

STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF PALESTINE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

In spite of all the attention which the problem of Palestine has received little basic research has been undertaken on the recent economic and social history of the Arab population of the country, both before and after 1948.

This book contains four new studies on different aspects of the subject. They include an examination of the first effects of European involvement on the urban and rural economy of Palestine during the mid-nineteenth century and a detailed analysis of socio-economic change in one very important hill region in the 1920s and 1930s: the Jabal Nablus. A third essay looks at the complicated problem of applying the concepts of 'faction' and 'class' to the study of Palestinian Arab society and Palestinian political activity, while a fourth traces the misfortunes of the villagers and refugees living along the new Israeli/Jordanian demarcation line in the years just after the 1948 war.

There is also a long introduction by the editor in which he examines the particular problems and difficulties involved in the analysis of the socio-economic history of a country which was both the colony of a great power and the site of a major attempt to establish a Jewish national home.

Dr Roger Owen, the editor of this volume, is Lecturer in the Recent Economic History of the Middle East and Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford. He is a former Director of the Middle East Centre at St Antony's.

He is the author of *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914* and *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* and the editor or co-editor of *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, Essays in the Crisis in Lebanon* and *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*.

St Antony's/Macmillan Series

General editor: Archie Brown, Fellow of St Antony's College,
Oxford

Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (*editors*) SOVIET POLICY FOR
THE 1980s

S. B. Burman CHIEFDOM POLITICS AND ALIEN LAW

Wilhelm Deist THE *WEHRMACHT* AND GERMAN
REARMAMENT

Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Ernesto Tironi (*editors*) LATIN
AMERICA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER

Bohdan Harasymiw POLITICAL ELITE RECRUITMENT IN
THE USSR

Richard Holt SPORT AND SOCIETY IN MODERN FRANCE

Albert Hourani EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN
MIDDLE EAST

Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (*editors*) NATIONALIST AND
RACIALIST MOVEMENTS IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY
BEFORE 1914

Richard Kindersley (*editor*) IN SEARCH OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Gisela C. Lebzelter POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN
ENGLAND, 1918–1939

C. A. MacDonald THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND
APPEASEMENT, 1936–1939

Patrick O'Brien (*editor*) RAILWAYS AND THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1830–1914

Roger Owen (*editor*) STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL HISTORY OF PALESTINE IN THE NINETEENTH
AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Irena Powell WRITERS AND SOCIETY IN MODERN JAPAN

T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér (*editors*) POLITICAL
LEGITIMATION IN COMMUNIST STATES

Marilyn Rueschemeyer PROFESSIONAL WORK AND
MARRIAGE: AN EAST–WEST COMPARISON

A. J. R. Russell-Wood THE BLACK MAN IN SLAVERY AND
FREEDOM IN COLONIAL BRAZIL

David Stafford BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN RESISTANCE,
1940–1945

Nancy Stepan THE IDEA OF RACE IN SCIENCE

Guido di Tella ARGENTINA UNDER PERÓN, 1973–76


Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead (*editors*) INFLATION
AND STABILISATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Rudolf L. Tókéš (*editor*) OPPOSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Edited by

ROGER OWEN



St Antony's

© St Antony's College, Oxford, 1982

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1982 978-0-333-30079-4

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission

First published 1982 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world

ISBN 978-1-349-05702-3

ISBN 978-1-349-05700-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-05700-9

Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| <i>List of Tables, Figures and Maps</i> | vi |
| <i>Preface</i> | ix |
| <i>Notes on the Contributors</i> | x |
| <i>Note on Transliteration</i> | xi |
| <i>The Maps</i> | xii |
| <i>Introduction</i> | 1 |
| ROGER OWEN | |
| 1. European Penetration and the Economic Development of Palestine, 1856–82 | 10 |
| ALEXANDER SCHÖLCH | |
| 2. The Political Economy of the Jabal Nablus, 1920–48 | 88 |
| SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN | |
| 3. Factionalism and Class Formation in Recent Palestinian History | 177 |
| SALIM TAMARI | |
| 4. The Palestinians of Jordan's Border | 203 |
| AVI PLASCOV | |
| <i>Index</i> | 243 |

