with a Mamluk household around him; the absence of a political community sufficiently consolidated to support and promote reform; and the cumbersome nature of the Ottoman central government which failed to take local needs into account, thus nourishing undercurrents of resentment in local society.²⁸

For our purposes, two reform laws are of special significance. The first was the Land Law of 1858. This law aimed at enabling the Ottoman government to assume control over state land and check the growth of large private-land ownership. By so doing, the government hoped to achieve two things: a) raise more revenues for the treasury, primarily through direct tax yields and through the disposal of state land and the successful collection of taxes on title deeds;²⁹ b) repay to the European powers at least part of the debts it had incurred as a result of the Tanzimat.

However, the real aim of the Land Law was deflected because it was predicated on two false assumptions: that the *fallahin* (agricultural laborers) would register their land and keep it, and that the land registry would be effective and impartial.³⁰ Paradoxically, the opposite took place. Fearful that the registration of their land would burden them with conscription and additional taxes, the *fallahin* registered their title deeds in the names of deceased relatives and wealthy urban and rural families. Moreover, the absence of a sufficient number of officials trained for the enforcement of the Land Law, coupled with the local dominance of corrupt administrators, made land registration and the implementation of the law very difficult.³¹ The result of this has often been described: land was accumulated in the hands of a few wealthy urban notables with government confirmation, while the *fallahin* lost their right to ownership and became sharecroppers or hired laborers.³² Through their wealth the urban notables could secure for themselves and their relatives senior posts in the local administration and in the central government.

The second reform edict was the Wilayat Law of 1864. Although this law aimed at correcting the abuses in the tax collection system by shifting the function of tax collection from rural *shaykhs* (local chieftains) to more powerful urban notables, it simply perpetuated the abuses and led to the predominance of tax-farming townsmen at the expense of the rural tax collectors.

This development is attributed to the very nature of the

role and composition of the *majalis al-idara* or local administrative councils, which the Ottoman authorities set up to help govern the cities and implement the Land Law of 1858. A critical feature of these *majalis* was the confinement of their membership to candidates who paid a direct tax of no less than 500 piasters (5 English pounds) per year. As a result of this restriction, the majority of village dwellers would not participate in *majalis al-idara* because of the harshness of their economic condition, thus leaving the management of their internal affairs in the hands of a rising group of wealthy urban notables. Through their participation in the local administrative councils, these townsmen "authorized the assessment and collection of taxes, approved land registration, decided questions of landownership, and expressed influential opinions about the ultimate fate of lands that reverted to the state."³³

Moreover, with the introduction of new legal codes and new taxing procedures, the government needed the notables to act both as helpers for the local Ottoman governors, and as intermediaries between the central government and the local population. As Hourani has explained, the Tanzimat made the notables more important for the government because a local governor could scarcely hope to apply the new reforming policy in a city about which he knew very little and in which the reforms would arouse opposition. Having no organized police force or armed forces, he could only rule with the help of local notables who knew the local population and had credit with it. In addition to that, the local population sought the intervention of the notables in matters of conscription, taxes, and their other dealings with the government.³⁴

This consolidated the control of the notables over the city, and even made them patrons of villages. Gradually, the urban notables formed alliances with country notables to strengthen their local position and expand their network of friends and supporters. Thus the notables could maintain their local predominance, even toward the end of the nineteenth century when the control of the central government became much

more efficient. They were able to do that by virtue of their locally based power and by securing high administrative posts in the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy.

Dominant Social Groups

In our present context, we are especially interested in one particular aspect of the growth of large private-land ownership. It is the question of who had the means to appropriate the land. Answering this question will shed light on the bases of social stratification in Ottoman Palestine.

In the period under survey, Palestinian society may be said to have been roughly divided into three major groups: the urban notable families, the commercial bourgeoisie, and the foreign colonists. The following analysis will not provide an exhaustive list of the members of each group in each Palestinian town, rather only a representative list of particular dominant families in certain towns, particularly Jerusalem and Nablus which later became the center of Palestinian Arab politics.

URBAN NOTABLE FAMILIES

One of the main beneficiaries of the Tanzimat laws was a group of individuals and influential family chiefs who had assumed local jurisdiction through wealth and political dominance. It must be noted that many members of this class had acquired in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries title deeds to land given up by the *fallahin* under duress in agricultural areas. In order to pay taxes to the government, many *fallahin* were forced to borrow money, until in the end the burden of tax and debts compelled them to sell their land to wealthy urban notables, usually remaining on the land and continuing to cultivate it with the obligation to hand over to the new owners a fixed percentage of the produce.

Additionally, the bankruptcy of the *fallahin* had frequently led them to borrow money from the notables in the towns. Unable to repay the usurious interest imposed on the loan—an interest which ranged from 10 percent to 50 percent annually—the *fallah* (singular of *fallahin*) was left with no option but to surrender his land to the money-lending notable in return for the outstanding loan.³⁵

In terms of the size of their landholdings and wealth, Palestinian notable families were not equal. Nor were they equal in terms of their social standing because, as we shall see below, ascribed social status was in some instances as important a basis of stratification as the accumulation of property and riches. Even though exact data on capital and property holdings are scarce, owing to the lack of a proper register and reliable evidence of ownership, it is possible to use available sources to study certain families that were socially dominant, keeping in mind that property was not the only basis for their social standing. Of course, this should not take away from the importance of land ownership as a basis for social power, especially if we take into account that 250 Arab families in Palestine owned about 4,143,000 dunums. This figure, which means an average of 16,500 dunums per family, is equivalent to nearly all the land owned by the Arab peasants in Palestine. It is important to note here that 3.13 million of those dunums belonged to large estate owners, that is an average of 22,000 dunums for each family.

The extent of the wealth of these families may be seen from the list below provided by Granott:³⁶

<i>Area</i>	<i>Number of Owners</i>	<i>Dunums in Their Possession</i>
Jerusalem and Hebron	26	240,000
Jaffa	45	162,000
Nablus and Tulkarm	5	121,000
Janen	6	114,000
Haifa	15	141,000
Nazareth	8	123,000
Acre	5	157,000
Tiberias	6	73,000

In Jerusalem, the family of al-Khalidi represented one of the oldest and most prominent families. Its members claim their descent from Khalid ibn al-Walid, the famous Muslim commander who conquered Syria in A.D. 636. The Khalidis could not be said to have been especially wealthy landowners. Strictly speaking, their status grew, to a large extent, out of their religious and educational standing. Over the centuries many members of the Khalidi family held senior governmental and religious positions.⁵⁷ In the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, the family had several distinguished religious scholars, or 'ulama, notably Ruhi al-Khalidi (1861-1913), who was elected from Jerusalem to the Ottoman parliament in 1908 and 1912, and served as vice-president of the parliament in 1911; al-Shaykh Khalil al-Khalidi (1863-1941) who was appointed president of the Shari'a Court of Appeal, and al-Shaykh Raghīb al-Khalidi, who in 1900 founded the al-Khalidiyya Library which houses a large collection of medieval Arab manuscripts in Bab al-Silsila in the Old City of Jerusalem.⁵⁸

The family also boasted many intellectuals and professionals. Among them were Jamil al-Khalidi (1876-1952), who participated in 1909 in the establishment of al-Dusturiyya School (Constitutional School) in Jerusalem. Founded and headed by the Christian Orthodox scholar Khalil al-Sakakini, the Dusturiyya School offered a secular curriculum and served as an example for private Palestinian Arab schools. Also prominent among members of the Khalidi family were Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi (1896-1951), who was a chemist and educator, and Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi (1893-1966), who was a physician.⁵⁹

Another Jerusalem family of ancient origins was the Nusayba family, which relates itself to a woman called Nusayba. According to Muslim tradition, Nusayba went to the Prophet with a delegation of women and complained to him about the unfair treatment they received. Since the Islamic conquest of Jerusalem in the seventh century, the

Nusayba family has been the keyholder of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. This arrangement was worked out in the days of the second Muslim Caliph 'Umar to avoid clashes among the rival Christian denominations over the control of the church.⁴⁰

A third notable family was the Nashashibi family, which established itself in Jerusalem in the fifteenth century. This wealthy landowning family, alleged to be of Circassian or Kurdish origin, owed its status in late Ottoman times to 'Uthman al-Nashashibi, a landowner who was elected to the Ottoman parliament in 1912, and Raghib al-Nashashibi, who was chief engineer of the Jerusalem district, and a member of the Ottoman parliament in 1914.⁴¹ Raghib, who later became head of the Nashashibi family, studied in Turkish schools and served as an Ottoman officer during World War I.⁴² Another distinguished member of this family was 'Is'af al-Nashashibi (1882-1948), a writer described as an "Arabic dictionary that walks on two feet."⁴³ 'Is'af was such a master of Arabic language and style that he won literary recognition on a pan-Arab level. The Nashashibi family possessed large areas of land in the vicinity of Jerusalem, as well as in Gaza, Jaffa, and Transjordan.⁴⁴

A fourth prominent Jerusalem family was the Husayni family. The Husaynis regarded themselves as *ashraf*, that is they traced their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. According to one source based on the family tree, the Husaynis moved to Jerusalem through Muhammad al-Badri in 1380.⁴⁵ Another source states that the Husaynis are mentioned in thirteenth-century Jerusalem chronicles which refer to the family's renting of the Sharafat lands in Jerusalem. There are also those who claim that the Husaynis settled in the vicinity of Jerusalem during or after the sixteenth century and resided in the village of Dayr Sudan, after which they were called "al-Aswad" (the Black). According to this tradition, the family changed its name to al-Husayni about 300 years later.⁴⁶ By the late nineteenth

century, the family became extremely wealthy and owned vast tracts of land which amounted to about 50,000 dunums, including extensive areas and plantations in Jericho district.⁴⁷

Members of the Husayni family held senior posts in the Ottoman administration. They were custodians of al-Nabi Musa (the Prophet Moses) shrines, delegates to the Ottoman parliament, administrators in the central government in Istanbul, mayors of Jerusalem, and muftis (Muslim scholars who pass legal opinion) of the town from the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1880s, shortly after a municipality was set up in Jerusalem, Salim al-Husayni became mayor. Likewise, his two sons, Husayn and Musa Kazim Pasha, also became mayors in the second decade of the twentieth century.⁴⁸

Among the other prominent families of Jerusalem were the families of al-'Alami and al-Dajani. These too boasted religious scholars, intellectuals, and public officials. Faydi al-'Alami, for example, served as mayor of Jerusalem between 1906 and 1909. He also served as Jerusalem representative in the Ottoman parliament from 1914 to 1918. As a scholar, he published a concordance of the Holy Quran. 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani was a mayor of Jerusalem during World War I, and after the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire, he played a prominent role in Palestinian Arab politics until his death in 1930.⁴⁹

By virtue of their positions and wealth, the Jerusalem families wielded a high level of political power. James Finn, the British consul who lived and traveled in Palestine from the mid-1840s to the early 1860s, built political alliances with them on the assumption that their local power would be of help to the British consulate and that favors given would be returned.⁵⁰

In Mount Nablus, ancient and notable families also enjoyed a dominant social status. These families included the Tuqans, the 'Abd al-Hadis, the Barqawis, the Jarrars, the Nimrs, the al-Qasims, and others. To illustrate the influence of the families, I shall concern myself with two of them, namely, the families of Tuqan and 'Abd al-Hadi.

Members of the Tuqan family trace their descent to an ancient tribe in the Arabian Peninsula. For many centuries, the Tuqans settled in Transjordan, mostly in Ma'an and Ghawr Dama, and migrated to Nablus in the course of the twelfth century.⁵¹ Over the years, the Tuqans established a network of rulers and pashas through whom they became influential in many parts of Nablus district. Together with the landowning families of al-Jarrar and al-Rayyan, they formed the Qaysi federation, while the families of al-Nimr, Qasim, and 'Abd al-Hadi belonged to the Yamani federation. Both federations, it must be noted, had their roots in northern or southern Arabia during the Arab waves of migration to Syria after the Islamic conquest in the seventh century. Up to the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman government reasserted its authority over the Syrian provinces, the Palestinian families of the hills of Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron, were split into shifting Qaysi and Yamani alliances that were engaged in constant struggle and warfare.⁵² As we shall see below, the camps of Qays and Yaman remained a focus of political alignment up to the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The wealth of the Tuqan family, which headed the Qaysi camp in Nablus, was impressive. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, one of the most imposing features of Nablus was the Tuqan Palace. This huge building, which was compared by European travelers to the medieval Italian family palaces, could house 1,000 soldiers.⁵³ In his unpublished autobiography Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, a member of a middle-class Nablus family, describes in detail the solidly built and picturesque houses of the prosperous Nablus families. Some of these houses or fortresses, like the Tuqan Palace, comprised an area of 2,500 square meters. They had at their entrance an open square surrounded by stables and suites for the servants. They also had huge pools, verdure, shade, and water everywhere. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of these houses was their iron gates which used to be shut in periods of local strife.⁵⁴

The 'Abd al-Hadi family also claims to be a descendant

of an ancient Arab tribe. Some of its members even claim that Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, the Muslim leader who liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187, brought them in the twelfth century to the village of 'Arraba near Jenin.⁵⁵ Over time, 'Arraba became the center for the 'Abd al-Hadi family, and from it the family members moved to Jenin and Nablus, where they became firmly established. The landed property of the family was estimated at 60,000 dunums, principally located in Jenin and 'Affula.⁵⁶

Toward the end of the Ottoman rule in Palestine, one of the most active members of the family was the well-known lawyer 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi. 'Awni was one of the first Palestinians who participated in the early activities of the Arab nationalist movement. He attended the Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913. Later in 1919 he joined the retinue of Amir Faysal, a son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, served as his political adviser, and attended with him the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.⁵⁷

A similar situation prevailed in other Palestinian towns such as Jaffa, Haifa, Ramla, Gaza, Hebron, and Acre where important local positions were held by prominent landowning families. In Jaffa, Palestine's main center for foreign trade during the period under survey, the families of al-Sa'id, al-Bitar, al-Dajani, Tayyan, Baydas, and Abu Khadra, were the dominant local force. These families owned among them about 162,000 dunums, and held such important positions as mayors and local muftis.⁵⁸ It is estimated that the Tayyan family possessed about 40,000 dunums, and the Abu Khadra family about 30,000.⁵⁹

In Haifa, which was a major port city, the al-Madi family enjoyed considerable wealth and influence. The Ijzim-Haifa area was the tax-farming territory of this family which managed to dominate the surrounding villages of the area socially, economically, and politically.⁶⁰ Other prominent families included the Greek-Orthodox families of al-Hakim and Nassar, and the Maronite family of al-Bustani.

In Ramla, another town not far from the coast, the al-Taji

and al-Ghusayn families owned estates, houses, citrus orchards, and other property mainly concentrated in the Ramla and Nes Zionah area.⁶¹ The al-Taji family alone, also called al-Faruqi, owned about 50,000 dunums.⁶²

In Gaza, the families of al-Shawwa and al-Husayni owned large estates and exercised great authority and influence in the whole district. The al-Shawwa family, one of the wealthiest and most prominent, concentrated in its hands about 100,000 dunums.⁶³ If one recalls that Gaza was the second largest town in Palestine with an estimated population of 19,000 in 1880 and that a few families nearly monopolized extensive irrigated farm areas and the production of textiles, pottery, and soap, it will be understood how wealthy families became the predominant force in the district.⁶⁴

In Hebron, a town famous for its viticulture and the manufacture of water bags and glass articles,⁶⁵ local power rested mainly in the hands of the family of 'Amr, which had the mainstay of its power in the village of Dura. From there, the 'Amrs spread their influence to Hebron,⁶⁶ and even to Bayt Jibrin, a village situated on the western Hebron mountain slopes. The 'Amr family derived its power from landownership, the manufacture of glass, and sheep and goat breeding.

In Acre, power was mainly concentrated in the hands of the al-Shuqayri family. Al-Shaykh As'ad al-Shuqayri, the most prominent member of this family in the period under survey, was elected from Acre to the Ottoman parliament in 1908 and 1912. A graduate of al-Azhar University in Cairo, he occupied several positions in the Ottoman religious judiciary, including that of mufti (interpreter of religious law) of the Fourth Ottoman army in the Syria-Palestine area during World War I.⁶⁷

Now that we have outlined a representative sample of dominant Arab families in Palestine in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it is of interest to note the impact of their independent power base on their relationship with the Ottoman government and the manner in which they interacted with each other. In other words, were they a cohesive group? Were they an economic class sharing com-

mon interests? Or were they groups competing for local dominance?

In the first place, these dominant families were able, by virtue of their independent power base, to have access to the Ottoman rulers. As such they could represent their society or some segments of it at official Ottoman institutions. The Ottoman rulers, in turn, needed these dominant families, both as instruments through which they could exercise their authority and as representatives through which the demands of Palestinian society could be channeled to the center of government.⁶⁸

One distinctive aspect of local Palestinian politics during this period was a tendency toward coalition formation along urban, rural, and nomadic lines. An examination of the relationships between the dominant urban Palestinian families should demonstrate this point in greater detail. A dominant and confusing aspect of these relationships was the alignments of Qaysi and Yamani coalitions.

The division of the people into Qaysi and Yamani camps goes back to pre-Islamic times when the tribes of the Arabian peninsula used to split into northern (Qaysi) and southern (Yamani) tribes. The expansion of Islam led to the spread of this schism throughout the Middle East, including the Fertile Crescent. Political control of local areas was the main reason underlying the Qaysi-Yamani quarrels. In nineteenth-century Palestine, these quarrels cut across bedouin tribes, as well as rural and urban groups. In some instances in Hebron and Bethlehem, the Qaysi-Yamani quarrels caused the intervention of European consuls and Christian monasteries. The British consul James Finn, for example, intervened on more than one occasion, sometimes at his own initiative, to mediate a Qaysi-Yamani skirmish. The French consuls also intervened and even backed the Latin Christians against the Muslim Abu Ghawsh family in the environs of 'Ayn Karim. Christian monasteries, which sometimes served as

places of refuge for warring factions, often intervened either with the Ottoman authorities on behalf of their community or directly to arrange a truce between the opposing sides.⁶⁹

Jabal Nablus saw, in the nineteenth century, intense struggles among its leading families for local control. The family coalitions, however, were not static, since families tended to change their affiliations subject to their perception of their own interests. Early in the nineteenth century, for example, the Qaysi families of Tuqan and al-Jarrar were engaged against each other in a struggle for dominance in their district. At first, the Yamani family of al-Nimr supported the Tuqans against the Jarrars. The Nimrs, notably Hasan 'Agha (agha=tribal chief) and Musa Bey became related by marriage to the Tuqans, largely for political reasons.⁷⁰ In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the Nimrs struck an alliance with the Jarrars against the Tuqans,⁷¹ only to change their position later and form a camp with the Yamani families of 'Abd al-Hadi and al-Jayyusi against the new Qaysi coalition comprising the families of al-Jarrar, Tuqan, al-Barqawi, and al-Sadiq.⁷²

The main reason for these rifts, which had earlier developed into a large-scale conflict that engulfed Jabal Nablus from 1794-1823 and outright civil war from 1841-1858, was control of the posts of *mutasallim* (civil governor) and shaykh of the *nahiya* (a cluster of villages). Nablus, it must be recalled, was divided into *nawahi* (plural of *nahiya*) which were administered by local shaykhs. If we bear in mind that the Ottoman rulers assigned these posts to members of important local families, and that the main responsibility of whoever became a *mutasallim* or a shaykh of a *nahiya* toward the Ottoman rulers was to ensure public security and raise taxes on time in return for a certain percentage of the tax he collected, we can appreciate why local urban families competed for these positions.⁷³

The Judean hills around Jerusalem, which were also divided into *nahiyas* run by local shaykhs, also witnessed struggles between Qaysi and Yamani coalitions. At the head of the Yamani coalition was the Abu Ghawsh family in the village of Abu Ghawsh, northwest of Jerusalem. This village, which was originally called Qaryat or Hisn al-'Inab, owes its present name to the Abu Ghawsh family, an Egyptian family of Circassian origin which settled in the village in the early days of Ottoman rule. On the other hand, the Qaysi coalition was led by the powerful 'Abd al-Rahman 'Amr, whose stronghold was in Dura, a village near Hebron. The most prominent affiliates of the Qaysi coalition were the Samhan family in Nahiyat Bani Harith, the Lahhams in al-'Arqub, the 'Azzas in Bayt Jibrin, the Barghutis in Nahiyat Bani Zayd, the people of Bayt Jala, and the majority of the people of Ramallah.⁷⁴

In the early 1850s major battles were waged between the two factions in the mountains north and south of Jerusalem. Villages were destroyed, agriculture was disrupted, and the loss of life and property was extensive.⁷⁵ Bedouin tribes were regularly used in these battles.⁷⁶

Security in the Judean hills around Jerusalem began to improve after the Ottoman government dispatched a battalion to Jerusalem in late 1854 and reasserted its authority by breaking the power of the warring local families. Thereafter, these families transferred their rivalries from the battlefield to the *majalis al-idara*. What emerged after this situation was a more powerful and peaceful class of urban notables whom the Ottoman government tried to court in an effort aimed at promoting state authority.

Thus the Qaysi-Yamani dichotomy, once a distinctive trait of peasant and bedouin relations in the Jerusalem area, began to give way to the urban notable who was an arbitrator rather than a participant in the Qaysi-Yamani schism. The role of the *majlis* as a forum for negotiation and conflict resolution among warring parties helped the urban notables who con-

trolled it exercise this function, usually in return for material benefits.⁷⁷

There seems to be no conclusive evidence, therefore, on the basis of which we can classify, like the Palestinian ethnographer Haddad has done, the notables of Jerusalem along Qaysi-Yamani lines, with the Husayni family representing the Yamani and the Khalidi family representing the Qaysi.⁷⁸ Miriam Hoexter has convincingly argued that no source or examples are cited in support of this classification, and that unlike ruralized Nablus and Hebron, urban Jerusalem, whose economy was largely based on pilgrimage and religious crafts, was relatively isolated from its rural hinterland and was therefore unconnected with the Qays-Yaman strife.⁷⁹

This, of course, does not mean that the Jerusalem notables did not engage in competition with each other. The Khalidis competed with the Husaynis who occupied the post of mufti of Jerusalem. Since 1864, when the first municipality was founded in Jerusalem, the Husaynis held the position of mayor, which was briefly taken away from them by Faydi al-'Alami in 1906. The Husaynis, however, became more powerful than the 'Alamis and the Khalidis by virtue of occupying the position of mayor of Jerusalem and other high posts in the local administration and in the central government.

Furthermore, the Husaynis competed with the Nashashibis after 'Uthman al-Nashashibi was elected to the Ottoman parliament in 1912, and after Raghیب al-Nashashibi became chief engineer of the Jerusalem district, and member of the Ottoman parliament in 1914.⁸⁰ As we shall see later, each of the two families established its own political association and forged its own political alliances after the British occupied Palestine in 1917-1918.

A similar situation of family rivalries existed in the towns of Gaza and Jaffa. The Qays-Yaman schism, however, was not as strong an element in these rivalries as it was in Jabal Nablus and the Judean Hills. The reason for this seems to

lie in the fact that the coastal areas were sparsely populated in the nineteenth century and that, as one theory has it, their important families were busier responding to the increased European and local demand for cereals, sesame, and olive oil than they were with settling local political conflicts.⁸¹

Moreover, in contrast to Jabal Nablus and the Judean Hills, there existed in the coastal plain families whose power extended over the entire region. The prestige and power of the prominent coastal families encompassed confined areas. Their rivalries therefore were not centered around regional control, but rather around the important positions of mayor and mufti, and around the purchase or control of agricultural stretches of land. In fact, the works written on local political divisions in Palestine in the nineteenth century do not report the existence in the coastal plains of the schismatic rifts connected with the Qaysi-Yamani coalitions.

From all the foregoing, it should be clear that in the nineteenth century and up to World War I, prominent Palestinian families dominated their local districts. It should be borne in mind that what was a Qaysi-Yamani affiliation in the political consciousness of some segments of the population of Palestine in the first half of the nineteenth century, began to lose its significance in the latter part of the century and thereafter. Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, a well-known Palestinian ethnographer, has even argued that the names Qays and Yaman slipped into oblivion after the conclusion of the civil war in Jabal Nablus in 1858.⁸² And even though these names reemerged locally and regionally after 1858, their effectiveness as a focus of group identification was greatly diminished or lost.⁸³ One observer has suggested that people simply used them because of the lack of local names to show political affiliations.⁸⁴ To reemphasize, what gradually took their place as a focus of political affiliations in the second half of the nineteenth century was a less bellicose and more adaptable system of urban-notable alliances whose dominant

members focused their attention on the expansion of their wealth and power, and later on the struggle against Zionism.

COMMERCIAL BOURGEOISIE

After the Crimean War (1853-1856), and particularly from 1867 onward, Palestine witnessed the slow emergence of what may be called a class of commercial bourgeoisie in the coastal plain and in Jerusalem. To a large degree, this class comprised Palestinian and Lebanese Christians, Jews, and Europeans, who either directly purchased plots of land in the coastal and inland areas or acquired land as a result of peasant poverty and indebtedness.

Schölch, a scholar who examined the socioeconomic development of Palestine during the period 1856-1882, concludes that by the end of the 1870s merchant and banking capital had begun to assert itself in the Palestinian countryside. Using the commercial reports of English, German, Austrian, and French consuls in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre, Schölch points out that German merchants, bankers, and Jewish protégés were heavily involved in twelve cases of property transfer around Jerusalem in the years 1872 and 1873, and that at least two merchants from Acre had acquired land around Tiberias. He also points out, on the basis of German sources, that local Jerusalem businessmen had invested capital in land, and the Jewish, Greek, and Maronite capitalists had purchased the coastal plain around Jaffa.⁸⁵

What contributed to the emergence of this class was the economic growth experienced by Palestine following the Crimean War. This growth had been stimulated by European economic penetration of the southern and eastern Mediterranean periphery, and by the gradual incorporation of the Palestinian economy into the world economic system.⁸⁶ Moreover, the Palestinian economy benefited from the more secure situation that prevailed in the central and northern plains after the Ottoman authori-

ties brought the mountain districts under their control in the late 1850s.

Local and foreign merchants and bankers took advantage of this trend, using their contacts with the Ottoman authorities to expedite land purchases and to play what Owen called the "triple role" of landowners, money-lenders, and tax-farmers.⁸⁷ They also introduced advanced methods of cultivation and busied themselves with crop marketing.

The major crops of Palestine during this period were wheat, barley, dhura (maize), sesame, olive oil, and oranges. Estimates calculated from the annual reports of the German consuls in Haifa/Acre show that all of these articles were exported in increasing quantities through the port of Jaffa between 1874 and 1880.⁸⁸ In addition, evidence for the increase in agricultural production between 1883 and 1913 is manifested in the value of export from Jaffa and Gaza, which constituted the main center for the foreign sale of barley grown in the southern districts. In Jaffa, for instance, foreign exports show a rise from just over £250,000 a year between 1888 and 1892 to nearly £750,000 in 1913.⁸⁹

The next two most important export crops were sesame and olive oil. Together with Ramla and Lydda, Jaffa was a major center of sesame and olive oil production, second only to Nablus. Owing to the rising demand of European soap manufacturers, sesame was grown on the plains of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, and Nablus, and exported to the European markets through the ports of Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre.

The trade in oranges, another crop grown in the large groves around Jaffa, also prospered and expanded. Quoting a British trade report for 1873, Owen showed that a sixth of the crop, estimated at over 33 million oranges worth £25,000, was sold in the local markets, and the rest sold to Egypt and Turkey. By the early 1880's Jaffa had about 800,000 orange trees. By 1908-13, Jaffa oranges constituted about 40 percent of the total foreign sales of Palestine.⁹⁰

Apart from the increased output of the agrarian sector, Palestine also witnessed an increase in industrial production, i.e., factory products and handicrafts. It is estimated that before World War I, there were 1,236 factories and workshops employing a capital of more than £1 million.⁹¹ Of these, about 925, or 75 percent, were owned by Arabs and about 300, or 24 percent, were owned by Jews.⁹² Although it is difficult to define exactly what was meant by factory or workshop, the existence of 1,236 production outlets seems to demonstrate that article-production by machine and by hand, as the First Palestine Industrial Census of 1927-28 indicates, was expanding from the latter part of the nineteenth century up to 1914.⁹³

One reason underlying this industrial upswing was the capital and expertise of the Jewish settlers. The Jewish Agency's Report and General Abstracts of the Censuses of Jewish Agriculture, Industry and Handicrafts, and Labor taken in 1930, estimates Jewish capital investment before 1920 at nearly £400,000.⁹⁴ A large percentage of the Jewish investment in industry must have been in the production of sesame oil, wine, and soap.⁹⁵

Three other activities stand out. One was that of pilgrimage and the sale of devotional articles. In 1899, for instance, 2,300 tourists and 13,400 pilgrims visited Palestine, bringing into the country cash amounts ranging between £60,000 and £80,000.⁹⁶ The second was spinning, weaving, and other allied industries, especially in Safad, Nazareth, Nablus, Beit Jala, Hebron, and Gaza. According to Himadeh, Majdal alone had 500 looms and Gaza had 50.⁹⁷ The third activity was the building boom. In Jerusalem, for example, this boom was encouraged by the funds that came mainly from European countries for the construction of churches, monasteries, hospices, hotels, and consulates. The building activity created jobs for lime-burners and quarry-men, raised the sale of building materials, and introduced European building materials and methods, notably in Jaffa and Jerusalem.⁹⁸

Jaffa, Palestine's main port of entry for pilgrims and foreign trade, had its quay repaired in 1864 to cope with

the upswing in trade and pilgrimage. By 1872, the city also had five soap factories, in addition to facilities for the production, processing, and export of oranges and cotton.⁹⁹

In Bethlehem, apart from agriculture and the building industry, the town increased its output of devotional articles and souvenirs on a significant scale. Nablus, too, continued to prosper as Palestine's most important center for local and regional trade, and to expand its manufacture of soap, oil, and cotton goods.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, Gaza increased its production of cloth, woven linen, pottery, and soap, while Hebron improved its viticulture and sheep and goat breeding.¹⁰¹

As to Acre, its trade and commerce did not develop, even though the city remained an important outlet for the grain produced in Hawran.¹⁰² Safad and Tiberias, on the other hand, witnessed no significant economic development.¹⁰³

In all the foregoing economic areas the new commercial bourgeoisie were the dominant force. In Acre, for instance, such Beirut bourgeois families as Sursuq, Tuwayni, and Huss controlled the cotton and grain trade together with the important export Beirut firms of E. Peyron, Sagraudi, Massauti, and others. In Gaza, two large soap factories were run by the Austrian ex-consular agent Basala and by the Prussian ex-consular agent Madbak, while the third was run by the Muslim merchant Abu Sha'ban.¹⁰⁴ In Nablus, trade and the manufacture of soap, oil, and cotton goods were in the hands of the commercial bourgeois families of al-Shak'a, al-Shakhshir, and others.¹⁰⁵

In Bethlehem, the manufacture of souvenirs and articles of ornament was mainly controlled by such Christian families as Qattan, Hazbun, Qawwas, and Bandak, while in Jerusalem the manufacture of soap was in the hands of Musa al-'Asali, 'Abdullah al-Khalidi, and other notable families.¹⁰⁶ In Jaffa, soap production and the export of oranges belonged to such wealthy families as al-Sa'id,

al-Bitar, al-Dajani, and Abu Khadra, and in Hebron glassware production and sheep breeding were in the hands of the families of 'Amr, al-Tamimi, and Maraqa.¹⁰⁷

FOREIGN SETTLERS AND LEBANESE LANDLORDS

This third class comprised mainly the German Templars, the Jews, and to a lesser degree some businessmen from Beirut.

The Templars, a group of German religious settlers who started coming to Palestine in 1867, represent one of the earliest phases of the European penetration of the country. They founded their first two colonies in Haifa and Jaffa in 1869 and followed them with a colony in Sarona, north of Jaffa, in 1871, Jerusalem (1878), Wilhelma (1902), Galilean Bethlehem (1906), and Waldheim (1907).

The Haifa colony consisted of 350 settlers, including 17 peasants, 12 viticulturists, and 20 craftsmen. The colony was based on the model of Württemberg, the Templars' country of origin. The same applies to the other colonies, all of which served as a model for the European village in Palestine, having chemists, architects, doctors, viticulturists, skilled artisans, in addition to modern agricultural and industrial machines.¹⁰⁸

Besides contributing to the material advance of the towns in which they settled, particularly Haifa, by increasing the number of local skilled urban craftsmen, the Templars provided a successful colonial example to be followed by the foreign Jews whose colonization efforts intensified after the First Aliyah (wave of Jewish immigrants) of 1882.¹⁰⁹ In short, by the 1870s the Templars were able to demonstrate that Palestine could be penetrated through colonies of the European style. Templar colonies were also an evidence of the rapid European expansion into Palestine, and the inflow of larger amounts of European capital into the country.¹¹⁰

The European penetration represented by the Templars gained a regular pace and a greater momentum with waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine from 1882 onward. These

waves opened up opportunities for city-based Jewish bankers, merchants, and land proprietors. Some of the best examples are those of Melville Bergheim, a German protégé in Jerusalem, and the Paris banker Baron Edmund de Rothschild.

According to the estimates of the German consul, the Bergheims had a capital of about 400,000 marks. Melville Bergheim, who founded the first bank in Jerusalem, acquired an estate in 1872 in return for the tax arrears owed by peasants of Abu Shusha, a village southeast of Ramla. Feeling threatened by European landlords, the peasants killed Peter Bergheim in 1884.¹¹¹

Baron Edmund de Rothschild, on the other hand, was involved from 1887 to 1900 in what some writers call "philanthropic" work, that is, providing the Jewish colonies with regular subsidies and directing them toward a specialized form of agriculture concentrating on such crops as grapes, almonds, and fruits.¹¹² It is important to note here that by 1908, there were twenty-six Jewish colonies with 10,000 settlers and 400,000 dunums (about 100,000 acres) of land. By 1914, the number of Jewish settlers rose to 12,000 and the area of colonies to 450,000 dunums.¹¹³ Granott describes the first phase (1882-1908) as the period of the "medium landowners" and of the Jewish "societies for the settlement of Palestine," and refers to the second phase (1908-1914) as the period of Jewish "small landowners" and the "colonization work of the Zionist Organization."¹¹⁴

However, whatever characterization one uses, most of the Jewish colonies were acquired either directly from the Ottoman government or from large estate proprietors. Only a few were purchased from peasant cultivators, in circumstances of peasant bankruptcy and crippling tax arrears. Moreover, the colonized land had been cultivated by peasants who had been either evicted or employed as laborers by the Jewish colonists.¹¹⁵

The non-Palestinian landowners comprised mainly businessmen and bankers from Beirut. The best illustrative example is that of Habib Butros, Niqula Sursuq, and members of

the Tuwayni and Farah families, who purchased from the Ottoman government in 1869 the land of seventeen villages in Marj ibn 'Amir. The Sursuq brothers, Christians from Beirut, had in 1872 about 230,000 dunums and a population of 4,000 peasants in the neighborhood of Nazareth and Marj ibn 'Amir. They bought all this vast area from the Ottoman authorities for as little as £20,000.¹¹⁶ The yield of the land proved to be profitable to the Sursuqs. The peasants cultivated the land for them, paid a tenth of the produce, a fixed amount per dunum, apart from the tithe they paid to the government. In the tradition of large-estate owners, the Sursuqs were also involved in moneylending at high interest rates. Owing to the wretched conditions of the peasants, members of this wealthy Beirut family were able to impose their rate of interest and the loan security they wished.¹¹⁷

Thus in the last fifty years of Ottoman rule Palestine witnessed an upward economic movement that was characteristic of most of the Middle East. This took place within the context of several developments. In the first place, there was the Ottoman government's effort to implement its program of centralization and modernization and gain a firm grip on the Arabic-speaking areas of the empire after the turmoil produced by the ambitious expansions of Muhammad 'Ali.

Second, there was the economic and political impingement of Europe on the Middle East and the drawing of the region into the world economic market in the nineteenth century.

Third, there was the role played by foreigners, including European Jewish immigrants. Although conventional wisdom has it that foreigners were the primary agent of economic change in the Middle East, more recent scholarship attaches greater importance to the role played by indigenous Arab actors who, according to this view, were largely responsible for the expansion of the commercial agricultural sector in Syria in general and Palestine in particular.¹¹⁸

However, despite the fact that there is merit to the view that indigenous Arab agents deserve more credit than has been

given to them in many standard economic writings, most middle-class economic activities were undertaken by foreign nationals. In many instances, these foreign agents provided most of the social overhead capital, either in the form of loans to the Ottoman government or through direct investment in local enterprises, such as the Suez Canal and the Berlin-Baghdad and Syrian railways.¹¹⁹ In addition, the economic upswing in Palestine was mainly confined to the agrarian sector. The development of other sectors of the economy, such as pottery, viticulture, and cotton processing, was not on the same scale as that of agriculture. And even though the economy of the country had gained in momentum and scope, it was not transformed into an economy that relied on new methods and machinery, or that could realistically manufacture new products.

Further, the expansion of some sectors of Palestine's economy in the last decades of Ottoman rule was accompanied by social changes. One such change was the emergence of landowners who possessed large estates, 5,000 Turkish dunums or more, mainly as a result of the Land Law of 1858. As we have seen, these landowners held senior administrative positions and became the leaders of the Palestinian Arabs under the Ottoman regime. The other change was the slow emergence of a small class of commercial bourgeoisie. Because of its passive class feeling, this class allied itself with the local landed elites around whom political coalitions were formed and through whom local demands were articulated and presented to the Ottoman sultan and later to the British authorities.

This was the Ottoman background of Palestine. Even though many Arab historians, mainly for nationalistic reasons, tend to say very little about the Ottoman period, the Ottomans had left a deep imprint on the Arab Middle East and North Africa. Besides providing a distinctive style of politics based on caution and the discreet neutralization of political foes for the purpose of consolidating and expanding political control, the Ottoman dynasty also provided a framework of unity through which

it ruled and defended this portion of Islamic society and civilization. To the maintenance of this framework the Arabs were committed until the last few years of Ottoman rule, and to its system of government the urban notable families of the Syrian provinces were drawn more closely after the initiation of the Tanzimat. It was also within this framework that Arab loyalty to the Ottoman state was maintained, and against the excesses of its Turkification measures immediately before World War I that the ideology of Arab nationalism began to take shape.

2.

Arabism and Ottomanism: The Young Turk Period Before the War, 1908-1914

We have seen how, as a result of the Tanzimat, an ascendant bureaucratic Palestinian class benefited from the modernizing reforms. This class came to identify with Ottomanism and to facilitate the sultan's program of centralization and modernization. The urban notables aligned with Istanbul and used their access to the central government to gain legal rights to private property and to secure office and become the dominant force in local society. Indeed, many notables were content to become an aristocracy of service, accepting directives from the Sublime Porte to retain their posts and maintain their access to the main pole of power in the capital.

With the advent of Abdulhamid II to power, the notables gained their greatest degree of strength. After all, Abdulhamid was hard pressed to tighten his control over the various parts of his empire in the face of the external pressure of the great powers and his fear of internal rebellions and dismemberment.¹

Generally speaking, there are two schools of thought regarding Abdulhamid's record: the traditional and what may

be called the "revisionist." The traditional version, as recounted for example in the works of Zeine Zeine and Wajih Kawtharani, tends to overstress the reactionary and despotic aspects of Abdulhamid's reign, while at the same time failing to point out Abdulhamid's contribution to modernization and reform.² However, a number of "revisionist" historians, including Lewis, Shaw, and Tibawi, have tried to redress the balance by giving more detailed consideration to Abdulhamid's constructive achievements.

From the works of revisionist writers there emerge two aspects of Abdulhamid. On the one hand, there was Abdulhamid the autocratic ruler, who, for the purpose of combating sedition and maintaining the stability of his reign, tried to stifle all opposition, unrestrained by any legal or social checks. On the other hand, there was Abdulhamid the modernizer, whose reign witnessed the construction of new mosques and the repair of old ones, the expansion of the state educational system, the publication of new books on Arabic, Islamic, and modern scientific subjects, as well as the introduction of judicial and legal reforms, the construction of railways and the spread of telegraphic services.³

It would therefore be a mistake to think that Abdulhamid was an ignorant autocrat whose despotism was comprehensive and whose censorship stopped all kinds of progress. Insofar as Abdulhamid was a politician committed to the consolidation of the established political order, he had, from his point of view, to stop the dissemination of ideas which were likely to undermine the stability of that order. But to the extent that he regarded himself as the guardian of his subjects, information and learning which he thought would not threaten political stability had to be diffused.

It was against this background that Abdulhamid actively pursued modernization and reform, especially in the fields of education and communication. Syria's share of Abdulhamid's reforms was, particularly in the field of

education, quite significant. Motivated by political and religious considerations, the sultan established modern government schools in the major Syrian cities. Moreover, he established a number of technical schools, placed private schools under official supervision, and encouraged the enrollment of Syrian students in Istanbul's high schools, particularly the Mulkiyya high school for administrative training and the Harbiyya high school for military training.⁴

Taken as a whole, the facts concerning Abdulhamid's record depict a sultan who was hostile to liberalism and to political opposition, but was at the same time an advocate of reform. It is true, as one historian has observed, that his elaborate network of spies served to "create, maintain, and legitimize the psychological atmosphere of the time."⁵ But it is also true, as another historian has noted, that in the early years of the reign of Abdulhamid the "whole movement of the Tanzimat—of legal, administrative, and educational reform—reached its fruition and its climax."⁶

As for the Arabs, Abdulhamid's fear of an Arab rebellion made him woo Arab notables in Syria and Palestine through expensive gifts and high posts in the bureaucracy and army. He also surrounded himself with an aristocracy of religious dignitaries whose main function was to symbolize the link between himself and his Muslim *umma*. One need not emphasize the importance of this function in a period characterized by the prevalence of traditional Muslim puritanism and outward religiosity.⁷

One of the earliest Syrian Arabs to win the confidence of Abdulhamid was al-Shaykh Abu al-Huda, an Aleppine sufi who regarded the sultan not only as a legitimate caliph (successor), but also as God's vice-regent on earth. Another Syrian Arab to appear on the scene and to exercise influence over the sultan was Ahmad 'Izzat Pasha al - 'Abid. While Abu al - Huda extended religious support to the sultan, al - 'Abid played a role in the Hijaz railway project, which was undertaken with Muslim monetary contributions in 1908.⁸

Through their relatives and friends, Abu al-Huda and al-Abid rallied influential religious leaders behind the sultan's claim to the caliphate and his ideology of Islamism. This popular ideology, which called for a return to the values and traditions of Islam, was used by Abdulhamid as a weapon to fight his opponents at home and abroad, and to counter the imperialism of Britain, Russia, and France. Despite the opposition to his autocratic rule, Abdulhamid was successful in his pan-Islamic endeavor. As a sultan-caliph, he was highly regarded by the mass of his subjects. The ideology of Islamism which he propagated, together with the accompanying threat that any outside aggression against the Ottoman Empire might lead to a united Muslim uprising against the aggressor, intimidated the Western powers who took it very seriously. As one historian has suggested, the fact that the imperialist powers shifted their rivalries from the military to the economic sphere in the latter part of Abdulhamid's reign can be attributed "at least partly" to Abdulhamid's successful use of Islam as a weapon to fight foreign aggressors.⁹

Syrian Christians were also brought in to serve in high positions of government especially in the ministries of foreign affairs, agriculture, and public affairs. The secret police was, for example, entrusted to a Maronite who publicly held a junior government post.¹⁰ The enlistment of Christians fitted well with Abdulhamid's policy of securing the loyalty of Arabs, and to projecting the image that his regime did not discriminate against its Christian subjects.

Nor were the Syrians the only men in the service of the sultan. Some Palestinian notables, even though they did not become ministers or commanders-in-chief in Abdulhamid's government, did occupy important positions in the army and administration of their districts and even outside their own areas. To cite a few examples: 'Abd al-Latif Salah of Nablus was first secretary of the senate; Ahmad Hilmi 'Abd al-Baqi, a Nablusite of Lebanese origin, was appointed director general of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank in Syria and Iraq; Yusuf Diya Pasha al-Khalidi of Jerusalem was an Ottoman vice-consul at

the Russian Black Sea port of Poti, a deputy in the first Ottoman Parliament (1877-1878), and president of the Jerusalem Municipal Council;¹¹ Mustafa al-Khalidi, also of Jerusalem, served as chief of the Beirut police, chief prosecutor and then judge of Beirut's Court of Appeal; As 'ad al-Shuqayri of Acre was a member of the Shari 'a Inquiries Court at Istanbul, and was appointed mufti of the Fourth Army which fought on the Egyptian-Palestinian front in World War I; and Musa Kazim al-Husayni served as district governor of Yemen.¹² With the reinstatement of the Constitution and the establishment of the new parliament in 1908, the Palestinian notables were able to enhance their position and acquire an added degree of political power. Indeed, one of the three vice-presidents of the new parliament was Ruhi 'Abd al-Hadi of Nablus.¹³

Of particular interest was the case of Nablus. Ihsan al-Nimr, a contemporary Palestinian historian from Nablus, describes how Abdulhamid extended his protection to members of leading Nablusite families. Al-Shaykh Amin Efendi Abu al-Huda, a Nablusite orator, was invited to Istanbul where he spent one year as special guest of the sultan. Mahmud Bey al-Sayrisi, Hamid Bey Islim, and Yasin Bey al-Faris al-Talluzi, all three being Nablusite officers, served as bodyguards for Abdulhamid. Al-Talluzi was even sent as emissary of the sultan to the emperors of Ethiopia and Germany.¹⁴

Moreover, Hafiz Tuqan served as member of the local agricultural bank and the finance commission in 1893; 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim was a member of the local education committee of the Bani Sa 'b (Tulkarm) *qada* in 1900, and of the local *majlis al-idara* in 1908. In Jenin, Sa 'id Mansur was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and the Land Commission in 1893, and in 1900 he served as member of the local education committee, and as president of the Chamber of Commerce; in 1908, al-Hajj Mahmud Mansur served as an elected member of the *majlis al-idara* and served at the same time on the Commission for Procurement of Military Transportation.¹⁵ As a consequence, these Nablusites acted as spokesman and pro-

pagandists for the sultan, trying to make people believe that Abdulhamid had almost supernatural powers.¹⁶

Of course, as far as Nablus was concerned, the Ottoman sultan had other reasons for adopting such a policy, foremost among which was the fact that Nablus had a homogeneous population and was, therefore, less open to foreign cultural influence than other Palestinian towns, such as Jerusalem, which had a large number of Jews and Christians. Because of this, Nablus was, from the sultan's point of view, a better representative of the religious affinity that tied the Arabs to the Ottoman state, and an instrument that could be used more successfully to promote his stated policy of pan-Islamism. Hence Abdulhamid also encouraged local industries in Nablus and granted scholarships to members of its leading families to study in Istanbul to prepare them for senior positions within the bureaucracy. Besides enhancing the political and social influence of the notables of Nablus, this policy prepared the town to play a cultural role that was disproportionate to the size of its population in later years.¹⁷

Likewise, the grand vezir of the Ottoman Empire, Midhat Pasha (1872, 1876-1877), favored members of the Khalidi family, such as Yasin al-Khalidi, who was appointed judge at the Shari 'a Court in Nablus when Midhat became *wali* of Syria in 1878. Other members of the family, such as 'Abd al-Rahman al-Khalidi, made frequent visits to Istanbul where some of their young sons were given special educational awards by Shaykh al-Islam (grand mufti).¹⁸

In Palestine and in other Arab lands there were, of course, those who criticized Abdulhamid's authoritarian rule. Yusuf Diya Pasha al-Khalidi delivered speeches in the Ottoman parliament in which he expressed his liberal views against censorship laws and unconstitutional government. As a result of this, he was dismissed from Istanbul in 1878 and went to Europe where he wrote articles criticizing the sultan's autocracy.¹⁹

Other rebellious voices were raised in Cairo, notably 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi of Aleppo and Muhammad

Rashid Rida of Tripoli. Both al-Kawakibi and Rida deplored 'Abdulhamid's disregard of *shura*, or Islamic government by consultation. Al-Kawakibi, who was of Kurdish origin, openly stated that the caliphate belonged to the Arabs and that an Arab of the line of the tribe of Quraysh should have religious authority throughout the world of Islam and temporal authority in the Hijaz.²⁰

There was also a significant minority of Christian critics who voiced their opposition to Abdulhamid's autocratic rule. In 1904, Najb 'Azuri, a Syrian Christian who was an Ottoman official in Jerusalem, issued from Paris through his *Ligue de la Patrie Arabe (The League of the Arab Homeland)* manifestos appealing to the Arabs of Syria and Iraq to overthrow the Ottoman sultan. One year later he published in French *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe (The Awakening of the Arab Nation)* in which he asserted that there was an Arab nation which must be independent of the Turks.