List of Tables, Figures and Maps

TABLES

| | |
|--|----|
| 1.1 Population of the towns of Palestine in the nineteenth century | 57 |
| 1.2 Average annual export of the main articles from Jaffa, Haifa and Acre | 57 |
| 1.3 Main export articles of Jaffa (by quantity) | 58 |
| 1.4 Value of the three main export articles of Jaffa in various years and their percentage of total exports | 59 |
| 1.5 Main export articles of Acre, 1872–80 (by quantity) | 60 |
| 1.6 Main export articles of Haifa, 1872–80 (by quantity) | 60 |
| 1.7 Cotton exports from Acre and Haifa, 1852–62 | 61 |
| 1.8 Estimate of the average proportion of northern Palestine's cultivated area devoted to certain crops, 1858–62 | 61 |
| 1.9 Increase in exports of main export articles from Jaffa (by quantity) | 62 |
| 1.10 Exports and imports of Jaffa (value in PT) | 62 |
| 1.11 Value of exports and imports of Jaffa, 1876–82, according to non-British consular reports | 63 |
| 1.12 Average value of export prices at Jaffa by quarter and year (in PT) | 64 |
| 1.13 Average annual export prices at Acre, Haifa and Jaffa (in PT) | 65 |
| 1.14 Consumer prices in Jerusalem, 1858 and 1880 (in PT) | 66 |
| 1.15 Main imports at Jaffa, 1874–7 and 1879–82 (in PT) | 67 |
| 1.16 Daily wages in the building industry in Jerusalem, 1861–3 | 68 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1.17 Occupational structure of the population in Jerusalem in 1877 | 68 |
| 1.18 Traffic between Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1877 | 71 |
| 1.19 Annual income from transport between Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1881 (£T) | 71 |
| 1.20 Occupational structure in Bethlehem (about 1890) | 72 |
| 1.21 Occupational structure of Nazareth in 1890 | 73 |
| 2.1 The redemption prices of six major Palestinian crops on which the tithe was commuted, 1924–7 and their market price in July 1930 | 157 |
| 2.2 Share of Jews, Arabs and others in Palestine's foreign assets, 1946 | 158 |
| 2.3 Percentage of population of the sub-districts of Nablus, Tulkarm and Jenin dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, 1931 | 158 |
| 2.4 The relationship of peasant population to agricultural land in the Jenin sub-district | 158 |
| 2.5 Stages of settlement work reached in the 167 villages brought under settlement at the end of 1935 | 159 |
| 2.6 Number of privately-owned parcels of land in five villages, distributed according to the number of owners of each parcel, 1944 | 160 |
| 2.7 Estimates of the average cost of agricultural production, of income and profit, 1930 | 161 |
| 2.8 Income and expenditure of an 'ordinary fellah' according to Wilkansky (area 80–100 dunums) | 162 |
| 2.9 Olive propagation: olive trees planted by the government according to source, 1924/5–1936/7 | 163 |
| 2.10 Wholesale prices of Nablusi soap compared with that of the Shemen factory, 1929–40 (£P per 100 kilos) | 164 |
| 2.11 Exports of soap from Palestine, 1928–40 | 164 |
| 2.12 Average wages paid to labour per 9-hour day in 1929 (skilled and semi-skilled work) | 164 |
| 2.13 Estimates of wage labour employed outside the village in two Palestinian sub-districts during World War II | 165 |
| 2.14 Source of income for wage-earners in three Palestinian sub-districts, 1931 | 165 |
| 2.15 Estimated production of Palestinian crops for the years 1927–42 | 166 |
| 2.16 Domestic expenditures of various colonial governments in the interwar period by purpose (per cent) | 167 |

FIGURES

- 2.1 Types of Share Contract 115

MAPS

1. Northern Palestine xii
2. Central and Southern Palestine xiii
3. The Arab border villages showing the 1949 Armistice line xiv

Preface

The four essays which form this volume were all written by friends and colleagues with some connection with the Middle East Centre of St Antony's College, whether as students, academic visitors or contributors to seminars. Although each piece of research was originally intended to stand in its own right it is my belief that, taken together, they constitute an important contribution to the study of the modern economic and social history of Palestine.