Alarmed by Abdulhamid's pan-Islamism and despotism, other Christian intellectuals in Beirut, such as Butrus al-Bustani who founded the Arabic Beirut periodical *al-Jinan* in 1870 and his cousin Sulayman al-Bustani, openly advocated constitutional ideas with a secular bent. They were joined by the Lebanese-owned newspapers of Cairo, *al-Muqattam* and *al-Ahram*, and by Khalil Ghanim, a Beiruti Maronite, who went to Paris and fostered the idea that the "Ottoman nation" had been ruined by tyranny and Islam.²¹

In Syria, however, Abdulhamid's call for pan-Islamism suited the Syrian Muslims. Using the slogan "combat Europe with its own weapon," and fearing that their power base within the state system might diminish, the Syrian Islamic establishment of 'ulama focused on fighting against the secular ideas of the Christian intellectuals, most of whom received their education in Western missionary schools, including the Syrian Protestant College (known as the American University of Beirut after 1919). Such Islamic ideas were received by the majority of Syrians more favorably than any racial or national or secular ideas.²² Hence important landowning and locally

dominant Syrian families, such as al-'Ajlani, al-Jaza 'iri, al-'Azm, and al-Quwwatli, clung to the sultan and subscribed to his policies.

Thus, despite the rumblings and complaints against Abdulhamid's autocracy, there was no widespread and organized attempt by the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere to form an Arab state independent of the Ottoman Empire. What the discontented Muslim intellectuals sought was a return to a pure, unadulterated Islam as a means of strengthening the empire and ridding it of censorship and repression. On the other hand, some Christians of Lebanon wanted secularism, good government, education, unity, and friendship among the different religious communities. Only a few of them, most notably 'Azuri, sought separation from the Ottoman Empire.²³ But since 'Azuri was suspected of being a French agent, his radical ideas may not be regarded as representative of those of his contemporaries who were critical of Abdulhamid.

The Young Turks and the Arab Movement: 1908-1914

About 1889 a group of cadets at a military school in Istanbul set up a secret association whose aim was the restoration of the constitution and parliament. They soon succeeded in attracting Ottoman liberals, in exile and at home, both Turks and non-Turks. By 1906, these moves resulted in the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) — a secret society composed of junior army officers stationed in Salonika, the headquarters of the third army corps.

Gradually, the CUP spread in an organized fashion. Its members, primarily Turkish middle-class men known as the Young Turks, belonged to the newly emerging professional classes of bureaucrats, 'ulama, and soldiers.²⁴ Most of them were self-educated in state schools, and the few well-educated

ones had no experience in administration or government.²⁵ The CUP membership also included certain Armenians, Albanians, Greeks, and Arabs.

Some Syrian Arabs rendered support to the CUP. The support of the Arab general Mahmud Shawkat Pasha strengthened the Salonika branch of the organization. The CUP branch in Damascus, the headquarters of the fifth army corps, also derived strength from the recruitment of local Damascenes, notably Rafiq al-'Azm and Muhammad Kurd 'Ali.²⁶ What encouraged certain Syrian Arabs to join the CUP was its proclaimed goal to ensure equality among all subjects of the empire, and to regenerate the state by restoring the parliament and the constitution of 1876.

But the revolution against Abdulhamid was not proclaimed from the Damascus branch of the CUP. It was rather the CUP leaders in Salonika who proclaimed the revolution. Several factors provoked the showdown. First, the defeat of Czarist Russia, an autocratic power, at the hands of Japan, a constitutional power, lent credence to the notion that democratic institutions augment state power. Second, the 1908 Reval meeting between England and Russia suggested to the critics of Abdulhamid that a serious foreign threat was in the making, and that constitutional reform was a matter of utmost urgency and importance. Third, and perhaps most importantly, strikes and displeasure were rampant among many soldiers whose salaries were in arrears, and whose promotions had been suspended.²⁷

Against this background of financial crisis and growing threats to the empire, mutiny spread among the third army corps in Macedonia in July 1908. Troops sent by Abdulhamid to crush the rebels sided with them instead. Attempts by the sultan to co-opt the dissident officers through promotions and arrears payments were to no avail. The CUP in Salonika came out into the open and demanded the restoration of the constitution. Taking seriously the CUP's threat of an army revolt, Abdulhamid was left with no option but to concede to the demands of

the rebels. On July 23, 1908, he declared that the constitution of 1876 was once again in force and promised elections for a new parliament and the lifting of press censorship.

When, about one year later, Abdulhamid tried to utilize a counterrevolution initiated by conservative Islamic elements who strongly opposed secularism and the influence of minorities and foreign representatives, the CUP held him responsible. On April 27, 1909, the parliament decided that Abdulhamid was an accomplice in the counterrevolution, and that he was responsible for the theft of state funds. The sultan and his family were immediately sent into exile in Salonika. The new sultan and brother of Abdulhamid, Muhammad Rashad, was under the domination of the CUP which now became the real master of the empire.²⁸

Arab Reaction in Palestine

The Young Turk coup evoked no enthusiasm among the leading local politicians in Palestine. Enjoying the fruits of their senior posts under the Hamidian rule, these politicians were unfavorably disposed toward any change which might destabilize the status quo. Drawing on British consular reports, the contemporary historian Elie Kedourie demonstrates how the inhabitants of Palestine at large showed "so little interest" in the reestablishment of the constitution. Indeed, it was the local junior officers who expressed satisfaction and support for the coup, while the traditional social hierarchies were shocked and in many cases "overborne, hustled, insulted, dismissed or even arrested by self-appointed secret committees of generally junior officers and officials, themselves secretly taking their instructions from an extra-legal secret committee sitting in Salonica."²⁹

The "great rejoicing," the "parties, receptions and daily

fêtes" described by Zeine Zeine were instigated by the Young Turk officers and do not seem to have been spontaneous popular reactions.³⁰ In Nablus, for instance, the evidence from Ihsan al-Nimr provides a picture similar to that portrayed by Kedourie. Here, when the *mutasarrif* (district governor) Amin Effendi al-Tarazi, refused to report the news of the reinstatement of the constitution, the Young Turk officers interfered and encouraged the Mayor Muhammad 'Abduh to report the news to the inhabitants of the city.³¹

Al-Nimr further describes how the Nablusites went out to the streets demonstrating against the Young Turks and expressing their support for Sultan Abdulhamid.³² The narrative of al-Nimr is corroborated by Darwaza, who observed the activities of what he calls "reactionary elements" that supported the anti-CUP movement of traditional local leaders, notably al-Hajj Tawfiq Hammad who led the local branch of the Muhammadan Union Society (Jam 'iyyat Ittihad Muhammad) to organize local forces against his opponent 'Abduh. It must be noted that this society, which was officially established on April 5, 1909, was at the time operating through its organ the *Volkan*.³³ It stood for the rule of the Shari'a and was against the constitutional reformism of the CUP. Hammad and his supporters called on the inhabitants of Nablus to remain loyal to the sultan, to support the Shari'a, and to condemn the "heretical" Young Turks.³⁴

This was the immediate reaction of the notables in Palestine. The evidence which exists shows that the same reaction prevailed in the other Arabic-speaking areas of the empire. In Damascus, Baghdad, and Mecca, the people and the traditional local figures were not delighted by the Young Turk coup.³⁵ The local notables were stunned by the news of the coup, and fearing the erosion of their social status and the rupture of social stability by new political challengers, they began to show their opposition to the Young Turks. In Damascus, for instance, the 'ulama were apprehensive of the liberal views of the CUP and thus began to unite against the new revolutionaries.³⁶ The Syrian population in general, especially the in-

terior, had shown no particular enthusiasm for the CUP revolution. Underlying this indifference was the conservative religious feeling of the majority of the Syrians who were sympathetic to Abdulhamid, and who were not particularly excited about liberalism or reform.³⁷

It should be noted, nevertheless, that a number of intellectuals welcomed the restoration of the constitution. Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi, a Jerusalemite who had written a long essay on the coup and the devastating impact of despotism on the Ottoman state, was happy to see the constitution reinstated.³⁸ Khalil al-Sakakini, a Greek Orthodox from Jerusalem, hailed the new development as a major step that would allow him to express himself freely, and to establish a school, a newspaper, and societies for the youth.³⁹ Similarly, certain Muslim and Christian men of letters in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt praised the sultan for "inaugurating an era of liberty, justice, and equality."⁴⁰

The Rise of Political Arabism

Throughout their history, the Arabs had always been conscious of themselves as a distinct ethnic and cultural group. Even before Islam, the tribes the Arabia felt that they shared a kind of ethnic and cultural unity that transcended their political differences. Two factors were at the heart of this feeling: the Arabic language and the belief, real or fictitious, that all Arabs descended from the same origin. As for Arabic, the Arabs had such admiration for literary Arabic expression that Islam made full use of the peculiar structure of the language. The admirable composition of the Quran was considered "miraculous." Modern Arab thinkers, such as Rashid Rida thought that the flourishing of Arabic was a sine qua non for the flourishing of Islamic civilization. No popular expression reflects the importance of Arabic in the psychology of the Arab

better than the old Arabic adage, "jamal al-insan fi fasahat al-lisan" (The beauty of man lies in the eloquence of his tongue).⁴¹

Besides adding people of different ethnic origins to the Arab stock, Islam gave the Arabs a distinguished status. The prophet Muhammad hailed from the high-ranking Arab tribe of Quraysh, the Quran was Arabic, and the Arabs played a critical role in the civilization of Islam.

By virtue of their ethnic feeling, and by virtue of the triumph of Arabic not only as the language of Islam but also as the main vehicle of Islamic civilization in Islam's intellectual golden age, the Arabs maintained their sense of ethnic difference. This was the case despite the fact that all Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, constituted an Islamic *umma* or community that was based upon the Shari' a and developed through divine guidance. In the classical age of Islam, for example, this manifested itself in more than one form, most notably in the current of reaction among the Arabs against the Persianizing movement of al-Shu'ubiyya. Even though the conflict generated by this movement was fought out largely on the pages of the literary and philosophic books, its greater significance lies in the fact that it was an Arab-Persian struggle over political and social dominance.⁴²

After the Ottoman Turks took over and consolidated their position of dominance within the world of Islam, the Arab feeling of distinctness persisted, but it was not so deep as to rupture the common Ottoman bond whose basis was Islam. Until the last few decades of Ottoman rule the focus of Arab political loyalty was the Ottoman house and state. The Arabs felt that they belonged to the larger Muslim Ottoman *umma*. What cemented this *umma* was the identity of faith, or the bond of the common embrace of Islam. The Arabs also felt that they were devoted to the greater purposes of the *umma*, foremost among which was the preservation of the unity of the empire as the surest way for the protection of Islam against Western designs.

Despite the sense of unity, however, differences between Turks and Arabs were gradually growing in the nine-

teenth century. There were, for instance, differences over the caliphate. For a long time, the Ottoman sultans attached relatively little weight to the title of caliph. Their system of government, which has been already sketched, was a sultanate; its basis of legitimacy was the Shari 'a. As the empire continued to disintegrate in the nineteenth century, and as the Ottoman state was hard pressed to rally support from Muslims all over the world as a way of warding off Western threats, the Ottoman sultan began to claim that he was the caliph of Muslims everywhere.⁴³ This claim was opposed by a number of Arab thinkers, most notably Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.

It should be underscored, however, that whatever differences existed between Arabs and Turks, these differences did not lead to "political divorce" (*talaq siyasi*) between the two ethnic groups until the last few years of the Ottoman Empire.

The critical factor that sparked the emergence of Arab nationalism as a movement that sought political and cultural independence for the Arabs was the rise of Turkish nationalism and the Young Turks' policy of imposing the Turkish language and culture on the Arabs. Other factors, such as the spread of the Western European concepts of patriotism and nationalism, came second. Recent research suggests that contrary to the commonly held view, the feeling of ethnic separateness on the part of the inner circle of the Young Turks antedates the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. In their private correspondence in the opening years of the twentieth century, some key members of the CUP used derogatory remarks to describe the Arabs. They referred to them as "the dogs of the Turkish nation" and considered them to be an inferior ethnic group.⁴⁴

After the CUP dominated the political scene following the deposition of Abdulhamid, the Arab-Turkish bond began to dissolve under the stress of the policy of Turkism. One of the most prominent theoreticians of Turkism was the Turkish sociologist and philosopher Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924). Ziya believed that Turkish interests had to be uppermost. Islam had to be Turkified. The Quran had to be taught in Turkish, and the Arabs had to adopt Turkish traditions and rituals.⁴⁵

In launching its campaign of Turkish nationalism, the CUP strove to promote the role of the Turkish language and culture and to give supremacy to the political and economic interests of the Turks. This ultimately resulted in "Turkification," or the emphasis on a Turkish input and the predominance of the Turkish element over the non-Turks.⁴⁶ One of the most serious results of this policy was the deterioration of the relations between Turks and Arabs, who together formed the backbone of the empire.

Once in power, the CUP sought to make a break with the Hamidian political order. Besides imposing Turkish in government schools, the courts, and in local government offices, the committee streamlined Abdulhamid's bureaucracy and dismissed many of the Arab notables who joined his administration. The unionist leaders believed that government positions had to be filled by trustworthy men who were closer to the new regime in background and political outlook. From their perspective, the Arab notables of the ancien régime were too close to Abdulhamid, and could not therefore be trusted. Moreover, the strong nationalist trend of the committee dictated the replacement of Arab officials with Turks.

It was only natural therefore that many Arab upperclass members of the Hamidian bureaucracy lost their important posts. In Jabul Nablus, for instance, the CUP detained the *qa'immaqam* (district chief) of Tulkarm, Salih Effendi al-Rikabi, and removed members of the families of Tuqan, Hammad, and 'Abd al-Hadi from their posts and ordered their exile from the district.⁴⁷ As Zeine has noted, the "governing body" was restricted primarily to the Turkish element throughout the empire.⁴⁸ Such a policy caused great disappointment among the Arabs—the notables because they were deprived of their key posts, and the liberal intellectuals because their vision of equal rights and opportunities under a constitutional and representative government was blithely shattered.

Now with the Arab notables streamlined, the intellectuals disenchanting, and the 'ulama fearful of the consequences of reform, certain members of these groups joined Arab op-

position forces which began to appear in the Arab lands. Until the outbreak of the war, however, the main object of these forces was not secession from the empire; it was rather reform, the reinstatement of Arabic in government schools, the courts, and in local administration, as well as Arab autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.

Besides that, the Arabs who were alienated most by the CUP were certain pensioned ex-officials, certain members of the intelligentsia and religious lawyers who viewed CUP secularization as a threat which was gradually eroding the influence they exercised through such important institutions as the Ministry of Justice and the Awqaf, institutions which the CUP filled with Turks at the expense of Arabs.⁴⁹

In Damascus, Hims, Hama, Baghdad, Nablus, Jaffa, and elsewhere in Arab urban and rural areas, the opposition seems to have been concentrated in the Muhammadan Union Societies which were popular in the Arabic-speaking territories. In one dispatch after another, the U.S. and British consuls described the strong undercurrent of Muslim feeling that existed among the Arabs, and how thousands of members, including local notables, had joined these societies.⁵⁰ That religion was such an important vehicle for Arab opposition to the CUP should be of no surprise if we bear in mind that Islam had always played a major role in Ottoman society and had continued since July 1908 to provide the opposition with the largest audience.⁵¹

In addition to their membership in Muhammadan Union Societies, educated young Arabs set up a number of secret and public societies to fight for equal rights in a multinational empire.⁵² Two of them deserve specific mention: al-Fatat, because it had a significant impact on the development of Arab nationalism; and al-Lamarkaziyya (Decentralization Party) because through this society Arab political goals were formally articulated for the first time.

Al-Fatat was formally founded by a group of young Muslim Arabs in the course of their higher studies in Paris in 1911, even though secret preparations for its establishment had

started around two years earlier. Two of its founders were 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi of Jenin and Rafiq al-Tamimi of Nablus.⁵³ It was first called Jam'iyyat al-Natiqin bil-Dad, literally the "society of those who speak the letter *Dad*."⁵⁴ Later on, the society changed its name to Al-Jam'iyya al-'Arabiyya al Fatat (The Young Arab Society).⁵⁵ The main aims of the society were to work for the administrative independence of the Arab lands from Ottoman rule, and to "raise the Arab *umma* (nation) to the level of living nations,"⁵⁶ a reference to Western nations. Contrary to what Antonius says, however, this did not imply the "independence of the Arab countries and their liberation from Turkish or any other alien domination."⁵⁷ What it meant was that the Arab and Turkish nationalities should combine together, each having equal rights and obligations in the Ottoman Empire.

Following the CUP's suppression of Syrian political organizations, particularly the Damascus branch of Al-Lamarkaziyya and the Beirut Reform Society before the war, al-Fatat moved its offices to Beirut late in 1913 and set up a branch in Damascus.⁵⁸ From there it started its clandestine operations calling for the Syrian masses to rebel against their Turkish rulers.⁵⁹ With the war, and as a result of Ottoman repression of Arabs and the execution of Arab nationalists on charges of treasonable activities, *al-Fatat* amended its political program and aimed at working for the complete independence and unity of the Arab lands.⁶⁰

The other society, al-Lamarkaziyya, was founded in Cairo in January 1913 by Syrian notables who were attracted by the sophisticated cultural atmosphere in the Egyptian capital. Its executive committee, based in Cairo, had eight Syrian Muslims, five Christians, and one Druze.⁶¹ In Palestine, the party had branches in Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, and Jaffa.⁶² These branches, however, did not gain widespread support and their membership was to a large degree limited to members of notable families. Among them were Hafiz al-Sa'id, the former deputy for Jaffa, Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi and al-Hajj Hasan Hammad (Nablus), in addition to some

members of an ascendant middle class, such as 'Izzat Darwaza and certain religious figures such as al-Shaykh Nimr al-Dari (also of Nablus).⁶³ The limited influence of al-Lamarkaziyya notwithstanding, prominent personalities of Gaza and Jerusalem also demanded reform along Arab lines.⁶⁴

By 1914, certain Palestinian notables were able to regain important posts by cooperating with the CUP. As we have seen earlier, two important members of the Nashashibi family, 'Uthman and Raghib, were elected to parliament in 1912 and 1914 respectively. Even in Nablus, which had branches for the Decentralization Party, members of such prominent families as Tuqan, Hammad, 'Abd al-Hadi, and al-Nimr were elected to the 1914 Ottoman parliament,⁶⁵ despite the fact that no one hostile to the program of the CUP was to be elected. This was the case in the various Arab provinces. The representation of the Arabs in the Ottoman parliament should be a good demonstration of that. In 1912, the Arabs were represented by 59 deputies. In 1914, however, the Arabs had 84 deputies representing a population of about 5,400,000, while a Turkish population of about 12,500,000 had 144 deputies. By granting these concessions, the CUP hoped to co-opt Arab notables, placate the Arab opposition, and legitimize its policies in Arab eyes.⁶⁶

The program of the Decentralization Party called for administrative decentralization in the Arab provinces, the recognition of Arabic as an official language in provincial business, the appointment of a greater number of local Arab officials, and the granting of wider powers to provincial councils.⁶⁷ These aims faced serious opposition from Syrian notables such as Muhammad Fawzi al-'Azm, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, and Sami Mardam-Bey, all being encouraged by the CUP to attack the Decentralization Party, and all having accused the party of being an agent of European powers.⁶⁸

A number of influential Christian Arabs also gave their support to the CUP. Among them were Ya'qub Sarruf, and Sulayman al-Bustani, the Christian Arab deputy for Beirut. Al-Bustani rejected the Arab claims that the Turks had deprived them of their rights and looked down on their language, while

Sarruf called on the Arabs to help the Turks achieve real Ottoman unity.⁶⁹

In Palestine, As'ad al-Shuqayri, the Acre district deputy in the Ottoman parliament, and Shukri al-Husayni, a high-ranking official in the Ottoman administration, opposed the program of decentralization and defended the CUP. *Filastin*, a bi-weekly Arabic newspaper founded in Jaffa in 1911 by two Christians, 'Isa Daud al-'Isa and Yusuf al-'Isa, also expressed strong opposition to decentralization on the grounds that such a policy would strengthen the local provincial councils at the expense of the empire, and might enable the Zionists to infiltrate Palestine in greater numbers. On the other hand, *al-Karmil*, a weekly Arabic newspaper published in Haifa in 1908 by a Christian called Najib Nassar, viewed with favor the program of decentralization.⁷⁰

Faced with mounting opposition and the rapid growth of Arab demands, the CUP adopted stringent measures that curtailed Arab activities, including those of the Decentralization Party. Thus in 1913 the Arab opposition shifted to Paris where a group of individuals, mostly members of the Decentralization Party, organized an Arab Congress in June 1913, apparently upon the initiative of al-Fatat.⁷¹ Except for two Iraqis, the twenty-five attendants were Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians. They were roughly divided between Christians and Muslims. The participants posited provincial liberty, the administrative autonomy of each Arab province, the adoption of Arabic as an official language, and democracy as the means for correcting the "decay" of the endangered Ottoman Empire.⁷²

Negotiations between the CUP and the congress members ensued after the Paris meeting. The CUP, however, tried to outwit the Arab reformers, first by secretly agreeing to grant reform measures in the Arab provinces, including a greater measure of autonomy and the use of Arabic in elementary and secondary schools, and then by rescinding the offer under the pretense that the president of the Decentralization Party, Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, had disclosed the provisions of the secret agreement. Indeed al-'Azm had committed a serious

blunder by giving the CUP the pretext it needed. Following the disclosure of the agreement by Reuter news agency sometime in July 1913, al-'Azm hastened to reveal its provisions believing the Ottoman government had itself endorsed it and authorized its release to the press.⁷³

Between the breakdown of the negotiations in July 1913 and the outbreak of World War I in November 1914, the CUP was able to split the ranks of the Arab reformers. Salim 'Ali Salam, the most prominent member of the Beirut Reform Society which was linked to the Decentralization Party, quit his society and got elected with unionist support on the CUP ticket as deputy to the Ottoman parliament in April 1914. At first, Salam hesitated to accept the CUP offer to run, but when serious differences over securing a government concession for the Hawla drainage project soured his relations with Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum and Rida Bey al-Sulh, two Beirut members of the society, he agreed to run and got, in addition to his parliamentary seat, a substantial share in the concession. Equally significant was the success of the CUP in securing the defection of 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, the president of the Paris Congress, alongside 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, Muhyi al-Din al-Khatib, and Ahmad al-Kikhya from their reformist comrades in the Congress and Reform Society in return for seats in the Ottoman senate.⁷⁴

Whatever success this CUP policy of co-optation may have had with certain notables of Palestinian and Syrian towns, it could do little to close the widening gap between the policy of Turkification and the Arabist leaning of the estranged Syrian and Palestinian group of reformers. The CUP tactics only served to make the gap more consciously felt, for the cleavage between the CUP and the Arabists went down to the roots. The issue at stake was no superficial matter of literary or bureaucratic modes and policies, but the whole political and cultural orientation of the Ottoman state—whether it was to remain a “universal” empire, holding in one framework of order and Islamic loyalty its various ethnic and religious con-

stituents, or to become a Turkish state in an exclusively racial sense.

The more the CUP promoted its doctrine of Turkism, the more the Arabists became alienated and convinced of the difficulty of achieving any of their demands. By mid-1913, the Arabists had concluded that their fight for decentralization and the language question was futile; the CUP adhered more tenaciously to its program of Turkification, and the Arabs must now seek independence. But such a revolutionary idea could not become widespread among the Arabs in a day, in view of the fact that for centuries their ultimate loyalty belonged to Islam, and their political allegiance to the Islamic *umma* and to the dynastic sovereign of the Islamic state.

Thus the Arab sentiment of nationalism, or political independence from the Ottoman Empire, began to make some headway in the last few years of Ottoman rule. There is nothing to indicate that this sentiment was widespread in Palestine or Syria as some nationalist historians have suggested.⁷⁵ It was rather a minority movement comprising a number of Arab intellectuals and disenchanted individuals who were mainly drawn from upper-class families, as well as a number of Arabic papers as is suggested by the pioneering works of Rashid Khalidi.⁷⁶

Besides coming from a narrow class base, the Arab men who sought independence were weak, conservative, and politically unsophisticated. These factors should help explain why they had been out-manuevered by the CUP in 1913 and 1914, and why they had failed to transform the idea of Arab nationalism into a widespread form of political loyalty and organization during the war. Despite this, however, members of the dissident Arabist group made a significant contribution to the cause of Arab independence. Young, intellectually inclined, and having no vested interest in the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy, they sowed the seeds of a political movement that later fought for complete Arab independence.

On the other hand, many urban notables, who managed

to secure positions of dominance through their local power base and the positions they held in the Ottoman administration, had a large stake in the stability of the Ottoman social order. These men had opted therefore to identify with Ottomanism until the final defeat of the empire in 1918. It was only then that they adopted the idea of Arab nationalism. Their aim was not only the perpetuation of their position of power and influence, but also the promotion of what they perceived to be the national interests of their community.

Two crucial questions are: How did the Palestinian elites react to the idea of Arab nationalism and what role did they play in its creation? What form of political loyalty began to take root in the sentiments of the Arab inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent after the war? Before providing answers to these questions, we have to analyze how the Palestinians reacted to what they considered to be their main enemy, namely Zionism. Since this alien Jewish settler movement threatened the very existence of the Palestinians as a political community, their specific grievances against it provided a focus for their politics before and after the war.

3.

Arab Reactions to Zionism, 1882-1914

The influx of Jewish immigrants into Palestine from 1882 onward had gradual effects on the politics of the Palestinian Arabs and on the broader context of Arab politics. Indeed, it is not possible to analyze the evolution of Palestinian nationalism without understanding Palestinian opposition to Zionism. Moreover, the Palestinian opposition itself cannot be understood outside the context of its interaction with the opposition of political and intellectual forces in the other Arab provinces of the empire.

Before entering into a study of the opposition, one fact must be noted at the outset. The Palestinian Arabs knew of Zionism from 1882, when the advent of Jewish immigrants aroused the fears of Arab peasants who lived near the Jewish colonies, and of Arab city-dwellers, particularly the commercial bourgeoisie in Jerusalem and Jaffa.¹ As the following pages will demonstrate, however, the Arab opposition became an apparent phenomenon in the Arabic-speaking provinces only after the Young Turk coup, as a result of the lifting of press censorship and the freeing of party political activities. This chapter will explore the development and the forces that were involved in it.

Phase One: 1882-1908

Details of Arab reactions to Zionism during this period are hard to document, and the most detailed work on the subject is Mandel's work *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I*. In this phase, the Arab trend opposing Jewish immigration and Zionism was comprised of peasants, urban notables, and intellectuals.

In 1881, the year which witnessed the start of the first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Jews numbered about 24,000 of a population of approximately 500,000. The majority were apolitical religious Jews, who had no affiliation with Zionism. Most of them lived in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safad, and Tiberias. With respect to the Palestinian Arabs, they saw no political threat in the presence of those Jews who were left to exercise autonomous control over their community under the millet system.

However, the Palestinian Arabs began to view the Jews with fear and suspicion after the arrival of politically motivated Jewish immigrants in Palestine in 1882. The Arab fear intensified after the start of the second influx in 1903. The succeeding waves of Jewish immigration more than tripled the Jewish population by 1914 to 84,600.² Yet the more important reason which alarmed the Arabs and ruptured Arab-Jewish tranquility was political Zionism, the ideology espoused by the new immigrants.

Political Zionism was a movement launched in Europe in 1896 by Theodore Herzl, a Hungarian Jew raised in a well-to-do conservative family; its adherents viewed it as a movement of Jewish national restoration in Palestine. They believed that it was rooted in Jewish history, religion, and custom. Many traced its origin to the commandment addressed by God to Abraham to go "unto the land that I will show thee" (Genesis 12:1).

But in addition to this internal, emotional factor which generated support for a Jewish national revival in Palestine,

there were external developments which were perhaps more significant. There was the nationalist ferment which swept the European continent. There was the territorial expansion of the European powers in Asia and Africa, and the competition to divide the shrinking territories of the Sick Man of Europe. Moreover, there was the persistent pressure of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, which had increased as a result of persecution and pogroms in Russia in 1881. There was also the trend of anti-Semitism in Western Europe, especially in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair in France in 1894.³ These factors, notably the external developments, disposed many Jews to adopt Zionism as an expression of their identity, and as the solution that would end their frustrations.

The new immigrants who came to Palestine and settled in agricultural colonies set up in rural areas were motivated by political Zionist objectives, unlike the majority of Jewish city-dwellers who were religiously oriented.

In addition to their political ideology and their settlement in large numbers, many European Jewish newcomers were ignorant of, and insensitive to, Arab ways and local custom in Palestine. For example, after establishing their colonies, they blocked the customary pasture rights to adjacent villages, rounded up trespassing flocks and fined the Arab peasants who owned them, and paid no heed to Ottoman civil law and courts.⁴

Such conduct led to numerous violent encounters between Arabs and Jews, the most serious resulting from quarrels over land questions, or grazing and crop rights. A first major collision took place in 1886 at Petah Tikva, the oldest Jewish colony, originally set up in 1878. When the settlers denied grazing access to the neighboring Muslim village of al-Yahudiyya, the Arab farmers attacked the colony, inflicting considerable damage and killing one Jewish settler and injuring four. Although the denial of grazing access occasioned the collision, the deeper reason was that the Arab peasants felt alienated from the land they had cultivated for centuries. The larger part of Petah Tikva, it should be noted, used to belong to al-

Yahudiyya villagers. However, their ownership was forfeited partly because Arab money lenders had defaulted on their debts, and partly because local officials did not pay land tax for a long period of time. ⁵

Peasant dispossession, as was also evident in Jewish purchases in Tiberias in 1901-1902 and 'Affula in 1910-1911, seems to have been more central to the Palestinian struggle against Zionist colonization than has been suggested in many writings on the subject. A recent attempt to fill this gap has been undertaken by Rashid Khalidi. According to Khalidi, the resistance of Palestinian peasants to Jewish settlers underlines the role of Palestinian peasantry in making the issue of Zionism central to Arab political discourse before 1914. This was particularly true of the 'Affula incident in which an armed clash took place between Palestinian peasants and Jewish settlers of Merhavia in May 1911, after the peasants discovered that the land they cultivated was sold from under their feet by the Sursuqs in Beirut. ⁶

The situation was not much different in the urban areas. The rapidly growing Jewish population of Jerusalem, Jaffa, and the other urban centers from 1881 onward alarmed the local elites, including merchants and craftsmen who felt threatened by Jewish economic competition. In response, on June 24, 1891, the notables of Jerusalem sent a telegram to the grand vizier, asking him to halt Jewish immigration into Palestine, and prohibit the Jewish purchase of land. ⁷

In 1899, Yusuf Dia Pasha al-Khalidi, addressed a carefully worded letter in French to Zadok Kahn, the chief rabbi of France and a friend of Theodor Herzl, in which he pointed out that Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, that it was inhabited by Muslims and Christians, and that its holy places were dear to the hearts of millions of Christians and Muslims around the world. Al-Khalidi also pointed out that, despite Jewish financial power, Palestine could only be acquired by war. Concluding his letter, al-Khalidi called on the Jews to leave Palestine alone "in peace," since the world had enough uninhabited areas in which they could settle and establish a

nation. Such a course, al-Khalidi argued, was in the interest of Jews in Turkey and of the Zionist movement in general.⁸

Despite Arab opposition to the Zionist movement, the Ottoman authorities were not effective in halting land sales and Jewish immigration. Under Sultan Abdulhamid, the Ottoman government was opposed to Jewish settlement in Palestine. Alarmed at a series of revolts in Crete and serious upheavals among the Armenians and in the Hawran and Yemen, the Ottomans did not want to see another wave of nationalism in their discontented empire. Nor could Abdulhamid, as caliph, relinquish to the Jews Palestine, including Jerusalem, one of the holiest cities of Islam.⁹

Yet despite its opposition to Zionism, there was little the Ottoman government could effectively do to stop Jewish settlement in Palestine. There were, first of all, the capitulations, which permitted the Jewish immigrants to seek the protection of their consuls after the expiration of their entry permit. There was the practice of bribery (*bakhshish*) which enabled the Jews to bribe Ottoman officials and stay beyond their allotted time. There was also the Jewish circumvention of Ottoman restrictions. The Jews could, for example, enter Palestine through Egypt and purchase land in the names of established Jews who were already Ottoman citizens.¹⁰

Perhaps the only time that the Ottomans were successful in halting land sales to Jews was under the leadership of the mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Tahir al-Husayni, who headed a local commission set up in Jerusalem in 1897 by local notables to examine land sales to Jews. Under Muhammad Tahir, the commission effectively stopped land sales to Jews in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem for the following few years.¹¹

Jewish immigration and land purchases were not viewed with alarm and apprehension by all Arabs. The editors of *al-Muqtataf*, Ya'qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr, maintained that the Jews would monopolize trade and commerce in Palestine, if their numbers increased. But they believed that the Jews would not devote their efforts to agriculture, because they had never been engaged in farming. As such, Nimr and Sarruf thought

that the Zionist movement would be unsuccessful in Palestine, especially since the Ottoman sultan himself was opposed to its program.¹²

The opinions of Nimr and Sarruf contrasted sharply with those of a prominent Islamic thinker, Muhammad Rashid Rida, a Syrian who, in 1897, emigrated to Egypt where he edited the monthly *al-Manar*. Muhammad Rashid aimed at reviving Islam along orthodox lines. In the footsteps of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, two of the most influential ideologists of pan-Islam and of Islamic reform in the nineteenth century, Rida called for a return to the practices of the *salaf* (ancestors).

It should be noted that al-Afghani believed that Islamic solidarity was more important than national solidarity. As Keddie has cogently remarked, the reform of Islam was, from the perspective of al-Afghani, secondary to the political unity and strength of the Islamic world and to the ending of the encroachment of the Christian world.¹³ On the other hand, 'Abduh espoused the view that the propagation of science and philosophy held the key to the social and political advancement of the Muslims. Al-Afghani and 'Abduh were therefore precursors of Arab nationalism, al-Afghani for stressing solidarity and self-strengthening, and 'Abduh for postulating that science, reason, and other modern virtues contributed to human progress.

Explicit in Rida's thought was a glorification of Arab Islam and a partiality against Ottoman Islam. Although the convictions of Rida were those of a staunch Muslim who would shrink from supporting rebellion within the Islamic *umma*, he enthusiastically supported the cause of Arabism after the Young Turks deposed Sultan Abdulhamid, and pursued policies which were, from his perspective, detrimental to the interests of the Arabs and of the empire.¹⁴

Rida's Arab Muslim thought and his pro-Arab sympathies prompted him to adopt a strong stand against Zionism at an early date in his intellectual career. Indig-

nant at the views on Zionism of Nimr and Sarruf, Rida wrote in *al-Manar* reproaching his compatriots for their indifference toward it:

You complacent ones, raise your heads and open your eyes. Look at what peoples and nations do. Are you happy to see the newspapers of every country reporting that the poor of the weakest peoples [the Jews], whom the governments of all nations are expelling, master so much knowledge and understanding of civilization methods that they are able to possess and colonize your country, and turn its masters into laborers and its wealthy into poor? Think about this question [Zionism], and make it the subject of your discussion to determine whether it is just or unjust, sincere or insincere. If you find out that you have failed to defend the rights of your homeland (*watanikum*) and the service of your nation (*umma*), study and examine, consider and discuss and debate this matter. It is more worthy of consideration than creating disasters and insulting innocent ones with calumnies. It is more worthy of dialogue than slandering your brothers.¹⁵

Rida's ideas on Zionism were more fully developed in an article on the subject which was published in *al-Manar* in January 1902, after Herzl reported to the Fifth Zionist Congress at Basel on his meeting with Sultan Abdulhamid. In this article, Rida propounded a doctrine which regularly appeared in subsequent issues of his periodical.

The thrust of Rida's doctrine had a traditional Arab Muslim cast, and a prescription to cope with the Zionist threat. He stated that the Jews had maintained their Hebrew language and their religious unity despite their dispersal and dispossession. They were cooperative with each other and excelled in the different fields of arts and sciences. More importantly, they had great capital and hence significant political power. Through their capital, Rida believed, the Jews could become the most influential nation in the world. Their organizations, he stressed, were trying to accomplish this goal through their attempts to purchase Palestine and establish a Jewish state

there. To avert this, Rida urged Muslims to revive their glory, to examine the behavior of their leaders, to learn science and technical skills, and become a nation governed by the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet.¹⁶

The Arab reaction to Zionism was formulated in a secular, Arab nationalist manner by Najib 'Azuri. 'Azuri's only preserved book was published in Paris in 1905 under the title, *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe*. This book has only been recently translated into Arabic under the title *Yaqzat al-Umma al-'Arabiyya* (The Awakening of the Arab Nation). In his book, 'Azuri mentions that he intended to write three more books, including a detailed study entitled *The Universal Threat of the Jews: Political Revelations and Studies*.¹⁷ But apparently the books were never written, since there is no trace of them anywhere.¹⁸

In his book, 'Azuri openly advocates the secession of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire. Such a doctrine was the first open demand for the complete detachment of the Arab provinces. From the perspective of 'Azuri, the Ottomans were barbarous oppressors who inflicted much suffering on the Arabs. His accusations against the sultan and the governor of Jerusalem, Kazem Bey, were violent and bitter. 'Azuri directed his most violent attack against Abdulhamid, whom he described as a pernicious "beast" running the empire through intrigue and espionage from his "cave" in Istanbul. All non-Turks in the Ottoman Empire hate the Turks, 'Azuri says, the Arabs as well as the Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs. 'Azuri also ridicules Abdulhamid's claim to the caliphate because he does not know Arabic and because at the age of sixty-five, he still had not performed the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca.¹⁹

Against this background, 'Azuri stated that the Arabs, with their national feelings now revived, will form an empire comprising Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the Arabian Peninsula.²⁰ Within these boundaries, 'Azuri wanted to see the emergence of an Arab nation under the protection of a European power, France being the "warmly

acclaimed" candidate with a "better right" to rule the Arabs than the rest.²¹

'Azuri's preference for France stemmed from his anti-Russian stance and his apparent belief in the right of France to protect the Catholics and their establishments in the Ottoman Empire. In his book, 'Azuri warned that should Russia control the Dardanelles and penetrate the Ottoman Empire, the people of the East would never attain their national independence. He asserted that France must maintain her religious protectorate in the Levant.²²

'Azuri had had close connections with French political figures in Paris and Cairo. Among them were René Pinon, Edmond Fazy, and Eugène Jung.²³ In partnership with Jung, who claimed to have been a vice-resident of France in Tonkin, 'Azuri tried to create the impression, by means of articles and periodicals, that an Arab movement was underway in the Ottoman Empire. Kedourie argues that by claiming that their movement was under the leadership of 'Azuri, the two would "offer its use to this or that government against large quantities of money and arms."²⁴ Their efforts, however, bore no fruit. They were rebuffed by the French, by the Italians, and by the British. Their ten-year partnership, which lasted roughly from 1905 to 1916, did not advance one iota their stated goal of raising the Arabs against the Ottomans.

'Azuri was also equally famous for his anti-Zionist position, and for his prediction that the Zionist movement was destined to conflict with Arab nationalism. He wrote prophesying:

Two important phenomena, similar in nature and yet opposed to each other, which have not yet attracted the attention of anybody, are now manifesting themselves in Asiatic Turkey, namely the awakening of the Arab nation and the concealed effort of the Jews to reestablish the ancient monarchy of Israel on a grand scale. These two movements are destined to a continuous struggle, until one of the two

prevails over the other. On the final outcome of this struggle between these two peoples, representing two opposing principles, will depend the destiny of the entire world.²⁵

'Azuri goes on to describe Palestine, its history, its borders, its resources, and Zionist activities there. Although 'Azuri was a civil servant in Palestine, his knowledge of the demography of the land was inaccurate, to say the least. He mistakenly claims that in 1905—the year in which he wrote his book—there were 200,000 Arabs and 200,000 Jews in the country.²⁶

Drawing on the Bible, 'Azuri also tried to prove that the Jews never occupied all of Palestine. He maintained in his book that they controlled only the West Bank of the Jordan and the range of mountains stretching from Hebron to al-Hawla. As a result of that, 'Azuri goes on to say, the Hebrew kingdom was destroyed. To avoid repeating the same error, the Jews planned to conquer the national frontier of Palestine, which to them comprised Mount Hermon and its water resources in the north, Sinai and the Suez Canal in the south, the Arabian Desert in the east, and the Mediterranean in the west. Once the Jews conquer these strategically located territories, they would hold on to Palestine and protect their new kingdom against destruction.²⁷

Beyond its contribution to Arab nationalist thought, one deduces in 'Azuri's book a European brand of anti-Semitism that was a typical of other writings by Arab nationalists in this period. It is probable that 'Azuri had developed his anti-Semitic sentiments during the Dreyfus affair, at which time he was a student in Paris.²⁸

Phase Two: 1908-1914

We may conclude, therefore, that before the Young Turk coup of 1908, the Arab reaction against Zionism had not been full-

fledged. Although some Arabs, like 'Azuri, viewed Zionism in terms of politics, one may suggest that the majority viewed it in terms of immigration and land sales. The peasants, for example, felt that their livelihood was threatened by the expanding Jewish colonies which were established on land they had usually lost to extortionist Arab moneylenders. Some landowners, however, utilized the situation to sell land at high prices, paying no heed to the concerns of the peasants. On the other hand, local merchants and craftsmen saw in Jewish immigration a threat to their economic interests and were wary of the potential competition of the new immigrants. In the years from 1908 to 1914, these fears developed into a full-blown Arab opposition against Zionism.

The immediate reason for the development was the freeing of party political activity and the lifting of press censorship after the 1908 coup. In the first year of the coup, thirty-five new papers were founded in Syria and Palestine alone.²⁹ This is not to mention scores of papers which appeared in Beirut, in addition to those that already existed in Cairo.

It is no exaggeration to state that the press was perhaps the single most effective vehicle through which the initiators and advocates of various political persuasions made their views known to the masses throughout Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Arab opposition to Zionism was no exception.

Within this context, four trends of Arab opposition to Zionism can be identified: opposition on the grounds that the Jews were not loyal Ottoman subjects, Palestinian patriotism, Arabism, and Islam.³⁰ Although the second and third trends matured later, they were foreshadowed in the daily press which, once unfettered, took the lead in giving expression to them. In this regard, the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram* was perhaps the first to call on the Jews to renounce their foreign citizenship and become loyal Ottoman citizens. Furthermore, *al-Ahram* cautioned that should the Jews be allowed to concentrate in large numbers in one territory, they might be encouraged to establish a state of their own.³¹

In Palestine and elsewhere, the Arabic newspapers reflected strong aversion to and fear of Zionism, particularly after the counterrevolution of April 13, 1909, which deposed Sultan Abdulhamid and brought to power a government controlled by the CUP. Four newspapers—*al-Asma'i* and *al-Karmil* of Palestine, *al-Muqtabas* of Damascus, and *al-Mufid* of Beirut—are good representatives of the four trends outlined above.

Al-Asma'i was founded in Jaffa in September 1908 by Hanna 'Abdullah al-'Isa.³² This biweekly publication opposed Jewish immigration, saw the Jews as a threat to the Arabs, and criticized the privileges bestowed upon the immigrants by the capitulations, a system under which Europeans enjoyed extensive extraterritorial privileges throughout the Ottoman Empire. From the perspective of *al-Asma'i*, the special rights accorded to foreigners and the corruption of the Ottoman administration were detrimental to the local population because they helped Jewish labor compete with Arab labor. To correct the situation, the paper called on the Arabs to promote their own commerce and industry and purchase their own goods. As for the peasants, *al-Asma'i* recommended that they adopt the agricultural techniques of the Jews to improve their standard of living.³³

Another expression of anti-Zionism in Palestine was articulated by Najib Nassar, whose position was a combination of Ottoman loyalism and Palestinian patriotism. Nassar was born in 1865 in 'Ayn 'Annub, Lebanon. He went to Tiberias where he worked as a pharmacist for a hospital run by the Free Church of Scotland's mission. In 1908, Nassar founded *al-Karmil*, a weekly paper which he published in Haifa.³⁴ Alarmed by the land sales to Jews, Nassar directed his efforts against those sales, regarding them as a threat to the Ottoman Empire in general and to the Palestinian Arabs in particular. He also criticized in patriotic terms the Arabs who migrated from Palestine, saying:

While societies are being established for the purchase of our country and for its colonization, and while these societies are

concentrating on reviving every aspect of their nationality, we migrate to foreign countries to make room for others. There are among us those who work against our community and eliminate our nationality just to promote their interests. When will the real Ottoman spirit awaken in us, and when shall we know our interests? ³⁵

Rashid Khalidi, the author of a detailed and well-documented essay on the reaction of the Arab press to Zionism in the period under survey, points out that of the 330 issues of *al-Karmil* that he surveyed, 134 articles on Zionism were printed, including 45 editorials. Nassar also reran articles from *al-Ahram*, *al-Mufid*, *al-Ittihad al-Uthmani*, and other Beirut and Cairo papers, as well as the Damascus paper *al-Muqtabas*. Besides his own critique of Zionism, Nassar described in detail the Zionist colonial activities in Palestine, thus making his paper a source of information on Zionism for other anti-Zionist papers outside Palestine.³⁶

Besides his anti-Zionist campaign in *al-Karmil*, which led to the suspension of his paper once in the summer of 1909 and again in the winter of the same year, Nassar wrote a 64-page book entitled *al-Sahyuniyya* (Zionism). In this book, published in 1911, Nassar outlines the history, purpose, and significance of Zionism. According to Nassar, Zionism was a racist movement with a political goal, namely the colonization of the Holy Land and the gradual settlement of the Jews there. In a prophetic tone similar to that of 'Azuri, Najib Nassar warns that the Zionist movement, though still limited in the scope of its activities, will ultimately expand and attract the Jews of the world. He also cautions that the Zionist organizations have become rich and powerful, and to resist them effectively, the "heart of every Ottoman must be rich with nationalism." To achieve that, the "country [*al-bilad*]" needs devoted leaders, like Herzl, leaders who sacrifice themselves for the common good."³⁷ But despite his implied criticism of Ottoman leaders, Nassar maintains his Ottoman loyalty coupled with local Palestinians patriotism. In this vein he wrote:

We are different from the Jewish people. We have an Ottoman state under whose banner we rally. The great majority among us have a religious caliphate to which they must be attached. All other Ottomans must respect it [the caliphate].³⁸

It is important to note, however, that Nassar's Ottoman loyalty did not stop him from opposing the CUP for what he perceived to be its favorable attitude toward Zionism. As Khalidi has demonstrated on the basis of the Arabic language newspapers published during the period 1908-1914, Nassar had become by 1911 an opponent of the CUP and supporter of the Ottoman opposition.³⁹ In this respect, Nassar's position was representative of that of most Arabs who opposed the policies of the CUP.

The third trend of anti-Zionism stemmed from Arabism. More than one Arab newspaper and political party articulated Arabist themes covertly and overtly. Palestinian opposition, though it had an Arabist touch, leaned toward decentralized reform and local patriotism. In 1910, for example, Najib Nassar was instrumental in founding an association in Haifa to persuade the Ottoman government to stop land sales to Jews and to persuade the local population to boycott the Jews economically.⁴⁰

In the same year, the Patriotic Ottoman Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-'Uthamani) was established in Jaffa under the leadership of al-Shaykh Sulayman al-Taji al-Faruqi. The overriding reason for setting up this party was the strong aversion of its founders to and their fear of Zionism which, they believed, threatened to tear apart the political and economic life in Palestine.⁴¹

Palestinian members of the Ottoman parliament were no less resolute and active in their opposition to Zionism. Ruhi al-Khalidi and Sa'id al-Husayni, two of the three representatives of the Jerusalem District from 1908 to 1912, argued that the Zionists intended to establish a Jewish state "extending from Palestine and Syria to Iraq."⁴² Both used the Ottoman parliament as a platform to show the Zionist threat and to stop Jewish settlement in Palestine.

In Ruhi al-Khalidi's manuscript entitled *Kitab al-Zionism aw al-Mas'ala al-Sahyuniyya*, which was written sometime before 1914, one finds the first fully detailed presentation of the ideological and organizational aspects of Zionism. Al-Khalidi emphasized above all the Zionist intention of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. He wrote about the Zionist attempt to formulate the symbols of statehood, including a Zionist flag, Zionist postal stamps, and a Zionist anthem (Hatikvah). He laid emphasis also on the origins of Zionism, arguing on the basis of a careful reading of modern Zionist thought that European anti-Semitism was the driving force behind the idea of a Jewish state. The European countries in which anti-Semitism was not widespread, he wrote, did not witness the emergence of a large number of Zionist organizations. On the other hand, European countries in which anti-Semitism was strong had a large number of Zionist organizations: 373 in Russia and 260 in Hungary in contrast to three in France and sixty in the United States. On the basis of these statistics, al-Khalidi concluded that as far as the Zionist presence was concerned Russia and Eastern Europe came first and the United States came second.⁴³

In his manuscript, al-Khalidi also went to great length to document the Zionist colonial undertaking in Palestine pointing to the increase in Jewish immigration and the setting up of Jewish colonies and Jewish colonial institutions, including the Jewish Colonization Association which was founded by Baron Maurice de Hirsch in 1891. He also provided a detailed description, enriched with statistics, of the schools and vocational centers set up by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, a Jewish organization which was founded in 1860 with headquarters in Paris.⁴⁴ Al-Khalidi was well acquainted, as the manuscript demonstrates, with the various views of the leading ideologists of the Zionist movement. He knew of both the details of the Zionist program and the inherent threat Zionism posed to Palestine and the Ottoman Empire. He can in fact be regarded as the first of the Palestinian intellectuals and public figures who followed with scholarly diligence the evolution and varieties of the Zionist idea from its earliest stages to the opening years of the twentieth century.

As for the official Ottoman reaction to Arab protestations against Zionism, the CUP-dominated government responded with indifference. The reason for this indifference seems to lie in the fact that Ottoman statesmen were preoccupied with the imminent threats much closer to home than the Zionist movement, which, to them, did not seem to be a serious problem worthy of immediate and resolute action.

To this must be added the CUP's desperate need for financial support. For that purpose, the Ottoman government negotiated with the Zionists the possibility of obtaining Jewish funds. Drawing on this opportunity, the Zionists asked the Ottoman government to abolish restrictions it imposed on them in Palestine. The government was ready to respond and, in late 1913, it abolished immigration laws, shut down three anti-Zionist papers, *al-Karmil* in Haifa, *Filastin* in Jaffa, and *al-Muqtabas* in Damascus, and permitted land sales to the Jews.⁴⁵ Together with the Turkification program of the CUP, these steps had apparently led to the charge that the CUP was linked with Jews and freemasons who, many Arabs believed, supported the party and were dominant within its ranks.⁴⁶

A much stronger streak of Arabism was to be found in Arab opposition to Zionism outside Palestine, perhaps because the Arabists of other Arab lands operated within the framework of a much wider campaign against Zionism, and perhaps also because some of the papers devoted their attention to developments in all the Arab areas of the empire, thus expressing political opinions that transcended local concerns.

A representative newspaper that advocated the cause of Arabism was *al-Mufid*, founded in Beirut in 1909 by 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi and Fuad Hantas.⁴⁷ Both were from Beirut and were members of al-Fatat. Born to a fruit wholesaler, the young al-'Uraysi was the outspoken representative of the Arabist views of *al-Mufid*. His editorials embodied Islamic and Western sociopolitical concepts.

By 1910, *al-Mufid* had become an influential daily throughout Syria, featuring articles written by the best-known spokesmen of the Arab movement, such as al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, Shukri al-'Asali, Rafiq Rizq Sallum, Salim

al-Jaza'iri, al-'Shaykh Rashid Rida, Tawfiq al-Natur, and many others who signed their articles with pseudonyms.⁴⁸

The paramount theme of *al-Mufid* was Arabism. The paper sought to revive Arab culture, awaken the Arab spirit, and secure administrative decentralization and reform in all the Arab provinces. Closely related to this theme were Islam and Zionism. For al-'Uraysi, and indeed for most Arabists of this period, Islam appears to have been an important vehicle through which they sought to convey their political message of Arabism. Although the exact relationship between Islam and Arabism was never resolved in their minds, they showed great respect for Islam and found it to be compatible with Arabism.⁴⁹

As to Zionism, there was no ambivalence about it. In 71 articles, 52 of which appeared in 1911 alone, *al-Mufid* strongly opposed the sale of Palestinian lands to foreigners or to those suspected of working for the Zionist movement, and emphasized the importance of protecting the indigenous Palestinian peasantry from expulsion at the hands of Zionist colonizers. Like *al-Karmil*, the Beirut newspaper *al-Mufid* condemned Arab landlords who sold their land to the Zionists. It strongly criticized the CUP for its laxity in implementing laws hindering Jewish immigration and land-purchase, accusing the committee of complicity with the Zionists.⁵⁰ Moreover, *al-Mufid* saw in Zionism a colonizing movement that aimed at dismembering Palestine from the empire. As such Zionism was believed to be a form of foreign domination tied to Western imperialism.⁵¹ Herein lies *al-Mufid's* linkage of the cause of Arabism with the struggle against Zionism, thus starting to lay the ideological foundations for anti-Zionism.

Al-Muqtabas, a newspaper edited in Damascus by Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, joined the campaign against Zionism. In his memoirs, Kurd 'Ali states that three Palestinians, 'Abdullah Mukhlis, 'Umar al-Salih al-Barghuti, and Najib Nassar had contributed to his paper, pointing out the threat to Palestine and Syria in general posed by Jewish settlement.⁵² Cautioning that the dispersion that befell the Arabs after the downfall of their kingdom in Spain in the year 1492 might happen to them in Palestine, 'Abdullah Mukhlis, of Haifa, blamed

the Ottoman government for its laxity in checking Jewish immigration and land sales, a theme which was also raised in the columns of *al-Ahram*, *Al-Muqattam*, *al-Mu'ayyad*, and *al-Manar* in Egypt.⁵³

It should be noted, however, that despite the campaign against Zionism, there were Arabs who seem to have been willing to allow the Jews to settle in Palestine, on condition that they become loyal Ottoman citizens. For example, Haqqi Bey al-'Azm, the secretary of the Decentralization Party, published an article in *al-Ahram* in which he argued that not all Syrians were hostile to Zionism, and that the Jews would help Syria progress with their capital and skills. The Arabs, argued Haqqi Bey, were prepared to receive the Jews provided they adopted the Arabic language, stopped being economically exclusive, became genuine Ottoman citizens, and did not practice politics.⁵⁴ At the same time, representatives of the Decentralization Party formally asked the Zionists to enter into an entente with them in 1913.

Nonetheless, these arguments were not presented in support of Zionism per se, but rather for possible economic, industrial, and agricultural interests. They were also confined to a very narrow stratum of Arab society. The Decentralization Party was a relatively tiny group in 1913, with limited influence and appeal in Palestine.

To sum up, two themes emerge from the subject discussed above. First, Palestinian peasants, urban notables, and merchants, together with leading Arab intellectuals and journalists, knew of Zionism and began to express their opposition to it as early as 1882. As Mandel pointed out, this opposition did not develop into full-fledged anti-Zionism before 1908.⁵⁵ It rather manifested itself in the form of an uneasy, discontented feeling about the increased flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, mostly for reasons pertaining to land questions or grazing and crop rights in the case of the peasants, and to economic fear of Jewish competition in the case of merchants and Arab notables.

Second, anti-Zionism became a widespread

phenomenon between 1909 and 1914, after the reinstatement of the constitution and the freeing of the press. We here see, in the various Arab trends that opposed Zionism and criticized the failure of the CUP in halting Zionist colonization, the seeds of linking the struggle against Zionism as an alien colonizing force to the larger cause of Arab nationalism. With the exception of the violent reaction of the peasants, we also see no call for armed struggle or for a transformation of Arab society on the part of the Arab press or intellectuals.⁵⁶ We see, however, in the campaign of *al-Karmil*, the dissemination of anti-Zionist ideas that inculcated wariness to Zionism in the Palestinian Arab readers. In other words, it was a process of political education that verged on Palestinian patriotism and Arab nationalism, a process that posed Zionism as a threat to Palestine and to the larger Arab cause.

Herein we have the embryo of Palestinian patriotism, because after 1909 the Palestinian Arabs increasingly became local patriots in the context of their opposition to Zionism. Palestinian patriotism, however, did not develop into full-blown Palestinian nationalism with its distinctive ideology and organizational structure as a result of Zionism. Palestinian politics had an Arab context, and it was in that context that Palestinian nationalism was born. How the birth took place and what identity the Palestinian Arabs adopted will be the subject of the following pages. I shall first start with the war years, then a study of Faysal's Arab government in Damascus, the role the Palestinians played in that government, and the pressures they faced there. This should be of special significance because the Palestinian experience in Damascus largely determined the future course of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement.

4.

Older Ottomanists and Younger Reformers in World War I

Most members of the Palestinian notability opted to identify with Ottomanism throughout the years of World War I. Thus, when the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany against Russia, Britain, and France on November 5, 1914, many dominant Palestinian notables remained loyal supporters of the sultan. No sooner had Sultan Muhammad Rashad proclaimed jihad (holy war) against the Allies at the start of hostilities than his call gathered momentum and support throughout Palestine.

In Nablus, for instance, a big crowd gathered at the palace of al-Nimr family with a huge camel which they slaughtered as a pledge of obedience to the sultan. In a resounding voice they all chanted: "God grant victory to the Prince of the Muslims our Sultan." Drawing on the support of local notables such as Sadiq Agha al-Nimr, the Ottoman state was able to recruit Nablusites to serve in the army. It should be noted that, when the British forces occupied the city in September 1918, they deported leading Ottomanist notables and religious functionaries such as al-Shaykh Sa'id al-Karmi, al-Shaykh Rif'at Tuffaha, 'Abd al-Fattah Agha Tuqan, and Fayiq

Effendi al-'Inibtawi. Some notables and religious figures, such as Isma'il Haqqi Salih Tuffaha and Rushdi Effendi 'Abd al-Hadi even withdrew with the Ottoman army and settled in Istanbul, continuing to occupy administrative posts in the new Turkish republic that emerged after the war.¹

In Jerusalem, the situation was not different. Here Shukri al-Husayni, Raghib al-Nashashibi, and other prominent urban notables also maintained their Ottoman patriotism and their support for the Ottoman regime. The fiery speeches of al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, whose oratory was later to play an important role in flaming Palestinian nationalists, attracted large crowds of supporters for the Ottoman cause.²

Also in other Palestinian cities, members of the local urban elite continued to identify with Ottomanism and protect their standing in local society. As'ad al-Shuqayri of Acre, for instance, served as mufti of the Fourth Army in Sinai, Palestine, and Syria during the war. The Jaffa newspaper *Filastin* did not depart from its pro-CUP position and continued to advocate the unity of the Ottoman Empire and the partnership of all its races and sects. In general, one may conclude that during the war the Palestinian Arabs kept their loyalty to the Ottoman regime.

Even Jamal Pasha's anti-Arab policy and the Arab revolt of 1916 did not change the situation drastically. It is undoubtedly true that Jamal's repressive measures did contribute to a change of the attitude not only of the Palestinians but also of the Arabs toward the Ottoman government. After all, the ruthless reign of terror instituted by Jamal against Arab nationalists, who were either hanged as "traitors" or deported and tortured in Ottoman jails in 1915 and 1916, was naturally bound to create a gulf between Arabs and Turks. The assertion, however, that Jamal Pasha's terror was "one of the determining factors which helped most of the Muslim Arab leaders to make up their minds once and for all to break away completely from the Ottoman Empire"³ needs close examination. The fact is that a large number of Arab leaders maintained their loyalty to the Ottoman state despite Jamal Pasha's heavy-handedness.

We have seen that in general the Palestinian Arabs were quiescent and did not foment a revolt against the Turks. We also have evidence that despite Jamal Pasha's repression, some Palestinian Arabs showered him with praise portraying him as the "dispeller of grief" (*mufrij al-karbat*) and the "beauty of religion" (*lil-din jamal*).⁴ Moreover, the Palestinian Arab As'ad al-Shuqayri was one of the first people to report to Jamal Pasha about a revolt that was being planned by Arab nationalists in Syria.⁵ Khoury relates how the wives and daughters of some members of the Damascus nobility attended a tea party in Damascus in March 1916 in honor of Jamal Pasha and Minister of War Enver Pasha in which they praised the "grand Caliph" and the "two noble Commanders" and pledged to fulfil the wishes of the two "beloved Commanders."⁶ Sharif Husayn himself stopped temporizing with the Turks only after Jamal Pasha had refused to assign to him the powers of the *wali* (governor) of the Hijaz and recognize the emirate of Mecca as hereditary in the house of Husayn, and after he had reached an understanding with the British regarding material assistance to the Arabs after the middle of March 1916, as well as vague British promises contained in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence of 1915 and 1916.⁷ Before that, he subscribed to Ottomanism, believing that a truly Muslim Ottoman state was the only effective way to defend Islam from the modernizing influence of Europe.⁸

Similarly, the Arab revolt did not have much impact on the Palestinian Arabs, including the elites of the Palestinian towns who continued to subscribe to the ideology of Ottomanism.⁹ The same position was also adopted by the political leadership of the Syrian towns.¹⁰ Darwaza, an Arab nationalist of whom more will be said later, states that Arab urban notables had either opted to take a "reserved" attitude toward the revolt or they opposed it, continuing to serve the politics of their own interest in the Ottoman parliament and administration.¹¹

The repression of Jamal Pasha and the Arab revolt naturally played a much more significant role in the politics of the prewar Arab advocates of reform. Both in Palestine and

Syria, Jamal's policies widened the gulf between Arab reformers and Turks, and made some of the former opt for Arab independence and secession from the empire.¹²

Because of their small number, their organizational weakness and lack of political consistency, the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement were unable to stage a revolt in Syria, the country which played a critical role in the birth of Arab nationalism. Moreover, Jamal Pasha's repressive measures limited Arab nationalist activities in Syria and Palestine. The execution, exile, and imprisonment of young Arab nationalist leaders prevented them from taking any significant initiative. Thus, when Sharif Husayn started the revolt they were in no position to make a notable military contribution to it. More significantly, the leadership of the Arab revolt was now in the hands of the Hashemite family in Hijaz.

Insofar as the revolt was concerned, it had an impact on only a small number of Syrians and Palestinians. Among the factors which led to this was the gulf between the leaders of the Arab movement and the Arab population, the religious conservatism among the population and their strong loyalty to the Ottoman state, as well as the effective Turkish security measures, especially the appointment of Arab officers in unimportant areas. Faysal's Arab army, which entered Damascus on September 30, 1918, under the command of Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id of Iraq, had Palestinian Arab recruits, most of whom had been prisoners of war rather than deserters from the Ottoman army.¹³ Among the Palestinians were Ahmad Makki, Mun'im 'Abduh, Rashid Khammash, and Ra'uf 'Abd al-Hadi, all recruited from British prisoners of war camps.¹⁴

Perhaps the group that contributed most to the revolt was a generation of younger Arab men who in most cases came from notable Syrian and Palestinian families whose leading members were landowners and senior officials in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Finding themselves on the margin of the Ottoman system of government by virtue of their failure to occupy high government posts as a result of the CUP policy of replacing Arabs with Turks in many senior posts in the pro-

vincial and central administration, members of this younger generation felt estranged and had therefore opted to join al-Fatat. Later, some of them joined the Northern Arab army, a Sharifian force commanded by Faysal and operating outside the Hijaz after the fall of al-'Aqaba to the Allies in July 1917.

One example of how a member of an influential Palestinian family shifted to Arab nationalism can be shown by briefly outlining the career of Mu'in al-Madi. Born in the village of Ijzim into a landowning Palestinian family dominant in the coastal area, which stretched between Haifa and Jaffa, and educated at al-Rushdiyya school (higher elementary) in Haifa and later at al-Mulkiyya high school in Istanbul, where he learned Turkish, Mu'in began his career as a government clerk in the town of Kashmuna in Anatolia after his graduation in 1912. Later he was appointed mayor of Acre, and then *qaimmaqam* of Banyas. However, after Jamal Pasha hanged the first group of Arab nationalists charged with working for the dismemberment of the Ottoman state at al-Burj, the main square in Beirut, on August 21, 1915, Mu'in, suspected of helping Arab nationalists, was transferred to Beirut to serve as a government employee. Following this demotion, Mu'in was tried by Jamal Pasha's military tribunal on charges of conspiracy against the Ottoman state. He was acquitted as a result of the great influence of his wealthy father, 'Abdullah, who interfered on his behalf. Embittered, Mu'in adopted an alias and hid in the house of a Damascene Christian, Najib al-Hakim.¹⁵

Three other members of leading Palestinian families who joined the group of Arab nationalists that constituted al-Fatat—'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Rafiq al-Tamimi, and Ibrahim Hashim (all from Nablus)—were also educated in Istanbul, spoke Turkish, and were unable to hold high administrative posts in the CUP-dominated government.¹⁶ They were barred from office-holding because they called for reform and attacked the CUP definition of Ottomanism, that is, the Turkification of the various sectors of Ottoman society and politics.

Their expectations frustrated, these young men increased their covert political activities in the war, redefined

Arabism, and focused their attention on Arab independence. Using their secret organization, al-Fatat, they approached Sharif Husayn in January 1915 through the organization's representative Ahmad Fawzi Bey al-Bakri of Damascus, who proposed to the Sharif to lead an Arab revolt against the Turks. The revolt was to be staged by Arab troops stationed in Syria.¹⁷

With this development al-Fatat was ushered into a new stage that put it in contact with the family of the Sharif, and consequently with the British. Later, when the Sharif dispatched his son Faysal to Syria in March 1915 to assess the extent to which the Arab nationalists there were prepared for a revolt, Faysal met with leaders of al-Fatat and the Iraqi-dominated al-'Ahd.¹⁸ Initially, al-Fatat members did not express their nationalist sentiments openly, for Faysal was not well-known to them and was suspected of favoring cooperation with the Ottomans. But when Faysal explained that his preference for the Ottomans derived from his fear of the European powers, notably the French claims to rights in Syria, the suspicion of al-Fatat members was dispelled and they readily found a common nationalist ground between Faysal and themselves. Gradually, Faysal became intimate with al-Fatat leaders and he was sworn in as a member.¹⁹

During Faysal's stay, leaders of al-Fatat and al-'Ahd drew up a document, known as the Damascus Protocol, in which they enunciated the conditions on which they were prepared to cooperate with England against the Ottomans during the war. The document outlined two fundamental principles: complete Arab independence from any foreign power, and Arab unity. Independence meant the security of the Arabs against all forms of foreign interference including the capitulations, namely the extraterritorial concessions which the Ottoman sultans granted to friendly nations largely to facilitate trade. Arab independence prescribed the establishment of a unitary Arab state comprising Syria (Lebanon and Palestine included), Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Once established the Arab state was expected to conclude a defen-

sive alliance with Great Britain, provided the latter recognized the independence of the Arab provinces.²⁰

The protocol seems to have converted Faysal, now a member of al-Fatat, to the cause of revolution for, when he returned to Mecca on June 20, 1915, he told his father that he was an advocate of a revolt, and that the rising should take place after the British had been properly approached and after the Ottomans had either suffered serious defeats or the Allied forces had made a landing at Alexandretta. Faysal's brother, 'Abdullah, argued that it was necessary to proclaim the revolt and escape from the rule of the Turks. The result was that the Hashemite family of Husayn decided to lead the Arab revolt and launch it in June 1916.²¹ Hence Faysal, who originally opposed the revolt on the ground that the Ottoman Empire was too formidable a force, became an advocate of revolution after his meetings with the leaders of al-Fatat in Damascus in March and May 1915.²²

During the war years, the political activities of the Arab nationalists were sharply curtailed. Some of them, such as Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, editor of the influential Damascene newspaper *al-Muqtabas* which was founded after 1908, received from Jamal Pasha "pretty substantial sums" in return for employing his pen in the service of the Ottoman commander.²³ Another Arab nationalist was Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, a doctor from Damascus who was trained at the American University of Beirut. Shahbandar called for political and administrative decentralization in the Arabic-speaking provinces before the war and in early 1916 fled to Egypt lest he be arrested by the Ottoman military authorities who were then chasing prewar Arabists.

By mid-1916, thirty-two Arab nationalists went to the gallows in Beirut and Damascus on charges of intriguing with the British and French authorities to sever the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire and establish an Arab caliphate through an Arab rebellion. Others, such as Rafiq and Haqqi al-'Azm, both Damascene notables who led the Syrian exiles in

Cairo, were sentenced to death in absentia.²⁴ Two Arab nationalists are known to have served as officers in the Ottoman army during the war. Several Palestinian Arab nationalists, including Rafiq al-Tamimi and 'Izzat Darwaza of Nablus, served in the local Ottoman administration, al-Tamimi as principal of a government school in Beirut and Darwaza as clerk in the Department of Telegraphic and Postal Services in Nablus. Still others, seventeen according to Dawn, did not engage in anti-Ottoman activities throughout the war years.²⁵

Thus with the Arab nationalists hanged, co-opted, or forced to acquiesce or go into exile, the nascent Arab nationalist movement mustered limited political influence in Syria and Palestine. But even though it was confined to an estranged faction of the educated and urban classes, its level of coordination and appeal to the narrow stratum of politically active Arabs was higher than is suggested by such skeptical scholars as Elie Kedourie, who seems to minimize the role of Arab discontent in the creation of Arab nationalism. By overemphasizing the Sunni background of the Muslim Palestinian Arabs as a factor which made them remain loyal supporters of the Ottoman state "firmly and continuously throughout the War," Kedourie underestimated the later impact of the growing distaste for the Young Turks among the dissident faction of Arab reformers.²⁶

Moreover, the role played by the Palestinians in the growth of Arab nationalism was greater than has been suggested by some historians. Porath, the author of a major study on the Palestinian national movement, tends to minimize the extent of Palestinian involvement in the Arab nationalist movement, arguing notably from the very small number of Palestinian Arabs who were attracted by the new ideology of Arab nationalism, from the failure of the Palestinians to rise against the Turks, and from the near absence of Arab nationalist societies in Palestine.²⁷

This question cannot be answered fully without further research based on local sources. Nevertheless, on the basis of a

closer look at the political content of articles published in *al-Karmil*, and at the number of Palestinians who were active in Arab nationalist societies before 1918, it can be asserted that the skeptical view about Palestinian involvement in Arab nationalism is not warrantable.

While Arab nationalism was by no means widespread in Palestine, we find many instances of devotion to the new ideology in *al-Karmil*.²⁸ Through this paper, which was popular in Palestine because it was the most outspoken opponent of Zionism, the Palestinian intelligentsia was exposed to the words and ideas of Arab nationalism. This exposure was reinforced by influential Arab nationalist newspapers outside Palestine such as *al-Muqtabas* (Damascus) and *al-Mufid* (Beirut).

Palestinian participation in Arab nationalist societies before the armistice would also seem to signify something beyond the small number of the active participants. According to Dawn, there were 126 members in Arab nationalist societies by 1914. Of the total number 22 were Palestinian.²⁹

According to my calculations, which are close to Dawn's, there were at least 25 Palestinians confirmed as members of Arab nationalist societies by the end of the war, 3 of whom were members of the Ottoman Parliament who overtly defended Arab rights in the empire. Of the 25 Palestinian members, 13 came from Jabal Nablus, 8 from Jerusalem, 1 each from Jaffa and Haifa, and 2 from Gaza (table 4.1). Moreover, of the 387 names which appeared on Arab telegrams sent in support of the Arab Congress held in Paris in June 1913, a total of 139 were Palestinian: 44 of these were from Nablus and its environs.³⁰ Indeed, several Palestinians played an important role in the organization of the Paris Congress itself. The figures cited suggest three observations:

1. On the basis of population estimates for the year 1915, Palestine's percentage of Arab nationalist leaders to the total population is higher than that of Lebanon and slightly lower than that of Syria. It is pertinent to provide Dawn's figures here: in Palestine there were 3.1 Arab nationalist leaders per

100,000 of the total population in comparison to 2.4 in Lebanon and 3.5 in Syria.³¹

2). It seems inconceivable that all literate and politically conscious Palestinians could have been neutral toward Jamal Pasha's brutal repression of Palestinian Arab nationalists, nor as a consequence, toward the Ottoman government itself. True, the Palestinian upper class and the Palestinians in general retained their loyalty to the Ottoman state; but certain Palestinians were imprisoned or even executed on charges of Arab nationalist activities including membership in al-Lamarkaziyya and al-'Ahd.³² It should be noted here that most historians have tended to ignore or pay insufficient attention to Jamal Pasha's sentences and public executions in Palestine, partly because they focused on the Palestinian-Zionist struggle and partly because a large number of those who wrote on early Arab nationalism concentrated their research on Beirut and Damascus. While Beirut had witnessed the gallows of Jamal Pasha in its main square al-Burj and Damascus in Al-Marje, Jerusalem saw the horror of similar gallows that stood in Bab al-Khalil (Jaffa Gate). As a result of these horrifying measures, there was distaste for the Ottoman government among a number of Palestinians, including some members of the class of notability, a class which had on the whole cast its lot with the government.

3). The figures cited above indicate that in comparison to other Palestinian towns, Nablus played a disproportionate role in the early phase of Arab nationalism. This role enabled the Arab nationalists of the town to be the most active advocates of the idea of Arab nationalism in Palestine after the war. Nablus can therefore be considered the Beirut and Damascus of Palestine, Beirut in the sense that it made a significant contribution to the cause of Arab nationalism in Palestine, and Damascus in the sense that it played a crucial role in its expansion in the country.

Two factors combined to enable Nablus to make such a contribution. In the first place, Nablus had a more homogeneous Muslim Arab population that maintained its

Table 4.1: Palestinians Confirmed as Members of Arab Nationalist Societies, 1909-1918

<u>Al-Fatat</u> (Nablus area)	<u>Green Flag Society</u>
'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi	'Asim Bsaysu (Gaza)
Rafiq al-Tamimi	Shukri Ghawshe (Jerusalem)
Zaki al-Tamimi	Mustafa al-Husayni (Jerusalem)
Muhammad 'Ali al-Tamimi	
Hafiz Kan'an	
Sidqi Milhis	<u>Al-Muntada al-Adabi</u>
Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza	Rushdi al-Salih Milhis (Nablus)
Ibrahim Hashim	Jamil al-Husayni (Jerusalem)
Salim 'Abd al-Rahman	'Asim Bsaysu (Gaza)
Rushdi al-Imam al-Husayni (Jerusalem)	
Muhammad al-'Afifi (Jerusalem)	<u>Ottoman Decentralization Society</u>
Mu'in al-Madi (Haifa)	Hasan Hammad (Nablus)
Rushdi al-Shawwa (Gaza)	Salim al-Ahmad 'Abd al-Hadi (Jenin)
	Muhammad al-Shanti (Qalqilya)
	Hafiz al-Sa'id (Jaffa)
<u>Al-'Ahd</u>	
'Ali al-Nashashibi (Jerusalem)	<u>Arab Parliamentary Bloc</u>
	Sa'id al-Husayni (Jerusalem)
	Ruhi al-Khalidi (Jerusalem)
	Hafiz al-Sa'id (Jaffa)

SOURCES: Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 108-110; Ahmad Izzat al-A'azami, *Al-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya*, 3; 9, Baru, *Al-'Arab wal-Turk*, pp. 309, 310, 319, 321, 434; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, 1:30-33, and *Nash'at al-Haraka*, pp. 354, 359, 371, 479, and *Tis'una 'Aman*, 2:69-72; Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghani Hasan, *Tarajim 'Arabiyya* (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1968), pp. 213-223; al-Hut, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat", vol. 2, appendix 2; 'Ajaj Nuwayhid, *Rijal min Filastin* (Beirut: Manshurat Filastin al-Muhtalla, 1981); Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:8-11; al-Barghuti, *Tarikh Filastin*, p. 271.

Note: I have included these societies because their members adopted the Arab cause for reform in the Ottoman Empire and the Arab cause for independence during the war. Members of the Parliamentary bloc were included because they defended Arab rights in the empire.

traditional patterns than did Jerusalem, Jaffa, or Haifa.³³ Because of its homogeneity, Nablus produced local political and commercial elites whose political thinking was Muslim Arab and unmingled with the European concepts of modern-

ization which tended to permeate the more ethnically and religiously diversified cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. Second, Nablus boasted the most important textile industry in the region which, together with its famous soap industry, helped its inhabitants maintain the strongest commercial relations with Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, and even Cairo, whereas Jerusalem was basically a city of pilgrimage and imports with very modest economic activities, and Jaffa a point of entry for pilgrims and tourists.

Insofar as the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement was concerned, it fell in the hands of the family of Sharif Husayn. Jamal Pasha's ruthless suppression of the Arab nationalists in Syria, together with the organizational weakness and narrow class base of those Arab nationalists, left no possibility of fomenting an Arab rebellion within Syria. Thus the Arab revolt was staged in the Hijaz under the leadership of the Hashemite family.

As Dawn has rightly pointed out, the revolt was the most important step in the growth of nationalism among the Arabs before 1918.³⁴ And even though Sharif Husayn was a traditional Ottomanist who sincerely believed that a truly Muslim Ottoman state was the best way of defending Islam against the West, he sparked the revolt mainly to preserve the autonomous status of his immediate family in the Hijaz and to foil the aims of his neighboring rivals in Arabia, particularly the fundamentalist 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud and the Wahhabis.

But to be able to claim legitimate supremacy over his rivals, Sharif Husayn had to adopt an ideology which would give him as broad a base of legitimacy as possible. Hence he adopted the ideology of Arab nationalism and sought kingship over the Arabs.³⁵ In that he was materially and politically assisted by the British who wanted to enlist the Arabs on their side in the war and who saw advantages in the rebellion of a Sunni Muslim against the Sunni Ottoman state, foremost among which was the usefulness of the rebellion as an instrument to delegitimize Ottoman Turkey in the eyes of the Muslim world.

The Postwar Administrative Setup in Palestine

In 1918, the last year of the war, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Allied armies occupied the Near East. In January 1917, British forces of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under the control of General Sir Edmund Allenby invaded southern Palestine, and on November 16 of the same year occupied Jaffa, and on December 9 occupied Jerusalem. On September 23, 1918, General Allenby's forces occupied Haifa; on October 1 they occupied Damascus; on October 3 Faysal, now commander of the Northern Arab Army which was controlled by Allenby, made a victorious entry into the city; on October 8 Beirut fell to Allenby's forces. Aleppo was captured on October 25, and on October 30 a separate armistice was signed between the Allied powers and Turkey.³⁶ Less than two weeks later Germany in its turn capitulated to the Allied powers.

On the eve of the capitulation, specifically in October 1918, General Allenby reported to the War Office that he had divided Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine into three administrative areas called Occupied Enemy Territory (OET): North (Lebanon and the Syrian Coast), South (Palestine), and East (Transjordan and the interior of Syria). Responsibility for the military government rested in the hands of Allenby until December 1919, when the French were given control of OET-North and OET-East was transferred to a provisional Arab government under Amir Faysal.³⁷ The boundaries of these administrations, it must be pointed out, departed from the Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded in October 1916 between Britain, France, and Russia for the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.³⁸

Chief administrators were entrusted with the task of governing the administered areas. These administrators were directly responsible to the commander-in-chief, General Allenby, who sent them instructions through his chief political officer. From an administrative point of view, this system rendered the French position considerably weaker than that of

the British. The commander-in-chief was responsible to the War Cabinet and his chief political officer received instructions from him and from the Foreign Office. The French administrator of O.E.T.-North was not only cut off from the command of operations but was also cut off from his own government and was subordinated to the British general. During the year which followed this arrangement, all permits for travel, meeting, publication, or censorship were within the jurisdiction of the British military administration.³⁹

In Palestine, the headquarters of O.E.T.-South were in Jerusalem, and its authority extended to the entire country, whose boundaries were yet to be determined. The chief administrator, who governed the country in Allenby's name, selected military governors to rule over the districts into which the country was divided.

At the beginning of the military administration, Palestine was divided into thirteen administrative districts. In 1919 these districts were reduced to ten and each one was put under a military governor, a situation which prevailed until July 1, 1920, when the military regime was replaced by a civil administration. Thus, under the military administration the chain of command ranged from the military governors to the chief administrator, to General Allenby, and to the War Office in London.⁴⁰

The War Office handled the day-to-day administration of the country, while the Foreign Office took the responsibility of determining its political future in consultation with a chief political officer, who was stationed in Palestine and reported to the Foreign Office on the country's political situation and passed along their advice to the chief administrator.⁴¹ Government departments were formed and Ottoman law and systems of administration were followed. Since the military administration was temporary, its objective was to preserve the status quo and maintain public services until a permanent government was appointed.⁴²

The Arab Political Configuration in Palestine, 1918

On the eve of the fall of Palestine in the autumn of 1918, political control was in the hands of older notables, many of whom were staunch Ottomanists and strong opponents of Sharif Husayn and his sons. The Arab nationalists, too feeble a minority to wield any political power, were either soundly defeated by Jamal Pasha or opted to serve in Faysal's provisional Arab government in Damascus. Heartened by the entry of Faysal's army into Damascus in early October 1918 and by Faysal's appointment as head of the military administration which was set up there, the Arab nationalists thought that the dream of Arab nationalism was close to fulfillment. They also thought that by turning toward Faysal and his Arab government in Damascus they could muster the requisite support for their struggle against Zionism.⁴³

For many of the older notables, the situation looked different. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire signified to these men that Ottomanism was no longer a viable political ideology. The ideological void left by the final collapse of the empire was filled by the new ideology of Arab nationalism. After the war, Arab nationalism became the prevailing ideology in Syria where the older generation of Syrian notables conveniently switched to the new ideology to protect their position of strength in local society. Moreover, younger Syrians, Palestinians, and Iraqis, many of whom were either officers in Faysal's army during the war or were members in Arab nationalist societies, rode the crest of Arab nationalism and became the real masters of Syria during Faysal's 22-month reign there. In short, the collapse of the empire stamped out the ideology of Ottomanism and caused Arab nationalism to emerge as the only viable political option.

In the case of the older generation of Palestinian notables, who had subscribed to Ottomanism until the final

defeat of the Ottoman Turks, adopting Arab nationalism was not a particularly attractive option. In the first place, the Zionist threat to Palestine dictated that they be Palestinian nationalists. This feeling was a natural outcome of local patriotism. We have already seen that from the outset of the Zionist activities in Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs protested against those activities out of local patriotism and Ottoman loyalty. Mandel had rightly suggested that from 1910 onward, when the Palestinian Arabs began to see the Zionists as a threat to Palestine in particular, they "increasingly spoke of themselves as 'Palestinians' in the context of Zionism."⁴⁴ Seeing Palestine put under a separate military administration, and alarmed at Britain and her Zionist policy in the country, the older generation of Palestinian political elites chose to focus on Palestine and the Palestinian struggle against Zionism. They seemed to believe that Zionism was a threat to the Arabs in general, but a direct danger to Palestine in particular. From their perspective, therefore, Palestinian nationalism carried the day because the Palestinians were the ones who were directly locked in conflict with the Zionist movement, and Palestine was the focus of this conflict. On the other hand, certain members of the younger generation of Palestinian elites championed the cause of Arab nationalism, believing that the victory of the new and ascendant ideology would not only serve Arab unity and independence but would also prevent the implantation of an alien Zionist entity in Palestine. As we shall see in the following chapters, it took two years for the debate between the advocates of the two points of view to settle and culminate in a geographically defined ideology of Palestinian nationalism.

Second, it was uncomfortable and difficult for older members of the Palestinian political elite to adapt to the new political framework that emerged after the Ottoman defeat. Their close collaboration with the Ottoman regime, and their involvement in the continuation of the empire, made it most difficult for them to switch their loyalty from Ottomanism to Arab nationalism. Embracing Palestinian nationalism,

however, proved to be an easier and more comfortable task. We can better understand the ease of this embrace in the light of the older Arab elite's opposition to Zionism on grounds of Ottoman loyalism. In the manner of the Ottoman sultan and his ministers, the older Arab elites of Palestine regarded the Zionist movement as a separatist movement that was supported by the foreign powers, and posed a threat to the unity of the empire.⁴⁵

Deeply ingrained as it was in most of these elites, Ottoman loyalism did not preclude Palestinian patriotism, but it seemed to preclude the separatist ideology of Arab nationalism. In other words, it was much easier for the traditional Palestinian elites to accommodate Ottomanism and Palestinian nationalism, than to accommodate Ottomanism and Arab nationalism. As for the younger members of the elite, the picture was different. Many of them were not involved in the continuation of the empire. Many had no careers after the Young Turk revolution. Many had been nurtured on the politics of the Arab movement before and during the war. Many also suffered from the draconian measures of the CUP. It was natural for these younger elites, therefore, to ride the tide of Arab nationalism and adapt to the new political order that emerged after the war.

Third, there was the question of self-interest. The political ambitions of the older generation of Palestinian notables were as old as the hills. They sought the maintenance and expansion of their positions of strength with the hope of molding Palestinian Arab politics in their own image of a stable political order over which they would dominate unchallenged by political newcomers. An independent Palestine was more likely to provide them with the opportunity to continue exercising political power from a position of strength. However, a Palestine united to Syria was likely to pose risks which they were not prepared to take. Faysal's political guard of younger and increasingly influential Arab nationalists who hailed from Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, were asserting themselves as the new masters of the Syrian interior. The older

Palestinian notables did not wish to see the ambitious young Arab nationalists dominate the political scene in Palestine. Their positions of local dominance were too important to be allowed to slip in the hands of the young Arab nationalists.

Fourth, Syrian cities such as Damascus and Aleppo posed a different kind of challenge for the positions of older Palestinian notables. The network of propertied urban families in Syria was much larger and, on the whole, wealthier than the network of urban Palestinian families. Compared to Palestinian cities, Damascus and Aleppo had a much larger population and greater commercial importance. It was therefore likely that should Palestine merge with a larger Syria, the Syrian notables would outshine their Palestinian counterparts. Moreover, the fact that Damascus played a more critical role in the birth of Arab nationalism could prompt the Damascus political elite to use this as an ideological weapon with which to assert their political supremacy over the elites of other cities.

That many older members of the Palestinian elite focused on Palestinian nationalism instead of Arab nationalism seems therefore understandable. Drawing on their sources of influence and their legacy of local political dominance, they tried to convince the British occupier that they were the natural leaders of their society. They also tried to demonstrate that they could effectively contribute to the restoration of law and order by continuing to play their political role as intermediaries between government and people.

Realizing that the British were now the new authority in Palestine, many of the urban notables discovered a need to be circumspect in their actions: the acceptance of administrative posts; the cautious engagement in politics and expression of discontent; discreet opposition to the policies of the occupier without provoking his wrath.⁴⁶ To take a few examples: Musa Kazim al-Husayni accepted his appointment as mayor by the British military governor in March 1918 after the death of his predecessor and brother, Husayn al-Husayni; the mayor of Nablus from Ottoman times, 'Umar Zu'aytir, formed upon the

request of the British military authorities in the fall of 1918, a local government in Nablus;⁴⁷ in November 1918, shortly after the appearance of the Jerusalem Muslim-Christian Association (MCA), of which more will be said later, one of its dominant members, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, refrained from demonstrating against Zionism after the Jerusalem governor, Ronald Storrs, told him that he must make a choice between politics and the mayoralty, and after Storrs showed him a letter signed by Raghīb Bey al-Nashashibi confirming the latter's acceptance of the post should Musa Kazim be dismissed,⁴⁸ the general administrator of the Awqaf, 'Arif Hikmat al-Nashashibi, also preferred administration to politics when he was asked by Storrs to make a choice between the two; in response to the order issued by the British military authorities to the Palestinian Arabs to refrain from all sorts of political activity, the mufti of Jerusalem, Kamil al-Husayni, whose appointment by the Ottomans was confirmed by the British, refrained from public attacks against Zionism throughout 1918.⁴⁹

Such circumspect behavior, however, did not mean that the urban notables subscribed to the Zionist policy of England, which was at the time embodied in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. All it did was help them retain their local posts and have a role in local politics. In fact, they could scarcely avoid their opposition to Zionism and the British Zionist policy for two interrelated reasons. On the one hand, they had heard of the Balfour Declaration when it was issued and were unanimous in resisting it because they could not accept, for moral and national reasons, foreign Jews being introduced into their country to enjoy equal rights with them and perhaps one day to dominate over them. On the other hand, their Arab constituency was also unanimous in resisting Zionism.

We need not here study the numerous petitions and memoranda delivered to the military administration by the Arabs during the period under survey. Nor need we analyze the speeches and newspaper articles prepared by the Palestinian Arabs to present the claim that Palestine belonged to its

native Arab people since this has been undertaken by other writers on the subject.⁵⁰ Suffice it here, for the purposes of this analysis, to summarize a memorandum which the Jaffa MCA submitted to General Allenby in the fall of 1918. After pointing out that Britain had entered the war in order to liberate weak nations and grant them autonomy, the memorandum went on to say that the Muslims of Palestine did not wish to drive anyone away from the country and that they desired, together with their Christian brethren, to live in freedom safeguarding their own language and rights and the rights of those who inhabit their homeland. The memorandum also affirmed the Palestinian Arabs' rejection of anyone who wanted to migrate to Palestine for the purpose of settling there.

Furthermore, the memorandum tried to refute the Zionist claim that the Jews were returning to Palestine after the absence of twenty centuries. "On the basis of their theory [meaning the Zionist concept of return]," asked the memorandum,

shouldn't we return the Kingdom of Spain to the Arabs who owned it and inhabited it for four hundred years, in addition to a great portion of Europe which they also owned and inhabited? Or, shouldn't we turn back the map of the world to the way it was on the day of the Flood, which is considered the beginning of history.

Another argument presented in the memorandum was the assertion that the Jews were a tiny minority compared to the Arabs (less than one Jew for every 500 Arabs according to the memorandum) and that their possessions were just a small fraction in relation to Arab possessions. As such, the memorandum questioned the logic of how a very small minority should assume sovereignty in Palestine after the British occupation.

One interesting aspect of the memorandum was the Arab fear of Jewish domination. The memorandum referred to the dangerous fate that awaited the Palestinian Arabs should they be subject to Jewish rule:

We accept them [meaning the Jews] as guests. How can we therefore succumb to their rule when we saw them [under the Ottoman rule] to be the most tyrannical and oppressive of peoples. They used to beat and imprison some weak individuals who were not Jewish. They even forbade them [non-Jews] to pass through public roads in their colonies. Have the Muslim and Christian Arabs done such acts? No. Is it conceivable that the civilized nations will decree that we leave a homeland in whose land are interred the bones of our forefathers? If that is the case, then we should consider as of now finding a cemetery to bury ourselves alive.

But to the mind of the drafters of the memorandum, that would not happen for they concluded by saying:

Great Britain is the one that saved us from Turkish tyranny and we do not believe she will throw us to the claws of the Jews. We plead for fairness and justice from her (meaning Britain). We plead that she safeguard our rights and refrain from determining the future of Palestine without asking us our opinion.⁵¹

The British military administrators, who were bound by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 not to tamper with existing Ottoman laws and institutions, were generally unenthusiastic about the British Zionist policy in Palestine. The three chief administrators during the military administration—General A. W. Money, Major-General H. D. Watson, and Major-General Louis Bols—warned their government that the Palestinian Arabs were vehemently opposed to Zionism, and that the Zionist program would result in serious outbreaks between the Arabs and the Jews, and would ultimately sour British relations with the Arabs.⁵² Moreover, British army personnel suggested that Britain should win the friendship of the Muslims by altering its pro-Zionist policy, and even help set up the MCA to “keep the ‘balance’ between the different factions of the population.”⁵³ Given the widespread Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism, some of the heads of the military administration doubted that their government policy would ever succeed.⁵⁴

Political Control in Damascus on the Eve of Capitulation

Like their counterparts in Palestine, the notables of Damascus, many of whom subscribed to Ottomanism and strongly opposed the Hashemites, realized after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that they had to adapt their political ideology to the new postwar realities. The march to the city of British and French troops and Faysal's Northern Arab Army inconvenienced the notables directly. To prominent Damscene notables like 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, Muhammad Fawzi al-'Azm, Badi' Mu'ayyad al-'Azm, and Muhammad 'Arif al-Quwwatli, the most pressing issue after the war was their reestablishment as an aristocracy of service. Cognizant that Faysal would be the new leader of Syria, they found it in their best interest to moderate their Ottoman ideology and shift to Arabism.⁵⁵ They were now to go through a new process of antagonistic ambitions and political agitations and passions.