I was distressed to learn of the tragic and untimely death of Avi Plascov during the proofing of the book. I wish he had lived to see it.

Roger Owen

Notes on the Contributors

SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN works for the *Middle East Economic Digest*. She is the author of *Palestinians and their Society 1880–1946* (London, 1981).


DR AVI PLASCOV, who received his doctorate from the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, was a Research Associate, 1978–80, and in 1981 was a Visiting Fellow of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. At the time of his death he was at the Centre for Strategic Studies and the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. He was the author of *The Palestine Refugees in Jordan, 1948–57* (London, 1981) and ‘A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives’, *Adelphi Papers*, no. 163 (IISS). His book, *Security in the Persian Gulf: Modernization, Political Development and Stability* is to be published shortly.

DR ALEXANDER SCHÖLCH teaches the modern history of the Middle East at the University of Essen. He is the author of *Ägypten den Ägyptern: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Krise der Jahre 1878–1881 in Ägypten* (Zurich and Freiberg, 1976), translated as *Egypt for the Egyptians* (London, 1981).


SALIM TAMARI teaches sociology at Bir Zeit University.

Note on Transliteration

Arabic words and proper nouns have been presented in as simple a form as possible. Those which can be found in *The Shorter Oxford Dictionary* have been presented in their anglicised form (thus, for example, fellaheen, feddan). Place names are given according to the way they appeared on the official maps produced by the Government of Palestine before 1948. Other words and names have been transliterated according to the method to be found in Wehr's *Arabic Dictionary*, but without diacriticals except in the case of the names of authors and titles to be found in the Notes and References sections, where ayns and hamzas have been used.



MAP 1 Northern Palestine



MAP 2 *Central and Southern Palestine*



MAP 3 The Arab border villages showing the 1949 Armistice line

Introduction

ROGER OWEN

The problems involved in the analysis of the recent economic and social history of Palestine are formidable. Some of them stem from the usual difficulties which face anyone trying to examine the structures and processes belonging to any part of the non-European world in the days before reliable censuses or an adequate survey of the pattern of rural landholding. But others, of course, derive directly from Palestine's own special history as a country in which the role of politics – and of sudden political change – has been unusually large. The invasion of the country by the British in 1917, the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, all represent abrupt changes of regime with enormous consequences for local economic and social arrangements. More insidiously, the constant play of passion and political calculation has meant that much of the information which does exist has been coloured to a greater or lesser extent by the way in which it has been used to support this or that tendentious argument, this or that piece of special pleading.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that many writers have treated the history of Palestine as almost entirely *sui generis*, that is as something with its own special logic requiring its own special mode of historical analysis and explanation. Against this view, however, it is a major feature of the present collection of studies that its authors believe that Palestinian structures and processes can be analysed satisfactorily with the help of concepts and methods used generally in the social sciences while, at the same time, giving due weight to their specific features. But rather than referring only to the particular virtues of this approach it may be useful to illustrate the point by spelling out what I take to be some of the major conceptual problems which they, like any other students of Palestinian history, have had to

face. I will begin with the period before the First World War, before going on to treat the infinitely more difficult question of how to approach the three decades of British mandatory rule.