When Faysal's Arab army and the Australian mounted troops marched through Damascus in the early morning of October 1, they found the municipality hall packed with notables who had formed a committee headed by Amir Sa'id al-Jaza'iri and his brother Amir 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaza'iris, grandsons of the famous Algerian nationalist 'Abd al-Qadir who was exiled to Damascus by the French in 1856, had the day before proclaimed the independence of Syria, hoisted the Sharifian flag, and took responsibility for governing Damascus in the name of Sharif Husayn. T. E. Lawrence, the British staff captain who joined Faysal's forces after the Sharifian Revolt, immediately dismissed the Jaza'iris after a meeting in the municipality hall. Whether he took this step because he feared the Jaza'iris' French connection or because he thought they were Ottoman adherents is unclear. But it seems that Lawrence did not want to see them killed, lest this be seen by the Arabs as an example of political murder set by the British. Lawrence's prudence, however, was to no avail, for in that same month of October,

the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir was killed and his brother Sa'id temporarily lost his liberty following a sudden revolt they had staged during the first night and second morning of the Allied occupation. Moreover, looting and lawlessness broke loose in the city.⁵⁶

In this atmosphere, Lawrence appointed Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi, an ex-Ottoman army officer, who was a prominent member of a Damascene notable family and a confidant of Amir Faysal, as acting military governor. On October 5, Faysal proclaimed an independent Arab government with the knowledge and recognition of General Allenby, who seems to have believed that in so doing he would be putting into operation the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and fulfilling McMahon's pledges to the Sharif.⁵⁷ In the first proclamation that he issued, Faysal referred to the government as an "Arab constitutional government . . . fully and absolutely independent," and having authority over "all Syria." Faysal concluded the proclamation by emphasizing that his Arab government would extend equal rights to Muslims, Christians, and Jews.⁵⁸

Appointed to head the government was Ali Rida Pasha al-Rikabi. Both al-Rikabi and al-Ayyubi were local Damascene notables who shifted to the Sharifian camp when they learned about the crippling Ottoman defeats toward the end of the war. al-Rikabi, who was a general in the Ottoman army, was in secret league with Faysal, and in June 1918 he surreptitiously met with T. E. Lawrence in Qabun, near Damascus. During the meeting Lawrence relayed a message from Faysal to al-Rikabi requesting the Arab leaders in Damascus to encourage Arab troops in the Turkish army to desert and join the forces at Aqaba.⁵⁹ During the war, al-Rikabi surrendered to a British officer, but owing to his Sharifian connections he was immediately released to become chief administrator of O.E.T.-East and later military governor of Damascus. Toward the end of the war he was recruited by the central committee of al-Fatat apparently because of his Sharifian links and because the society thought that his position in the Ottoman army would be of help to its Arab nationalist objectives.⁶⁰ Shukri al-

Ayyubi was socially and politically of the same background as al-Rikabi. He was an ex-officer in the Ottoman army, a notable Damascene, and a confidant of the Sharifians.

Such was the political mixture in Damascus on the eve of Faysal's establishment of his independent Arab government: fearful notables who replaced the feathers of their Ottoman cap with Arab feathers; an uncertain political future; social turmoil; and above all, a dynamic and assertive group of Arab nationalists, to whose brand of nationalism Faysal himself fell captive and whose political style and ambition were a constant rebuke and threat to the local notables. In this disorderly state of affairs, Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian Arab nationalists solidified their positions, thus forming a heterogeneous group with overlapping interests, a group that ultimately clashed with the passions and jealousies of local Damascene politicians. This will be the subject of the next two chapters. Before dwelling on that, however, it is pertinent to discuss briefly the collapse of the Sykes-Picot agreement, because the Anglo-French disagreement over the meaning and implementation of its terms created antagonistic ambitions and visited unpleasant consequences on the people of Arab Asia.

The Fate of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the French tried very hard to have the British implement every term of the Sykes-Picot accord, except for minor reciprocal alterations. Realizing that Faysal was seeking Syrian independence under his leadership, they saw no reason to acquiesce, because from their perspective the alternative to French domination in Syria was not Arab sovereignty over an independent Syria but British hegemony.⁶¹ Moreover, as one observer has noted, the Sharifian demand to unite the areas of Arab Asia under their rule

ran counter to the postwar power position of Britain and France in Arab Asia, and to the interest of Ibn Sa'ud (then the Amir of Najd and its dependencies), and the ruler of Yemen Imam Yahya, both of whom refused to acknowledge the leadership of Husayn and his sons in Arab Asia.⁶² When, at a meeting of the Allied Supreme Council on March 20, 1919, the British and French exchanged recriminations over the Syrian question and the meaning of the Sykes-Picot agreement, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States proposed that an inter-allied commission, appointed by England, France, and the United States, travel to the Lebanon-Syria-Palestine area to ascertain the wishes of the people. The French insisted that they would not accept a commission of inquiry unless French replaced British troops in Syria. The British refused to accept this demand and the deadlock continued.⁶³ The American section of the investigative body, or the King-Crane Commission, proceeded to Syria on its own. The Sykes-Picot agreement was on its death bed. But this did not mean that the two powers would not patch up their differences. After all, Britain and France needed each other more than they needed Faysal. To quote Kedourie, "when the events compelled England to choose between France and Faysal, it was France naturally that England chose."⁶⁴

In the end, the French prevailed over the British. When the Allied Supreme Council met at San Remo, on April 25, 1920, it finally decided to put Syria and Lebanon under the mandate of France, and Palestine (within boundaries yet to be decided) and Mesopotamia (later Iraq) under the mandate of Britain.⁶⁵ Three months after this formal agreement, the French invaded Syria, deposed Faysal, and created a power vacuum in the southern half of OET-East. In this area, later known as Transjordan, the British, in 1921, recognized Amir 'Abdullah, Husayn's second son, as ruler and allowed him to set up with their assistance a new Arab amirate to which their Jewish national home policy did not apply. As to the boundaries of Palestine, they remained undefined until the Anglo-French boundary convention of March 1923.

5.

Faysal's Arab Government: The Making and Unmaking of a King, 1918-1920

The Faysal administration in Damascus was, as Macaulay said of unstable political systems, "all sail and no anchor."¹ It was plagued with financial and administrative difficulties. The war shattered its income, with revenues falling to less than £1,400 million and expenditures rising to over £2,250 million in 1919.² Agricultural output suffered a severe setback. Exports of cereals, cotton, and wool, as well as textile production, were badly disrupted. The communications network, particularly the railways and road system, was also disrupted.³

Social and economic problems were equally shattering. Peasants fled their farms and moved to Damascus and Aleppo in quest of livelihood. To these problems should be added the influx into Damascus of Hijazi and Syrian tribesmen, and non-Damascene civilians and military officers who joined Faysal's army and accompanied him seeking posts in an already shrunken administrative apparatus.

As to the administration itself, it passed through three phases which were also beset by serious problems. The first phase, known as the phase of the "pure military government,"

(*al-hukuma al-'askariyya al-bahta*) extended from September 5, 1918, to August 4, 1919, the day on which the Board of Administrators (*majlis al-mudirin*) was formed. In the first phase, authority was vested in the hands of the military governor who was under the supervision of Amir Faysal and was responsible to the British commander-in-chief. General administrators (*al-mudara' al-'ammun*) ran departmental affairs but exercised no political influence.

In the second phase, which lasted from August 4, 1919 to March 8, 1920, when Faysal's Arab government declared Syria independent, general administrators acted as ministers and took part in the decision-making process. The military governor became the vice-president of the Board of Administrators from August 4, 1919, until January 26, 1920, after which he became director-general (*mudir 'amm*) for military affairs.

The third phase, known as the phase of formal independence (*al-istiqlal al-rasmi*), stretched from March 8, 1920 until July 25 of the same year, the day on which the French forces overthrew Faysal's Arab government in Damascus and forced him to leave Syria three days later. This phase was characterized by the formation of two Arab governments, composed of seven ministers and responsible to the General Syrian Congress, which acted as a constituent assembly and first convened in Damascus on June 3, 1919.⁴

In all three phases, the Arab government had to face internal administrative and political problems. The most serious administrative problem was the government's inability to establish a thoroughly reformed governmental apparatus after the break from the Ottoman framework. The Arab administration was a continuation of the Ottoman, new in nothing except its personnel. Obligated by his diplomatic duties to be absent in Europe for lengthy intervals pleading the case of Arab independence, Faysal had to depend on the existing administrative framework and its Ottoman law codes.⁵ The day-to-day governmental operations were left to his followers and confidants. Many of them were young Syrian, Palestinian, and

Iraqi officers and intellectuals who took part in Faysal's war effort. To repay the debt, Faysal expanded the bureaucracy and granted them privileged administrative positions at the expense of the older Damascene notability. These young upstarts went to great extremes in their attempt to assert their political dominion and push to the sidelines older members of the Syrian notability.

The internal political problems were more serious and more far-reaching. They may be described as a clash of interests among a loosely organized group of young Syrians, Palestinians, and Iraqis. These were the political upstarts whom Faysal had accommodated within his government. Even though these men raised the banner of Arab unity and independence, reason of state seems to have been predominant among them. For all practical purposes, greater Syria was now dismembered. Its reconstruction into three zones, each under a military administration, created a new political situation.

In Palestine, the British sought to shape the political future of the country in accordance with the Balfour Declaration which called for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." Armed with British protection and with the legal status granted to it by the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist movement was doing its best to attain a Jewish majority and to achieve statehood in Palestine, without regard to the wishes of the Arab majority.⁶ Prominent Zionists declared these goals publicly on more than one occasion. Herbert Samuel, the British Zionist Jew who was appointed high commissioner for Palestine in July 1920, stated in 1919 that the Zionist movement should seek the creation of new conditions in Palestine which would enable it to set up an independent state controlled by a Jewish majority. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, stated before the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919 that when the Jews become a majority in Palestine through massive immigration they would form an independent government, and Zionism's goal was that "Palestine become as Jewish as

England is English."⁷ The leaders of the Jewish community (Yishuv) said, as early as December 1918, that they aimed at securing a Jewish majority in Palestine with the purpose of establishing a Jewish state in which the Arabs would become only a minority.⁸ As many historians have shown, the Palestinian Arabs were aware of these intentions and they strongly opposed them, insisting that Palestine remain an Arab country and that the Palestinian Arab majority was entitled to self-determination and self-government.⁹

In Syria, a different political situation prevailed. The Arab administration, which was set up in the interior under the leadership of Faysal, had to contend with the designs of the French who not only controlled Mount Lebanon, the city of Beirut, and the Turkish divisions along the littoral to Alexandretta, but who were also reinforcing their military forces in Lebanon and western Syria. Having practically no means to defend itself, the Arab government in Damascus was an easy prey to French colonial ambitions. In the course of less than two years, the French military force on the Syrian coast gradually expanded from 2,000 men in the fall of 1918 to over 180,000 in the spring of 1920, in addition to the French forces in Cilicia, and to tanks, heavy guns, and airplanes.¹⁰

Insofar as Iraq was concerned, the British considered its possession to be vital to their imperial interests. After occupying Baghdad in March, 1917, the British set out to keep Basra under their administration and to establish in Baghdad, according to the War Cabinet, "an Arab State with local ruler or government under British Protectorate in everything but name."¹¹ Whether or not this was intended to be the guide for the actual administration of the territory, there was no doubt that the British were determined to assert their presence in Iraq for the purpose of controlling the Persian Gulf and preventing any rival power from taking over that territory or making difficulties for Britain there.

The scene in Damascus was thus set for two kinds of political difficulties. There was, on the one hand, the confrontation between Arab national aspirations and the imperial

designs of France and England. On the other hand, there was a conflict in the political priorities of the Syrians, Palestinians, and Iraqis who formed the backbone of Faysal's government.

In the eyes of Arab nationalists from Palestine, Faysal's government represented a crucial step for the realization of the dream of Arab independence. More importantly, a strong and independent Arab government in Damascus was from their perspective a great source of strength for their struggle against Zionism. No wonder, therefore, that tens of Palestinians played an active role in Faysal's administration and some occupied key positions there. Sa'id al-Husayni served as foreign minister in the government of 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi (March-April 1920); 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi was a member of the Hijazi delegation which represented Faysal at the Paris Peace Conference and later served as Faysal's private secretary; Muhammad 'Ali al-Tamimi served as chief of the Damascus gendarmerie; Amin al-Tamimi was advisor to Amir Zayd, Faysal's brother, and head of the Directors' Council which was formed in January 1920; Ahmad Hilmi 'Abd al-Baqi was director of the treasury in this council; Mu'in al-Madi was director of the Department of Intelligence and afterward served as governor of al-Karak district in Transjordan.¹²

Though the Palestinians in Damascus expressed pan-Arab demands and sentiments, their focus on Palestine overshadowed all other matters. The Iraqis and Syrians were not any different. The upstart Iraqi group of al-'Ahd (The Covenant), some of whose members held positions of chief of staff and ministerial portfolios in the new Arab government, was mostly preoccupied with the interests of Iraq. Faced with the ever present possibility of a French attack, the Syrian Arab nationalists gave priority to affairs in Syria. Moreover, the older Damascene notables disliked seeing an alien group of young Palestinians and Iraqis and a local group of Syrian newcomers exercise authority over them and pursue political goals which, they thought, would set Syria ablaze. How these clashes of interest led to the emergence of various political groups whose local political interests predominated over their pan-Arab

ideas is the primary theme of the next chapter. Before dwelling on that, however, we should examine Faysal's relationship with his Arab nationalist supporters, and the events that culminated in his downfall.

Political Pressures and Political Control

Actual political control during Faysal's short reign in Damascus lay in the hands of three Arab nationalist organizations: al-Fatat, al-'Ahd, and Hizb al-Istiqlal al-'Arabi (the Arab Independence Party). Although all three professed the goal of complete Arab independence, their different political ambitions and interests sapped much of their strength. As such, they could not form the basis of a harmonious community. Nor did they constitute what may be called political movements, that is groupings that seek to involve the masses in politics by mobilizing them around a leader and his political program. They were, rather, overlapping groups with aims and motives of their own, groups that operated somewhat in the nature of a snare about Faysal's neck, putting formidable internal pressures on him.

The Syrians, the Iraqis, and the Palestinians who joined Faysal's movement during the war were now effectively established in power in Damascus. Having learned the politics of conspiracy from their prewar experience in the Young Turk cause, they could now draw from England a monthly subsidy of up to 150,000 British pounds. They could also levy taxes, conscript men, and purchase surplus British arms.¹³ Moreover, they resorted to intimidation, nepotism, and uprisings and insurrections to consolidate their position, helped in that by Faysal's preoccupation with countering French designs in Syria, his lack of determination, and the unsettled conditions resulting from the war.¹⁴

To take one instance: Jean Pichon, the French foreign minister, had reasserted in the French Chamber, on December

29, 1918, that France had traditional rights in Syria, in Lebanon, in Cilicia, and in Palestine. When Faysal's Arab nationalist supporters received Pichon's statement at the end of January 1919, the newspapers began attacking the French, accusing the Eastern Christians of preference for French over Sharifian rule. An emotional atmosphere of public excitement ensued, and in a brawl some fifty Armenian refugees were killed in Aleppo.¹⁵

Also in January 1919 pressures on Faysal surfaced when he made an informal agreement with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the World Zionist Organization, following several meetings between the two at the request of the British government, first in Aqaba in the first week of June 1918 and later in Europe. The agreement, which permitted Jewish immigration into Palestine without supporting the idea of a Jewish national home, was predicated on the fulfillment by Great Britain of its pledges regarding Arab independence as demanded in Faysal's memorandum, which he submitted to the Foreign Office on January 4, 1919. "But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made," Faysal stated in his handwritten condition which was affixed to the agreement, "I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever."¹⁶

Since Faysal's condition of Arab independence was not fulfilled, the agreement never became valid. Its main significance lies in the evidence it presents regarding Faysal's desire to promote Arab-Jewish cooperation so long as that did not compromise Arab independence.¹⁷ Faysal believed that through cooperation with the Jews he would avoid becoming too indebted to the French and would even "squeeze them" out of Syria.¹⁸

Although Faysal never understood Arab-Jewish cooperation to mean the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish polity but rather a step that would lead to a "reformed and revived Near East," and although Zionist leaders had tactically told him and other Arab representatives whom they met that they did not wish to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, the Fay-

sal-Weizmann agreement provoked a strong Palestinian reaction in Damascus.¹⁹

We have already seen the Arab opposition to Zionism and how it developed into a widespread phenomenon after 1908. It is no surprise, therefore, to see the emergence in Damascus of a Palestinian political club dedicated to staging anti-Zionist activities, including the distribution of anti-Zionist manifestos in January 1919. The club, known as al-Nadi al-'Arabi (the Arab Club), tried to pressure Faysal into rejecting any cooperation with the Zionists. Its Palestinian leadership could effectively block Faysal from using the Zionists to secure British support in his attempts to counter French ambitions in Syria.²⁰

Moreover, in an attempt to rally public support and dissuade Faysal from dealing with the Zionists, Palestinian Arab nationalists in Damascus, such as Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, a key member of al-Fatat, wrote articles in the local press calling for action against the Zionists. In his articles, Darwaza ridiculed the idea of possible Jewish contribution to Palestine and pointed out the catastrophic impact of Jewish immigration on the country and the threat that Zionism posed to Syria and the Arab world.²¹

In their reaction to the Faysal-Weizmann agreement, the Palestinians in Damascus were reflecting the position of many an Arab nationalist. "The authenticity of this agreement," wrote Nabih al-'Azma, an Arab nationalist from Syria,

bestows neither value nor legitimacy upon it because it contradicts the will of the Arab nation which is manifest in its national covenants and in the resolutions of its parties and committees. The Arab nation never granted Faysal or any other person such a mandate that runs counter to the aspirations it had expressed on many occasions. Matters that are decisively essential to the life of a nation cannot be dealt with simply on the basis of a document signed by one person or a group of persons.²²

The Palestinian Arab nationalists must have known that the matter of Palestine was out of Faysal's hands. After all, they

were at the height of power and authority and very close to him. In his private papers, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, a Palestinian who traveled with Faysal to Europe to discuss the Syrian question, cites a subtle apology that Faysal made, an apology which demonstrates that some of his Palestinian followers were aware of his dilemma. When the French Minister Pichon asked the amir why he had stressed Syria's independence but not Palestine's, Faysal answered:

Your Excellency, whenever I speak of Syria's independence I hear the echo of my voice resounding in London. But when I mention Palestine I hear no echo for its name at all, neither in London nor in Paris. Help me, Your Excellency, and back me up and you will then see whether or not I will loudly demand Palestine's independence.²³

Despite their knowledge that Faysal had an Anglo-French noose around his neck, the Arab nationalist groups were not willing to appreciate his position of weakness in dealing with the two imperial powers. Some of them believed that they could grapple with both France and England. Some, especially among members of al-'Ahd, started to veer against the Sharifian family, and even to say that it had betrayed Islam by siding with the British against the Ottoman Empire during the war.²⁴ Others became extreme opponents of the family, vowing never to associate with any of its members. "As to the sons of al-Husayn," wrote Muhammad al-Qadib to Nabih al-'Azma sometime in the winter of 1920,

I pledged to God that I will not work with anyone who thinks of working with them. I believe that he who works with any of them, trusting that with their help he can save the country and its people [meaning Syria], is either their accomplice, or is ignorant of their past deeds.²⁵

A third pressure also appeared early in the winter of 1919. After the breakup of the Paris Peace Conference, which first took up the question of the Ottoman Empire on January 18 of the same year, and after a long deadlock over Syria between England and France, the two powers reached an agreement on

September 13, 1919. The agreement provided for the withdrawal of British troops from Syria (excluding Palestine) and from Cilicia on November 1, and their replacement by Arab troops in the cities of Damascus, Hims, Hama, and Aleppo and by French troops in Cilicia and along the Syrian littoral.

When Faysal protested against the agreement on the grounds that he opposed any partition of Arab territory and any French mandate over Syria, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George invited him to come to Europe and try to reach an understanding with the French. On October 20, Faysal arrived in Paris, and after two and a half months of negotiations with Georges Clemenceau, the French premier and minister of war (November 1917-January 1920), and other French officials at the Quai d'Orsay, Faysal came to a provisional agreement upon the urging of the British at the beginning of January 1920. The agreement recognized the right of the "Syrian nation" to independence and unity, but insisted that the Syrian state was to be defended, advised, and represented abroad by France.²⁶

This agreement, which Faysal had apparently refused to sign before obtaining the consent of his people in Damascus, was distasteful to his followers. Once in Damascus, Faysal made several attempts to convince his supporters to accept his agreement with Clemenceau, but to no avail. Al-Fatat and al-'Ahd were now not only anti-French but also began to make hostile allusions to the British as a result of the Anglo-French agreement of September 1919.²⁷ Constrained by these political groups, Faysal could do little to overrule their rejection of the agreement, even though he knew their refusal meant war with France. Most members of al-Fatat even told Faysal that they were ready to declare war against France and England together.²⁸ From their perspective, England planned to give Palestine to the Jews and France was a double enemy; it endorsed the formation of a "Jewish state" in Palestine, and it wanted to "swallow" Syria.²⁹

Unable to convince the ardent Arab nationalists to accept compromise with France, Faysal was also without control

of the situation in the Syrian hinterland. What followed shows the limitations on his political power. In the early months of 1920 he started to court the conservative Damascene notables, who never sympathized with his father's revolt and whom he had personally ignored in favor of the Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi newcomers. In a move of despair, he managed to convince older Syrian notables who were strong opponents of his family, such as 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf, to form a new political party that suited his policy of compromise and moderation.³⁰ The upshot was the establishment of al-Hizb al-Watani (the National Party), which sought compromise with the French on the basis of the unsigned Faysal-Clemenceau agreement. As we shall see in the following chapter, this party came under scathing attacks from young Syrian and Palestinian activists who disliked and distrusted the old guard of Damascus and tried their best to block their return to positions of local political control.

The General Syrian Congress

Amid the discontent and nationalist pressures, and in an effort to position himself in European eyes as the accommodating leader of a stable Arab state, Faysal called, around the middle of May 1919, for a general national congress to be held in Damascus. Foremost on Faysal's mind was perhaps his strong desire to communicate to the forthcoming King-Crane Commission that the people of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine included, were unanimous in their search for total Syrian independence. The idea of the commission, it must be noted, goes back to the decision of the Paris Peace Conference in March 1919 to send an inter-allied commission to the Middle East to acquaint itself with the sentiments of the people of the region with regard to the future administration of their affairs. This commission, the instructions of which were accepted "in

principle" by the French and "lukewarmly" by the British on March 25, ended by being an American commission of inquiry, known as the King-Crane Commission, without the participation of either England or France.³¹

Allenby warned Faysal of the dangers of convening a congress, because on the one hand political activities were not permitted in a territory under military occupation, and on the other it would strain still further Faysal's relations with France.³² Faysal, however, proceeded with assembling the congress. Elections were conducted according to the Ottoman two-tier system in the areas under Faysal's control or, where this was opposed by British and French military authorities in their zones, representatives to the congress were given proxies (*madabit tawkil*) by local notables.³³ As such, several members were ex-deputies of the prewar Ottoman parliament.

In Damascus, for instance, the anti-Faysal ticket of land-owning notables headed by Muhammad Fawzi al-'Azm and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf scored a decisive victory and only two Arab nationalists, Fawzi al-Bakri and Fayiz al-Shihabi, were elected to the eighteen-man delegation that was to represent Damascus at the congress.³⁴ However, the fifteen-man Palestinian delegation to the congress had at least seven representatives who were overt Arab nationalists.³⁵ The reason for this difference between Palestine and Damascus lies in the fact that because of the British ban on elections in Palestine, the local Arab associations had to select their representatives. The Arab nationalists in Palestine had the upper hand in these associations and could therefore select representatives sharing the same political persuasions. Moreover, certain notables of the MCA did not wish to attend a congress that was first, pro-Faysal, and second, a supporter of pan-Syrian unity. Nor did they wish to anger the British military authorities by attending a congress that was expected to vote for something they did not favor, that is the unity of Palestine with Syria. On the other hand, elections were permitted in Damascus and as such the Damascene notability could effectively use its local sources of power to muster enough support and win at the polls.

The First General Syrian Congress was convened in Damascus on June 3, 1919. Attending it were 90 delegates representing Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Hims, Dayr al-Zur, Hawran, the Druze Mountain, al-Karak (East Jordan), Antioch, Latakia, Beirut, Tripoli, Mount Lebanon, and Palestine. The overwhelming majority of the 39 representatives of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Hims, were wealthy landowners.³⁶ Three different groups emerged during the deliberations of the congress, representing to some degree the social composition of the delegations.

The first group was composed of young Arab nationalists who rejected the mandate of any foreign power, viewing it as a threat to Arab independence and a disguised form of imperialist penetration. Among the subscribers to this view were Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Sa'id Haydar, Ahmad Maryud, Rafiq al-Tamimi, Khalid al-Hakim, and al-Shaykh Kamil al-Qassab—all members of the inner circle of al-Fatat.³⁷

The second group was represented by Amir Faysal and the newly elected Syrian notables. They rejected any form of French protection and called for the selection of England as the mandatory power, provided her mandate would in no way compromise the complete independence, sovereignty, and unity of all of Syria. Representatives of this trend favored England out of their belief that the British government was the ally that had supported the Arabs in their revolt against the Turks and promised them independence, freedom, and unity. Moreover, they believed that the Arabs needed guidance and assistance and that Britain, by virtue of her friendship with them, was the power best equipped to assume that role.³⁸ France, on the other hand, had, in their view, designs on Syria which were reminiscent of her imperialist policies in North Africa.

As to the third group, its proponents called for American assistance or mandate over Syria. On the basis of President Woodrow Wilson's principle, enunciated in his address of July 4, 1918, which stated that every international question must be settled on the basis of the wishes of the people immediately concerned, the advocates in this group had

reason to believe that America had no political ambitions in the Middle East and that it was committed to the right of all peoples to choose their own government.³⁹

At the end, however, the congress proved to be a great embarrassment to Faysal and a blow to his hope to bring the Arab nationalists in line with his moderate policies. It was also a disappointment to the local notables. An idea of who controlled the congress is gained from the resolutions it passed. Contrary to what Faysal had hoped, the congress asked for the complete independence of geographical Syria, including Palestine, as a constitutional monarchy, the repudiation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, the rejection of the political tutelage implied in the proposed mandatory systems, and the rejection of French assistance in any form. Moreover, the congress expressed its intention to elect Faysal as king of a united Syria.⁴⁰

In early March 1920, this congress, still convening in Damascus, demanded the complete independence of geographic Syria, refused to recognize the mandate of any power, rejected the Jewish national home policy in Palestine, called for the withdrawal of all foreign armies, and proclaimed Faysal king of Syria. Thus Faysal became a prisoner of a congress of his own creation. Unable to impose his will, he and the conservative Syrian "neo-nationalists" were overpowered and manipulated until General Henri Gouraud, the French commander-in-chief as of November 1919 and later high commissioner in the territories under French mandate, marched on Damascus toward the end of July 1920, forcing Faysal to leave the city on July 28 by train to Dar'a, and from there to Haifa two days later, and then to Italy, and then to a new life in some other part of this puzzling "Arab homeland." His followers were scattered all over, some in Palestine, others in Egypt and Iraq, while others were either summarily executed by the French or thrown into jail for their uncompromising nationalism.⁴¹

Faysal, however, was also a hostage of Anglo-French designs. Power politics was the driving motive of both England

and France. In the course of implementing their imperialist ambitions they inflicted much suffering on many nations and deprived others of their independence and right to self-determination. Such was the English and French record in the Middle East in those stormy years and thereafter.

6.

The Eclipse of the Pan-Syrian Dream, 1918-1920

Apart from the Anglo-French discord and the conflict of interests at San Remo, there existed in Syria a different group of political actors, whose political priorities were not identical. I mean those Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi actors who peopled the Damascus political scene. They did not need a Dickens, or a Hemingway, or a Conrad to develop their characters and establish a spatial and temporal setting for them. Their characters were already there, with a plot, a tone, a theme, a passion, and a point of view; the setting was also there, a particular geographical area with foreign armies, foreign desires, and conflicting local ambitions.

Now what we must know about the actors is how they acted in relation to one another. The imperialism of Britain and France, we are told, caused great damage to the reputation of both powers in the Arab world. Its repercussions, we are also told, still reverberate in strife and tension throughout the Middle East.¹ It is true that British and French imperialism had created shattering problems for the Arab nationalist movement and had, together with Zionism, played an important role in shaping and directing Palestinian nationalism. But it is also

true that the Arab nationalist movement had its crisis-ridden context in which the movement and its leaders labored. The chaos and upheaval of that context made a significant contribution to the emergence of a territorially defined idea of a Palestinian nation-state.

It is also in this context that we find a determining and yet neglected factor underlying the eclipse of the idea of a unitary Arab nation rooted in a common culture. Faysal's Arab state was the first experiment in the bewildering dream of Arab unity. It failed not only because of British and French imperialism, but also because of its contending regionalist tendencies and its factionalized elites who were embroiled in personal and ideological quarrels which the imperialists successfully exploited.² This disruptive process was hastened and aided by the imperialist policies of England and France, without which the breakup of the Arab nationalist movement in Syria would have been delayed, but not altogether discontinued. This is borne out by the analysis in the following pages.

Al-Fatat: The Politics of Discord

Of the parties outlined in the preceding chapter, al-Fatat was the most influential. It was indeed the main prop around which clustered al-'Ahd, the Istiqlal party, and the Arab Club. For all practical purposes, it was Faysal's official party and the main pillar of his government.³ Hence an understanding of its rifts and factions should shed ample light on the larger political picture of Faysal's Arab government.

On December 17, 1918, the founding members of al-Fatat held a meeting in Damascus in coordination with the Beirut branch of the society.⁴ In the meeting, they reconstituted the society, passed new bylaws, and resolved that the organization should remain clandestine on account of the unresolved political situation in Syria and the other Arab lands. The founding

members also resolved to establish a public political organization—Hizb al-Istiqlal al-'Arabi—to act as a front for al-Fatat.

Besides being a member, Faysal provided al-Fatat with financial assistance, thus enabling it to establish branches in Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon.⁵ The society also established a branch in Constantinople and another in Egypt, where it sent Bashir al-Qassar ostensibly as commercial representative for Faysal in Cairo.⁶ Furthermore, the society established an intelligence department with branches throughout Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon.⁷

Al-Fatat, though originally devoted to Arab independence and unity, focused more attention after the war on events in Syria, and adopted the principle of pan-Syrian unity.⁸ This change in focus reflected the postwar Anglo-French division of the conquered Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, it reflected the desires of the strong Syrian and Palestinian elements in al-Fatat's leadership, whose members had a political edge by virtue of being on their home territory or close to it. Al-Fatat soon produced political schisms and regionalist tendencies that reflected the politics of the Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi groups that comprised it.

One of the early schisms occurred following the Faysal-Weizmann draft agreement of January 1919. Here the Palestinian leadership of the Arab Club began to withdraw its support for Faysal on the ground that the amir and other Arab nationalists, particularly the Iraqi members of al-'Ahd, were not treating the Palestinian question as a crucial issue.⁹ We have already seen how the club foiled Faysal's attempt to cooperate with the Zionists in the hope of securing British support for his policy of countering French designs in Syria.

Another schism occurred in late November 1919 following the British detention of Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, Iraqi-born ex-general in the Ottoman army who was then a member of the central committee of al-Fatat and chief of the general staff of Faysal's Arab army. Yasin was invited by the British to tea, arrested on Allenby's orders, and interned in the town of Ramla in Palestine. Several reasons were given for Yasin's ar-

rest. One was that the British suspected him of preparing a coup against Faysal, whose policy toward the French Yasin regarded as being too mild.¹⁰

The second was that Yasin was suspected of conducting anti-French propaganda and making military preparations to oppose the French occupation of the Blue Zone which extended from north of Acre to Alexandretta after the British withdrawal in the fall of 1919.¹¹ A third reason was that General Gouraud insisted upon Yasin's arrest because the French perceived him as the most influential anti-French military leader in Faysal's Arab army and hence he was regarded as a threat to French interests in Syria.¹² Whatever the real reason for Yasin's arrest was, the incident caused ill will within al-Fatat. Members of the central committee of the society and many of its rank and file thought that al-Rikabi had a hand in Yasin's detention. Their suspicion was reinforced by the rivalry that existed between Yasin and al-Rikabi. Some of them, particularly Palestinians and Iraqis, viewed al-Rikabi as a compromiser who was moderately disposed toward the French and British policies in the Arab lands. On the other hand, they saw Yasin as a true Arab nationalist who was strongly opposed to those policies.

As a result of their suspicions, al-Fatat's members pressured al-Rikabi into resigning his office as military governor and president of *majlis al-mudirin*. They were assisted by Amir Zayd, the fourth son of the Sharif Husayn and Faysal's deputy in Damascus. Zayd, it must be noted, did not see eye to eye with al-Rikabi and, obviously, he sided with Yasin and his supporters within al-Fatat. Al-Rikabi, it must also be noted, secluded himself in his home after his resignation following al-Hashimi's arrest and did not reemerge until Faysal's return from Europe on January 14, 1920. Faysal gradually persuaded al-Rikabi to abandon his political isolation and named him prime minister of the first Syrian cabinet on March 8, 1920. Although the anti-Rikabi group within al-Fatat did not favor the new appointment, they did not vehemently oppose it because al-Rikabi enjoyed Faysal's strong support. Moreover,

they had no desire to clash with Faysal in that critical stage in which Syria was threatened by the growing possibility of French aggression.¹³

A third rift resulted from the Faysal-Clemenceau agreement of early January 1920. Following his return from Europe after the agreement, Faysal held a meeting with the leading members of al-Fatat to discuss the results of his trip to Europe and to let them voice their opinion on the agreement. For most of the attending members, the agreement had to be rejected because it compromised their ideal of unity and complete independence. As we have seen, they preferred fighting England and France to accepting the agreement. Among the strongest critics were Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza and Rafiq al-Tamimi (both of Nablus), Sa'id Haydar (Ba'labak), and al-Shaykh Kamil al-Qassab and Ahmad Maryud (both of Damascus).¹⁴ A minority group, notably Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar of Damascus, was favorably disposed toward the agreement and toward conciliation with France, believing that such an approach would secure independence for Syria, especially since Britain was withdrawing from the country leaving it to the mercy of France.¹⁵ Ultimately the rejectionist majority within al-Fatat had the upper hand and was able to persuade Faysal to change his mind. Indeed, Faysal was reported to have said at Aleppo on February 4, 1920, that if independence were not won by word then it would be won by the sword.¹⁶

Now that a brief discussion of important rifts in al-Fatat has been presented, a look at three major groups in the society, their personal and ideological differences, their allies and opponents, should elucidate better the nature and scope of these rifts, and how they affected the future course of the Arab nationalist movement.

THE SYRIAN GROUP

The Syrian group consisted of personalities who were by no means united on a common political strategy or one ideological orientation. On the one hand, there was a group of

Syrians who were *wataniyyun* (advocates of local nationalism) in their ideology, and moderate in their attitude toward the French.¹⁷ They stood for the independence of Syria and were willing to cooperate with the French to accomplish their goal. On the other hand, there was another group that expressed Arab nationalist sentiments and strong aversion to the French. Its members stood for the complete liberation of the Arab territories from foreign rule and the establishment of a unitary Arab state. Some were willing, through Faysal, to cooperate with the British to promote this goal.

Within al-Fatat, perhaps two of the most outstanding advocates of *wataniyya* were 'Ali Rida Pasha al-Rikabi and Nasib Bey al-Bakri. 'Ali-Rida, who was born to a notable landowning Damascene family, served as a general in the Ottoman army and, during the war, established his connections with the Amir Faysal. Some time before the armistice he joined al-Fatat and in December 1918 he was elected a member of the society's central committee.¹⁸ In the last week of October 1918 General Allenby appointed him military governor of OET-East, and later Faysal appointed him as military governor of Syria. On March 8, 1920, Faysal entrusted him with forming the first Syrian cabinet.

'Ali Rida was one of the most influential military figures in Syria. He was "firm, serious and had a frightening reputation." Some viewed him as too lenient toward the French and disdainful toward the Arab nationalist members of al-Fatat, especially toward the Palestinians and Iraqis.¹⁹ 'Ali Rida exhibited no significant intellectual capabilities and was best known for his military expertise, which he acquired from Ottoman military schools.

Closely associated with 'Ali Rida was Nasib Bey al-Bakri. Nasib was born in Damascus in 1888 to a well-known landowning Damascene family which claimed descent from the Prophet. Nasib graduated from al-Sultaniyya school in Beirut in 1912. During the war he developed close links with the Sharifian family and he and his brother Fawzi were associates of the Amir Faysal who stayed at their home when he visited

Damascus in the spring of 1915. At the al-Bakri house Faysal met for the first time the leading members of al-Fatat.²⁰ When Faysal established his provisional Arab government in Syria he appointed Nasib as a private consultant, a post which he held until the fall of Faysal's regime in July 1920.²¹ Like 'Ali Rida, Nasib was believed to have been lenient toward the French and antagonistic toward the Arab nationalists, particularly the Palestinians and the Iraqis.²² He too demonstrated no intellectual inclinations of any significance.

'Ali Rida and Nasib had therefore more than one thing in common: both came from the land-owning elite, both were educated in Ottoman schools, one in a military school, the other in a non-military school; both were close to the Sharifian family; and both resented the presence of non-Syrians in Faysal's government and focused their attention on Syrian independence.

In an attempt to promote their political goals and wrest control from the hand of the Arab nationalists, 'Ali Rida and Nasib, together with a number of Syrian notables—some of whom were from outside al-Fatat—established al-Hizb al-Watani al-Suri (the Syrian National Party), sometime in January 1920.²³ The professed goal of the party was to work for achieving Syria's independence, and to assist Amir Faysal in fulfilling that aim with a parliamentary, democratic monarchy.²⁴ In reality, however, the more important aim of the party seems to have been to isolate the non-Syrians and undermine their influence. "What we and other Arab nationalist observers have seen," wrote Darwaza, "is that the party was established to protect the so-called Syrian rights against the competition of what was referred to as the strangers (*al-ghuraba'*)."²⁵

Dr. Ahmad Qadri, a Damascene who was a confidant and private physician to Faysal, wrote in a similar vein about the Syrian National Party, saying that it comprised the "aristocratic notables and their friends who rallied around them yearning to maintain their authority and stay around the amir."²⁶

That Syrian notables formed their own party to check the influence of the upstart group of Arab nationalists was hardly astonishing on account of the little appreciation that they had for the political aims of this group. The traditional Syrian elite tended to believe that the only way to regain their power in Syria was to strike against the unwelcome "aliens." They saw themselves on the verge of losing their influence and aristocratic prestige to the "confused," "hot-headed" youths, better known in aristocratic circles as *rijal al-ghayb* (men of the invisible world).²⁷

Perhaps no Syrian has expressed his attitude more strongly than Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, the noted Damascene man of letters, who lamented the presence of the Palestinians, blaming no other but al-Rikabi. In this vein Kurd 'Ali wrote:

In forming his government, al-Rikabi relied on foreigners more than he relied on nationals. He abundantly praised the Palestinian head of the police.

Kurd 'Ali states that he used to blame al-Rikabi, saying to him:

You hasten in appointing Palestinian employees when Palestine, I believe, will be separated from us. If we love Palestine, we should not take away its men from it. Here (meaning Syria) we can do without the Paletinians, for we have many like them. Our interest dictates that we employ those who complain about unemployment.

The Syrian belletrist further noted, apparently more out of his anti-Palestinian sentiment than out of genuine concern for the Palestinians:

Who knows whether or not that [the employment of the Palestinians in Syria] was a plan devised by him [al-Rikabi] and by those in positions of authority [Faysal's government] to empty the new Jewish homeland and thus enable the Jews to work alone in the Promised Land and set up their own rule there.²⁸

As to the Arab nationalists within the Syrian group, many of them were much more sophisticated ideologically, had a better education, were more loquacious in their brand of na-

tionalism, and much more pronounced in their opposition to the French. Perhaps the most outstanding personalities among them were Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, and the Amir 'Adil Arslan.

Muhibb al-Din was born in Damascus in 1887 to a Damascene family noted for its wealth and education. He studied in Damascus and Beirut schools and was introduced at an early age to al-Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri, the Syrian Islamic reformer. In 1905 he studied law and literature in Istanbul.²⁹ At the Ottoman capital, Muhibb al-Din used to gather Arab students and teach them Arabic language and literature. From his perspective, the dissemination of Arab culture was conducive to the renaissance of the Arabs.³⁰

While in Istanbul Muhibb al-Din also attacked Sultan Abdulhamid for his hostility to constitutional government, thus invoking the wrath of the Ottoman authorities who tried to arrest him. He managed to evade arrest, however, and fled to Yemen only to come back to Damascus, where he attacked the Turkification policies of the CUP and was ultimately forced to flee to Beirut, then to Istanbul and finally to Cairo in August 1909.

In Cairo Muhibb al-Din founded al-Salafiyya printing press, a name which originally belonged to an Islamic reform movement in Egypt founded by the Egyptian reformer al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905). Muhibb al-Din also worked as editor for the Cairo newspaper *al-Mu'ayyad*, and developed his journalistic skills through his association with Muhammad 'Ali Yusuf, a well-known Egyptian journalist. But most important of all, Muhibb al-Din met, while in Cairo, the Islamic reformer al-Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Rida, and taught at Dar al-Da'wa wal-Irshad (the School of Advocacy and Guidance) which Rida had established in 1913.

During the war, Muhibb al-Din established close connections with Sharif Husayn, issued *al-Qibla* newspaper in Mecca to act as a vehicle for promoting the sharif's ideas, joined al-Fatat, and was later sentenced to death by Jamal Pasha.³¹ After the war, he returned to Damascus where he was in charge

of *al-'Asima*, the official newspaper of Faysal's government. When the French occupied Damascus in July 1920, he fled to Cairo again.

The politics of Muhibb al-Din were naturally affected by his upbringing and strong desire for change. Through his association with al-Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri at an early age, and with al-Shaykh Rashid Rida when he was about twenty-five years old, Muhibb al-Din became a strong believer in Islamic reform and the unity of Islam and Arab nationalism, as well as in the assimilation of Western science and technology. He believed that Arab nationalism was the most noble element of *al-Jami'a al-Islamiyya* (pan-Islamism). He blamed the Ottoman sultans for not using Arabic as the official language of the state and for "ignoring" the scientific and technological developments of the West. Only the "giant of Arab nationalism" (*'imlaq al-'uruba*), he believed, could close the gap between the developed, industrial West and the backward, non-industrial Muslim peoples. "Should Islam be separated from Arab nationalism," Muhibb al-Din also wrote, "Arab nationalism will become a body without a soul and Islam a soul without a body."³² From the perspective of Muhibb al-Din, the synthesis between the two must rest on two pillars: a) flexibility in acquiring the science, industry, and other "positive" elements of the West; b) the preservation of the Islamic heritage, Arab national principles, and the Arabic language.³³

Other prominent personalities within the Arab nationalist Syrian group had qualities similar in many respects to those of Muhibb al-Din. Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, for example, was born to a Damascene mercantile family. He married into the Mu'ayyad al-'Azm family, which happened to be a prominent landowning Damascene family. Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman acquired an income through his wife and through property he inherited from his paternal grandmother. 'Abd al-Rahman, a distinguished physician trained at the Medical Faculty of the American University of Beirut, had been a supporter of the CUP early in his life. Later, however, he became an outspoken opponent of the committee's Turkification pro-

grams in the Arab provinces. He had to flee Damascus in 1916 after Jamal Pasha hanged a number of Arab nationalists from Syria on charges of treasonable nationalist activities against the Ottoman state. Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman went to Cairo where he took part in the propaganda work undertaken by Arab nationalists who rode the tide of the Arab revolt. In Cairo, 'Abd al-Rahman also established friendly relations with Sharifian representatives and with the British political officers of the Arab Bureau, including David Hogarth, the director of the bureau.³⁴

Early in 1919, Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman returned to Damascus where he joined al-Fatat and played an important role in Faysal's government. When the King-Crane Commission came to Syria in the summer of 1919, 'Abd al-Rahman was assigned the task of making the necessary arrangements that would enable eminent personalities and influential parties to receive the commission. In view of his good grasp of English, 'Abd al-Rahman also acted as special interpreter for Charles Crane, one of the co-chairmen of the commission. Shortly after the commission's inquiry, Faysal appointed 'Abd al-Rahman as his chief liaison with the British troops in Syria.³⁵ In May 1920, al-Fatat chose 'Abd al-Rahman as minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Hashim al-Atasi which was formed on May 7 of the same year. Al-Fatat's choice fell upon 'Abd al-Rahman because key members of the society saw in his strong anti-French position a check against Faysal's inclination to reach a compromise solution with France.³⁶ But 'Abd al-Rahman's term of service was short-lived, for less than two months later the French invaded Damascus, thus destroying the Syrian Arab kingdom. Sentenced to death by the French, 'Abd al-Rahman fled to Cairo again where he publicized the cause of Syrian independence through the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, a political organization of Syrian and Palestinian exiles in Cairo which was called in early 1921 to devise a strategy for Syrian independence, including Palestine.

Besides his political activities and brilliant medical training, 'Abd al-Rahman had other qualities: he was an ex-

cellent orator in Arabic, he was also a capable translator and talented writer.³⁷

Much the same could be said about the Amir 'Adil Arslan, a wealthy member of a family of Druze amirs from the Lebanese mountain village of Shuwayfat. He was exposed to Sunni Islam, since his family preferred to spend several months a year in al-Musaytba, a Beirut quarter inhabited by Sunni Muslim and Greek Orthodox Arabs. Amir 'Adil was also a close political adviser of the Amir Faysal and an active member of the Istiqlal party. Moreover, he was an outspoken opponent of the French, a graduate with a degree in literature from Paris, a poet, a writer, and an orator whose grasp of Arabic won him the name, the Prince of the Sword and the Pen (*amir al-sayf wal-qalam*), and a political exile in Transjordan sentenced to death in absentia by the French in July 1920.³⁸

Syrian members of the Arab nationalist group within al-Fatat had therefore more than one thing in common: they came from wealthy, landowning families; they had a strong fondness for Arab culture and heritage; they were pro-Sharifian and anti-French; their intellectual upbringing placed them among the leading advocates of Arab nationalism.

Despite the many things they had in common, however, the Syrian Arab nationalists in al-Fatat had their differences, some personal and some more profound, reflecting conflicts over diplomatic and political strategies. Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, for instance, was an Anglophile who was willing to cooperate with the British to accomplish his goal of Syrian independence. Some even accused him of being a British agent.³⁹ On the other hand, Amir 'Adil Bey Arslan was opposed to cooperation with the British for any purpose and was more assertive than Shahbandar in his belief in a unitary Arab state completely free from foreign rule.⁴⁰ Moreover, Shahbandar was viewed as being "impetuous, fanatic, too self-confident, bossy, inclined to show off, boastful, and fond of blaming and criticizing other people." Amir 'Adil Bey Arslan, however, was conceived as being a quick-witted, affable person who was more liked by his colleagues.⁴¹

The major political organization in and around al-Fatat which many Syrian Arab nationalists joined was Hizb al-Istiqlal al-'Arabi. This organization was established by al-Fatat in early February 1919. It was intended to act as a front for al-Fatat, and to provide the growing number of members who sought to join al-Fatat with an organizational framework through which they could carry out their political activities in an open fashion. Moreover, by establishing the Hizb al-Istiqlal, al-Fatat hoped to dispel the notion, propagated by Syrian notables, that it was a society of "invisible" men closed to the outside world.⁴²

The headquarters of the Hizb al-Istiqlal were in Damascus. The political and financial support rendered to this organization by the Amir Faysal helped it to establish branches throughout Syria. Unlike al-Fatat, the Hizb al-Istiqlal maintained a policy of open registration and, as such, was joined by members whom al-Fatat deemed unfit to join its inner circle.⁴³ As'ad Dagher, a prominent member of the Hizb al-Istiqlal, put its membership at 75,000, a figure which, I think, is exaggerated. Although the organization had Palestinian members, its rank and file was predominantly Syrian.⁴⁴

Ideologically, Hizb al-Istiqlal stood for al-Fatat's principles of Arab unity and complete Arab independence. Following its establishment, it became one of the major public political organizations in Syria. It worked very closely with the Arab nationalist members of al-Fatat's central committee and its decisions were an "echo" of theirs.⁴⁵

THE IRAQI GROUP

The most outstanding members of the Iraqi group were Yasin al-Hashimi, Nuri al-Sa'id, Mawlud Mukhlis, Jamil al-Midfa'i, 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi.

Yasin al-Hashimi was perhaps the leading Iraqi personality in Syria. He was also a key member of al-Fatat. Yasin was born in Baghdad in 1884 to a Sunni Arab middle-income family. His original name was Yasin Hilmi and he adopted the

family name al-Hashimi around 1902 when he entered the military academy at Istanbul. Al-Hashimi, of course, is a very prestigious name because it denotes that its bearer belongs to Banu Hashim, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. Some doubt the Arab descent of Yasin and link him to the Karawiyya, a Turkish tribe which settled in Iraq in the seventeenth century.⁴⁶

Yasin's father, Sayyid Salman, was the mukhtar (chief) of the Barudiyya quarter of Baghdad. He is said to have been a sayyid, or sharif, namely a descendant of the Prophet. Sayyid Salman's post was considered degrading in Ottoman times, for only the lowest class of persons agreed to be town or village mukhtars.⁴⁷ Yasin, therefore, had no advantage of wealth or high social status. Despite that, however, he proved during the course of his studies at the military academy in Istanbul to be of outstanding military talent and he was gradually promoted until he became a major general in the Ottoman army.

Ideologically, Yasin remained loyal to the Ottomans until the end of the war. In the early days of the war he opposed a plot by Arab nationalists to assassinate Jamal Pasha, even though he had sensed that Jamal was preparing to strike against those nationalists.⁴⁸ And as late as 1918, when Yasin was the commander of an Ottoman division stationed at Tulkarm in Palestine, he refused—despite his membership in al-Fatat and the promises he made to the Sharifians to join their revolt—a request by Faysal to enlist in the Sharifian army, saying that he could not abandon his military duties.⁴⁹

In the course of the war Yasin demonstrated an exceptional military gift that won him wide repute. In 1917, when he was only 33 years old, he won the admiration of Wilhelm II, emperor of Germany, as a result of his superior performance against the Russians in Galiwa. In the spring of the following year, Yasin proved his military abilities against the British. He commanded the Ottoman troops at al-Salt and Amman with a strategy that was "too good" for the British.⁵⁰ Through his impressive military record, Yasin attracted the attention of Faysal. Although the Arab Amir feared this ambitious general,

he appointed him, in early August 1919, chief of the General Staff of the Arab army.⁵¹ By so doing, Faysal expected to win Yasin to his cause and put his military expertise in the service of the fledgling Syrian Arab government.

Yasin's military brilliance also won him great support among Iraqi officers. As viewed by a prominent Palestinian who worked with him closely in al-Fatat, Yasin was "respected, feared, influential, farsighted, decisive in his opinion, serious, profound, not talkative, not given to joking or smiling."⁵² As viewed by the British, he was "doctrinaire, dogmatic, efficient, unscrupulous, and extremely ambitious."⁵³

Yasin's military reputation as well as his personal qualities enabled him to play a significant role in Arab politics at the time. One of his earliest political activities was in al-'Ahd. This organization, composed mostly of Iraqi officers, aimed at achieving internal Arab independence (*istiqlal dakhili*) within a united Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴ Yasin founded al-'Ahd's Mosul branch and spread its principles in Istanbul. When the society joined hands with al-Fatat in the spring of 1915 and began to advocate the principle of complete Arab independence, Yasin remained faithful to the Ottomans.⁵⁵ After the war, when al-'Ahd split into Iraqi and Syrian branches thus marking one of the first postwar Arab splits along regional lines, Yasin secured for himself a position of dominance within the Iraqi branch. Not only was he a key figure in the Iraqi al-'Ahd but he and his brother Taha and other Iraqis maintained their membership in al-Fatat and their posts in Faysal's government.⁵⁶

Associated with Yasin were, to mention a few names, Nuri al-Sa'id, Mawlud Mukhlis, Jamil al-Midfa'i, 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. With the exception of al-Suwaydi who came from an upper-class landowning family of *ashraf*⁵⁷ and studied at the law school in Istanbul and Paris, the majority of Sharifian Iraqi officers who were in Syria at the time came from the middle or lower middle classes, or even from more modest origins. Most were the product of the European-oriented military academy and staff college at Istan-

bul; most had an aversion to wealthy families; most were secular nationalists; most were members of al-Fatat and al-'Ahd.

Nuri al-Sa'id, for example, was born in Baghdad in 1888 to a government auditor of a modest status. He studied at the Istanbul war college and the military academy and staff college in the Ottoman capital. So did Mawlud Mukhlis, who was born in Mosul in 1886, to a family of modest background and was a classmate of Nuri at the Istanbul war college from 1903 to 1906. 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi was born in Mosul in 1886 to a chief sergeant in the gendarmerie, a member of the official lower middle class. He studied at the military academy in Istanbul. So did Jamil al-Midfa'i who was born in Mosul in 1890 to a poor Ottoman captain.⁵⁸

Thus Iraqi personalities in al-Fatat and al-'Ahd were linked by very similar social backgrounds, identical education at Ottoman military schools, and a common national origin. All these factors helped develop among them a common bond that was reinforced by the hostility of Syrian nationalists, the majority of whom were civilians who came from urban notable families, and many of whom saw in Iraqis and non-Syrians in general a threat to their goal of political control in Syria. Because of that, the Iraqis felt isolated and viewed themselves as "undesirable strangers" in Syria.⁵⁹ They therefore chose to focus most of their attention, through al-'Ahd, on Iraqi affairs, especially since Syria had, from their perspective, achieved its goal of independence after Faysal's coronation as its king.⁶⁰

THE PALESTINIAN GROUP

The most prominent members of the Palestinian group were Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Rafiq al-Tamimi and 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi. 'Izzat was born in Nablus in 1888 to a Sunni Arab mercantile family. His father, 'Abd al-Hadi, and his paternal grandfather, Darwish, were textile merchants and had a store in the merchants' district (Khan Al-Tujjar) in Nablus. 'Izzat received only elementary and preparatory education at Ot-

toman government schools in his native city.⁶¹ 'Izzat combined government service with political activities and intellectual pursuits. From 1906 to 1918, he worked at the Department of Postal and Telegraphic Services, first as deputy for the Beisan district in northern Palestine, then as commissioner and deputy for the Nablus post office, and later as director of postal stamp sales in Beirut. During the war he served as secretary of the Postal Directorate-General in Beirut until the end of hostilities.

As far as his politics were concerned, 'Izzat joined the CUP club in Nablus in 1908 only to withdraw from it as a result of the CUP's exaltation of the Turkish race and its adoption of a policy of strict centralization. 'Izzat played an active role in establishing a branch for the Party of Harmony and Freedom (Hizb al-'Itlaf wal-Hurriyya) in the city of Nablus, a party that was originally founded in Istanbul and joined by Arab members to counter the Turkification policies of the CUP in 1911. 'Izzat also established early in 1914 the Arab Scientific Society (al-Jam'iyya al-'Ilmiyya al-'Arabiyya) to spread Arabic culture through the establishment of Arabic schools. As a result of the outbreak of the war, however, the plan bore no fruit.

Moreover, 'Izzat joined in 1913 a Nablus anti-Zionist group that was engaged in preventing the Zionists from buying Arab land by sending petitions to the Ottoman sultan and by purchasing the land ahead of the Zionists.⁶² 'Izzat also joined Jam'iyyat al-Islah and in June 1913 he played an active role in preparing for the First Arab Congress, held in Paris in the same year, which restated the decentralization principles of Jam'iyyat al-Islah with emphasis on Arab claims to full political and administrative rights.

Later in 1914, 'Izzat and other Nablus personalities planned to establish in their hometown a branch of the Decentralization Party.⁶³ The outbreak of the war, however, frustrated their plan. In 1916, 'Izzat joined al-Fatat through Dr. Ahmad Qadri. Following the armistice, 'Izzat occupied several political posts, most important of which were: secretary of al-Fatat

(May 1919-March 1920);⁶⁴ secretary of the Nablus MCA; secretary of the First Palestinian Arab Congress, which convened in Jerusalem in January 1919; secretary of the General Syrian Congress; and member in the leadership of al-Istiqlal party.

Ideologically, 'Izzat was an Arab nationalist. He favored the unity of Syria and Palestine. His brand of Arab nationalism rested on Islam, the belief in Arab unity, and the oneness of Arab culture. From 'Izzat's perspective the main constituents of Arab nationalism were Arabic language, the Arab homeland, a common Arab history, and common Arab interests.⁶⁵

Although 'Izzat believed that Arab nationalism antedated Islam, he maintained that Islamic religion had not only expanded the Arab territories but had also "stamped them with the eternal mark of Arab nationalism." In other words, Islam has provided Arab nationalism with a spiritual, cultural, and legal unity which engulfed the entire Arab lands. Within the framework of that unity, the Arab individual formed his moral and social beliefs, irrespective of where he lived, and through it the Arabs were able to preserve their national identity and maintain their culture in the face of foreign invaders, including the Ottomans.⁶⁶ 'Izzat was a prolific writer. He wrote over thirty books and published numerous articles on the Palestinian question, on Arab history, and on Islam.

Another Palestinian member, Rafiq al-Tamimi, was also born in Nablus in 1889 to a Sunni Arab landowning family. He received his elementary and preparatory education first at the schools of his hometown, and later at the Marjan preparatory school in Istanbul. Because of his sterling school performance, Rafiq entered an academic contest and won. As a result he joined the al-Mulkiyya in the Ottoman capital. Again, his distinguished performance at al-Mulkiyya entitled him to enter another academic contest, which he won. He was consequently awarded a grant by the Ottoman Ministry of Education to study at the Sorbonne in Paris.⁶⁷ At the Sorbonne, Rafiq received a *licence* degree in literature and education.

In addition to being a Nablus-born Palestinian, Rafiq

had many things in common with 'Izzat: he was a member of the CUP before the outbreak of the war; he was a member of al-Fatat and an activist on its behalf in Damascus during the war, and later in 1919 both he and 'Izzat alternated as general secretaries of the association; he was a member of the leadership of al-Istiqlal party; he was a Palestinian representative in the General Syrian Congress; he was a close confidant of Faysal; he was a believer in Syrian-Palestinian unity and in pan-Arab nationalism; and he was an Arab nationalist who played a conspicuous role in arousing anti-Zionist sentiment in Damascus.⁶⁸

The third prominent member of the Palestinian group, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, was also born in Nablus in 1882 to a Sunni Arab family noted for its wealth and social status. 'Awni received his elementary and preparatory education in Beirut, Nablus, and at the Marjan preparatory school in Istanbul. He joined the al-Mulkiyya from 1908 to 1910 where he studied Arabic under Tawfiq al-Bassat and the Amir 'Arif al-Shihabi, both from Lebanon and both prominent members of the Literary Club (al-Muntada al-Adabi). The club was founded in the Ottoman capital in the summer of 1909 by a group of officials, deputies, writers, and students to serve as a meeting place for Arab visitors and residents of the capital.⁶⁹ After graduating from the al-Mulkiyya, 'Awni went to Paris where he received a law degree.

'Awni shared many interests with 'Izzat and Rafiq: he and Rafiq were members of al-Muntada al-Adabi during their studies at the al-Mulkiyya in Istanbul; they were members of the First Arab Congress; both were founders of al-Fatat and together with 'Izzat were activists on its behalf during the war years; all these were strong opponents of the Turkification policy of the CUP; they were close confidants of Amir Faysal; they were members of al-Istiqlal party; they held Arab nationalist sentiments and a belief in Syrian-Palestinian unity; and were bitter opponents of Zionism and the Jewish National Home policy of England in Palestine.⁷⁰

In practice, members of the Palestinian group focused

most of their attention on affairs in Palestine. To promote the cause of Palestine, they founded several political organizations in Damascus, all offshoots of al-Fatat. One of the earliest of these organizations was the Palestinian Renaissance Society (Jam'iyyat al-Nahda al-Filastiniyya), whose president was Salim Bey al-Tayyibi, a lieutenant-colonel in the Syrian Arab army of Amir Faysal.⁷¹ Another organization was the Palestinian Arab Society (al-Jam'iyya al-'Arabiyya al-Filastiniyya), which was established early in June 1920.⁷² The main purposes of these two organizations were to rally support for the struggle against Zionism and to secure Syrian-Palestinian unity.

Another organization, Jam'iyyat Fata Filastin (the Palestine Youth Society), was established in Damascus by members of the al-Jam'iyya al-'Arabiyya al-Filastiniyya early in 1920. The aim of this organization, which was funded and supported by al-Fatat, was to launch military attacks against the British units stationed on the Palestine borders to alert the British government and the Zionists to the fact that the Palestinians were determined to thwart the Jewish National Home policy.⁷³ The Jam'iyyat Fata Filastin worked diligently to achieve its objective. On April 24, 1920, it organized a military attack against a British unit in Samakh by over 2,000 armed Bedouins from the Hawran and Beisan Valley. Arab, British, and Zionist sources state that the attack was organized by Palestinians active in Damascus, with Darwaza affirming that it was undertaken by the Jam'iyyat Fata Filastin.⁷⁴

However, the primary Palestinian organization in Damascus was al-Nadi al-'Arabi. The main functions of al-Nadi were to fight for Palestinian rights, to promote the idea of pan-Syrian unity, and to convince Faysal to reject any cooperation with the Zionists.⁷⁵ According to Arab, Zionist, and British sources, this club was the main public nationalist organization in Damascus.⁷⁶ The headquarters of the club were not only the site of the most important political meetings, such as the First General Syrian Congress, but were also a meeting place for Arab nationalists who came to Damascus from different Arab provinces. At the club's headquarters, nationalist speeches

were delivered, demonstrations were organized, and instructions were sent to various political organizations throughout Syria.⁷⁷ Thanks to the dynamism of its leadership, its network of various branches in Syria and Palestine, and the great influence the Palestinians exercised in Faysal's government, al-Nadi al-'Arabi was an important force behind Faysal's coronation as king of a united Syria, and behind the rejection of the Faysal-Clemenceau agreement.⁷⁸ These factors made it hard for Faysal to break with the club and proceed with his policy of conciliation with the French. As one source has noted, with the club and his supporters the Arab amir was a credible power; without them he would have been a "shadow of a name."⁷⁹

Such, then, was the state of affairs in Damascus during Faysal's short-lived rule in Syria. In the first place, there was the strong dislike expressed by older members of the Damascene notability toward the Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi newcomers who suddenly became the new masters of local Syrian politics. Older urban notables were pushed, in the space of three years, to the sidelines of the local political scene. Their traditional positions of local leadership had slipped, at least for the time being, into the hands of young men, many of whom were strangers to Damascus, Aleppo, Hims, and Hama. Discontented with the loss of the power they once wielded, and believing that they were the wise men of the country, these older urban notables were determined not to submit to the upstart group of young Arab nationalists who, from their perspective, neither cared about the interests of Syria nor knew what those interests were.

But, above all, the Syrian notables disliked the Palestinian and Iraqi "strangers" who, they thought, had no stake in the land, and no local attachments to maintain and cherish. They secretly advised Faysal to sack these strangers. According to Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, a medical doctor from Jerusalem who worked for the Department of Public Health in Aleppo during Faysal's rule, the Palestinians were compelled to resign the posts they held in Aleppo. This is al-Khalidi's description of what happened: Numerous anti-Palestinian peti-

tions, he wrote, were submitted to Nazim Pasha al-Qudsi, the administrative governor (*al-hakim al-idari*) of Aleppo, urging him to dismiss the Palestinian "foreigners" and fill their posts with local Syrians (Shamiyyun).⁸⁰ The description of al-Khalidi is echoed by Kurd 'Ali and Gertrude L. Bell, the British official who was later appointed as oriental secretary to the high commissioner in Iraq, from whose report titled *Syria in October 1919* Elie Kedourie extracts a long quotation about the angry mood of the local Syrian notability. The Syrian notables, according to Bell, resented the presence of Palestinians and Iraqis and believed that they "cannot be expected to have local interests at heart."⁸¹

Second, there was the political immaturity of the Arab nationalists themselves. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the only viable ideology that could inherit the place of Ottomanism in the Syrian provinces was Arab nationalism. Some members of the relatively small group of Arab activists, who joined the societies before 1914 and who during the war embraced the goals of Arab independence and unity, had sincere sentiments about Arab nationalism. However, these sentiments did not serve as a guide to action. They were no more than a fascination with the ideal of recreating the glorious Arab past and establishing a united society in which the Arabs could be their own masters. Moreover, the idea of Arab nationalism was relatively new in conception. Thus, it was by no means easy for the new idea to strike deep roots in the consciousness of its advocates, or for that matter in the consciousness of the Arab masses, both of whom were so long accustomed to loyalty to Islam and to the Ottoman dynasty. Yet overlapping with these loyalties were other local loyalties which were still at work, such as loyalty to a tribe, family, or local group. Arab nationalism was too new an ideology to prevail over these local loyalties.

Third, the imposition by England and France of political divisions on geographical Syria including Lebanon and Palestine after World War I posed the first serious challenge to the idea of Arab nationalism in the aftermath of the collapse of

the Ottoman Empire. Under the weight of this challenge, loyalties to a larger Arab homeland lost out and local loyalties prevailed. In other words, the Syrians were not so concerned with asserting pan-Arab rights as they were with asserting their rights as Syrians against domination by the French. The same applies to the Iraqis, who were asserting their rights as Iraqis against British domination, and to the Palestinians, who were struggling to protect themselves from British control and Zionist domination. The Arab nationalists from Palestine believed that pan-Syrian unity would ward off the threat of Zionism. But their experience in Syria taught them that they were unwelcome "strangers." Equally important, it taught them that for Faysal and the Syrian Arab nationalists the cause of Palestine was second to the cause of Syria.

Thus in setting up their own organizations, the Palestinians were speaking the idiom of Palestinian nationalism. An intelligence report prepared in January 1920 correctly predicted a new epoch in the Arab movement which it called the "Arab Nationalist Movement of Palestine."⁸² The Syrian attacks against the Palestinians and the preoccupation of each Arab group with its own national rights and politics forced on the Arab nationalists from Palestine their first encounter with the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement. The case of pan-Syrian unity, the doctrine of pan-Arabism, had been repeatedly exposed, in the course of less than two years, to "separatist" attacks from Arab brethren who spoke the same language and shared the same culture. Worse still, the Palestinians were called *ghuraba'* (strangers) in Syria, which was the birthplace of Arab nationalism.

Now the idea of Arab nationalism was challenged. Otherwise, why didn't the Syrians pay enough attention to the case of Palestine and Iraq? Why was the presence of Palestinians and Iraqis so strongly resented? Since their experience in Damascus, Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi Arab nationalists have generally come to discover the political differences among Arabs that had eluded them in the war years. The fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement and the attacks against

the Palestinians and Iraqis had a reality after all. In Syria and elsewhere in the Arab lands, reason of state appeared to be the dominant reality: It dictated the political priorities of the Syrians and Iraqis, so why shouldn't it dictate those of the Palestinians.

7.

The Beginnings of Political Organization in Palestine

On the eve of Ottoman capitulation, the confusion in Palestine was as widespread as it was in the interior of Syria. Britain intended to have Palestine solely under its control by honoring its policy of facilitating the establishment of a Jewish National Home in disregard to the wishes of the Arab majority. Besides its sympathy to Zionism, Britain hoped to protect its strategic interests in the Middle East through its Jewish National Home policy. These interests centered on maintaining British control of Egypt, assuring access to the Suez Canal, and securing a land route that would give Britain access to its strategic oil interests in Iraq.

With the breakup of Syria into three military administrations and the onset of British military rule in Palestine, the Palestinian notables lost the government influence they once had in Ottoman times, even though they maintained their dominant social and economic status.¹

The elite families, who in Ottoman days represented society or part of it at the ruler's court, were now in a quandary. On the one hand, there was a new ruler, the mighty British Empire with its Zionist policy; on the other, there was a political vacuum left by the defeated Ottoman troops. The

power of the urban notables, rooted in major cities whose elite families ruled urban centers and the rural hinterland jointly with, and on behalf of, other dominant elites, began to slip gradually into the hands of the British occupier. In these circumstances, the freedom of local political action enjoyed by these notables was sharply curtailed despite the fact that they continued to be accepted as the *de facto* leaders of the Palestinian Arabs. In addition, the political order that existed in Palestine in Ottoman times had to enter into a new phase of change.

What emerged after 1917 reflects this change. In the new situation, we witness the entry into politics of several small groups of Arab nationalists who were attracted to Faysal and to the goal of pan-Syrian unity. The dominant individuals of these groups were almost invariably younger members of local aristocratic families. There were some young individuals who came from families that were not socially prominent, but these did not become the political leaders of the Arab nationalist groups. These groups attempted to dominate the local political scene in Palestine, and inculcate the new ideology of Arab nationalism.

The older members of the aristocratic class, who articulated political demands on behalf of Palestinian nationalism after the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire, watched with discomfort the younger generation of Arab nationalists challenge their conservative ideology and disseminate Shari'ian slogans and the idea of pan-Syrian unity. An examination of the Palestinian Arab political associations which surfaced in the period between 1917 and 1920 should help explain the politics of both the older urban notables and the younger Arab nationalists.

Political Associations

In the period under discussion, more than forty Arab political associations sprang up, with a total membership of over 3,000.²

These associations were nationalist bodies whose main objective was the thwarting of the Zionist program and the establishment of an independent Arab Palestine or an independent Greater Syria with Palestine united with it. Their program was based on nationalist principles and ideals and had no defined framework for a political regeneration or reshaping of the Palestinian Arab community. Like their counterparts in Damascus, these associations cannot therefore be classified as comprehensive nationalist parties because they did not have the organization and functions of parties. Nor were they trying to secure the support of the widest combination of social strata for the implementation of sociocultural aims, such as economic and social development and political institutionalization.³

For the purposes of this chapter, I shall classify the Palestinian Arab political associations into two groups: a) the group of the Older Politicians; b) the group of the Younger Politicians. The term Older Politicians designates those men who hailed from great urban families, families whose members had a tradition of social leadership in Palestinian society, had been officers or civil servants in the Ottoman system of local government, and had a vested interest in the continuation of the empire.

The Younger Politicians, most of whom also came from influential aristocratic families, were either too young to climb to the high levels of the social ladder in Ottoman days, or were unable to join the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy as a result of the Turkification policy of the CUP and the eruption of World War I. They therefore tended to have a smaller stake in the continuation of the Ottoman Empire than their older counterparts. This group of Younger Politicians was joined by some members of less wealthy branches of local prominent families, or members from families that were not at the top of the social hierarchy in Palestine. On the whole, however, the largest number of the Younger Politicians belonged to the local upper class. Within the active Palestinian political elite, therefore, age rather than conflict was the foundation of political affiliation and ideological differences. It is to an examination of the

the political ideology and organization of the two groups of Older Politicians and Younger Politicians that I shall now turn.

THE OLDER POLITICIANS

The Palestinian Older Politicians were represented in the Muslim-Christian Association (MCA). This association first appeared in Jaffa early in November 1918, then spread to Jerusalem later in the same month. The contemporary source material does not confirm the exact date when the MCA was formed. Nor does it identify the founders with complete certainty. But as tables 7.1 and 7.2 demonstrate, the MCA top leadership was largely drawn from the older generation of urban notables who had high social standing in Ottoman times.

However, in contrast to Ottoman days, one of the distinctive new marks of Palestinian Arab politics in this period was the role played by the Christian Arabs. Indeed, Christian representation in the MCA tended to exceed the proportionate number of the Christian Arabs in Palestine. The Committee of the Jerusalem MCA, formed in November 1918, was composed of 28 Muslims and 10 Christians (see table 7.1).⁴ This is a disproportionate number of Christian representatives, since the total Christian population of the Jerusalem sub-district was approximately 14,000 in 1918, while the Muslim population totalled about 40,000.⁵ The reason for this overrepresentation is attributable to the fact that commerce and education, and hence politics, attracted a disproportionate number of the relatively urbanized and educated Arab Christian community.⁶

Most of the MCA notables went through the same process of political socialization. By virtue of coming from the same class, and by holding similar positions and by studying at similar schools and colleges, they acquired similar value-laden political identifications and developed interests which influenced their political attitudes and behavior.

Two outcomes of this process of political socialization were that the notables who led the MCA viewed themselves as

Table 7.1: Administrative Committee of the Jerusalem MCA, 1918

Representatives of the Muslim Population

of Jerusalem City:

'Arif Pasha al-Dajani, President
 Al-Shaykh Tahir Abu al-Su'ud
 Al-Shaykh Musa al-Budayri
 Al-Shaykh Husam al-Din Jarallah
 Badr Yunis
 Isma'il al-Husayni
 Fahmi al-Nashashibi
 Muhammad Yusuf al-'Alami
 Khalil al-Nashashibi
 Sa'id Nimr

Representatives of the Greek Orthodox:

Ya'qub Farraj
 Ilyas Mushabbik
 Andony al-Ghuri
 Yusuf Qurt
 Ibrahim Shammass

Representatives of the Latins (*Roman Catholics*):

Salim Ayyub
 Hanna Ayyub
 Lutfi Abu Suwwan
 Butros Hallaq
 Shukri al-Karmi

Representatives of the Villages Surrounding

Jerusalem (All Muslims):

'Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghawsh
 'Umar al-Salih al-Barghuti
 'Abd al-Fattah Darwish
 Sa'id Darwish
 Muhammad Mahmud
 Yusuf Ahmad
 Muhammad 'Alawi
 Musa Dyab
 Muhammad al-Shaykh Ibrahim
 'Abd al-Rahman 'Urayqat
 Al-Hajj Husayn Mahmud
 Al-Hajj Isma'il al-Najjar
 Muhammad 'Abd al-Sallam
 Mustafa Hasan
 Muhammad 'Abd al-Hay
 Ahmad 'Allan
 Muhammad 'Ali
 Isma'il Hammud

SOURCE: P.L.O. Research Center, MCA Files, File B/MS1.

the natural leaders of their community and maintained their old tradition of having access to authority. Thus, in general, their behavior was circumspect: they were cautious in expressing discontent with the British policy in Palestine and they discreetly encouraged opposition to that policy—but at the same time they abstained from open confrontation with the British. Such was their behavior because they wanted to preserve the two poles of their power, namely access to the ruler and their local positions.

The British, like the Ottomans, needed notables to serve, through their own power base, as brokers between ruler and ruled. It is no wonder, therefore, that some British military officers encouraged the establishment of the MCA.

According to the intelligence reports of the Zionist Commission, the establishment of the MCA was prompted by Captain C. D. Brunton, a British military intelligence officer posted in Palestine during the war and later in the Jaffa area after the armistice. Brunton was assisted by a local notable named 'Ali al-Mustaqim. Years later, Sir Wyndham Deedes, chief secretary of the Palestine government during the years 1920-23, claimed in a conversation with Hayyim M. Kalvarisky, who headed the Arab Department of the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem in the early 1920s, that the MCA received from the start "support and financial aid" from the Palestine government.⁷

Although the British records do not completely confirm this claim, the position of some high-ranking officers in the British military administration in Palestine tends to give credence to it. Lieutenant-Colonel I. E. Hubbard, the military governor of Jaffa, recommended to the British government, in November 1918, the formation of a Palestinian Arab commission to keep the balance of power between the Arabs and the Jews.⁸ He referred to the Jaffa MCA as a strong pro-British association with a pro-British majority of members who objected very strongly to what he described as the radical Arab nationalist views of its president, Raghīb Abu al-Su'ud al-Dajani.⁹ (See the list of Jaffa MCA in table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Membership of the Jaffa MCA, 1918

President: Raghīb Abu al-Su'ūd al-Dajani
 Members of the Board: 'Umar al-Bitar, Yusuf al-Dajani

Members of the Association:

Shafiq al-Dajani	Hanna Bayruti
Mahmud Abu al-Huda	Andoni Al-Khury
Darwish Wasfi al-Dajani	Jiryis al-'Isa
Amin Ishhaybir	Andraus al-Dabbas
Sa'id Abu Khadra	Hanna al-Jallad
Muhammad 'Ali Dia al-Dajani	Daud al-Jallad

SOURCE: I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File A/MS3.

It seems that the Jaffa military governor was inclined to think that the MCA was a moderate association which could form, with British support, a representative Arab party capable of preventing the Palestinian Arabs from pursuing an assertive, anti-British course.

This view was shared by several British officers. Talking about the MCAs in September 1919, Major-General H. D. Watson, the second chief administrator in Palestine, said that should the MCA be prohibited a great deal of harm might result because "we are able now to keep a close eye on its doings which are open to view." Watson further stated:

On taking this Administration I was advised to keep the balance of all parties, and in view of the fact that the Administration is known to be in close touch with the Zionist Commission, it is as well to be in touch with the body representing the other parties in the country, although the body is not officially recognized beyond registration.¹⁰

The available Arab records on the MCA do not mention the support which it received from the British authorities in Palestine. Palestinians who were active in local politics during the period under survey maintain that certain British military officers supported the MCA out of their anti-Jewish feelings.

Wadi' al-Bustani, a Maronite from Haifa, used to relate to his friends how some British officers encouraged the formation of the MCA because they did not like the Jews.¹¹

As noted earlier, the MCA notables were on their part interested in maintaining friendly relations with the British. This is reflected in the statutes which the MCA adopted at its first general congress held in Jerusalem in early February 1919. In this congress, the MCA defined its objectives in non-political terms. It called for the preservation of the material and moral rights of the people; the advancement of the agricultural, industrial, economic, and commercial conditions of the "homeland;" the revival of learning; and the education of the new "nationalist generation."¹²

But while the MCA did not publicly define itself as a political organization, it nonetheless articulated political demands on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs. The allegiance of its leaders was to the land of Palestine; they were also strongly opposed to the Jewish National Home and to Jewish immigration. Moreover, they upheld the principle of Palestinian independence in internal affairs (see chapter 8 for details). As such, they should be considered the first generation of Palestinian politicians whose ideals formed the basis of Palestinian nationalism.

To attain their nationalist demands and promote their views, the MCA leaders resorted to persuasion and petition. They were the most conciliatory among the Palestinians, and the most willing to bargain and compromise, but not on the issue of Zionism. In February 1919, for instance, the MCA leaders adopted at the end of the First Palestinian Congress a resolution considering Palestine part of Arab Syria, as a conciliatory step to appease the Arab nationalists. In the summer of the same year, the Jaffa and Jerusalem MCAs pleaded before the King-Crane Commission for British protection.¹³

In addition, the MCA leaders had a traditional outlook, taking a rather paternalistic view of their responsibilities for guiding the Palestinian Arab community. It is perhaps not surprising then that the MCA was, from an organizational point

of view, an elitist body controlled by an administrative committee elected by the members. It gained legitimacy and support through the social status of its leaders, through support by British officials, and through articulating popular nationalist demands, particularly opposition to Zionism.

Reflecting the traditional nature of Palestinian society and politics, the MCA was merely a loose alliance of notables with no political structures designed to penetrate society and incorporate new social forces. Political participation was an unpaid, voluntary undertaking, which was in most cases attractive only to the wealthy few. This situation was complicated by the British occupation of Palestine and the British pro-Zionist policy. Preoccupied as it was with these two factors, the MCA was in no position to concentrate on widening political participation and establishing formal bureaucratic structures capable of harnessing the resources of society.¹⁴

Operating in a society that was disrupted by war, the MCA had meager funds at its disposal. Its income came mainly from contributions made by Palestinian Arabs. The amount of these contributions varied with political events in the country, increasing in times of crisis and decreasing in more stable circumstances.¹⁵ Jamal al-Husayni, secretary of the Arab Executive Committee (AE) which was set up by the Third Palestinian Arab Congress in December 1920, complained in his unpublished memoirs about the chronic financial crisis that afflicted the MCA and the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine. "We did not have fixed income," wrote al-Husayni,

for overhead expenditure [meaning the necessary expenses for the MCA and AE]. The Arab Executive left me very little money. The Muslim-Christian Association used to overburden me with expenses and abandon me when the payments were due.¹⁶

THE YOUNGER POLITICIANS

The Palestinian Younger Politicians entered into Palestinian politics through two organizations: al-Muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club) and al-Nadi al-'Arabi (the Arab

Club). The two organizations represented a new generation of political activists. The careers of some of these activists, it should be recalled, had been stymied after the Young Turk revolution and further impaired by World War I. Owing to their young age and the process of their political formation, the members of al-Muntada and al-Nadi realized the power of propaganda and of political agitation. Compared to the Older Politicians who led the MCA, the Younger Politicians tended to be less conciliatory and less open to bargaining. In this period, the Younger Politicians succeeded in moving to the forefront of the Palestinian nationalist movement, only to be eclipsed late in 1920 by the Older Politicians of the MCA.

Al-Muntada dominated much of Palestinian political life in 1919 and early 1920. It started originally as an Arab association which was founded in Constantinople in the summer of 1909 by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil of Tyre, Lebanon, and by a group of officials, deputies, men of letters, and students, to act as a meeting place for Arab visitors and residents in the Ottoman capital.¹⁷ This club contributed to the prewar Arab movement of reformers by strengthening its appeal and extending its reach, as manifested by its membership, which ran into the thousands, and its branches, which spread in the various towns of Syria and Iraq. There were several Palestinian Arabs active in the organization, notably Jamil al-Husayni of Jerusalem, who was a close friend of 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, and Asim Bsaysu of Gaza, as well as Rushdi al-Salih Milhis of Nablus.¹⁸

In November 1918, al-Muntada reemerged with new members and a new political program. Its leadership was composed of Jamil al-Husayni, Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani, Yusuf al-Khatib, Fakhri al-Nashashibi, Is'af al-Nashashibi, Fu'ad al-Nashashibi, Mahmud 'Aziz al-Khalidi, and Saliba al-Juzi. As is evident, the club was largely dominated by prominent members of al-Nashashibi family, members who did not belong to the Ottoman aristocracy of service.

A composite image of the dominant Nashashibi members of al-Muntada shows men born toward the end of the

nineteenth century, in the district of Jerusalem, of a wealthy Muslim family. From this family origin, they went to the Roman Catholic Patriarchate school in Beirut and the Franciscan Frères' school in Jerusalem, completed a university education either in Istanbul, London, or Paris, and qualified for professional careers in teaching, military service, and later in the police force of the British administration in Palestine.¹⁹

For one of these Nashashibi members, namely Is'af, a more complete image reveals devotion to Arab unity, and to Arabic culture and language, and a belief that Arabic, the language of the Quran and the Prophet, is a unifying factor among the Arabs.²⁰ This attitude was shared by Jamil al-Husayni who, as an active member of al-Muntada in Ottoman days, adopted the pan-Arab motto: "In the name of the Arabs we will live, and in their name we will die."²¹

The Arab nationalist sentiment of al-Muntada's leading figures was primarily responsible for the association's demand for complete Arab independence and the union of Palestine with Syria.²² This sentiment was reinforced by al-Muntada's association with Amir Faysal's Arab administration in Damascus. It is no wonder therefore that al-Muntada asked the Muslim religious speakers to mention the sharif of Mecca as the khalifa (caliph) in the Friday sermons they delivered at the mosques.²³

Furthermore, the active members of the club worked diligently to rally support for Faysal in Palestine throughout 1919 and early 1920.²⁴ Motivated by their Arab nationalist ideals, and by the belief that Arab nationalism was a source of strength for Palestine, they felt it was their duty to demonstrate the threat of Zionism not only to their Palestinian constituency, but to the Arab public at large. Thus in the summer of 1919, al-Muntada helped organize an anti-Zionist movement among the Muslims and Christians of Beirut through its branch there.²⁵ Despite that, however, Jerusalem remained the center of the club, which succeeded in setting up active branches in Jaffa, Tulkarm, Gaza, and other towns of Palestine.

Al-Nadi al-'Arabi, the second organization through

which the Younger Politicians engaged in politics, shared with al-Muntada several features, notably the fact that it was set up by young Palestinian members who hailed from local aristocratic families. Unlike al-Muntada, however, al-Nadi was founded by the younger members of al-Husayni family and those related to it, and by young members of other prominent Jerusalem Arab families.²⁶ Within al-Nadi, the Husaynis were the dominant political force. Here again, the leadership of al-Nadi did not come from the Ottoman class of office-holders.

To understand the political beliefs of the al-Husayni members of al-Nadi, we must look at their political socialization. This was a process which began early within their families, continued through their school years, and developed further as they entered into politics.

Of the Husaynis, only the political career of Muhammad Amin (1895-1974) has received scholarly attention because he became the predominant Palestinian leader during the British mandate. However, in many respects his political socialization is typical of that of other members of his family.

Muhammad Amin was born in 1895 in Jerusalem. He studied at a local Muslim school where he acquired an Islamic education, at a government local school where he learned Turkish, and at the Frères' school where he learned French.

Within the family and the school, Muhammad Amin learned a number of values of great significance for his future political career. These primarily concerned questions of personal and group identity. One was that Muhammad Amin became aware at an early age that he was a Muslim Arab. This awareness developed into overt political sentiments when Muhammad Amin went to Cairo in 1912 to study at al-Azhar, the ancient center of Islamic and Arabic studies.

While in Cairo, Muhammad Amin registered at Dar al-Da'wa wal-Irshad (School of Advocacy and Guidance) which belonged to the Muslim reformer Rashid Rida. Through Rida, Muhammad Amin was exposed to the ideas of Islamic reform, Arab revival, and the need to establish a united and independent Arab state.²⁷ Equally significant was that in Cairo

Muhammad Amin learned his first lesson in political organization. According to one of his classmates, he helped set up, together with about twenty Muslim and Christian Palestinian Arabs, a society to alert the Palestinians to the threat of Zionism.²⁸ In Cairo, Muhammad Amin was also introduced to the ideas of revolt, and of using the press, the mosques, and the schools as tools of political mobilization.²⁹

Other experiences instrumental in shaping Muhammad Amin's political education and beliefs were his service in the Ottoman army in World War I as an aide to a Turkish commander in Izmir, and later his appointment as recruiting officer working with Captain Brunton.³⁰ While the former experience transformed Muhammad Amin's nationalist sentiments into mature political beliefs, the latter introduced him to the skills of recruitment and enlistment.

Family, school, and career socialization, then, seem to have been important for Muhammad Amin in two ways. First, the family established the basis of a Muslim Arab identity by bringing him up as a Muslim Arab. This basis was developed into a strong sense of national and religious awareness through his education in Cairo and his association with Rashid Rida. Second, Muhammad Amin's experience in the Ottoman army strengthened his sense of Arab identity, while his experience as a recruiting officer served as a prelude to political organization and mobilization.

After the war, therefore, Muhammad Amin and his generation of Husaynis became directly involved in politics. Their family bond and, in particular, family heritage of political involvement and ascendancy, led them to the establishment of al-Nadi al-'Arabi.

The club was originally set up by Palestinian Arab nationalists in Damascus as an offshoot of al-Fatat. The Damascus central organization of the club was dominated by Arab nationalists from Nablus. Thus it is interesting to note how the younger generation of Husaynis became part, at least for a temporary period of time, of a group of young Nablusites who shared with them their Arab nationalist sentiment and

sent them, from time to time, instructions from al-Fatat and al-Nadi in Damascus. On behalf of the central committee of al-Fatat in Damascus, Dr. Hafiz Kan'an of Nablus used to contact the Arab Club in Jerusalem. Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, in his capacity as the president of the club in Jerusalem, met frequently with Kan'an in Nablus and agreed to work within the framework of the instructions of Faysal's administration in Damascus. Through al-Fatat, Kan'an also rendered financial assistance to the Jerusalem branch of the club.³¹

By virtue of identity of interests, members of al-Nadi al-'Arabi also cooperated with al-Muntada in promoting the idea of pan-Syrian unity in Palestine. They also cooperated in arranging for the appearance of Arab nationalists before the King-Crane Commission in the summer of 1919, and in submitting petitions demanding unity with Syria to the British military authorities in Palestine.³² However, imbued with their family values of independence and political supremacy, and with their perception of themselves as community leaders, the young Husaynis chose to be independent organizationally and refused to be integrated into any political structure which was not predominantly theirs.

In Palestine, al-Nadi al-'Arabi expressed its ideas through the mosques, the press, and active mobilization in Palestinian towns and villages. Al-Shaykh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud, the shafi'i mufti of Jerusalem, preached Arab nationalism at the al-Aqsa Mosque. The newspaper, *Surya al-Janubiyya* (Southern Syria), founded in Jerusalem in September 1919 and edited by two members of the club, Muhammad Hasan al-Budayri and 'Arif al-'Arif (both from Jerusalem), also disseminated the club's Arab nationalist ideology. The president of the club, Muhammad Amin, campaigned among the Palestinian Arab peasants and city-dwellers propagating anti-Zionism and unity with Syria.³³ He also helped organize demonstrations in Palestine on March 8, 1920, the day of Faysal's proclamation as king of Syria and Palestine. Equally significant was his role in the demonstrations of the Muslim holiday al-Nabi Musa, which were staged in Jerusalem in early April 1920. The

demonstrations resulted in the death of five Jews and four Arabs, and the wounding of many. Muhammad Amin's role in these demonstrations seems to have been the incitement of the Arab crowds by raising a portrait of Faysal and shouting: "This is your King," to which the crowd responded: "God save the King."³⁴

Al-Nadi al-'Arabi also used cultural events as a means of political mobilization. A performance entitled "The Ruin of Palestine," presented by the club in Nablus in January 1920, is a vivid demonstration of that. The performance runs as follows: Two wealthy Arab men sit in a coffee shop. The hostess is a young flirtatious Jewess who flatters them. Upon departing they leave her a large tip. When they call again the next day, she gets them drunk, goes out with them that evening, and steals their money. The relationship goes on for days and suddenly an old Jew called a "Zionist Leader" emerges and pretends to be drinking wine with the hostess. When the two rich Arab men enter the room, the "Zionist Leader" caresses her saying: "Do your best for your country and nation." One day the hostess threatens to break off with the two men if they do not register their property in her name. Being drunk, they comply and a British officer certifies the transfer of title. Next day, when the two rich Arabs go to the coffee shop, the hostess turns them out. Having lost all their property, they despair and commit suicide in the middle of the market shouting: "The country is ruined, the Jews have robbed us of our land and honor."³⁵

Socially, the activities of al-Nadi al-'Arabi were limited because of the lack of sufficient funds and its preoccupation with political issues. These activities included the establishment of schools, medical clinics for the poor, and the delivery of speeches about social and literary topics.³⁶

In addition to al-Nadi and al-Muntada, one last group of Arab political associations deserves specific mention, for they were involved in preparing armed resistance against the British and the Zionists. These associations, however, were never particularly strong. British and Zionist intelligence

reports considered them to be secretive and radical fronts for al-Muntada and al-Nadi. Perhaps the most active of these secret associations was Jam'iyyat al-Ikha' wal-'Afaf (Association of Brotherhood and Purity).

The association was formed sometime in 1918. Its main leaders were Hasan Jarallah, who was inspector at the Jerusalem municipality, Mahmud al-Dabbagh (nicknamed Abu Sa'ad), al-Shaykh Sa'id al-Khatib, Mahmud 'Aziz al-Khalidi, and 'Abd al-Halim al-Tawbji. A British intelligence report prepared by J. N. Camp, assistant political officer of intelligence in Jerusalem, referred to these people as a "host of ordinary ruffians and cut-throats" doing the "dirty work" for al-Muntada and al-Nadi.³⁷ Many policemen and gendarmes were overtly or covertly connected with the association.

The only Arabic source which mentions this association confirms the view that it was set up for the purpose of carrying out violent actions, especially the assassination of any Palestinian Arab who cooperated with the Jews or sold them land. Most of the members of this association, whose number did not exceed 200 in 1919, had not received any education, with the exception of Mahmud 'Aziz al-Kahlidi, Sa'id al-Khatib, and Hasan Jarallah.³⁸ This association lasted for a period of less than one year, when Ronald Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, ordered a crackdown on it.