The main outlines of the process of economic and social change which took place in that part of the Ottoman Empire which was later to constitute Mandatory Palestine have been traced in a number of studies. They include the growth of population (including that of the various foreign settlers), the expansion of the cultivated area and the development of a variety of exports, notably citrus fruits and cereals.¹ However, what such a general approach has so far concealed is the existence of a number of special features which raise particular problems for analysis. I will mention just three. The first concerns the unit of study and the extent to which nineteenth century Palestine can be treated as a single market or a single economic entity. At the very least, as Schölch demonstrates, much of the northern region has to be seen as subject to economic and political forces deriving not from Jerusalem but from its provincial capital, Beirut. Among many other things this division had an important effect on the pattern of land acquisition with the estates of the Lebanese bankers and merchants, like the Sursuqs, not to mention the Sultan's own extensive properties, being concentrated almost exclusively in the north. There were also significant regional variations within the different parts of Palestine. It is usual to draw the important distinction between the economic vitality of life in the hills and the relative absence of extended agricultural activity down on the plains along the coast. But, again, as Schölch's careful study of the growth of various regional centres is able to demonstrate, this view tends to ignore not only the differential impact of European influence on the different hill towns but also the fact that, from the early part of the century, it was the coastal region round Gaza which provided a large part of the local, exportable, agricultural surplus.

A second important feature is the role played by the system of communal land tenure known as *mushaa*. Its existence was noted by many resident Europeans in the late nineteenth century as well as by the first British experts of the Mandate period.² But in each case, they were unable to provide much useful information either about the variety of forms which it undoubtedly took or about the extent of the area over which it was practised. Just as important, they tended to assume that it represented some kind of traditional practice, with its origin, perhaps, in certain tribal arrangements, which would – and ought – to wither swiftly away once a proper system of land

registration and individual ownership was introduced.³ The result is that the modern researcher is left with little to go on when seeking to understand the influence of what was clearly the dominant form of peasant land management. And while a historian like Firestone has shown enormous energy and imagination in trying to come to terms with the different types of economic and social logic behind *mushaa* in its various forms and to establish the lines along which it may have developed, the result has also been to demonstrate just how daunting is the task which any study of the rural sector has to face.⁴ The fact that something of the same kind of arrangements also existed in Syria and parts of Lebanon may help throw light on the situation in Palestine.⁵ But it would certainly be wrong to assume that, *a priori*, they had absolutely identical features.

Third, there is the fact, once again well illustrated by Schölch, that Palestine acted as a magnet for a variety of Christian and Jewish groups drawn there by its particular religious history. This clearly had an important effect on local economic and social conditions. But in the case of the German Templars, as well as, *a fortiori*, by the Jews of the First Aliyah, the real nature of their impact is obscured by their obvious interest in seeking to present such colonisation as in the best interests of everybody. By the same token, the economic rationale behind many of the early foreign agricultural settlements is not always easy to discern. In the case of the Jewish ones, for instance, the story is one of a long history of trial and error in which it took at least three decades to find a type of organisation (the kibbutz) and a type of crop mix which would allow the colonists to obtain a more or less European standard of living without the employment of low-wage local Arab labour.⁶

With the establishment of the British Mandate the problems involved in analysing the economic and social transformation of Palestine become much more intractable. In spite of considerable effort the British authorities were unable to generate a number of vital statistical indices or to produce a full cadastral survey of the whole country as a prelude to the proper registration of all landed property. In addition, much of the analysis produced by non-government bodies and institutions is suspect, as it was generally prepared with some particular political purpose in view. This is especially true of all contributions to the heated debates surrounding such highly controversial matters as the economic absorptive capacity of the country (and thus of its ability to sustain a high level of foreign immigration), the pattern of property ownership, the dispos-

session of Arab cultivators as a result of Jewish land purchase or the relative contributions of Arabs and Jews to public revenues.

But even more important than the problem of finding reliable data is that of the overall frame of reference within which it is to be used. To speak very generally, writers have adopted three different approaches to the study of the economic and social transformation of Palestine in the Mandate period, each of which, if pushed too far, produces its own systematic distortion of the picture as a whole. Stated briefly, these are the views that Palestine was a typical European colony with a typical European settler minority, the view that Palestine contained two communities with their own quite separate political and economic arrangements and the view that the situation was best analysed as one in which a capitalist sector (identified largely with Jewish industry and agriculture) came to dominate a pre-capitalist (predominantly Arab) one. Let me examine each of these views in turn.