Associated with Jam'iyyat al-Ikha' wal-'Afaf were the society of al-Fida'iyya (Self Sacrificer), and al-Muntada al-Dajani (al-Dajani Club). Al-Fida'iyya was initially set up in Jaffa by local people in early 1919 and lasted until 1923. Many of its members belonged to aristocratic families or to less wealthy branches of those families. The association succeeded in establishing branches for itself in Jerusalem, Gaza, Tulkarm, Lydda, Ramla, and Hebron. Although Jaffa was its center, the association was strong in Jerusalem and Nablus. In Nablus, where the Arab nationalist sentiment was strong, al-Fida'iyya was in close contact with Damascus. It invited the peasants of the Nablus district to its meetings. Some of the key active members of the association in Nablus were Sharif Qasim,

Munir 'Abd al-Hadi, Hilmi 'Abd al-Hadi, and 'Adil Daud Sharif. Every member who joined the association took the oath upon enlistment and was instructed that a traitor should be killed by his own friend.³⁹ The Jerusalem branch of al-Fida'iyya was also in touch with Damascus and with other Palestinian towns, especially Jaffa and Nablus. Among its most active members were Raghīb Bey al-Nashashibi, Fakhri al-Nashashibi, Muhammad al-Husayni, and Muhammad Yusuf al-'Alami.⁴⁰

As to al-Muntada al-Dajani, it was set up in Jerusalem sometime in the summer of 1919. It was led by Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani of Jerusalem, and its membership was confined to the younger members of the aristocratic family of al-Dajani.⁴¹

According to Zionist and British source material, these organizations were providing their members with small arms, preparing a list of prominent Zionists and their collaborators, contacting the Bedouins of Transjordan to gain their support in their fight against Zionist policy in Palestine, and propagating Arab nationalist ideas among Palestinian Arabs.⁴²

Although the Arabic source material does not provide information on these associations, the link between the Arab societies in Damascus and those in Palestine suggests a connection between these spirited associations and Damascus. As noted earlier, Darwaza describes the establishment in Damascus during the Faysal regime of al-Jam'iyya al-Filastiniyya (The Palestinian Society), and Jam'iyyat Fata Filastin (The Society of Palestinian Youth). We have seen how the latter association was formed by 'Izzat Darwaza, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, 'Arif al-'Arif, and Mu'in al-Madi for the purpose of carrying out military operations on the Palestine border to alert the Jews and the British to the fact that the Palestinians would struggle against the Balfour Declaration and the Zionist program. Financing for these operations came from the central committee of al-Fatat. The association prepared an ambush for Kalvarisky upon his visit to Damascus early in March 1920, because he was trying to make contacts with politically active Palestinians to reconcile them with the Zionist program. But the attempt to assassinate him failed

because he returned to Palestine through Beirut rather than through Qunaytara in Syria as was expected by Jam'iyyat Fata Filastin.⁴³

Al-Jam'iyya al-Filastiniyya, on the other hand, was set up in Damascus in 1919 by Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, Mu'in al-Madi, 'Arif al-'Arif, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, and Salim 'Abd al-Rahman. Its aim was to promote the Palestinian cause and enlist the support of the Arabs of Syria and Palestine.⁴⁴

These, then, were the Palestinian political associations, their political ideas, and their means of articulation. The urban centers, especially Jerusalem and Nablus, were the areas where these ideas seem to have had greatest currency. It was by way of Damascus and its active political associations that the unionist idea spread in Palestine and attracted members of the younger generation. Disaffected as they were by their exclusion from the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy, the Younger Politicians were captured by Faysal's kingdom in Syria, hoping that through their political positions with Faysal they would make up for the political losses they had suffered under the impact of the policies of Turkification. They also believed that if Arab unity and independence were achieved the Zionist undertaking would be abated. But they were disappointed to find out that the fight against Zionism, which was the most explicit concern of the Palestinian leadership, was not at the top of the nationalist agenda in Damascus.

The Palestinian Older Politicians, on the other hand, tended to favor an autonomous Palestine under their leadership. After all, these belonged to the first generation of Palestinian Arabs who opposed Zionism on the ground of Ottoman loyalism and local patriotism. Moreover, an autonomous Palestine was the only viable option for the protection of their local positions. A Syria united under Faysal, so they must have thought, would deprive them of their posts and usher a new process that would bring the Younger Politicians into key administrative posts, thus putting them on the sidelines and enfeebling their standing in local society. Naturally, they

watched with fear as the Damascus notables were pushed aside by young and ambitious Arab nationalists who took control of Faysal's Arab government in Syria.

The Younger Politicians tended to be younger, of course, their median age being ten or more years less than the median age of the Older Politicians. To take a few examples: among the Younger Politicians, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni was born in 1895, Ishaq Darwish in 1896, 'Arif al-'Arif in 1892, Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi in 1894, Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza in 1888, Rafiq al-Tamimi in 1889, and Fakhri al-Nashashibi sometime after 1890. On the other hand, among the Older Politicians Musa Kazim al-Husayni was born in 1853, 'Arif al-Dajani in 1856, Raghīb al-Nashashibi in 1883, 'Umar al-Bitar in 1878, and Ya'qub Farraj in 1875.⁴⁵

However, it should be noted that a few relatively old Palestinians were connected with the cause of Arab nationalism even before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Among them were 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, who was born in 1882, and Is'af al-Nashashibi, who was born in 1885. As we have seen, Is'af exhibited a superior literary talent. Older still were Sa'id al-Karmi of Tulkarm (b. 1852), Hafiz al-Sa'id (b. 1841) who was born in Gaza but served as mayor of Jaffa in Ottoman days, and Salim al-Ahmad 'Abd al-Hadi of Jenin (b. 1870). These three older men, it should be noted, had a talent for and a strong interest in Arabic language and literature. Two of them, Hafiz and Sa'id, composed Arabic poetry, though Hafiz was more prolific. Salim, the sources tell us, was well versed in Arabic culture and composition.⁴⁶

This lends credence to the view that intellectuals were more important among the Arab nationalists than they were among the Ottomanists,⁴⁷ though not all intellectuals subscribed to Arab nationalism. Some indeed remained staunch adherents of Ottomanism to the end. To take a few examples: Salim al-Ya'aqubi, the Palestinian poet, journalist, and orator who was born in Lydda in 1880, supported the Ottoman claim to the caliphate, and attacked the Arab revolt and its leader Sharif Husayn.⁴⁸ As'ad al-Shuqayri (b. in Acre in 1860), who besides

his expertise in *shari'a* law also had some talent for Arabic composition, supported the unity of the Ottoman Empire and spoke against its breakup and against the Arab nationalist movement even after 1918.⁴⁹

Compared to the Older Politicians, the Younger Politicians were more willing to resort to agitation and to more assertive means of political mobilization and propaganda. They were also more willing to try active political methods, such as demonstrations and radical political fronts, in order to achieve their goals. But like the Older Politicians, though less than these, the Younger Politicians had developed some skills in political bargaining. Also in common with the Older Politicians, the Younger Politicians never created a model of cohesive nationalist politics which might have brought the next generation of elites into a unified political process. Instead, they were organized along fragmented family lines, and established active political fronts with overlapping memberships.

Both the Older Politicians and the Younger Politicians believed they had the right to represent the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. Both groups were also unwilling to share power with the other. But being more skilled politicians, members of the older group were considerably more willing to enter into coalitions, and even change their political style when necessary. For example, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, mayor of Jerusalem, and 'Arif al-Dajani, president of the Jerusalem MCA, participated in the demonstrations which spread throughout Palestine in early March 1920 when Faysal was proclaimed as king of a united Syria.

The distinctive trait of the Younger Politicians was their ability to become the dominant ideological force in Palestinian politics until the spring of 1920. How they advanced their Arab nationalist program, and how they later accommodated Palestinian nationalism within their doctrine of Arab nationalism is the story of the following pages.

8.

The Crisis in Political Identity

Political identity is a phenomenon which has preoccupied the peoples of Asia and Africa since World War I. For many politicians and intellectuals, the growth of national consciousness involved, in the words of one observer, a "widespread desire to rid themselves of all vestiges of the colonial era and to create or revive their own distinctive culture."¹

After World War I, the vision of a nation always included the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. In the view of many in Asia and Africa, the principle incorporated the ideals of freedom and democracy and the rights of individuals and peoples. Even though the concept of self-determination found no place in the Covenant of the League of Nations, it became one of the fundamental principles of international society after the war.² Closely connected with self-determination was the universal aspiration for a unified, consolidated nation.

The very nature of Arab society has been one factor which stood in the way of fulfilling this aspiration. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the people of Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon were precipitated into a new political setting with their old views and their tribal and regional loyalties still largely unchanged. Hence it was difficult for them to identify themselves as members of one new nation. "It took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen," wrote Karl Deutsch, "How

are variegated tribal groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians, or Malaysians in one generation?"³

Palestinian society, which was perhaps the most compact and homogeneous society in Arab lands, suffered from family, tribal, and political divisions. The Palestinians were unanimous in their opposition to Zionism and the Jewish National Home policy, but they were not as unanimous in their definition of the political future of Palestine.

Many changes were also telescoped into a very short period of time. Ottomanism was defeated as an ideology and as a locus of political identification; the local political elites were factionalized; the British were in control of Palestine with a pro-Zionist policy; the future of Palestine and the other Arab provinces was yet to be decided; and the ideological balance of power was tilting in favor of the Arab nationalist groups in Damascus.

No wonder, therefore, that in the first two years of the British occupation of Palestine, the issue that came to dominate much of the political life of the notables and Arab nationalists was the definition of political identity. Does the Palestinian Arab belong to a Palestine that should be independent, or to a Palestine that should be united with Syria?

An episode related by Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza encapsulates the intense preoccupation with this question. In January 1919, when the issue of pan-Syrian unity was the subject of discussion among the Palestinian political elites, 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani, president of the Jerusalem MCA, out of his preference for a Palestine separate from Syria, jokingly said that the Syrians would snatch away the fezzes of the Palestinians. Darwaza, a strong proponent of pan-Syrian unity, answered saying that should Jerusalem become the capital of an independent Palestine, its people should be expected, on the basis of al-Dajani's logic, to snatch away the fezzes of the people of other Palestinian cities and villages.⁴ Darwaza's message was simple: Just as Jerusalem cannot be separated from Palestine, so Palestine cannot be separated from Syria.

This chapter focuses on the process of the debate over

the political identity of Palestine and on the failure to reach a consensus on the future of the country. The inability to reach this consensus opened the way for British, French, and other kinds of foreign manipulation and kept the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement swaying back and forth during the formative period 1917-20 between separate independence for Palestine and unity with Syria.

Arab Political Trends in Palestine After the War

We have seen how Palestine was put under a separate military administration, OET-South, and how the two political trends of Arab nationalism and local nationalism started to surface following the British conquest of 1917-1918. The Younger Politicians believed that jointly with Syria, Palestine had gone through many tragedies, and the two "sisters" should therefore be indissolubly linked in their struggle for freedom and independence.⁵ On the other hand, the Older Politicians called for the establishment of a separate government for Palestine.

On November 2, 1918, the Jaffa MCA submitted a memorandum to General Sir Gilbert Clayton, chief political officer and policymaker of the military administration, in which it affirmed the Arab character of Palestine and objected to the Jewish National Home policy. The petition made no mention of Palestine being part of Syria and referred to it as "our Arab homeland, Palestine."⁶

On February 5, 1919, however, the representatives of fourteen Palestinian cities and villages submitted a petition to the Paris Peace Conference demanding that Palestine, or "Southern Syria" as they called it, be "inseparable from the independent Arab Syrian government that is bound by Arab unity, and free from all foreign influence or protection."⁷ Other petitions echoing the same demands had already been submit-

ted by the Younger Politicians to the Peace Conference and the United States government in January 1919. Those sent to the United States extolled President Wilson's principle of the "consent of the governed" and asked the American government to support the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs and to decide against the "detachment" of Palestine from Syria.⁸

Besides ideological differences, the Older Politicians and the Younger Politicians held different opinions on who was to govern Palestine. The Older Politicians had no desire to see Palestine come under Faysal's rule. Aside from the fact that they were not excited about Sharif Husayn and his sons, the Older Politicians seem to have concluded that a Palestine under Sharifian rule would bring about two undesired developments: one would be the loss of their positions of leadership to the Younger Politicians;⁹ the other would be the frustration of their patriotism which was anchored after the war on Palestinian independence.

In contrast, however, the Younger Politicians saw more advantage in Faysal's leadership over Syria including Palestine. First, it would be a base for Arab unity and strength against the Zionists. Second, a Syria united under Faysal's crown would be the first step toward pan-Arab independence and the restoration of the Arabs to their position of primacy on the world scene. Third, under Sharifian rule the Younger Politicians would have the chance to become the leaders of Palestine and steer the course of Arab nationalist development in the country.

The First Palestinian Arab Congress

The two political trends represented by the Older Politicians and the Younger Politicians were reflected in the first Palestinian Arab Congress. The MCAs held this congress in Jerusalem between January 27 and February 9, 1919. By virtue of the fact

that it was attended by delegates from various Arab villages and major towns, with the exception of Beersheeba, Acre, and Hebron, the congress was a testing ground for the strength and influence of these two groups.¹⁰

Eleven of the twenty-seven delegates were Palestinian nationalists, two were French sympathizers, twelve were Arab nationalists, and two tended to be undecided.¹¹ The two delegates from Gaza, two from Haifa, one from Ramla, two from Safad, one from Tiberias, one from Jaffa, and two from Jerusalem were Palestinian nationalists with pro-British sympathies. The other two delegates from Jerusalem had pro-French sympathies. One delegate from Jaffa, two from Jenin, four from Nablus and Jamma'in, one from Nazareth, two from Tiberias, and the two from Tulkarm were Arab nationalists. One from Jaffa and one from Nazareth were undecided (table 8.1).

The unpublished memoirs of Darwaza, the secretary of the congress, state that the Arab nationalists of Nablus raised the idea of convening the Congress after the establishment of the MCAs was completed in the northern cities of Palestine. Motivated by a desire to study the various aspects of the Palestinian cause and to frame a national charter, the Nablus Arab nationalists discussed the subject with the MCAs. The latter welcomed the idea and agreed to hold the congress in Jerusalem.¹² Fear of Zionist immigration and patriotic sentiment prompted the Palestinians to convene the congress. The primary focus of the congress was the question of Zionism and the political future of Palestine.¹³

Early in the congress, the French government worked hard through its Arab sympathizers to secure a resolution favoring union of Palestine with Syria, hoping that it might be interpreted as favorable to union with a French Syria. It seems that the French were relying for this on the two pro-French delegates from Jerusalem, Shukri al-Karmi (Latin) and 'Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghawsh (Sunni). They also counted on the agents of the French consulate and some pro-French Catholics and Latins, like Hanna Ayyub, Salim Bey Ayyub, and Lutfi Abu

Table 8.1: Delegates of the First Palestinian Arab Congress

<i>Name of District</i>	<i>Delegates</i>	<i>Political Preference</i>
Gaza	Al-Hajj Sa'id al-Shawwa Ahmad al-Surani	Palestinian independence Palestinian independence
Haifa	Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim Iskandar Munassa	Palestinian independence Palestinian independence
Jaffa	Ahmad Raghib Abu al- Su'ud al-Dajani Yusuf al-'Isa Muhammad Baydas (Jaffa region)	(Unity with Syria?) Unity with Syria Palestinian independence
Jenin	Haydar 'Abd al-Hadi Nafi' 'Abbushi	Unity with Syria Unity with Syria
Jerusalem	'Arif Pasha al-Dajani al-Daudi Ya'qub Farraj Shukri al-Karmi 'Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghawsh	Palestinian independence Palestinian independence Pro-French Pro-French
Nablus	Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi Ramiz al-Nimr	Unity with Syria Unity with Syria
Jamma'in	Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza Kamal al-Din 'Arafat	Unity with Syria Unity with Syria
Nazareth	Jubran Iskandar Kazma Husayn al-Zu'bi	(Unity with Syria?) Unity with Syria
Ramla & Lydda	Ahmad Sayf al-Din al-Husayni	Palestinian independence
Safad	Salah al-Din al-Hajj Yusuf Muhyi al-Din 'Isa	Palestinian independence Palestinian independence
Tiberias	Mahmud Tabari Mahmud Husayn Ilyas Ka'war	Unity with Syria Unity with Syria Palestinian independence
Tulkarm	Sa'id al-Karmi Muhammad Tawfiq al-Tibi	Unity with Syria Unity with Syria

SOURCE: I.S.A., J. N. Camp's report on the First Palestinian Arab Congress, Record Group 2, File 155. Description of political preferences enclosed in parentheses had a question mark in Camp's report. I compared the names in Camp's report with the signatures of the delegates on the original Arabic document of the Congress resolutions that is deposited at the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File A/MS 16, and with an account of the congress in a Zionist intelligence report, C.Z.A., Jerusalem, Record Group L4, File 768.

Suwwan.¹⁴ Although the pro-French and Arab nationalists desired unity with Syria and lobbied for a resolution in favor of that, the aims of the two groups were different. The Arab nationalists wanted a united and independent Syria under Sharifian rule; the pro-French were both anti-Sharifian and for a Syria under French protection.

Aware of that, the Arab nationalist delegates made a tactical reversal of attitude and jointly with the Palestinian nationalists passed two separate resolutions, one anti-French and one with a proviso which asked for British assistance in the development of Palestine.¹⁵ (See resolutions 2 and 5 below.) The goal of the Arab nationalists to secure independence for Syria, and the desire of France to put Syria under her control, caused this convergence of interests. "If Syria falls under French protection," wrote Taha al-Hashimi, a prominent Arab nationalist from Iraq, "then farewell to the Arab world, for Syria will become like Algeria and Tunis, in which the foreigner will savor the happy life and the Christian will procure his rights. As to the Muslims who number three million, they will be deprived of everything."¹⁶

The British, more than the French, exerted their influence on the congress delegates hoping to win a resolution in favor of British administration or protectorate. Relevant British records indicate that British officials were almost confident that the congress would pass pro-British resolutions.

Resolutions of the First Palestinian Arab Congress

1) We consider Palestine nothing but part of Arab Syria and it has never been separated from it in any stage. We are tied to it by national (qawmiyya), religious, linguistic, moral, economic, and geographic bonds.

2) The statement made in the speech of M. Pichon, France's Foreign Minister, claiming that France has rights in our country based on the desires and hopes of the native population (al-ahlin) has no foundation and we reject everything in this speech of December 29, 1918, and our hopes rest only in Arab unity and complete independence.

3) Based on the above we desire that this district of ours, meaning Palestine, remain undetached from the independent

Arab Syrian Government that is bound by Arab unity, and free from all foreign influence or protection.

4) In accordance with the rule laid down by President Wilson and which most of the leaders of the Great Powers had accepted, we consider as invalid and unacceptable every promise or treaty made regarding our country.

5) The government of the country will seek the assistance of its friend Great Britain in case that is needed for development, on condition that this will not prejudice in any way its independence and Arab unity, while maintaining good relations with all the allied countries.

SOURCE: I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File A/Manuscript 16.

"The original intention of the majority when the assembly first met," wrote Ronald Storrs, "was to apply to Great Britain for an independent autonomous Palestine under British protection on condition of guarantees against Zionist government or immigration." A Zionist intelligence report stated that the majority of the congress delegates were "more or less guided by the present authorities of the country."¹⁷

To counter the influence of the French, and the apparent dominance of Arab nationalists lest they prevail over their sympathizers, the British sent General Gabriel Bey Haddad, director of public security in Faysal's government, to Jerusalem on February 8, 1919, one day before the conclusion of the congress, to persuade the delegates to demand home rule for a Palestine separate from Syria.¹⁸

At this juncture the majority of delegates were in favor of pan-Syrian unity. With the assistance of Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni, the mayor of Jerusalem, Haddad held a meeting with about half the congress delegates at the Jerusalem municipality. Some Arab nationalists and advocates of Palestinian independence attended the meeting. Among the Arab nationalists were Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi, Jubran Kazma, Yusuf al-'Isa, and al-Shaykh Raghīb Abu al-Su'ud al-Dajani who subscribed at that point to the Arab nationalist view.

The Arab nationalists challenged Haddad, asserting that Palestine has always been part of Syria. When Haddad failed to prevail, he urged 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani to convoke all the congress delegates hoping to convince the majority of his views. Musa Kazim Pasha remained neutral; 'Arif Pasha endorsed the idea and promised Haddad that he would do his utmost to help him present his views to the congress. The Arab nationalists were quick to respond. Fearing the possible impact of Haddad's views on some delegates because he implied that his views were very close to those of Faysal, the Arab nationalists, forming a majority with their supporters, held an emergency session over which al-Shaykh Sa'id al-Karmi, the congress vice-president, presided. After the session they issued a statement in which they announced the closing of the congress meetings, thus foiling the attempts of Haddad and the advocates of Palestinian independence to persuade the congress members to adopt a resolution advocating the separation of Palestine from Syria.¹⁹

This turn of events sheds light on why the delegates passed inherently inconsistent resolutions, and on why some members changed their positions after the congress. The first and third resolutions, which demand the unity of Syria and Palestine, were brought about by the convergence of the interests of the Arab nationalists and the pro-French delegates on this particular point although, as we have seen, each group had different motivations. The anti-Sharifian position of France and its desire to control Syria made the Arab nationalists and Palestinian nationalists pass a conditional resolution favoring British assistance in the development of Palestine (resolution 5), and another one denouncing the statement of Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, regarding alleged French rights and interests in Palestine (resolution 2).²⁰

It was within this context, therefore, that the Palestinian nationalist delegates from Jerusalem, Gaza, and Haifa made a statement after the congress in which they disapproved the change of name from Palestine to Southern Syria and affirmed that the government of Palestine must be independent and

autonomous in its home affairs having only a cultural union with Syria. This government must appeal to Great Britain as a sort of protecting power, provided Zionist immigration were prohibited and the independence of the country guaranteed.²¹

The Palestinian nationalists of the Jerusalem MCA even forced Shukri al-Karmi, a pro-French Jerusalem delegate to the congress, to request in writing the withdrawal of his signature from the congress statements and resolutions which had been submitted to the British, French, Italian, and Spanish authorities in Jerusalem.²² 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani and Ya'qub Farraj, the two Palestinian nationalists from Jerusalem who were aided by Isma'il al-Husayni, did not sign the document of the resolutions. On the other hand, the two pro-French delegates from Jerusalem announced that they only endorsed the two resolutions demanding Syrian-Palestinian unity and disassociated themselves from the pro-British and anti-French articles.²³

Differences also arose over the composition and financing of two delegations, one to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference and another one to Faysal's Arab government in Damascus to transmit the congress resolutions. The Damascus delegation had the additional responsibility of meeting Amir Faysal and the leaders of the Arab movement in Syria to seek support for the Palestinian Arabs.²⁴ Had it not been for the insistence of the Arab nationalist delegates, the idea of sending the two delegations might have been almost dropped.²⁵ The delegates who favored Palestinian independence particularly 'Arif Pasha, did not want to send delegates carrying a resolution of pan-Syrian unity with which they disagreed. In the end, the Arab nationalists and their supporters prevailed.

The Paris delegation consisted of al-Hajj Tawfiq Hammad of Nablus, al-Shaykh Raghīb Abu al-Su'ud al-Dajani of Jaffa, and Jubran Kazma, an agronomist from Nazareth who had a working knowledge of French. The Damascus delegation was composed of Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi (Nablus), Haydar 'Abd al-Hadi (Nablus), Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza (Nablus), in addition to the latter two members of the Paris delegation.²⁶ Of the £3,500 which the congress assigned as expenses for the two delegations, Nablus was responsible to

raise £1,000 which it did. But most of the other districts of Palestine failed to fulfill their financial obligations.²⁷

Motivations of the Two Groups

One authority on Palestinian nationalism argues that both the advocates and the opponents of Syrian-Palestinian unity were mainly motivated by the desire to acquire political posts. "The establishment of a separate government for Palestine," writes Porath,

would turn the notables of Jerusalem and the heads of the influential families into office-holders, ministers, and future heads of state. On the other hand, the youthful partisans of unity could only gain from unity with Damascus. Around Faysal converged their contemporaries and ideological comrades from Syria and Iraq, who had become the decisive element in his regime, pre-empting the veteran Damascene elite.²⁸

This interpretation, though it has a measure of truth, fails to take into account other complex factors that motivated the leaders of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. Arab fears of Zionism, patriotic Arab sentiment, and the ideological strength of the Arab nationalists were crucial factors.

British officials early recognized that the Palestinian Arabs suspected and feared Zionist aims to colonize Palestine and thus vigorously opposed the British policy of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In the winter of 1918, Syrian and Palestinian Cairenes came together, fearing the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish administration or state. On their mind was the expected large-scale Zionist purchases of Arab-owned land, and the possibility that the Jews would rebuild the Temple and thus cause sectarian strife in the country.²⁹

"In Palestine," Curzon wrote, "the feeling of both Christians and Moslems against our Zionist policy has now reached fever heat, and is increasing with every week's delay of a set-

tlement."³⁰ The Information Office of the Zionist Commission acknowledged in its intelligence reports that despite their different viewpoints, the Palestinian Arabs were unanimous in combating Zionism and Jewish immigration.³¹ The Arabs believed that should the Jews outnumber them, they would be subject to oppression.³²

Exorbitant claims which leading Zionists expressed publicly and in Hebrew journals contributed to the widespread Arab fear of Zionism.³³ Parallel with these pronouncements there was the Zionist Commission's program to control most of the Jewish private schools, to make Hebrew the medium of instruction, and organize elections for a Jewish constituent assembly in the spring of 1920, in violation of the military administration's ban on political elections.³⁴

Thus it is reasonable to say that in the face of a Zionist encroachment aided by the awesome power of Great Britain, the Palestinian Arabs found haven in a united Syria. "Once it is united," Kamil al-Dajani, an Arab nationalist from Jaffa, later observed, "Syria would serve as a wider protective circle from which we [the Palestinians] could derive the strength to fight against the Zionist onslaught."³⁵

Yet to argue that fear of Zionism was the only factor underlying the national sentiment of the Palestinians is an oversimplification. For in addition to defensive needs, there was the predominant element of self-assertiveness and natural patriotic sentiment. Herbert Samuel, later the first British High Commissioner in Palestine, quickly realized that sentiment among the politically conscious Arabs during his two-month visit to Palestine early in 1920 and cited it as the first reason for the movement for union with Syria.³⁶ Moreover, Arab nationalists viewed as a retrograde and inconvenient step the creation of political and economic divisions between territories that had been only recently parts of a larger empire.

Faysal's rule in Syria reinforced such Arab national feelings. "Amir Faysal," wrote the Greek Orthodox Jerusalemite, Khalil al-Sakakini, in 1918,

is the one who made us raise our heads high, and awakened our hopes from their slumber. The Amir did not revolt in the name

of the Hijaz, for the Hijaz had always been independent and the Ottoman state ruled it only by name. The Amir rather revolted on behalf of all the Arabs.³⁷

It takes a good deal of empathy to appreciate what it meant to a politically conscious Arab to see an Arab prince reigning in Damascus after more than four centuries of Ottoman suzerainty. The report of the Palin Commission, which investigated the April 1920 uprising in Jerusalem, recognized that for the first time after centuries of subjugation the Arab imagination was fired by the vision of a great Arab empire, ruled by members of the old Arab nobility of Mecca.³⁸

Now turning to the influence of the Arab nationalists, the source of that influence was Damascus. The Syrian capital was the center of the Arab nationalist movement. There, Faysal had the Arab army and administration; there, the Arab nationalists gathered and published their newspapers and issued their pamphlets and sent their instructions to their supporters in Palestine.

The Arab nationalists in Damascus included active and highly placed Palestinians. Although we cannot say, as a Zionist intelligence report did, that the Palestinians created the claim for a united Syria, yet we have enough evidence to argue that they endorsed that claim energetically and forcefully.³⁹

Locked in violent conflict with the Zionists, the Arab nationalists from Palestine had explicit concerns about their country. They knew what was going on in Palestine: Britain intended to control the country, and to facilitate the creation of a Jewish national home in disregard of the wishes of the Arab majority and the principles of self-determination and the consent of the governed.

While in Syria, therefore, the Arab nationalists from Palestine did their best to promote the idea of pan-Syrian unity and advance Palestine's cause, utilizing the senior posts they held in Faysal's government. The organizations they established, and the pamphlets they distributed, reflected their interests and political priorities. Their organizations, most notably al-Nadi al-'Arabi, were mainly preoccupied with affairs in Palestine. Their pamphlets carried expressions which were explicit-

ly intended to point out the political and religious significance of Palestine, to arouse Syrian sentiments for the country, and to pressure Faysal into opposing more forcefully the British Zionist policy in Palestine because it threatened not only Palestine but the cherished cause of Arab nationalism. Many of these expressions read: "Palestine is Arab," "Palestine is the key to the East," "Palestine is the first of the two Qiblas," "Down with Zionism."⁴⁰ Aware of the importance of the press as a platform for political propaganda, the Arab nationalists from Palestine used the power they wielded in Damascus to carry the Palestinian point of view to the Syrian public. This is explicitly outlined in the unpublished memoirs of 'Isa al-'Isa, a Greek Orthodox from Jaffa and chief of Faysal's royal court in Damascus. Before giving the Damascus newspapers their monthly allowance, states the memoirs, al-'Isa used to stipulate that the publishers devote to the Palestine cause half the columns of their papers.⁴¹

Through the political influence they exercised in Faysal's government and through the extra-governmental organizations of al-Fatat, al-Nadi al-'Arabi, and al-Istiqlal party, the Palestinian Arab nationalists in Damascus also tried to influence the outcome of the political debate in Palestine regarding the future of the country. The available evidence indicates that they were well-connected with the Palestinian Younger Politicians. For example, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni served as a link between Darwaza in Damascus, Dr. Hafiz Kan'an in Nablus, and the Arab Club in Jerusalem. He paid several visits to the delegates of the First Palestinian Arab Congress to propagate the idea of unity with Syria.⁴²

In his turn Darwaza was the link between the Arab nationalists in Syria and the Younger Politicians in Palestine. His membership in al-Fatat greatly aided him in that role. Several Zionist intelligence reports prepared early in 1920 describe the central role which al-Nadi al-'Arabi played in the Arab nationalist movement, but fail to mention al-Fatat and al-Istiqlal party. The same is true of J. N. Camp's intelligence report of August 1919 on the Jerusalem organizations.⁴³ Porath, however,

perceived the centrality of al-Fatat in Damascus and correctly noted that it set up al-Istiqlal party as a front for its public activity.⁴⁴

The private papers of Darwaza provide revealing information on its composition and activities in Syria and Palestine, particularly during Faysal's reign. As pointed out, this society was the decisive political force in Faysal's administration in Damascus. The amir himself, his entourage, and his palace officials joined as members.

Al-Fatat was so influential that Faysal's officials treated it as the party of his administration and regarded it as the power base of his regime. Its central committee established branches in the areas that came under the rule of the Arab provisional government in Damascus and appointed its own members as heads of those branches. One of the tasks of those branches was to transmit messages and reports to and from the areas of their appointment. Al-Fatat also established a Department of Information and Intelligence with branches in the different parts of Syria and Palestine.⁴⁵ Darwaza, Dr. Hafiz Kan'an (Nablus), 'Arif al-'Arif (Jerusalem) and Amin al-Husayni (Jerusalem) were some of the key figures who were active on behalf of al-Fatat in Palestine.

In consultation with the society's central committee in Damascus, Kan'an got in touch with al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Jerusalem immediately after the British occupation of Nablus. Amin al-Husayni, in his capacity as president of al-Nadi al-'Arabi, met frequently with Kan'an in Nablus and agreed in 1918-1919 to work within the framework of the instructions of Faysal's administration in Damascus. Through al-Fatat, Kan'an offered financial assistance to al-Nadi al-'Arabi.⁴⁶ Muhammad Amin, together with Younger Politicians from Jerusalem, such as Fakhri al-Husayni, 'Abd al-Latif al-Husayni, Ishaq Darwish, Al-Shaykh Yusuf Yasin al-Ladhiqi, and al-Shaykh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud, shared with al-Fatat a similar ideology and interest. They did not hold government positions in Ottoman times; most of them were born into aristocratic families; they all opposed Zionism and subscribed to the goal of pan-Syrian unity.

It was therefore through their supporters in Palestine, particularly through their ties to al-Nadi al-'Arabi, that the Arab nationalists of al-Fatat were able to win a majority vote in favor of pan-Syrian unity at the first Palestinian Arab congress. The Arab nationalists from Palestine also played an important role in convincing important Palestinians to abide by the resolutions of the congress and present the same demands to the King-Crane Commission in 1919.⁴⁷ How they did this, and how Palestinian nationalism later carried the day, will be the focus of the following chapter.

9.

The Ascendance of Palestinian Nationalism

The principles of Arab nationalism, particularly the post-1914 central principle of setting up a modern, independent, and united Arab state, had a strong element of idealism in them. Only in a superficial sense can it be said that this principle was applicable in the aftermath of World War I. A unitary Arab state, even a Syria united with Lebanon and Palestine, was a farfetched goal, given the strength of local loyalties, the lack of political sophistication on the part of the relatively small group of active Arab nationalists, and the ambitious designs of England and France.

The young group of men who were politically active on behalf of Arab nationalism, and these were mostly men who came from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, offered abstractions about nationalism, rather than a scientific analysis of it. No amount of romantic formulations, no matter how sincere their author might be, would substitute for the difficult path of entering the modern world, and of setting up an independent state, inhabited by all the Arabs, and united in culture, religion, and aim. This was the kind of *internal* challenge that Arab nationalism had to face after the war. It could not face the challenge not merely because *outside* colonial powers had the means and the will to shape the political realities of the Fertile

Crescent, but also because these realities were not compatible with the main principle of Arab nationalism.

After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the political consciousness of the Arabs inhabiting the Fertile Crescent seems to have been more amenable to the idea of a territorial nation-state than it was for the idea of one single state encompassing all the Arabs. In other words, the Arabs of Syria, the Arabs of Palestine, and the Arabs of Iraq concluded that their destiny and their responsibility lay in their native land, which it was their duty to liberate, to defend, and to rebuild. On this duty they focused, with the Syrians stressing the primacy of Syria's interests, the Iraqis those of Iraq, and the Palestinians those of Palestine.

Despite the unitarian content of Arab nationalism, political identity and loyalty were therefore crystallizing after the war on the basis of the entities inhabiting within the national frontiers of Iraq, and what later became a separate Syria, a separate Lebanon, and a separate Palestine. Loyalty to separate territorial Arab nation-states was gradually consolidated after the dismemberment of geographical Syria, even though the larger Arab entity beyond the national frontiers remained the central ingredient of the ideology of Arab nationalism.

Two ideological forces therefore emerged on the political scene after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: the push of Arab nationalism, and the stronger pull of local nationalism. The first stressed a shared Arab destiny and provided the idiom in which pan-Arab sentiments were couched. The second was the product of the impact of Western civilization upon the Arabs of Asia. The first was the universe of a minority composed of young political activists; the second was the realm of older politicians. The first idea was the one that was expected to replace Ottomanism because it was the only viable ideological option left on the eve of the Ottoman collapse; the second was the more powerful force that shaped the course of Arab politics after the war.

This chapter focuses on the pull of Palestinian nationalism. In the currents and crosscurrents that battled with each other after the war, was Arab nationalism able to win and occupy a position of primacy? How hard did the Palestinian Younger Politicians push for it, and how strong was the pull of local nationalism?

The Arab Nationalist Push

The spring and summer of 1919 witnessed a vigorous political campaign waged by the Younger Politicians and the Older Politicians. Both groups continued the promotion of their views in preparation for the forthcoming King-Crane Commission. Their focus was, as in the winter, the political future of Palestine. Should it be part of Faysal's Syrian dominion? Which foreign power, if any, should assume mandate over the country?

Determined to realize their dream of unity, the Younger Politicians used whatever institutional instruments they had: al Nadi al-'Arabi, al-Muntada al-'Adabi, and al-Fatat. Active Palestinian members of al-Fatat and its offshoot al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Damascus sent emissaries to different Palestinian cities and villages to propagate the demands which they wanted the Palestinian Arabs to present to the King-Crane Commission. These were: a) the unity of Palestine with Syria; b) complete independence for Syria within the context of Arab unity; c) rejection of the Balfour Declaration and Jewish immigration; d) rejection of any form of protection or mandate.¹

Some Younger Politicians were so enthusiastic about the program that they thought that its implementation was inevitable. "Our country (Palestine) is burning with zeal and Arab patriotism," wrote Rafiq al-Tamimi, an Arab nationalist from Nablus who was connected to the Beirut liaison office of

Faysal's Arab government. "I do not think that the Zionists are capable of occupying this beautiful spot of land. Public opinion in Palestine is concentrated upon political and economic unity with Syria, and upon demanding its absolute and complete independence."²

Darwaza and Kan'an, two important members of al-Fatat, continued their lobbying on behalf of the idea of Syrian-Palestinian unity. Before the arrival of the King-Crane Commission for the first time in Jaffa on June 10, 1919, the two went to Jerusalem to persuade its politicians to abide by the resolutions of the First Palestinian Arab Congress. They first met with the leadership of al-Nadi al-'Arabi, including Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, al-Shaykh Kamil al-Husayni, and Isma'il al-Husayni. All three expressed their support for unity and suggested that Darwaza and Kan'an meet Raghīb al-Nashashibi and 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani, who were advocates of a separate government for Palestine. Darwaza and Kan'an convinced Raghīb to call some of the Older Politicians of Jerusalem to a meeting at his house. When it was made clear at the meeting that Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni was now in favor of unity, the Older Politicians who attended the meeting, including Raghīb, 'Arif Pasha, Ya'qub Farraj, and al-Shaykh Husam Jarallah, followed suit.³

The belief in unity, however, was not a garb that could be donned. Some of the Older Politicians were willing to accept, for reasons of political convenience, the idea of unity, only to change their minds later. At stake were their interests as Palestinian nationalists and their interests as local political leaders. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the Palestinians, at least for the time being, to reach a workable consensus on the future of their country. They were unanimous in their opposition to Zionism and their determination to keep Palestine in Arab hands. But they were not unanimous on the issue of what kind of relations they should have with Syria or with the colonial European powers. This is borne out by the political preferences submitted to the King-Crane Commission and the British authorities by the Younger Politicians and the

Older Politicians, as well as by other political and religious Palestinian representatives.

Following its arrival in Jaffa in June 1919, the King-Crane Commission began to receive written and oral petitions from the political societies and religious representatives of the city, and from representatives of various villages around Lydda and Ramla. The head of the Protestant Syrian community, together with the Jaffa MCA, later said to have been appointed by the British military administrator, favored unity with Syria under a British mandate. In the event of British refusal the Protestants were inclined to favor France.⁴

On June 16, the commission interviewed forty Muslim and Christian members of the Jerusalem MCA, of whom twenty represented Jerusalem and the other twenty represented the villages surrounding the city. Of the twenty members who represented Jerusalem, five were Greek-Orthodox and five were Catholic. During the interview, the Commission inquired about Palestinian wishes regarding the mandatory power, Jewish immigration and Zionism, Palestine's unity with Iraq and the Hijaz, and the Arab prince who should rule Palestine in case independence were to be secured.

Three principles, later known as the three national demands, emerged from the answers presented by the Older Politicians of the Jerusalem MCA: 1) since Palestine was part of Syria, the question of who would be the mandatory power should be decided by the General Syrian Congress; 2) the Palestinian Arabs should reject Jewish immigration and the transformation of their country into a national home for Jewish immigrants; 3) the Palestinian Arabs should insist on complete independence.

The first principle, that is the one which considered Palestine to be part of the Syrian dominion, was a mere ploy designed to appease the Younger Politicians whose influence could not be ignored. The Older Politicians were not blind to what was taking place in the Syrian interior. They saw the Damascus-based counterparts of the Younger Politicians acquire standing with Faysal and exercise almost decisive

authority in his government. They knew that these were the real force behind the push of Arab nationalism. They also knew that it was wiser not to challenge them openly, not because they feared them but because in their calculation the general direction of Palestinian politics was running contrary to the political prescription of the Younger Politicians and their ideological comrades in Damascus. Palestine was now under British control, and England was opposed to Faysal exercising sovereignty over the country because this ran counter to Zionist policy.

So the best policy to follow, the Older Politicians seem to have thought, was to maneuver and wait for the Younger Politicians to exhaust their energy. They therefore played the game of experienced politicians. When pressured, they would subscribe to the ideal of unity; when they felt that the initiative was in their hands, they would press their desire for Palestinian independence.

And independence was what the Older Palestinians really wanted. When Ibrahim al-Shammas, a Greek-Orthodox member of the Jerusalem MCA, stated in his testimony before the King-Crane Commission that the Palestinian Arabs wanted nothing but their independence and freedom, the place of the meeting resounded with the applause of the attending Older Politicians.⁵ In front of their Palestinian constituency, the Older Politicians also threw their weight behind the cause of Palestinian independence, asserting that Palestine should legislate its internal laws on the basis of the wishes of the Palestinian Arabs and the requirements of their country.

Before the advent of the commission, the Older Politicians had already submitted similar demands to the British authorities. In their direct contacts with British officials, they did not refer to Palestine as southern Syria; nor did they demand its unification with Syria. They rather stressed that the future of Palestine should be decided by its Arab people and even referred to it as "our country Palestine" (*biladuna Filastin*).⁶ The farthest point the Older Politicians reached in terms of pan-Syrian unity was

to demand, rather vaguely, a constitutional and internally autonomous Palestinian government that would be politically linked to an independent Syria.⁷

In their own interests, and in the name of their ideology, the Younger Politicians pleaded the case of Syrian-Palestinian unity. They asserted before the commission on June 19, 1919, that Syria was entitled to complete independence from the Taurus Range in the north to Rafah in the south. This was roughly the area which medieval Arab authors designated as *Bilad al-Sham*, or geographical Syria. This land was approximately 500 miles in length and 100 miles in width.

Among the other principles which the Younger Politicians appealed to were those of individual rights and social progress. In their testimony before the commission, they appealed to the conscience of liberal Europe, always calling on the Allied Powers to apply the principles of democracy and the consent of the governed in their dealings with the Palestinian Arabs. They claimed that the Arabs were more qualified for independence than Turkey, not only because they fought on the side of the Allies against the Ottoman Turks, but also because they have an ancient civilization and a great culture. The Arabs, they said, had also been among the first people that came in contact with modern Western civilization. This is how the Younger Politicians expressed these ideas:

We demand independence because we are competent and qualified. Many of us have been trained to administer high posts. You find among us doctors, engineers, commanders, officers, teachers, writers, merchants, farmers, and craftsmen. Many of us occupy important posts in Egypt and the Sudan. In Europe and America hundreds of thousands of our people have for long lived in the midst of a refined civilization. They were imbued with modern ideas; they acquired sophisticated values, became experienced men, got used to the active life, and became familiar with the style of modern life. These people will greatly assist us in the ad-

ministration of the country and in its progress and development.⁸

The Younger Politicians continued to use their possibilities of action fully even after the King-Crane Commission concluded its work on June 27, 1919. Emboldened by the commission's recommendation in favor of Syrian-Palestinian unity,⁹ they tried to disseminate their Arab nationalist ideology in the rural and urban areas of Palestine. In addition to their endeavors in Jerusalem, Nablus, Jaffa, and Haifa, they were also active in Beersheeba, Gaza, Tiberias, and Ramla.

In Beersheeba, the Younger Politicians approached, in June 1919, al-Shaykh al-Sufi, the influential Bedouin chief in the district, and convinced him of the dangers that would come from the British and the Zionists. They pointed out that the most effective way to avert these dangers was to struggle for pan-Syrian unity under Faysal's rule. As a result, al-Shaykh al-Sufi propagated the program of the Arab nationalist movement among the Bedouins in Beersheeba and even sent several couriers to Faysal in Damascus. It should be recalled at this point that in his testimony before the King-Crane Commission on June 17, 1919, al-Sufi endorsed the unity of all Syria under Faysal's crown.¹⁰

In Gaza, Shukri al-Shawwa, the eldest son of al-Hajj Sa'id al-Shawwa, who was one of the two Gaza delegates to the First Palestinian Arab Congress, had close ties with the Arab nationalists in Damascus. Shukri encouraged the people of Gaza to revolt against the Zionists and the British in order to attain their freedom. He spread the idea that only through an Arab nationalist revolution assisted by Amir Faysal would the Arabs be able to resist the Zionist encroachments and attain the freedom and independence they desire.¹¹

Also active in Gaza on behalf of the Younger Politicians were Shukri's brother, Rushdi, and Hafiz al-'Alami. Al-Muntada al-'Adabi held regular meetings in this southern district and called for a rebellion against the Zionists and the British, reminding the farmers that the Zionists aimed at depriving them of their land. In Tiberias, the mayor, Qadri Ef-

fendi, was in constant touch with the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement in Damascus.¹²

As to Ramla, it became by the summer of 1920 a center for the political activities of the Younger Politicians. A significant percentage of the financial resources of the Arab nationalist organizations, particularly al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi, was kept in the town, and instructions from Damascus reached Ramla constantly. The most active members of the Arab nationalist movement there were the mayor, al-Shaykh Mustafa al-Khayri, and Shukri al-Taji al-Faruqi, a young local notable. A woman singer named Badi 'a sang at coffee houses in the town and encouraged her enraptured listeners to join Amir Faysal.¹³

The *diwan* (council room) of al-Faruqi was a meeting place for the pro-Faysal Palestinians of Ramla. Al-Faruqi, however, was anti-Zionist but not anti-British. He believed that the main strength of the Zionists came from the British, and that in case the Arabs won over the British they would be better able to defend themselves from the Zionist threat. Furthermore, al-Faruqi believed that the British government was united with Amir Faysal and favored Syrian-Palestinian unity.¹⁴

Throughout Palestine this Arab nationalist campaign was mainly undertaken by al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi. Together with their front societies, these associations formed, late in November 1919, a country-wide framework called the "Higher Committee of Palestinian Associations" (al-Lajna al-'Ulya lil-Jam'iyyat al-Filastiniyya).¹⁵

To further consolidate their program of Syrian unity, the Younger Politicians convened on their own a General Palestinian Congress (al-Mu'tamar al-Filastini al-'Amm) in Damascus late in February, 1920. From the few details available on this congress we know that some of the participants suggested that no mention be made of the term Palestine and that the name "Syrian Land" (al-Bilad al-Shamiyya) be adopted. The congress reaffirmed the indivisibility of Palestine from Syria and the resolutions of the General Syrian Congress.¹⁶

One month later, specifically on March 8, 1920, the cor-

onation of Faysal as king of a united Syria including Palestine, reinforced the political campaign of the Younger Politicians. "There is a marked hardening of the determination on the part of the Muslims and Christians to fight to the last against the idea of a National Jewish Home in Palestine," stated a British military intelligence report in April 1920,

Anti-British feeling is on the increase. Large orderly demonstrations against Zionism were held in several towns coinciding with the coronation of Amir Faysal. At Jaffa, a determined attempt has been made to collect delegates from all towns in Palestine to a Syrian conference in Damascus. The Arabic press hails the anti-Zionist demonstrations that have taken place recently as a sign of re-awakening national spirit.¹⁷

Among some Arab nationalists in Palestine and Syria, anti-British feeling had reached a peak, and some of them even sought to strike an alliance with the postwar Turkish leader, Mustafa Kamal (later Ataturk).¹⁸ "Europe is after colonizing Palestine, exploiting its wealth and desecrating its holy places," stated an unsigned proclamation which was distributed in Palestine in May 1920. It continues

Right can only be secured by the sword, and freedom by fire. You see what tricks and wiles are used by Europe in order to put an end to Turkey's liberty, honor, and independence.¹⁹

The Pull of Palestinian Nationalism

Bursts of enthusiasm, no matter how sincere, can rarely sweep away existing realities or change their pressing logic and legitimacy. A burst could stay around for a short or long time and then fade, or be overwhelmed by the superior force of a prevalent reality, by lack of maturity or a devastating external challenge, or by all of these. The enthusiasm might return, only to be twisted again, for a short time or for a long span of years.

The Younger Politicians and their Arab nationalist comrades in Damascus lived their moments of enthusiasm. A few of those moments may have been sweet; but the rest, as events tell us, were not as sweet. By the summer of 1920 the hope of a unitary Syrian state under the crown of Faysal had been shattered. The Palestinian Younger Politicians could no longer persist in their Arab nationalist pursuit. They now accepted in full daylight the supremacy of Palestinian nationalism. The character and development of their ideology became increasingly focused on a specific territory—Palestine—and on a specific group of people—the Palestinian Arabs.

The postwar dismemberment of geographical Syria by the British and the French was no doubt an important factor underlying the thwarting of the pan-Arab ideal. Palestine became a separate unit under British control. Syria and Lebanon emerged as separate political entities under French rule. Iraq fell in the hands of the British. But to say just this is to simplify too much. There were internal Arab factors which contributed to the eclipse of the Arab nationalist dream.

One such reason was the weakness of pan-Arab solidarity. In Damascus, the place of Arab nationalism, the anti-Palestinian wind was blowing from more than one direction. On one extreme were the loud calls for the resignation of the Palestinians from the positions they held in Faysal's government, as described by Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi.²⁰ On the other were the active enemies of the non-Syrian groups who, in the words of Darwaza, "gave impetus to local Damascene chauvinism" (*al-na'ra al-iqlimiyya al-Dimashqiyya*), and disseminated the idea that the Palestinians and Iraqis were responsible for the inability of the Syrians (*al-Shamiyyun*) to excel and become prominent in their own country. These were the members of the Syrian National Party (*al-Hizb al-Watani al-Suri*) or, in Arab nationalist parlance, the "Party of the Damascene Notables" (*Hizb Wujaha' Dimashq*).²¹ It was the party which described the Palestinians and Iraqis as "foreigners." In between were the silent Syrian onlookers, who quietly resented the Palestinian and Iraqi presence and dis-

liked the idea of seeing "aliens" wielding power in local Syrian politics.

This the Palestinians saw and reacted to in their own way. Some resigned their posts, and some lived with the wound it had inflicted for years to come. "The propaganda campaign waged by the Syrian National Party against the Palestinians and Iraqis," wrote Darwaza, "left its impact on me, and compelled me to refuse Faysal's offer, which had been conveyed to me in a letter from Sati' al-Husri, to go to Iraq and take part in the establishment of Faysal's government there."²²

Evidence of the anti-Palestinian sentiment can also be found in British sources, as Kedourie has demonstrated,²³ and in Zionist archives. A Zionist intelligence report prepared early in January 1920—almost seven months before the French forces occupied Syria and deposed Faysal—described the tension which arose between the Palestinians in Faysal's administration and some Syrian members of the administration. Referring to the Palestinians as the apparent "masters of Syria," the report stated that Syrian members brought pressure upon the Arab government to discharge the Palestinians from their sensitive posts and order them to return to Palestine where they would serve as agents for Faysal's cause.²⁴ Several Zionist intelligence reports were written on the subject later in the same year.²⁵

A second internal factor was Faysal's controversial dealings with the Zionists. It is this kind of situation that demonstrated the differences in political priorities. For Faysal, an understanding with the Zionists had the advantage of securing British support in his struggle with the French over Syria. After all, his main preoccupation was Syria; Palestine came second. For the Palestinians, however, the situation was different. They identified their struggle, first and foremost, with a specific territory—Palestine—and against a specific enemy—Zionism. Small wonder therefore that highly placed Palestinians were disappointed when they saw Faysal reach an agreement with Weizmann. They were equally disappointed

when their hands fell on a telegram which Faysal sent from Paris to this fledgling government in Damascus instructing his bureaucrats to prevent the Syrian newspapers from writing about Zionism because the Zionists "are helping us in the Conference" (meaning the Paris Peace Conference).²⁶

A remark on Faysal's relations with the Zionists by Darwaza, the Arab nationalist who carried the amir's banner, tells a lot about what many Palestinians thought. "Since the Arab revolt against the Turks," explained Darwaza, "no Arab leader has been up to the level of events except Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. He emerged and vanished like a shooting star."²⁷ In a way, this remark puts Faysal at a distance, as someone who did not give Palestine all the attention that it deserved.

Thus the experience of the young Arab nationalists in Damascus forced on them an encounter with their own fragmentation. Working with one another, they discovered the political realities that separated them. The Palestinians proceeded from the centrality and weight of the Palestinian problem. The Syrians embraced the cause of Syria, and the Iraqis the cause of Iraq. The Arab nationalist push could not overcome the powerful pull of local interests. This was the primary internal factor underlying the eclipse of the idea of Arab nationalism and the lack of smooth and harmonious relations among the Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi groups in Faysal's Arab government.²⁸

The dismantling of Faysal's government at the hands of the French forces in July 1920 only hastened the change of focus in the political orientation of the Palestinian movement. "The collapse of Faysal's rule in Syria," noted Kamil al-Dajani, a Palestinian who participated in the events of the period under survey, "and the disappointment of the hopes which were pinned upon that rule, made the Palestinians feel that the orientation toward a Greater Syria bore no fruit."²⁹ The distribution of the mandates between France and England, and the confirmation of the British mandate over Palestine at the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920, had given added thrust to the

force of local nationalist movements. Each movement was dedicated primarily to the settlement of the particular problems of its own region.³⁰

In Palestine, this process was even further accelerated by the institution of a civilian administration under a British Zionist, Herbert Samuel, on July 1, 1920. Samuel's appointment as High Commissioner of Palestine reinforced in the minds of Palestinians, including the Younger Politicians, Britain's determination to proceed with its Zionist policy.³¹ They therefore realized that they had to rely on themselves and concentrate on Palestine, especially since the hope of pan-Arab nationalism had receded, and Faysal's Arab rule, from which they had expected to draw strength, had collapsed.³² What propelled them further in this direction was the fact that Palestine was the country upon which the Zionist movement had concentrated its efforts with the ultimate goal of changing its Arab character and turning it into a Jewish state.

The Third Palestinian Arab Congress

Against this background the Third Palestinian Arab Congress convened in Haifa on December 13, 1920. It was designated as the third congress despite the fact that the second congress was never actually held. The MCA had decided to hold the second congress in Jerusalem in May 1920 to protest against the confirmation of the British mandate over Palestine and the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration in the instrument of the mandate at the San Remo Conference. However, the Palestine government forbade its convening lest it lead to disturbances like those of April of the same year during al-Nabi Musa celebrations in Jerusalem. Despite that, the MCA considered the congress to have been held and designated it as the second Palestinian Arab Congress.³³ Some historians therefore erred

when they wrote that the third congress had been designated as such because it followed the General Syrian Congress and what they called the Second Palestinian Arab Congress, which was held in Damascus at the end of February 1920.³⁴

Few details on the debates of the Third Palestinian Arab Congress existed before Akram Zu'aytir, who was a member of the Istiqlal Party and later a highly placed diplomat in the Jordanian government, deposited his private papers at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut. The congress held nine sessions over a period of seven days. Although the Haifa MCA requested the holding of the congress, several meetings of the Palestinian Arab political clubs and associations preceded its convening.

The purposes of the congress were to make the world hear the voice of the Palestinians and to pay heed to their national demands, as well as to unite the various Palestinian associations and clubs.³⁵ Thirty-one members attended each of the first and seventh sessions, thirty-two attended each of the second, fourth, and fifth sessions, twenty-four attended the third session, twenty-six attended the sixth, thirty attended the eighth, and thirty-eight attended the ninth session.

Eighteen of the forty-six delegates who attended represented Haifa; nine were delegated by the MCA, five by the Association of Christian Youth (*Jam'iyyat al-Shabiba al-Masihiyaya*) and two by the Association of Muslim Youth (*Jam'iyyat al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya*), both local committees of politicians who attempted to coordinate the affairs of their communities after the war. Ten delegates represented Jerusalem, six were delegated by the MCA and the notables of the city, three by *al-Nadi al-'Arabi*, and one by *al-Muntada al-Adabi*. Two represented Lydda and Ramla and were delegated by the mukhtars of the two towns. One represented Jaffa and was delegated by the MCA. Two represented Tiberias and were delegated by the MCA. One represented Safad and one represented Nazareth by virtue of proxies (*madabit tawkil*). One represented Acre. Two represented Jenin and were delegated by the MCA: Two

represented Tulkarm and were delegated by the National Club (al-Nadi al-Watani), and five represented Nablus and were delegated by the Nablus MCA.³⁶

The *madbata* (singular of *madabit*), signed by the MCA or a particular club or society or by the mukhtars or notables of a certain town or village, was the instrument used to bestow representation status upon the delegates. The following episode reveals the standing of the congress in the eyes of the Palestinians: Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner in Palestine, stated in his reply to a memorandum he received on behalf of the congress, on December 18, 1920 from Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the president of the congress, that the congress did not legally represent all classes and communities of the Palestinian Arabs but was rather composed of members who were "appointed by small groups."³⁷ In response, the presidents of the MCAs and of other clubs and associations, as well as the mukhtars and muftis and the representatives of the various professions throughout Palestine cabled the High Commissioner stressing that the congress represented all Palestinian Arabs and their aspirations and asking Samuel to amend the reply he had sent to Musa Kazim.³⁸

A careful study of the discussion which took place during the various sessions of the congress reveals not only the issues which concerned the attending delegates, but also the main political trends which were prevalent then and their impact on the future development of Palestinian society and politics in the years that followed. Three points have to be established before we move to an examination of the deliberations of the congress and of their significance: 1) the leitmotif of the Palestinian leadership was Palestinian politics and the fight against Zionism; 2) the leadership was aware of the need to organize the Arab movement in Palestine in a more coherent fashion; 3) the leadership addressed itself to the issues which were of major concern to all Palestinian Arabs, that is the focal point was Palestine and its local problems.

During the first session (December 13, 1920) the delegates endorsed the proposal of Muhammad Murad, the

mufti of Haifa. They agreed to confine the agenda to three items: a) the establishment of a national government (*hukuma wataniyya*); b) the rejection of the idea of a Jewish National Home; c) the organization of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. Thus, in contrast to the first congress, the political future of Palestine had been from the start unanimously decided upon and was no longer a bone of contention between Arab nationalists favoring pan-Syrian unity, and Palestinian nationalists favoring Palestinian autonomy.

In its fifth session (December 16, 1920), the congress reached a unanimous resolution regarding the political future of Palestine. In explicit terms it appealed to Great Britain to establish a "national government responsible to a representative assembly, whose members would be chosen from the Arabic-speaking people who have been inhabiting Palestine until the outbreak of the War." By so doing Britain will be honoring, according to the resolution, the "noble principles which it seeks to apply in Arabic-speaking Iraq and Transjordan, and will be enhancing and consolidating the deep-rooted friendship existing between Britain and the entire Arab nation."³⁹

Upon close examination, this resolution reveals two significant points which shed light on the political orientation of the Palestinian leadership in those days. In the first place, the framers of the resolution were using Iraq and Transjordan as models for the kind of government they were envisioning for Palestine. In principle, the government must be ultimately independent and responsible to a parliament elected by native Muslims, Christians, and Jews. In practice and as a transitional step, however, there was no objection to the establishment of self-governing institutions under British supervision and guidance. The British role in this case would be limited. In other words, the High Commissioner and his appointed advisory council would have, as Porath noted, only limited authority.⁴⁰ Any British-guided institution should be temporary, should reflect the majority strength of the Arab population, and should not be based on the hated Jewish Na-

tional Home policy. These demands were developed in detail at a later date and continued to represent the demands of the Palestinian Arabs throughout the mandate.⁴¹

Second, the Palestinian leaders were not anti-British or anti-Western. On the contrary, they naively hoped that the sense of justice and fair play which characterized British political culture would finally prevail in Palestine. Moreover, some members of the Palestinian leadership were inclined to believe that Palestine, a country that was predominantly Arab in every aspect, could not conceivably be converted to a Jewish state or commonwealth at the hands of a Christian power. As far as its Zionist policy was concerned, the holders of this opinion believed that Britain was under tremendous Zionist pressure in London, a pressure which they thought was shaping British policy in Palestine.⁴²

During its second, third, fourth, and fifth sessions (December 14, 15, and 16, respectively),⁴³ the congress laid down its own statutes (*al-nidham al-dakhili*). These were originally prepared by a special committee upon the recommendation of Ibrahim Shammas, one of the members of the Jerusalem MCA, and al-Hajj Tawfiq Hammad, one of the Nablus delegates.⁴⁴ Also discussed in these four sessions were the means for the unification of the nationalist movement in Palestine. For this purpose, the congress elected a special body called the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arab Congress. This elected committee, composed of representatives of the various regions of the country, was headed by two of the Older Politicians, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, president, and 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani, vice-president.⁴⁵

During the ninth and final session of the congress (December 19, 1920), the delegates discussed a number of administrative matters, including the excessive prices of crops. A decision was made to request the Palestine government to lift the ban on cereal grains and to reopen the agricultural bank.

Reviewing the deliberations of the congress, Najib Nassar, a delegate from Tiberias, endorsed the proposal of 'Arif Pasha al-Dajani, one of the delegates from Jerusalem, to

publish newspapers on behalf of the Palestine cause and distribute them free of charge in Europe. Here we see a recognition on the part of the Palestinian leadership of the importance of mass communications, and a realization of the role the press can play in shaping public opinion and influencing the output of the political system in a democratically run country such as Britain.

To conclude, the absence of reference to pan-Syrian unity in the resolutions of the Third Palestinian Arab congress, as well as the focus of the delegates on local Palestinian issues, indicate that the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement had for the first time defined its objectives, from both an ideological and organizational perspective, in distinct Palestinian terms.

It is important to point out, however, that such a development did not mean that the idea of unity with Syria, or even the idea of pan-Arab unity, was completely forsaken. What emerged from the congress was the growth of a narrower, territorially defined concept of an independent Palestinian state. As a matter of fact, the idea of unity with Syria was later raised on several occasions, including the Fifth Palestinian Arab Congress which was held in Nablus on August 22, 1922, and the Palestinian revolt of 1937-39. After the Third Palestinian Arab Congress in 1920, however, the principle of unity was not raised with the idea of submerging Palestine within a greater Arab nation, but rather defining the relationship between an independent Arab Palestine and other Arab countries. "Once Palestine assumes its independence," observed Munif al-Husayni, later a close associate of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, "then the Palestinians will consider the idea of unity with the other Arab states."⁴⁶

Insofar as the Younger Politicians were concerned, the power of their top leadership, notably the members who hailed from the al-Husayni and al-Nashashibi families, gradually grew stronger after the pull of Palestinian nationalism had prevailed, and after they themselves focused their attention on Palestinian nationalism. Indeed one of the Younger Politicians,

Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, emerged after 1920 as the leader of the Palestinian national movement and the consolidator of the foundations of Palestinian nationalism. Once they had secured power and dominated the Palestinian national movement, the dominating group of Young Politicians pursued for about a decade and a half the political style of the Older Politicians: the maintenance of access to the British ruler; the use of petitions as instruments of political opposition to the Zionist policy of the British; the discreet and infrequent encouragement of political violence but not to the point of alienating themselves from the ruler; the practice of local politics from a position of strength; and the neutralization of political rivals through the skillful building of coalitions and the balancing of one rival against the other.⁴⁷

Thus, by the end of 1920 the regional division between Syria and Palestine was complete. The idea of a unified Arab nation propagated in schools, in barracks, in exile in Ottoman days, and in Faysal's Arab army gave way to new political divisions along Palestinian and Syrian as well as Iraqi lines after the tempestuous experience of the Arab nationalists in Damascus. Later the idea of Arab nationalism had to compete with the overriding reality of local nationalisms. Whenever the advocates of Arab nationalism tried to implement their ideal, they were confronted with the reality of these nationalisms. In every case, the ideal of Arab nationalism lost out to the reality of local nationalism.

Conclusion

The conclusions to this study can be summarized in terms of two frameworks—the ideological, that is the shift of political loyalty from one set of ideas to the other, and the institutional, that is the political elites within whose ranks these ideas arose.

The Ideological Framework

The Ottoman Empire, which held together in one framework many different regions and ethnic and religious groups for almost six centuries, was the focus of loyalty not in a national but in dynastic sense until the nineteenth century. In other words, the loyalty of the Arabs, Turks, Greeks, and others, was to the house of Osman and to the Islamic *umma* over whom this house reigned. However, the influence of Western ideas, particularly the concepts of patriotism, nationhood, and sovereignty, gave rise to the unsuccessful attempt to make the concepts of an Ottoman nation and a vaguely defined Ottoman fatherland, the foci of political loyalty.¹

Ottomanism was the ideology that emerged to win the loyalty of the subjects of the empire, including the inhabitants of the Arab provinces which lay to the east of Suez. Two

varieties of Ottomanism, one conservative and one modernist, were current among politicians and intellectuals within the empire in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Conservative Ottomanism stipulated that Islam and its civilization were inherently superior to Christianity and to European civilization. Some of its advocates denied that in their day the Ottoman lands and their Islamic civilization were lagging behind Western Europe. Others, especially those who had lived in Europe, conceded that the West was superior only in its materialism and industrialism, but was inferior to the East in culture and morality.

On the other hand, the modernist variety of Ottomanism stressed that the world of Islam was in a sad condition and that the progress of the Muslim lands was stultified because true Islam had been corrupted. From the perspective of the advocates of this view, Islam could regain its past greatness if the Muslims restored to their religion its original purity, and if they adapted themselves to the advancements of modern civilization.²

Despite their differences, the two varieties of Ottomanism had one common denominator, namely the aspiration for a single Ottoman nationality and a common loyalty to the larger Ottoman framework. The unity and continuation of the Ottoman Empire, so the advocates of both varieties believed, were the remedy that could bridge the gap between the East and the West and protect Islamic civilization from the encroachments of the West.

Ottomanism, with its emphasis on a common Ottoman citizenship and loyalty, was the reigning ideology of the empire until the early years of the twentieth century. The gradual rise of Turkish nationalism evoked a ready response from the Arabs: if the Turks were a nation, so were the Arabs, who were predisposed, by virtue of their legacy, to think of themselves as a distinct ethnic and cultural group within Islam and Islamic civilization.

The Arab response found expression first in political Arabism (1908-1914), and then in Arab nationalism during

World War I. While the goal of Arabism was reform, which would insure Arab rights and greater Arab autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, that of Arab nationalism was complete political independence for the Arab provinces. By the end of the war, Ottomanism was dying, and the only viable ideology to inherit its place was Arab nationalism.

Even though the new ideology of Arab nationalism was by no means universal in the Arab provinces, it incorporated an ingredient of super-legitimacy, because it postulated the existence of a single Arab nation that would be independent, free, and glorious. The creators and advocates of Arab nationalism, among whom were numerous Palestinians, envisioned the establishment of a pan-Arab system, the nucleus of which would be a united Syria including Lebanon and Palestine.

The account of the politics of the Syrians, Palestinians, and Iraqis contained in the previous chapters provides an assessment of the real strength of the idea of Arab nationalism.

The experience of the Arab nationalists in Damascus during Faysal's short reign underlined the vulnerability of Arab nationalism. Many of the young, transnational elites who formed the backbone of Faysal's Syrian kingdom truly believed that under the leadership of the Hashemite prince, they would give pan-Arabism its life of glory in the sun. But their doctrine, which postulated the existence of one indivisible Arab nation with identical interests and goals, could not withstand the traumatic postwar realities imposed by the colonial policies of England and France. In other words, the "universalism" of Arab nationalism which replaced the "universalism" of the Ottoman Empire was not as concrete a reality as its exponents and advocates had initially thought.

We should bear in mind that by 1918 Arab nationalism was not a fully developed ideology, with grass-roots support and a program which would serve as a guide to action. It was rather an idea which arose first and foremost as a response to the nationalism of the Young Turks and appealed to a glorious

Arab past. Thus, when its leaders, most of whom hailed from great notable families, found themselves operating in a new environment in which the relations of society and political forces had to be redefined and in which there was no sultan in the center to restrain and stabilize, they hit the rock of reality and learned their first lesson in the difference between the pan-Arab ideal and the pressing demands of local politics.

The separate and quite different political concerns of the Palestinians, Syrians, and Iraqis analyzed in this study illustrate this point. Except for the shared themes of independence and self-determination, there was no collective Arab crisis that dictated a collective plan of action. In Palestine, the life-and-death issue was national survival in the face of the deadly threat of Zionism, an alien Jewish settler movement of European provenance. Syria and Iraq faced a different challenge. There, the crisis was not national survival but political independence; it was a crisis of countering the hegemony of France and England and of finding a framework that would satisfy the aspiration for self-determination.

Hence Arab political elites—Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi—were confronted with two forces: the push of Arab nationalism and the pull of local nationalism. Traumatized as they were by the policies of England and France, and having failed to translate the “universalism” of the pan-Arab doctrine into a concrete reality that would transcend other realities, they resigned themselves, some painfully and begrudgingly, to the overwhelming pull of local concerns and priorities. Nationalism, which was linked with a specific piece of land and a specific group of people, prevailed.

We may argue, therefore, that the failure of the “universalism” of Arab nationalism played a critical role in the emergence of Palestinian nationalism. In the studies written on modern Palestinian politics, this point has not received the attention it deserves.

The commonly held view, implied in many Arab works and explicitly stated in many non-Arab writings, that Zionism motivated the Arabs of Palestine to organize themselves

politically and formulate their nationalist ideology, while justified, is incomplete.³ It is clear from the evidence presented in this study that internal Arab factors—especially the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement—forced upon the Palestinian Arab nationalists an encounter with the *things* that separated them from the Syrians and Iraqis. For all the pan-Arab fervor of dominant Syrians and Iraqis, the Palestinians were not at the top of their agenda. In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Palestinians would have abstained from establishing their own independent national movement, even if Zionism were absent from the scene. After all, the mighty British empire was there to divide, rule, and subjugate.

But since Zionism was also there, the question that presents itself is this: What was the role of this alien political force in the emergence of Palestinian nationalism; and what difference did it make to the direction of this nationalism? In answer to this question, three immediate points may be made.

First, a priori, it is only logical that two forces interlocked in a struggle against each other, in this case the indigeneous Palestinian opposition and the Zionist colonists, must have left their impress upon each other. Two points ought to be noted here: a) Zionist colonization underscored in the minds of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular the importance of aggressive leadership, unity, and organization, b) the fear on the part of the Palestinian Arabs that Zionism would one day reduce them to an alienated minority in their own country intensified their conviction that local Palestinian interests and wishes should be given more serious attention by the Ottoman authorities. Hence the Palestinian opposition to the laxity of the Ottoman state in checking Zionist colonization. We have here, in this opposition and in other forms of resistance to Zionism, the beginnings of a strong patriotic devotion to Palestine.

Second, the few authors who wrote on Palestinian Arab politics before World War I agree that there were three threads in the Palestinian opposition to Zionism in Ottoman times: Ottoman loyalism, Palestinian patriotism, and Arab na-

tionalism.⁴ Ottoman loyalism dictated the rejection of Zionism because it was bent upon separating Palestine from the Ottoman state; Palestinian patriotism dictated its rejection on the ground that it was a deadly threat to the Palestinians; and Arab nationalism called for its rejection because it would wrest Palestine from Arab hands and thwart the cherished goal of Arab unity. Ottoman loyalism, which was upheld by the older notable elites, ran parallel with Palestinian patriotism until the downfall of the empire in 1918. Its advocates were on the whole anti-Sharifian and not too enthusiastic about Arab nationalism. On the other hand, Arab nationalism—which was espoused by younger urban elites—intertwined with Palestinian patriotism until 1920. Its adherents, anti-Ottoman and pro-Sharifian after 1914, believed that the pan-Arab order postulated by their Arab nationalist doctrine would provide Palestine with a protective shield against Zionism. Thus Palestinian patriotism was the common characteristic of the two main Palestinian groups: The group of older urban notables and the group of younger urban notables. Zionism was the context in which this patriotism grew.

But, third, Palestinian patriotism needed another kind of challenge to develop into full-fledged Palestinian nationalism, a nationalism that has its own ideology and its own institutional framework. This challenge came in the form of two developments after the war: one, internal, pertained to the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement, and the other, external, pertained to the dismemberment of Syria at the hands of Britain and France. As we have seen, the Ottomanists embraced Palestinian nationalism, or the principle of a separate Palestinian entity after the war. It was an understandable response from traditional people whose political loyalty to Palestine was next to their basic loyalty to the Muslim Ottoman *umma*: if Ottomanism was dead, Palestinian nationalism was the logical ideology that should replace it. However, for the Arab nationalists, or the group of Younger Politicians, the adoption of Palestinian nationalism was not so easy. They felt they were committed to the implementation of their Arab na-

tionalist doctrine. After they tried and failed, they accommodated the particularism of the Palestine cause within the "universalism" of their pan-Arabism.

We may conclude, therefore, that Zionism did not create Palestinian nationalism. What Zionism did was provide the Palestinians with a focus for their national struggle. In other words, Zionism was the focus of the Palestinians and the pivot around which their politics centered. The origins and growth of Palestinian nationalism as a distinctive force that won the political loyalties and sentiments of all Palestinian Arabs can be found in the inter-Arab processes discussed earlier in the study. But although the ideology and organization of the Palestinian Arab national movement developed along Palestinian lines after 1920, the Palestinian political leadership continued to adopt in principle the goals of Arab nationalism. Like the leaders of the nationalist movements of neighboring Arab countries, however, the Palestinian leaders were mainly preoccupied with the affairs of their own community. In the name of Palestinian nationalism, they struggled for independence and self-determination, hampered on one level by the lack of sophisticated organization and strategy and on another by the overall balance of power which was crushingly in favor of the Zionist immigrants and their British sponsors.⁵

The Institutional Framework

Palestinian politics in the period under survey was dominated by urban notable families who had been linked with the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy. These families constituted the institutional framework within which the ideologies of Ottomanism and Arab nationalism competed with each other, and within which the Palestinian nationalist movement arose. What were the sources of power of these families? Who were the dominant families among them? And what political style

and practices did their leading members adopt? The answers to these questions can be provided as follows:

The sources of the power of these families lay primarily in their acquisition of property, their tradition of learning, and their integration into the Ottoman system of government in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Through the modernization movement, which it initiated, the Ottoman government could extend its authority over the administration and public institutions of the state, thus making local political power a function of position in the bureaucratic machinery. A post in government service was highly desirable because it served as a status symbol and as a means through which wealth and influence could be maintained and expanded.

As we have seen, the class that benefited most from this situation was that of high-status families. Members of these families filled senior posts which afforded them authority in local society. Besides acting as intermediaries between the government and their society, leading urban families in Palestine used their posts to gain legal rights to more land and private property. In this way, they were able to emerge after 1860 as the most powerful political group in Palestinian society. Political leadership rested almost exclusively in the hands of these families for nearly nine decades, that is from the 1860s until the loss of Palestine in 1948.

Among the politically active Palestinian elites, the notables of Jerusalem wielded most power in the total political process of Palestine. The reasons for this dominance can be summarized as follows: In the first place, Jerusalem's sanctity to the three monotheistic religions and its autonomous status under the direct control of Istanbul after 1887 (the year in which the Porte created the independent *sanjaq* of Jerusalem) gave it a special significance that transcended its immediate vicinity.⁶ For example, the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem court of appeal which was set up in 1910 extended to the district of Nablus. Moreover, the *Qadi* (religious judge) of Jerusalem exercised jurisdiction over Gaza, Nablus, and Haifa.⁷

Second, the aristocratic families of Jerusalem had lived

for many centuries in the city. This contrasts with Nablus, for example, where many leading families had settled in the city toward the middle of the seventeenth century.⁸ In addition, some of Jerusalem's families, notably the houses of al-Husayni, al-Khalidi, Jarallah, and al-'Alami, held religious posts for hundreds of years and were hereditary managers of important *waqfs*.⁹ By virtue of holding the important posts of mayor and mufti of Jerusalem in the late nineteenth century, the Husaynis outranked the other aristocratic families, thus emerging as the most dominant political elite in the country until 1948.¹⁰

Third, the heavier involvement of the Jerusalem notable class in what one observer calls "economic-administrative activity"¹¹ (i.e., contracting and employment) in the civil service in the second half of the nineteenth century, widened the economic basis of the financial power of this class. In addition, some prominent rural families joined members of the urban notable class in their economic activities. This resulted in the broadening of propertied political coalitions under the leadership of office-holding urban elites.

Fourth, Jerusalem acted as a capital for Palestine. It housed, for example, the consulates of Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Spain. The city was also the residence of a Greek Orthodox patriarchate, a Latin patriarchate, and an Anglican bishopric.¹²

Since senior posts in the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy had many advantages, and since the assignment of these posts was in the hands of the government, it became necessary to support the sultan's cause to secure a post. Thus many of the bearers of aristocratic names subscribed to Ottomanism until the dissolution of the empire. After that, and for the reasons that we have analyzed in detail, it was only natural for them to embrace Palestinian nationalism.

Nevertheless, only prominent members of leading Palestinian families succeeded in acquiring senior offices in the Ottoman state. Many younger and less prominent members had failed to attain public office, either because of their age or

because of the limited opportunities in their place of residence. They therefore had a smaller stake in the continuation of the Ottoman state than the older and bureaucratically established men of their families. Feeling alienated, these younger holders of proud names seized the ideas of Arabism and Arab nationalism in order to promote pan-Arab rights, protect Palestine from Zionism, and install themselves in sensitive political positions.

Even though certain middle-class individuals did participate in Palestinian politics in the period under survey, none attained a top leadership position in the Ottomanist, Arab nationalist, or Palestinian nationalist groups that we discussed, because they belonged to a humble class with no tradition of influence and social leadership. Therefore, neither their society nor the British occupier viewed them as natural leaders with local sources of political power.

The distinctive traits of the two Palestinian groups, whom we called the group of Older Politicians and the group of Younger Politicians, can be summarized in the following fashion.

First, the Older Politicians sought to act in a legalistic manner. Petitions were a major political instrument which they used with the British authorities to promote the cause of Palestinian independence. They sought to appeal, in pragmatic and constitutional terms, through the MCAs and the congresses which they held. To mobilize the Palestinian public and disseminate their political views, they used mosques, churches, guesthouses, town cafés, as well as the press, clubs, and schools.¹³

Second, the political societies set up by the Older Politicians were family coalitions that were characterized by two sets of relationships. The first concerned the domination of a particular political society by one family, the al-Husayni family in the case of the Arab Executive, for example. The second pertained to the family's ability to increase the network of its power partners and, in the process, to expand its base of sup-

port, thus enhancing its bargaining power vis-à-vis the competition and government.

Third, although the political field in Palestine was controlled by powerful aristocratic families, these families operated as vehicles for the national interests of the Palestinian Arab populace. True, these families also served their own interests, but as units with an appreciable measure of social responsibility and social standing they had to cater to the national demands of other groups in Palestinian society.

Fourth, the Older Politicians were schooled in Ottoman politics and they carried over their Ottoman values into the mandatory period.¹⁴ We have seen how their actions were circumspect, and how their political behavior was cautious and discreet. In the words of Jamal al-Husayni "these older men inherited indecision and laxity (*muyu'a wa rakhawa*) from the Ottoman etiquette." These traits, Jamal asserts, were not a reflection of weakness or fear, but rather of a mode of expression which denoted "good intention and civic politesse (*husn al-niyya wal-talattuf al-madani*)." From the standpoint of Jamal, such kindness and courtesy were no match for the realpolitik of the British and Zionists.¹⁵

Fifth, the Older Politicians and the Younger Politicians were influenced by the liberal thought of Europe. In the manner of the nationalists of the time, they believed in constitutional government, westernization, individual virtue, and the right of self-determination. Even though the two groups identified themselves with Islam, they had a strong tendency to secularism. They laid their emphasis on a national idea which included the Christians and the indigenous Jews. Members of neither group justified their nationalist ideology in religious terms, that is they did not aim at political independence for the purpose of promoting Islamic revival. From their perspective, independence was a step toward remaking Palestinian society in the image of the modern world. In other words, an independent Palestine was not meant to be the servant of a universal Islamic system. Palestine was rather perceived to be its own

judge and master, with its own interest reigning supreme. This was the essence of the two groups' opposition to Zionism and their insistence on self-determination. Their logic went like this: If national interest was the supreme principle of society, why should the Palestinians allow foreign Jews to establish a geographical base in Palestine in order to turn the country into a Jewish state? Or why should the Palestinians, who constituted the overwhelming majority, accept anything less than being the masters of their own society? This was, after all, the thrust of the principle of self-determination which was prevalent in Europe and America, and which had become so fashionable in the Middle East in the second decade of the twentieth century.

Sixth, leading Older Politicians, and leading Younger Politicians came mostly from upper-class Palestinian families. In respect of family and occupational background, the chief differences between dominant members of the two groups can be described as follows:

1. Fewer of the Younger Politicians had served in the Ottoman administration;

2. In terms of political and ideological orientation, occupants of senior posts in the Ottoman government tended to be Ottomanists and Palestinian nationalists, while those who had not occupied such posts tended to be Arab nationalists;

3. Intellectuals were better represented among the Younger Politicians than they were among the Older Politicians. This can be attributed to the Older Politicians' preoccupation with administrative responsibilities in the Ottoman hierarchy. Nevertheless, the two groups of Younger Politicians and Older Politicians had within their ranks a variety of professionals, including lawyers (e.g., 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Rafiq al-Tamimi, and 'Arif al-Dajani), engineers (e.g., Raghیب al-Nashashibi), and physicians (e.g., Ahmad Qadri and Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi).

4. Even though the top leadership of the Older Politicians and the Younger Politicians came from aristocratic families, middle-class individuals, both Muslim and Christian,

did participate in the political societies of the two groups. These individuals apparently played a relatively greater role in the Arab nationalist groupings than they did in the Palestinian nationalist groupings and in the entire political field of Palestine.

5. The incidence of service in the Ottoman army was relatively higher among the Younger Politicians, though few seem to have attained senior rank. For instance, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni was an aide to a Turkish commander during World War I. Ishaq Darwish, 'Arif al-'Arif, and Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, also served in the Ottoman army during the war, but they were not of senior grade.

As to political socialization, the dominant Younger Politicians came to politics by certain paths different from those of the Older Politicians, despite the fact that both groups hailed in general from the same social background. In contrast to their elders, the Younger Politicians' experience at school, in secret societies, in the barracks, and in the Sharifian army seems to have instilled in them a stronger disposition to political activism than to compromise. A few of them had also developed certain organizational skills. Like the Older Politicians, however, the Younger Politicians believed that they earned the right to represent the Palestinian Arabs. Like their elders, too, the Younger Politicians were deeply committed to the Palestine cause.

Like father, like son. Just as the Older Politicians wanted to continue practicing politics from a position of dominance, the Younger Politicians wanted to climb the ladder of political power and mold the Palestinian political process in their own image. The dominant members of the two groups worked toward concentrating political power within their own circle. Thus the younger members of al-Husayni family, for example, established al-Nadi al-'Arabi, while the younger members of al-Nashashibi family established al-Muntada al-Adabi.

In the manner of politicians everywhere, the leaders of the two clubs tried to exclude competitors, in the process bringing in their comrades and supporters, thus gradually

emerging after 1920 as the dominant group in Palestinian Arab society. And even though the class that produced the Older Politicians and the Younger Politicians was virtually unassailable from below for nearly four decades after the disintegration of the Ottoman state, the nationalism in whose name the two groups waged their struggle was not created by either one of them. It was, as events and research have confirmed, a genuine movement that encompassed all the Arabs of Palestine. At the heart of this nationalism lay a system of principles derived for the most part from the thought of Europe. Sovereignty and loyalty to a specific society and territory rather than to a dynasty or a religious doctrine were the axiomatic ingredients of this system, which deeply affected not only Palestine, but the Middle East in general.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. I acknowledge here my debt to the analysis of C. Ernest Dawn in his *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 148-179.

2. Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," pp. 48-49.

3. Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 26-27. For details on the Islamic city, see Albert Hourani and S. M. Stern, eds., *The Islamic City*, and Ira M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). In my treatment of notables and city-government relations in this section, I have drawn on the analysis provided in the work of Hourani and Stern, in the process adapting it to the Palestinian context.

4. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 174.

5. For details on the European economic penetration of the Middle East, see Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914*, pp. 3-15; Roger Owen, ed., *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, pp. 1-10.

6. See Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 15-16.

7. I borrowed this term from Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*, p. 8.

1. THE OTTOMAN BACKGROUND OF PALESTINIAN POLITICS

1. See J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 17; Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*, p. 5.

2. Ann Lesch, "The Origins of Palestine Arab Nationalism," p. 280; Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, p. 44; Zeine N. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, pp. 25-26; 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad 'Awad, *Al-Idara al-'Uthmaniyya fi Wilayat Surya, 1864-1914*, pp. 61-82. All translations from Arabic into English throughout the book are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

3. A. L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine*, pp. 22, 26, 53-54.

4. Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, p. 85; Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionsim Before World War I*, pp. 106-107, 112-116.
5. Kenneth W. Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939*, p. 3.
6. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," p. 140.
7. Abu-Lughod, "Demographic Transformation," p. 141.
8. J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, p. 102.
9. For details on the population of Palestine in the period under survey, see Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893"; Justin McCarthy, "The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq, 1878-1914;" and *The Arab World; Turkey and the Balkans (1878-1914)*, pp. 72-80; Stanford Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914;" Alexander Schölch, "The Demographic Development of Palestine, 1850-1882."
10. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, p. 102.
11. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 29.
12. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 9. In my analysis of the Ottoman state, I drew on the analytic framework of this masterly work.
13. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3:110-111, 128-130, 253-256.
14. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 7.
15. Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy*, ch. 15, p. 42.
16. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3:105-106.
17. David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*, pp. 1-2.
18. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 7.
19. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, ch. 15, p. 50.
20. Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 3; Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 16-18; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 40-75; R. H. Davison, "Westernized Education in Ottoman Turkey."
21. For details, see Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 354-357; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 2: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:196-211.
22. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 10-11.
23. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, ch. 15, p. 44; Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3: 101.
24. A.L. Tibawi, *Jerusalem, Its Place in Islam and Arab History*; 'Arif al-'Arif, *Tarikh al-Haram al-Qudsiyy* and *Tarikh al-Quds*; Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, *Urubat Bayt al-Maqdis*.
25. Roger Owen, ed., *Studies, in the Economic and Social History of Palestine*, pp. 1-9; Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, pp. 18-19, 26-27, 101.
26. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 52, 49; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 196-232. For more details on the rise of local leaders in Egypt in Ottoman days, see P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922*, chs. 5, 6; Stanford Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution*.
27. J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa, A Documentary Record: European Expansion, 1535-1914*, 1:269; Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861*, p. 21; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2:55.

28. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 45-49; Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 75-100; Shimon Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdulhamid," In Polk & Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization*, pp. 352-353.
29. Alexander Schölch, "European Penetration and the Economic Development of Palestine, 1856-82," in Owen, ed., *Studies*, pp. 21-22.
30. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 27.
31. Stein, *The Land Question*, p. 11; Gabriel Baer, "The Evolution of Private Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent," in Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914*, pp. 83-84.
32. A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine: History and Structure*, pp. 54-77; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 117; Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 162-163; Stein, *The Land Question*, pp. 16-28.
33. Stein, *The Land Question*, p. 10.
34. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 59.
35. For details, see Granott, *The Land System*, pp. 58-59; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 118-120; Stein, *The Land Question*, pp. 19-25.
36. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 39.
37. Ya'cov Shimoni, *The Arabs of Palestine*, p. 342.
38. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 13; Ya'qub al-'Awdat, *Min A'lam al-Fikr wal-Adab fi Filastin*, pp. 153-155; Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, pp. 73-74.
39. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lam*, pp. 146-150; Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 72; Ahmad Khalid al-'Aqqad, *Al-Shakhsyyat al-Filastiniyya hatta 'Amm 1945*, pp. 49-50.
40. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, p. 344.
41. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 209.
42. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, pp. 346-347.
43. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lam*, p. 626, citing Khalil al-Sakakini, the Palestinian linguist and educator from Jerusalem.
44. Stein, *The Land Question*, p. 26.
45. Philip Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem: Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, A Founder of Palestinian Nationalism," p. 1. See also A. N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250-1900*, pp. 38-39.
46. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, p. 349.
47. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 81.
48. Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 13-14; Shimoni, *The Arabs*, p. 35.
49. Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 74; Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami*, chs. 1 and 2.
50. James Finn, *Stirring Times or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856*, 1:181; Arnold Blumberg, ed. *A View from Jerusalem, 1849-1858*, p. 96.
51. Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, *Al-Qaba'il al-'Arabiyya wa Sala' iluha fi Biladina Filastin*, p. 77.
52. R. A. S. Macalister and E. W. G. Masterman, "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine," *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement* (hereafter referred to as PEFQS), pp. 43-44; Porath, *Emergence*, p. 7.
53. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 81.
54. Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 1:60 ff.
55. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, p. 384.
56. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 81.

57. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lam*, pp. 419-426; 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, *Awraq Khassa*, pp. 9-26.
58. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 39.
59. Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 228-229.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.
61. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, pp. 378-379.
62. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 81.
63. *Ibid.*
64. See W. M. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, 2:334-338.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 389-393; see also Henry Baker Tristram, *The Land of Israel*.
66. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, p. 368.
67. Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 74; Porath, *Emergence*, p. 24; Rafiq al-Tamimi and Muhammad Bahjat, *Wilayat Beirut*, 1:124-136.
68. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 41-42.
69. Miriam Hoexter, "The Role of the Qays and Yaman Factions in Local Political Divisions" pp. 306-307.
70. Ihsan al-Nimr, *Tarikh Jabal Nablus wal-Balqa'*, 1:245-247. Hereafter referred to as Al-Nimr, followed by volume and page numbers. This book, which consists of four volumes, is a major work on Jabal Nablus, with rich documentation and personal experiences that are of great value to the historian.
71. Al-Nimr 1:194 ff.
72. Al-Nimr, 2:417-429.
73. For details, see Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 113-118; Miriam Hoexter, "Qays and Yaman," pp. 251-256; Samir 'Uthman, "Harakat al-Tatawwur wal-Sira' Dakhil al-'A'ilat al-Filastiniyya al-Hakima," Gabriel Baer, "Village and City in Egypt and Syria: 1500-1914."
74. Hoexter, "Qays and Yaman," pp. 287-288.
75. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, p. 119.
76. Hoexter, "Qays and Yaman," pp. 288-289; R. A. S. Macalister and E. W. G. Masterman, "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine," PEFQS, pp. 35ff.
77. Hoexter, "Qays and Yaman," pp. 303-304.
78. E. Haddad, "Political Parties in Syria and Palestine," p. 213.
79. Hoexter, "Qays and Yaman," pp. 303-305.
80. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 209.
81. Roger Owen, *The Middle East in The World Economy*, pp. 176-177.
82. Al-Dabbagh, *Al-Qaba'il*, p. 192.
83. See Salim Tamari, "Factionalism and Class Formation in Recent Palestinian History," p. 183.
84. Hoexter, "Qays and Yaman," p. 311.
85. Schölch, "European Penetration," p. 23.
86. Charles Issawi, "Middle East Economic Development, 1815-1914: The General and the Specific," in M. A. Cook, ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, p. 395.
87. Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 175.
88. See figures in Alexander Schölch, "The Economic Development of Palestine, 1856-1882," p. 52; Owen, *The Middle East*, pp. 176-177.
89. Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 265.

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178, 265.
91. Palestine, *First Palestine Census of Industries 1928* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1929), p. 8. 1 Palestine pound (£P) = 1 English pound (£).
92. Said B. Himadeh, "Industry," in Said B. Himadeh, ed., *Economic Organization of Palestine*, p. 221.
93. *First Palestine Census*, pp. 5-6.
94. Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 266.
95. Himadeh, "Industry," pp. 216-222.
96. Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 341, n.115.
97. Himadeh, "Industry," p. 218.
98. See Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Growth of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century"; Al-'Arif, *Tarikh al-Quds*, pp. 210-216; and Himadeh, "Industry," p. 219.
99. Schölch, "European Penetration," p. 38.
100. Al-Nimr, 2:288-298.
101. Schölch, "European Penetration," pp. 51-52.
102. Claude R. Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine*, 1:188-189.
103. Schölch, "European Penetration," p. 48.
104. *Ibid.*, pp. 46 and 54.
105. Al-Nimr, 2:292; Darwaza, "Tis' una 'Aman," 1:66-67.
106. Elizabeth Anne Finn, *Home in the Holy Land*, pp. 250-253.
107. Shimoni, *The Arabs*, pp. 369-372.
108. Schölch, "European Penetration," p. 44.
109. For details on the Templars, see Alex Carmel, "The German Settlers in Palestine and Their Relations with the Local Arab Population and the Jewish Community, 1868-1918."
110. See Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East*, pp. 10-13.
111. Schölch, "European Penetration," pp. 25-26.
112. See Granott, *The Land System*, p. 254 and Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel*, ch. 4.
113. Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 270.
114. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 254.
115. Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 270.
116. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 80.
117. Granott, *The Land System*, p. 80; Lawrence Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, pp. 277-278.
118. See, for instance, Haim Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 1890-1914*; Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*.
119. Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East*, pp. 8-9.

2. ARABISM AND OTTOMANISM: THE YOUNG TURK PERIOD BEFORE THE WAR, 1908-1914

1. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, pp. 46-47.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66; Wajih Kawtharani, *Al-Ittijahat al-Ijtima'iyya wal-Siyasiyya fi Jabal Lubnan wal-Mashriq al-'Arabi, 1860-1920*, pp. 119-180.
3. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* pp. 178-194; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2:212-263; Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine*, pp. 179-198,

4. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, pp. 168-169.
5. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 257.
6. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 179.
7. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 258-261.
8. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, pp. 182-183.
9. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 260.
10. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 183.
11. Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I*, p. 47.
12. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 13. Munif al-Husayni, a relative of Musa Kazim, stated that Musa Kazim used to pass information to the followers of Amir 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal al-Sa'ud, ancestor and namesake of the present Sa'udi dynasty, on the Sultan's secret plans and policies towards them. The Sa'udi dynasty, according to Munif, never forgot this favor and followed a policy of granting Saudi citizenship to prominent Husaynis. Haydar and Raja'i al-Husayni confirmed this information. Interviews with Munif, Haydar, and Raja'i al-Husayni, Beirut, February/April, 1979.
13. Zeine, *Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 72. Other prominent members of the Parliament were Ruhi Effendi al-Khalidi, Sa'id Effendi al-Husayni, and Hafiz Bey al-Sa'id of Jaffa.
14. Al-Nimr, 3;102-104, No dates for the appointments are provided by al-Nimr.
15. Stein, *Land Question*, pp. 244-245, n.12. Stein's information is based on Ottoman government records for the years 1893, 1900, and 1908.
16. Al-Nimr, 3:101-104. On the spread of superstition in the Hamidian era, see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, pp. 258ff.
17. Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, *Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine*, pp. 18-20.
18. Nasir al-Din al-Asad, *Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi*, pp. 38-39.
19. Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya at-Haditha*, p. 144.
20. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, *Umm al-Qura*, pp. 14ff; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p. 273; 'Abd al-Karim Rafiq, *Al-'Arab wal-'Uthmaniyyun 1516-1916*, pp. 539-544.
21. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 263-265.
22. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 171.
23. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 277-279; Zeine, *Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 66; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 79-101; Shimon Shamir, "Midhat Pasha and the Anti-Turkish Agitation in Syria," *Middle Eastern Studies* (May 1974), 10:115ff.
24. Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 121.
25. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 16-17.
26. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 199.
27. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 206-207; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 266.
28. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 279-282.
29. Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, pp. 129-130, 135. Kedourie describes how in Haifa the *naqib al-ashraf*, an old man of eighty, was accused of having cursed the constitution and had to be jailed for three days, only to be acquitted by the court because the prosecutor was Christian.

30. Zeine, *Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 70.
31. Al-Nimr, 3:107.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 40.
34. Darwaza, *Nash' at al-Haraka*, pp. 180-181.
35. Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, pp. 128-135.
36. Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, p. 56.
37. Rashid Ismail Khalidi, *British Policy towards Syria and Palestine 1906-1914*, p. 210.
38. Al-Asad, *Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi*, pp. 108-114; Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi, *Al-Inqilab al-Uthmani*.
39. Khalil al-Sakakini, *Kadha Ana Ya Dunya* pp. 33-34.
40. Zeine, *Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 70.
41. Philip K. Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History*, p. 26. For details on the significance of Arabic, see Anwar G. Chejne, *The Arabic Language*.
42. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 260; Hamilton A. R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, pp. 12-13, 66-73.
43. Hourani, *Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 8.
44. Sukru M. Hanioglu, "The Relations Between the Young Turks and the Arab Organizations Before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908."
45. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 301-304; David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 99-101; Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk*, pp. 56-72; Taha Parla, "The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gokalp"; Uriel Heyd, *Foundation of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 164-170.
46. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, pp. 325-427; Rafiq, *Al-'Arab wal-Uthmaniyyun*, p. 535; Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 29-38; Heyd, *Foundation of Turkish Nationalism*; Tawfiq 'Ali Baru, *Al-'Arab wal-Turk fil-'Ahd al-Dusturi al-Uthmani 1908-1914*, pp. 376 ff; Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*.
47. Al-Nimr, 3:109-110.
48. Zeine, *Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 86.
49. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 122-123, n.20.
50. Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, pp. 147-150.
51. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 43.
52. For details on these societies and their programs, see Darwaza, *Nash' at al-Haraka*, pp. 350 ff.; Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 107-121.
53. The others were Jamal Mardam (Damascus), Muhammad al-Mahmasani (Beirut), Rustum Haydar (Baalbek), Tawfiq al-Natur (Beirut), 'Abd al-Ghani al-Uraysi (Beirut). See Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 111, n. 2.
54. *Dad* is the name of a letter with a sound peculiar to Arabic.
55. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*. p. 83.
56. Darwaza, *Nash' at al-Haraka*, pp. 481-482.
57. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 111; Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 84. Zeine draws on information given to him by Tawfiq al-Natur, a Lebanese who was active in the society. The same point is articulated by Darwaza, a Nablusite who joined the society in 1916. See Darwaza, *Nash' at al-Haraka*, pp. 480ff; see also Amin Sa'id, *al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra*, 1:9-10; Khayriyya Qasimiyya, *Al-Hukuma al-'Arabiyya fi Dimashq bayna 1918-1920*, pp. 19-20. Qasimiyya draws on the records of *al-Fatat*.

58. Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, p. 503.
59. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 65.
60. See Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 202-203; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 155-156; and Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:9-10.
61. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 63.
62. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 23.
63. Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, pp. 367-368, n. 1.
64. Rashid Khalidi, *British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine*, pp. 296-297.
65. Al-Nimr, 3:114-115.
66. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 156.
67. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 283.
68. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 63-64.
69. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 202.
70. Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 24-25.
71. Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, p. 421. Darwaza states that the idea of holding the congress was fathered early in 1913 by five members of *al-Fatat* who were students in Paris: Muhammad al-Mahmasani, 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, Tawfiq Fayid (Beirut), 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi (Nablus), Jamil Mardam-Bey (Damascus).
72. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 284.
73. Baru, *Al-'Arab wal-Turk*; pp. 531-539; Sati' Al-Husri, *Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiyya*, pp. 222ff.
74. Fawwaz Sa'dun, "al-Haraka al-Islahiyya fi Beirut fi Awakhir al-'Asr al-'Uthmani," pp. 133-134. This study, given to me by Sa'ib Salam, is largely based on the unpublished memoirs of Salim 'Ali Salam. See also As'ad Dagher, *Mudhakkirati 'Ala Hamish al-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya*, p. 67; Kawtharani, *Al-Ittijahat al-Ijtima'iyya wal-Siyasiyya*, p. 224.
75. See, for instance, Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*; Dagher, *Mudhakkirati*.
76. Rashid Khalidi, *British Policy*, pp. 372-373, and "The Press as a Source for Modern Arab Political History: 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi and Al-Mufid."

3. ARAB REACTION TO ZIONISM, 1908-1914

1. Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I*, p. 223.
2. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, *Report of the Palestine Royal Commission*, Cmd. 5479, p. 13.
3. See, for instance, Israel Cohen, *A Short History of Zionism*; Arthur Hertzberg, ed., *The Zionist Idea, A Historical Analysis and Reader*, pp. 15-32.
4. Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939*, p. 28.
5. Mandel, *The Arabs*, p. 36.
6. Rashid Khalidi, "The Palestinian Peasantry and Zionism Before World War I," Paper submitted to the conference of the Middle East Studies Association in New Orleans in November 1985. See also Ya'kov Firestone, "Crop-Sharing Economics in Mandatory Palestine."
7. Ya'acov Ro'i, "The Zionist Attitudes to the Arabs," 1908-1914, p. 201.
8. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 20-22; Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 47-48.

9. Mandel, *The Arabs*, p. 17.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
13. Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism, Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani*, p. 39. For more details on al-Afghani, see also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 47-51, and Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh*.
14. See Sylvia Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism* pp. 23-25.
15. *Al-Manar*, April 9, 1898, p. 108.
16. Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 46-47.
17. Najib 'Azuri, *Yaqzat al-Umma al-'Arabiyya*, p. 38.
18. For details on 'Azuri's life and contribution to the Arab nationalist movement, see Stefan Wild, "Negib 'Azoury and His Book 'Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe," pp. 92-103; Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, pp. 29-30; Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 49-54; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 277-279.
19. 'Azuri, *Yaqzat*, pp. 181-187, 185, 220-221.
20. For further details, see Stefan Wild, "Negib 'Azoury," p. 96.
21. 'Azuri, *Yaqzat*, pp. 115, 120-121.
22. Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, pp. 114.
23. Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, pp. 29-30; Wild, "Negib 'Azoury," p. 94.
24. Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, p. 118.
25. 'Azuri, *Yaqzat*, p. 41.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.
28. For details, see Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 51-54; Wild, "Negib Azoury," p. 102; Sylvia G. Haim "Arabic Anitsemite Literature."
29. Philip Tarazi, *Tarikh al-Sahafa al-'Arabiyya*, vol. 4.
30. Mandel, *The Arabs*, p. 80.
31. *Ibid.*; *Al-Ahram*, December 4, 1908.
32. See Yusuf Khury, *Al-Sahafa al-'Arabiyya fi Filastin, 1876-1948*, p. 7.
33. Mandel, *The Arabs*, p. 81.
34. *Al-'Awdat, Min A'lam al-Fikr*, p. 632.
35. *Al-Karmil*, March 27, 1909, no. 15, p. 8.
36. Rashid Khalidi, "The Role of the Press in the Early Arab Reaction to Zionism," pp. 108, and 119-120; Khayriyya Qasimiyya, "Najib Nassar fi Jaridatihi al-Karmil (1908-1914), Ahad Ruwwad Munahadat al-Sahyuniyya."
37. Najib Nassar, *Al-Sahyuniyya*, pp. 12-13, 62, 63.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
39. Rashid Khalidi, "The Role of the Press," p. 109. Khalidi's research findings seem to correct Mandel's generalization that *al-Karmil* and other papers edited by Christian Arabs were generally pro-CUP (*The Arabs*, p. 130).
40. Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 28-29.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
42. Mandel, *The Arabs*, p. 113; Baru, *Al-'Arab wal-Turk*, p. 283.
43. For an analysis of this work, see Walid Khalidi, "Kitab al-Zionism aw al-Mas'ala al-Sahyuniyya li-Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi al-Mutawaffi Sanat 1913" (forthcoming, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut), pp. 77-81. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Mr. Khalidi for making this work available to me.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-100.

45. Neville J. Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914," pp. 101-102.

46. For a treatment of this subject, see Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 82-92. For a treatment from an Arab perspective, see Hassan 'Ali Hallaq, *Mawqif al-Dawla al-Uthmaniyya min al-Haraka al-Sahyuniyya, 1897-1909*. Hallaq contends that Jews and Donmes (members of Judeo-Islamic syncretist sect) were the "moving force" behind the CUP, because they wanted to get rid of Sultan Abudulhamid who opposed the Zionist program. The same viewpoint was expressed to me in interviews with some ex-members of the Arab nationalist movement in Beirut and Damascus in 1978 and 1979.

47. For more details on al-'Uraysi's life, see Rashid Khalidi, "The Press as a Source for Modern Arab Political History: 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi and *al-Mufid*," pp. 24-25; 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi, *Jawla fil-Dhikrayat bayna Lubnan wa Filastin*, pp. 67, 94-105.

48. Khalidi, "The Press as a Source", p. 29.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

50. Khalidi, "The Role of the Press," pp. 109-110.

51. Khalidi, "The Press as a Source," p. 31.

52. Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat*, 3:913.

53. Khalidi, "The Press as a Source," p. 31; Khayriyya Qasimiyya, *Al-Nashat al-Sahyuni fil-Sharq al-'Arabi wa Sadah 1908-1918*, pp. 69-74; Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 132-133; Khalidi, "The Role of the Press," pp. 118-119.

54. Mandel, *The Arabs*, pp. 150, 151.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

56. Khalidi, "The Role of the Press," p. 119.

4. OLDER OTTOMANISTS AND YOUNGER REFORMERS IN WORLD WAR I

1. Al-Nimr, 3:132, 144, 149, and 153.

2. Khalil Al-Sakakini, *Kadha Ana Ya Dunya*, pp. 83-84.

3. Zeine, *Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 114.

4. Al-Nimr 3:136, n. 1.

5. Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919*, p. 206.

6. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, p. 126, n. 1. There were a number of dissident voices, however. 'Anbara Salam, a Sunni Muslim Beirut woman from a leading notable family, gave a speech before Jamal Pasha in Beirut in early 1917 in which she described the famine and devastation caused by the war. She describes in her memoirs how enraged she was by Jamal's heavyhandedness. Anbara Salam al-Khalidi, *Jawla fil-Dhikrayat*, pp. 107-110.

7. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 31-39; Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglc-Arab Labyrinth*, pp. 130-134 and 3-32; Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 209-211.

8. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 51.

9. Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 153.

10. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 78.

11. Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya al-Haditha*, 1:65.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 42; Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:107-110.
13. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 157.
14. A. L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine 1914-1921*, p. 134.
15. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lām*, pp. 564-566.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 419, 646.
17. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 149-150; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:105.
18. Steuart Erskine, *King Faysal of Iraq*, p. 40.
19. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 152-153. The facts provided by Antonius were taken from Faysal himself and from Dr. Ahmad Qadri, an active member of *al-Fatat*.
20. See text of the Damascus Protocol in *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.
21. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 30-31; 'Abdullah Ibn al-Husayn, *Mudhakkirati*, pp. 104 ff.
22. T. E. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches From Arabia*, pp. 52 ff.
23. Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs*, p. 199; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 75; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 156.
24. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 75-76; Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 110; Adham al-Jundi, *Shuhada' al-Harb al-'Alamiyya al-Kubra*, pp. 89-135.
25. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lām*, pp. 80, 212; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 156.
26. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 152-153.
27. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 24.
28. Khalidi, "The Role of the Press," p. 109; Qasimiyya, "Najib Nassar," pp. 101-124.
29. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 153.
30. See names in Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, pp. 430-432; *Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabi al-Awwal* (Cairo: al-Lajna al-'Ulya li-Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya, 1913), pp. 150-210.
31. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 153.
32. Among these were Salim al-Ahmad 'Abd al-Hadi (Nablus), 'Ali Umar al-Nashashibi (Jerusalem), Sayf al-Din al-Khatib (Haifa), Muhammad al-Shanti (Nablus), and the mufti of Gaza Ahmad 'Arif al-Husayni and his son Mustafa al-Husayni. Others were sentenced to death but were not executed either on account of their advanced years or because they managed to escape. Among these were Hafiz al-Sa'id (Jaffa), who had served in the Ottoman parliament, al-Shaykh Sa'id al-Karmi (the mufti of Tulkarm), and Hasan Hammad (Nablus). A number of Palestinians were sent to jail, including Rushdi al-Shawwa (Gaza), 'Asim Bsaysu (Gaza), Jamil al-Husayni (Jerusalem), Mu'in al-Madi (Haifa), Ibrahim Hashim (Nablus), al-Shaykh Nimr al-Dari (Nablus area), Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi (Nablus area), Husam al-Din Abu al-Su'ud (Jerusalem), Kamil Hashim (Nablus), and Ilyas Rizq Sahyun (Haifa). The names were drawn from Bayan Nuwayhid, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat," vol. 1, ch. 5, and vol. 2, appendix 2; Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 186-189; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:65-73; Darwaza "Tis 'una Aman," vol. 1 'Umar al-Salih al-Barghuti, *Tarikh Filastin*, pp. 271ff.
33. For details on social life in Nablus, see Tamimi and Bahjat, *Wilayat Beirut*, 1:99-123; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," vol. 1; al-Nimr, *Tarikh Jabal Nablus*, vols. 1 and 2.

To the best of my knowledge, these works provide the most comprehensive description of the social life of Nablus in late Ottoman times. With the exception of Bahjat who is from Aleppo, the other authors are Nablusites. All four have an intimate knowledge of the city, and their presentation of the social milieu is profound and penetrating.

34. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 53.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-53; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 77-78.
36. See text of the armistice agreement in Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa*, 2:129-130.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
38. For details on the agreement, see Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, pp. 114-115; Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa*, 2:62-64; Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 40-43.
39. This discussion of the administrative setup draws on Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920*, p. 77.
40. John J. McTague, "The British Military Administration in Palestine, 1917-1920," p. 57.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *A Survey of Palestine*, 1:15-16.
43. Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 70-71.
44. Mandel, *The Arabs*, p. 226.
45. *Ibid.*
46. I acknowledge here that I have been influenced by the framework of analysis employed by Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 46-68.
47. Al-Nimr 3:151.
48. Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 333-334.
49. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 31.
50. See, for instance, Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 31-70; Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 152-156; Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939*, pp. 79-93; 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*.
51. I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File 1, MS1, November 1918. These papers are in Arabic; translation into English throughout the study is mine.
52. Major-General Gilbert Clayton, first Chief Political Officer, to Foreign Office, June 16, 1918, F.O. 371/11053/130342.
53. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 36.
54. For details, see *ibid.*, pp. 37-38, 123-125; McTague, "The British Military Administration," pp. 55-77; Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 408, 381-383; Richard Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary, 1917-1956*, pp. 18-22; Norman and Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memoirs, 1918-1948*, pp. 34-36.
55. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 79, 81.
56. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 125-126; Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, pp. 26-27; Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate* pp. 65-85; Thomas E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, pp. 573-670, 668-676.
57. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 128.
58. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, pp. 32-33.
59. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 221-222.
60. Darwaza, "Tis' una 'Aman," 2:94.

61. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 133.
62. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, p. 116.
63. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 138-140.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.
65. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, pp. 17-18; Nevakivi, *Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East*, pp. 241-260; Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, p. 399; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 89; Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, *The Climax of French Imperial Expansion 1914-1924*.

5. FAYSAL'S ARAB GOVERNMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A KING, 1918-1920

1. Thomas B. Macaulay, letter to Henry S. Randall, Courtland E. Village, New York, May 23, 1857, cited in Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 87.
2. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 305.
3. Sa'id B. Himadeh, ed., *Economic Organization of Syria*, p. 264.
4. See the detailed discussion of Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, *Yawm Maysalun: Safha min Tarikh al-'Arb al-Hadith*, pp. 243-259. This book is of special significance since al-Husri was a member of the Board of Administrators and had a ministerial portfolio in the two Arab governments formed in Damascus under Amir Faysal. He was also delegated to negotiate with General Gouraud who filled the dual office of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, after the French army's march on Maysalun. Al-Husri was also very close to Amir Faysal. See also Malcolm B. Russell, "Towards an Arab State: The Syrian Administration, 1918-1920."
5. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 82; Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 305.
6. Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 12.
7. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 35.
8. Neil Caplan, *Palestinian Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-25*, pp. 24-25.
9. See, for instance, Porath, *Emergence*, pp.35-39; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, pp. 79-80.
10. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 305.
11. Cited in Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 176.
12. Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 87-88.
13. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 156-157.
14. Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, *Ma Ra'aytu wa-Ma Sam'itu*, p. 125. Al-Zirikli, a prominent Damascene journalist and writer with a literary talent of a high order, was a witness to the conditions that prevailed in Damascus in the period under survey. He personally knew Sharif Husayn and his sons. His short book is written in excellent Arabic style, vivid, moving, and at times highly colored, carrying the reader swiftly and elegantly from one narrative to the other, always engaging him with his mastery of prose. There is no detailed analysis, but there are revealing personal experiences and brief portrayals of personalities.
15. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 158; Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon*, p. 86.
16. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 439.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 286.

18. The minute of Major the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, who was accompanying a Zionist commission which went to Palestine in March 1918 in his capacity as political officer delegated by the Foreign Office, in Clayton's despatch, October 27, 1918, F.O. 371/3398/27647/178952; and note of Hubert Winthrop Young, an Indian army officer who had served during the war in Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, and who at the beginning of 1919 joined the newly formed Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, in the report of Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis of the Cairo Arab Bureau and a staunch supporter of the Sharifian family, September 25, 1919, F.O. 371/4183/2117/134093.

19. Minute of Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, chairman of the Eastern Committee, on Faysal's interview in the October 3, 1919, issue of the *Jewish Chronicle*, October 9, 1919, F.O. 371/4183/2117/137796; Faysal to Felix Frankfurter, member of the American Zionist deputation, March 1, 1919, C.Z.A., Record Group Z4, File 25001; see also Faysal's letter to Dr. Shmarya Levin, a prominent Zionist lobbyist and propagandist, October 31, 1919, and his letter of Herbert Samuel, November 20, 1919, in same file; and see, for example, Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, p. 234; see also the minutes of a conference held in Cairo on March 27, 1918, between the Zionist Commission and Sa'id Shuqayr Pasha, Dr. Faris Nimr, a Lebanese Christian who founded the famous *al-Muqattam* newspaper, and Sulayman Bey Nasif, an Arab from Haifa, C.Z.A., Record Group L4, File 768.

20. The leadership of the club was entirely Palestinian. It consisted of ai-Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar of Jerusalem, Salim 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim of Tulkram, Muhammad 'Ali Bey al-Tamimi of Nablus, the Damascus police chief in Faysal's administration, Subhi Bey al-Khadra of Safad, the commander of the gendarmerie, and 'Izzat Darwaza, secretary of the club. See Porath, *Emergence*, p. 77; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 84; and Qasimiyya, *Al-Hukama al-'Arabiyya*, pp. 69-70.

21. See Clayton's dispatch to Foreign Office on anti-Zionist articles in the Damascus press, February 18, 1919, F.O. 371/4153/275/38827, and the dispatch of the British director of military intelligence in Palestine, November 19, 1919, F.O. 371/4185/2117/153591.

22. I.P.S., the Private Papers of Nabih al-'Azma, the Palestinian Collection, File 19/n.d., no number.

23. I.S.A., the Papers of 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Record Group 66, Box 162. In the original manuscript, Syria is inadvertently substituted for Palestine, perhaps because when 'Awni wrote it on the spot he, too, was preoccupied with Syria.

24. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 169-171.

25. I.P.S., the Private Papers of Nabih al-'Azma, Appendix 2/MS107, winter 1920. A similar denunciation of the Sharifian family is found in Anis Sayigh, *Al-Hashimiyyun wa-Qadiyyat Filastin*.

26. Albert H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon*, p. 53; Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, pp. 107-127; Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 165-167.

27. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 168; Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, p. 123.

28. Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:125-126; Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 168. By relying uncritically on Sa'id, Kedourie is in error to state that "the Committee of al-Fatat" rejected the Faysal-Clemenceau agreement. As I shall point out in chapter 6, the truth of the matter is that al-Fatat was split over this agreement as well as over other political issues.

29. The French were not any far from that as their position at the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919 indicates; see Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, p. 245.
30. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 90.
31. Harry N. Howard, *An American Inquiry in the Middle East: The King-Crane Commission*, p. 34; Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, pp. 116-117.
32. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 145-146.
33. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, pp. 297, 312-313; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:60; Sati' Al-Husri, *Yawm Maysalun*, pp. 261-262.
34. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 87.
35. For a complete list of the delegates, see Yusuf al-Hakim, *Surya wal-'Ahd al-Faysali*, pp. 91-94.
36. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 87; see also the lists provided by al-Hakim, *Surya wal-'Ahd al-Faysali*, pp. 91-94, and by Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 175-176.
37. Darwaza, "Tis 'una 'Aman," 2:73, 79-80.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
39. Interview with Munif al-Husayni, Beirut, February 23, 1979; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:74.
40. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 293-294; Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 297.
41. For details, see Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon*, pp. 82-103; Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 169-174; Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, pp. 169-189; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 91-92; al-Husri, *Yawm Maysalun*, pp. 161ff.; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:105-116; al-Zirikli, *Ma Ra'aytu*, pp. 3-26.

6. THE ECLIPSE OF THE PAN-SYRIAN DREAM, 1918-1920

1. Nevakivi, *Britain, France*, p. 260; Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, p. 490.
2. For an analysis of factions among Arab nationalists, see Philip S. Khoury, "Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists During the French Mandate."
3. Interview with Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Damascus, May 16, 1979.
4. In the parlance of al-Fatat, founding members referred to those who joined the society before the entry of Faysal's army into Damascus.
5. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, 1:74-75.
6. Qasimiyya, *Al-Hukuma al-'Arabiyya*, p. 66, n.5.
7. Darwaza, "Tis 'una 'Aman, 2:107.
8. Al-Hakim, *Surya wal-'Ahd al-Faysali*, p. 70.
9. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 85; Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 74-107.
10. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 179.
11. Nevakivi, *Britain, France*, pp. 210-211; Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, pp. 372-373.
12. Darwaza, "Tis 'una 'Aman," 2:156.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157, 168-169.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
15. Al-Hakim, *Surya wal-'Ahd al-Faysali*, p. 129; Dr. Ahmad Qadri, *Mudhakirati 'An al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra*, p. 175.
16. Nevakivi, *Britain, France*, p. 216.

17. Arab nationalists coined the term *iqlimiyya* (regionalism or provincialism) to describe territorial or state nationalism. From an Arab nationalist perspective *iqlimiyya* contradicts *qawmiyya* (Arab nationalism) and is therefore a pejorative term. For a discussion of these terms see Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914*. For an idea of how negative *iqlimiyya* is see the works of Sati' al-Husri, especially *Abhath Mukhtara fil-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya*.

18. During Faysal's rule in Syria al-Fatat elected three central committees, the first in December 1918 comprising 'Ali Rida Pasha al-Rikabi, Yasin al-Hashimi, Dr. Ahmad Qadri, Nasib al-Bakri, Rafiq al-Tamimi, and Tawfiq al-Natur; the second committee was elected in May 1919 and consisted of Yasin al-Hashimi, Dr. Ahmad Qadri, Rafiq al-Tamimi, Sa'id Haydar, Ahmad Maryud, Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, and Shukri al-Quwwatli; the third committee was elected in March 1920 and consisted of 'Ali Rida Pasha al-Rikabi, Nasib al-Bakri, Sa'id Haydar, Khalid al-Hakim, Dr. As'ad al-Hakim, Muhammad al-Shurayqi, and Jamil Mardam Bey. See Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra*, 2:35-36.

19. Darwaza, "Tis 'una 'Aman," 2:94, 95-96.

20. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 152.

21. Ahmad Qudama, *Ma'alim wa A'lam fi Bilad al-'Arab*, 1:142.

22. Darwaza, "Tis 'una 'Aman," 2:141; Qadri, *Mudhakkirati*, pp. 172-173.

23. Among the most important members of the party were: the Sharif Nasir, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, Fawzi al-Bakri, 'Ala' al-Din al-Durubi, Rashid Mardam, 'Ali al-'Asali, 'Ata al-Ayyubi, Badi' al-Mu'ayyad, Anwar al-Bakri, Sharif al-Kilani, al-Shaykh Taj al-Din al-Husni, Nasib Hamza, Zaki al-Mahayni, Hasan al-Suyufi, 'Umar al-'Abd, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Ustuwani, Dr. Shakir al-Qiyam, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jalil al-Dura, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Attar, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khatib, al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Mujtahid, Ahmad Ibish, Muhammad al-'Ajlari, Muslim al-Hisni, and Muhammad Kurd 'Ali. See Qadri, *Mudhakkirati*, p. 173.

24. See Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:42.

25. Darwaza, "Tis 'una 'Aman," 2:140.

26. Qadri, *Mudhakkirati*, p. 172.

27. Dagher, *Mudhakkirati*, p. 110; Khalid al-'Azm, *Mudhakkirat Khalid al-'Azm*, 1:94-95.

28. Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat*, 1:231-232.

29. Qudama, *Ma'alim wa A'lam*, 1:380.

30. Anwar al-Jundi, *Mufakkirun wa Udaba' min Khilal Atharhim*, p. 201.

31. Qudama, *Ma'alim wa A'lam*, 1:380.

32. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, *Mudhakkirat Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib*, pp. 11, 19.

33. 'Adnan al-Khatib, *Al-Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza' iri: Ra'id al-Nahda al-Ilmiyya fi Bilad al-Sham wa A'lam min Khirriji Madrasatihi*, p. 48.

34. Houry, "Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists," pp. 465, n.15, 445, 465, n. 17.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

36. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:128.

37. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, *Mudhakkirat 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar*, p. 6.

38. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:113-114; Houry, "Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists," p. 449; Qudama, *Ma'alim wa A'lam*, 1:23.

39. Houry, "Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists," pp. 445, 462; Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat*, 2:444.

40. Khoury, "Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists," p. 462.
41. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:127-128 and 113.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
43. *Ibid.*; Qasimiyya, *Al-Hukuma al-'Arabiyya*, p. 69.
44. As'ad Dagher, *Mudhakkirati 'Ala Hamish al-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya*, p. 107; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:138.
45. Dagher, *Mudhakkirati*, p. 107; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:138.
46. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 195 and 196.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
48. 'Ali Jawdat, *Dhikrayat 'Ali Jawdat, 1900-1958*, p. 31.
49. Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, p. 133; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:258.
50. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 196.
51. Al-Hakim, *Surya wal-'Ahd al-Faysali*, p. 109. For more details on Yasin see Phebe A. Marr, "Yassin al-Hashimi: The Rise and Fall of a Nationalist"; Reeva S. Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology* pp. 46-49; Mohammad A. Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941*, pp. 235-238; Sami 'Abd al-Hafidh al-Qaysi, *Yasin al-Hashimi*.
52. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:85-86.
53. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 197. For the information on Iraqi personalities in this section I am indebted to Batatu, unless otherwise indicated.
54. See Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, pp. 474-475; Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars*, pp. 29-39; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*; Abdul Wahhab Abbas al-Qaysi, "The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society During the Ottoman Era: A Study of Intellectual Development in Iraq 1869-1917"; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:46-48; Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, pp. 477-478.
55. For details, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 155-157; Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, p. 473.
56. Qasimiyya, *Al-Hukuma al-'Arabiyya*, pp. 70-71.
57. Ashraf (plural of sharif), claimants of descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
58. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 180-181, 319-320, 1,089.
59. 'Ali Jawdat, *Dhikrayat*, pp. 91, 93.
60. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, *Mudhakkirati: Nisf Qarn min Tarikh al-'Iraq wal-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya*, p. 44.
61. Unless otherwise indicated, the information on 'Izzat is taken from Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 1:1ff.
62. For more details on such activities in Nablus see Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 173-174. Mandel states that the newspaper *Filastin* published on July 12, 1913, a suggestion by a correspondent from Nablus which proposed the formation of a society made up of notables from Nablus, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Gaza to purchase crown (*ciftlik*) land from the Ottoman government before the Jews. At the end of August, an anti-Zionist group was set up in Nablus for this purpose.
63. The others were: al-Shaykh Nimr al-Duri, Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi, al-Hajj Hasan Hammad, and Kamal Hashim.
64. Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:35-36.
65. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, 1:5.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

67. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lam al-Fikr wal-Adab*, p. 79.
68. This information is taken from *ibid.*, pp. 79-80; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:36-37; and from biographical notes in C.Z.A., Record Group S/25, Files 4022 and 3008.
69. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 108.
70. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'lam al-Fikr*, pp. 419-423; 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, *Awraq Khassa*, pp. 9-23; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:174.
71. Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:43; Porath, *Emergence*, p. 87.
72. The most prominent members of this society were: Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi, Amin al-Husayni, Salim 'Abd al-Rahman, Mu'in al-Madi, 'Izzat Darwaza, 'Arif al-'Arif. See Amin Sa'id, *ibid.*, and Darwaza, "Tis'una Aman," 2:143.
73. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:143-144.
74. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 100; C.Z.A., Record Group L/3, File 278; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:144.
75. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, pp. 126-127; C.Z.A., Record Group Z/4, File 1366.
76. Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 2:44; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, 1:91-92; C.Z.A. Record Group Z/4 File 1366.
77. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, 1:91; "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:143.
78. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 78; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 127; Ahmad Qadri, *Mudhakkirati*, pp. 162-169.
79. C.Z.A., Record Group Z/4, File 1366.
80. Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 65-66. Al-Khalidi does not state the exact date of the petitions, but from the course of the events described it seems that the episode took place sometime in the spring of 1920.
81. Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Al-Mudhakkirat*, 2:444ff; and cited in Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 160.
82. Zionist intelligence report, January 31, 1920, C.Z.A. Record Group L/3, File 278.

7. THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE

1. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 59; Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 35.
2. Criminal Investigation Department (CID) report on Muslim and Christian societies in Palestine, December 1920, I.S.A., Record Group 2, File No. 155.
3. For a discussion of comprehensive nationalist parties, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Politics of the Near East," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, pp. 369-452.
4. Al-Hut, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat," 1:87.
5. These figures are rough estimations reconstructed on the basis of the first official census of Palestine conducted by the British government in 1922. The figures of the census were reprinted in *A Survey of Palestine*, pp. 141-156.
6. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, p. 59.
7. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 32.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Secret military dispatch from the military governor of the Jaffa district to OETA-South headquarters, June 20, 1919, I.S.A., Record Group 2, File No. 155.

10. Major-General H. D. Watson, chief administrator of OET-South, to chief political officer, Colonel Meinertzhagen, September 26, 1919, I.S.A., Record Group 2, No. 140, cited in Porath, *Emergence*, p. 33.
11. Interview between Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hut and 'Ajaj Nuwayhid. Beirut, December 14, 1973, cited in al-Hut, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat," 1:88.
12. I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File B/MS1.
13. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 93.
14. For a theoretical treatment of these issues, see Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 89 ff.; Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development*, pp. 35 ff.
15. Muslim-Christian Associations' Document, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Research Center, Beirut, Lebanon, n.d., no number.
16. Jamal al-Husayni, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 12-13.
17. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 108; Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya*, 1:8-9.
18. Darwaza, *Nash'at al-Haraka*, pp. 353-354.
19. See al-'Aqqad, *Al-Shakhsiyyat al-Filastiniyya*, pp. 144-147.
20. Al-'Awdat, *Min 'Alam al-Fikr*, pp. 626-630.
21. 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi, *Jawla fil-Dhikrayat*, pp. 75-77.
22. Secret report of J. N. Camp on the Arab movement and Zionism, August 12, 1919, F.O. 371/4182/2117/125609.
23. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 74.
24. Camp's report on the Arab movement; Zionist intelligence report on the Jaffa district, July 23, 1919, C.Z.A., Record Group L4, File no. 759.
25. Zionist intelligence report on Beirut, June 18, 1919, C.Z.A., Record Group L4, File no. 750.
26. Among the founders were Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, the club's president, his brother Fakhr al-Din al-Husayni, Jamal al-Husayni, Ibrahim Sa'id al-Husayni, Hilmi al-Husayni, Tawfiq al-Husayni, Ishaq Darwish, al-Shaykh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud, 'Arif al-'Arif, Muhammad al-'Afifi, Kamal al-Budayri, Muhammad Hasan al-Budayri, al-Shaykh Musa al-Budayri, 'Abd al-Samad al-'Alami, Yusuf Yasin, Bulus Shihada, and others. See Bayan al-Hut, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat," 1:94-96.
27. Mattar, "Mufti of Jerusalem," p. 6.
28. Interview with Kamil al-Dajani, Beirut, March 13, 1979.
29. Mattar, "Mufti of Jerusalem," pp. 11ff.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-13.
31. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:143 ff. and 19-20.
32. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 77.
33. Camp's report on the Arab movement; Mattar, "Mufti of Jerusalem," p. 16.
34. Mattar, "Mufti of Jerusalem," p. 24.
35. C.Z.A., L/4 File 742, Zionist intelligence report on Nablus, January 24-29, 1920.
36. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:27; C.Z.A., L/4, File 762, Zionist intelligence report on Nablus, November 7-11, 1919.
37. Camp's report on the Arab movement.
38. Al-Hut, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat," 1:98-100. Al-Hut bases her argument on information obtained from Zuhdi Hasan Jarallah, a relative of Hasan Jarallah, who was a leading member of the association.

39. C.Z.A., L/4, File 762, Zionist intelligence report on Nablus, September 7-15, 1919.
40. C.Z.A., L/4, File 758, Zionist intelligence report on Jerusalem, September 10-13, 1919, and September 19-30, 1919.
41. C.Z.A., L/4, File 758, Zionist intelligence report on Jerusalem, August 10-15, 1919.
42. Camp's secret report on the Arab movement; C.Z.A., L/4, File 758.
43. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman, 2:143-145.
44. *Ibid.*, pp.143-144.
45. Biographical information on politically active Palestinians in the period we are surveying is scarce because of the very small number of biographical dictionaries. The information provided here is taken from al'Awdat, *Min A'alam al-Fikr*; al-'Aqqad, *Al-Shakhsiyyat al-Filastiniyya*; 'Abd al-Hadi, *Awraq Khassa*; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," vol. 1; al-Hut, "Al-Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat"; 'Arif al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba, Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis wal-Firdaws al-Mafqud 1947-1952*, vol. 1; Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, *Al-A'alam: Qamus Tarajim li-Ashhar al-Rijal wal-Nisa' min al-'Arab wal-Musta'ribin wal-Mustashriqin*, vol. 8; Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, vols. 4 and 7; Taysir al-Nashif, *Mufakkirun Filastiniyyun fil-Qarn al-Ishrin* (Union City, N. J.: American Publishing House, 1981); Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 167-168.
48. *Al-Mawsu'a al-Filastiniyya*, 2:583.
49. Al-'Awdat, *Min A'alam al-Fikr*, pp. 318-320; Porath, *Emergence*, p. 252.

8. THE CRISIS IN POLITICAL IDENTITY

1. Howard W. Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, p. 211.
2. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, p. 295.
3. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, p. 73.
4. Interview with Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Damascus, May 17, 1979.
5. Al-Sakakini, *Kadha Ana Ya Dunya*, p.161.
6. I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File A/MS4, November 2, 1918.
7. The cities and villages were: Jaffa, Jerusalem, Ramla, Lydda, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Jamma'in, Tiberias, Nazareth, Safad, Sha'rawiyya, Haifa. See I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File A/MS 16, February 5, 1919.
8. I.P.S., Akram Zu'aytir's Papers, File A/MS 15, January 19, 1919.
9. Clayton to Foreign Secretary in London, July 1, 1918, F.O. 371/3398/27647/123904.
10. The Muslim-Christian Association chose delegates to the congress from Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jenin, Jerusalem, Nablus, Jamma'in, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Ramla, Safad, Tiberias, Tulkarm. Delegates from Acre, Hebron, and Beersheeba had been invited, but none attended the congress.
11. Secret report of Camp, February 15, 1919, I.S.A., Record Group 2, File 155.
12. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:34.
13. Zionist intelligence account of the first Palestinian Arab Congress, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 768.

14. Camp's secret report on the Arab movement; and Porath, *Emergence*, p. 83.
15. Camp's secret report on the Arab movement; and Porath, *Emergence*, p. 82.
16. Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, *Mudhakkirat Taha al-Hashimi, 1919-1943*, p. 47.
17. Ronald Storrs to Chief Political Officer, Advanced General Headquarters (Secret Dispatch), February 1919, I.S.A. Record Group 2, File 155; C.Z.A., L4, File no. 768.
18. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:42-43.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-43; interview with Darwaza in Damascus, May 18, 1979.
20. Camp's secret report on the Arab movement.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 83.
24. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:37.
25. C.Z.A., L4, File no. 768.
26. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 82.
27. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:43.
28. Porath, *Emergence*, p.84.
29. Confidential letter from Ormsby-Gore to Mark Sykes, March 31, 1918, F.O. 371/3383/747/81519.
30. Confidential dispatch from Curzon to Balfour, April 18, 1919, F.O. 371/4180/2117/60671.
31. C.Z.A., L4, File no. 768, February 1919.
32. Camp's secret intelligence report, February 15, 1919, F.O. 371/4153/275/41476.
33. Curzon to Balfour, April 18, 1919, F.O. 371/4180/2117/60671; Clayton's telegram of February 28, 1919, F.O. 371/4178/2117/33851.
34. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 46.
35. Interview with Kamil al-Dajani, Beirut, March 1979.
36. Samuel to Curzon, April 2, 1920, F.O. 371/5139/E3109/131/44. Ann Lesch correctly notes that the political aims of the Palestinian Arabs were fully articulated at the outbreak of World War I, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 31.
37. Al-Sakakini, *Kadha Ana Ya Dunya*, p. 155.
38. Palin Report, F.O. 371/5121, p. 6.
39. Secret Zionist intelligence report on the Arab national movement, January 31, 1920, C.Z.A., L3, File no. 278.
40. 'Isa al-'Isa, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 47-48; C.Z.A., L3, File no. 278, January 31, 1920; see also Clayton's despatch of translations of anti-Zionist articles in the Damascus press, February 18, 1919, F.O. 371/4153/275/38827, and the despatch of Director of Military Intelligence on same subject, November 19, 1919, F.O. 371/4185/2117/153591.
41. 'Isa al-'Isa, "Al-Mudhakkirat," p. 47.
42. Interview with Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Damascus, May 17, 1979; al-Sakakini, *Kadha Ana Ya Dunya*, pp. 175-176.
43. C.Z.A., Group L3, File 278, January 31, 1920; C.Z.A., Z4, File 1366; Camp's report on the Arab movement.
44. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 78.
45. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:106.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

47. Interview with Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Damascus, May 18, 1979.

9. THE ASCENDANCE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

1. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:56.
2. 'Abd al-Hadi, *Awraq Khassa*, pp. 32-33.
3. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:46, 48.
4. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, p. 91.
5. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, File B/MS8, June 1919.
6. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, File A/MS6; see also petitions in I.S.A., Record Group 2, File 140, and Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 92-93.
7. Political memorandum submitted by the Jerusalem MCA to the Military Governor of Jerusalem on March 24, 1919, Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, File A.
8. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, File B/MS9, June 1919.
9. See the recommendations of the Commission in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 443-458. For a detailed analysis of the recommendations, see Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, pp. 311-325.
10. Zionist Intelligence Report on Beersheeba, June 20, 1919, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 751; I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, File B/MS9, June 1919.
11. Zionist Intelligence Report on Gaza, May 10, 1919, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 753.
12. Zionist Intelligence Report on Gaza, June 20, 1919, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 753; and on the Arab nationalist movement in Tiberias, n.d., C.Z.A., L4, File no. 766.
13. Zionist Intelligence Report on Ramla, July 12, 1920, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 743.
14. Zionist Intelligence Report on Ramla, September 1919, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 765; and April 11, 1920, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 743.
15. See C.Z.A., L4, Files no. 739, 738, 750; C.Z.A., Record Group Z4, File no. 1366; Camp's report on the Arab movement and Zionism, August 12, 1919, in F.O. 371/4182/2117/125609.
16. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, File B/MS17.
17. Secret General Headquarters Intelligence summary, political and military, April 9, 1920, in W.O. 106/196/15. For more details, see Zionist Intelligence Reports on Jerusalem, March 9 and April 2, 1920, C.Z.A., Record Group L4, File no. 738 and Zionist Intelligence Report on Jaffa, April 6-11, 1920, C.Z.A., Record Group L4, File no. 737.
18. See, for instance, Zionist Intelligence Report on Jaffa, January 23, 1920, C.Z.A. L4, File no. 737; Zionist Intelligence Report on Lydda, August 5, 1919, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 760.
19. Zionist Commission Press Bureau, Jerusalem, June 1, 1920, C.Z.A., Record Group Z4, File no. 1454.
20. Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 65-66.
21. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:141-142.
22. *Ibid.* Darwaza refers here to a letter which he received from Sati' al-Husri, then Iraq's Minister of Education, sometime in 1923.
23. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 159-160.
24. Zionist Intelligence Report, January 12, 1920, C.Z.A., L4, File no. 738.
25. See, for instance, Zionist Intelligence Report, C.Z.A., L4, January 31, 1920,

File no. 738; and C.Z.A., L3, File no. 278.

26. 'Isa al-'Isa, "Al-Mudhakkirat," p. 48.
27. Interview with Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Damascus, May 18, 1979.
28. Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 2:216-218; Sati'al-Husri, *Yawm Maysalun*, pp. 105-106.
29. Interview with Kamil al-Dajani, Beirut, March 11, 1979. See also 'Awni 'abd al-Hadi, *Awraq Khassa*, p. 57.
30. Interview with Akram Zu'aytir, Beirut, January 29, 1979.
31. Interview with Saliba al-Juzi, Beirut, April 17, 1979. Al-Juzi is a Palestinian Arab from Jerusalem who was, in 1920, an active member in *al-Muntada al-Adabi*. See also petition signed by 'Arif al-'Arif on June 25, 1920, in I.S.A., Record Group 2, File no. 32.
32. Interview with Kamil al-Dajani, Beirut, March 11, 1979.
33. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, no date, no number; Darwaza, "Tis'una 'Aman," 3:7-10.
34. The real title of the congress was the General Palestinian Congress (al-Mu'tamar al-Filastini al-'Amm). See 'Isa al-Sifri, *Filastin al-'Arabiyya bayna al-Intidab wal-Sahyuniyya*, pp. 35-36.
35. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, MS/61, December 1920. This manuscript is handwritten by Ahmad al-Imam, the secretary of the congress, and is to the best of my knowledge the only comprehensive document which contains the minutes of the congress. Unless otherwise indicated, the analysis below draws on this document. The interested reader can find the contents of the document in Akram Zu'aytir, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya, 1918-1939*, pp. 42-58.
36. See list of the delegates, *ibid.*.
37. Samuel to Musa Kazim, December 21, 1920, F.O. 371/6374/E501/35/88.
38. *Al-Karmil*, January 13, 1921, p. 3, and January 15, 1921, p. 2.
39. I.P.S., Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir, MS/61.
40. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 109.
41. See, for instance, the letter submitted by the MCA delegation in London to the Colonial Secretary, October 24, 1921, C.O. 733/16. The delegation went to London for the first time on official business in the summer of 1921.
42. Interviews with Palestinians who were contemporaries of the period in Beirut, Damascus, 'Amman, and Jerusalem in the winter, spring, and summer of 1979.
43. The third and fourth sessions were held on the same day, the third in the morning and the fourth in the afternoon.
44. The committee was formed of Muhammad Murad (Haifa), al-Hajj Tawfiq Hammad (Nablus), Amin al-Tamimi (Nablus), Wadi' al-Bustani (Haifa), Bulus Shihada (Jerusalem), and Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (Jerusalem).
45. For details on the organization of the Arab executive, see Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 288-293; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, pp. 90-95.
46. Interview with Munif al-Husayni, Beirut, February 23, 1979.
47. For details on the political style of the leadership of the Palestinian national movement after 1920, see Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya fi Mukhtalaf Marahiliha*; al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*; al-Sifri, *Filastin al-'Arabiyya*; al-Hut, "Al-'Qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat;" Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, pp. 79-131; Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 184 ff.

CONCLUSION

1. For details on the emergence of the ideas of Ottoman patriotism and the Ottoman fatherland, see Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 323-362; Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, pp.97-104; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2:255-272; Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* and "Ziya Gokalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," 8:379-480.

2. This analysis of the two varieties of Ottomanism is indebted to Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 129-147.

3. Among the authors who treated Palestinian nationalism mainly from the standpoint of its struggle against Zionism are Naji 'Allush, *Al-Muqawama al-'Arabiyya fi Filastin, 1914-1948*; 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, *Palestine: A Modern History*; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine* and "The Origins of Palestine Arab Nationalism;" Matiel Mogannam, *The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem*; Porath, *Emergence*; Al-Sifri, *Filastin al-'Arabiyya*; 'Abd al-Qadir Yasin, *Kifah al-Sha'ab al-Filastini qabla al-'Amm 1948*.

4. See Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 226-227; Rashid Khalidi, "The Role of the Press," pp. 108-109.

5. For details on the power equation between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist immigrants, see Porath, *Emergence*, pp. 140-141; 158; 168-169; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, pp. 32-42; Walid Khalidi, "The Arab Perspective," pp. 104-136.

6. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 242; Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, p. 26; Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, pp. 96-98.

7. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 6.

8. Baer, "Village and City in Egypt and Syria," p. 638.

9. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine*, pp. 38-39.

10. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 26.

11. Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem*, p. 111.

12. Baer, "Village and City in Egypt and Syria," p. 638.

13. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, p. 17.

14. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 68, 126.

15. Jamal al-Husayni, "Al-Mudhakkirat," pp. 9, 12, and 5.

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 - The Private Papers of Akram Zu'aytir
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The Institute for Palestine Studies Series

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS/New York

ISBN 0-231-05509-4



9 780231 065092