There is no doubt that in terms both of its administration and of the policies pursued towards it Palestine had many important features in common with ordinary British colonies. Although nominally only a 'mandated' territory and subject to certain international restrictions preventing the mandator power from establishing any special privileges for itself (for example with regard to trade) it would seem that these were largely disregarded in practice.⁷ It also had a typical system of colonial finance with revenues drawn largely from indirect taxes, notably the external tariff, and a very high proportion of government expenditure on security and defence.⁸

Again, like any formal colony, Palestine was expected to pay its own way financially as well as to support the cost of the local British garrison. Lastly, the currency was managed by the same type of currency board to be found in many parts of the Empire with the Palestine pound linked directly to sterling and backed by reserves of British Treasury bonds and other paper held in London. Policies, too, were often very much in line with those pursued elsewhere in Africa and Asia, for example the determined effort to promote rural stability by means of strengthening existing village hierarchies.⁹

There was, however, one significant difference from the formal colonies and this was that the terms of the Balfour Declaration regarding the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine were written directly into the Mandate thus providing an extra guarantee that they would be adhered to both in London and by the local administration in Jerusalem.¹⁰ This had a number of important

implications. Not only was the Palestine government required to treat the Jewish Agency as the authoritative spokesman for the Jewish community as a whole but it also felt itself obliged to take measures to facilitate Jewish land purchase and, more generally, to develop the economic resources of the country in such a way as to provide a basis for continuing Jewish immigration. If, as time went on, the administration was forced to take more account of the political consequences of such policies as a result of protests from Palestine's Arab inhabitants this was only to underline the special character of its position still further. Unlike other colonial governments it was forced to balance Britain's imperial interest with the contradictory interests of two quite different local communities, one of which possessed a set of institutions parallel to those of the state and designed to facilitate the achievement of its own particular national goals.

It is this situation which has encouraged writers to speak not only of a dual political system – Jewish and Arab – but also of a dual society and a dual economy.¹¹ However, the notion of a dual economy or, in some of its formulations, of a quite separate Jewish economy system, raises a host of problems. Perhaps the best place to begin their discussion is with Szereszewski's assertion that what he calls the 'Jewish economy' was originally a set of separate and fragmented enclaves which, under the impact of a large inflow of people and capital and of the strategy of the Zionist movement and the pressure of external events, congealed into a definable economic organisation.¹² Now, at the very least, this implies that it took some time for the separate enclaves to congeal after 1918, something which many writers tend to ignore, and ought to suggest the further question of how the economic transformation of Palestine should properly to be analysed while this process was going on. Further, the evidence put forward to clinch the argument concerning the existence of a separate Jewish economy with minimal interaction with its Arab neighbours is taken largely from the short period of the Arab Revolt, 1936–9, when economic relations between Arabs and Jews were widely interrupted by political events. But this is to ignore the fact that, during the Second World War, and the significant mobilisation of both Jewish and Arab labour which accompanied it, many economic contacts were quickly resumed and new patterns of association called into being.¹³

All this is not to say that the concept of a Jewish economy does not have some meaning if properly defined in terms of its scope and in terms of the exact historical period under examination. But its use

should certainly not be allowed to give support to the assumption that it enjoyed a quite separate and independent existence or that economic relations between Jews and Arabs or Jews and the Palestine government can only be treated at the level of the two communities as a whole. To do this is to effect the surprising conjuring trick of causing the larger Palestinian economy – in which both Jewish and Arab activity was embedded – to disappear. And without such an analytical tool the historian is immediately deprived of any method of examining a huge variety of important topics, for example the differential impact of the government's policies on different sections within each community or of the development of certain activities such as citrus production in which both Arab and Jewish capital was heavily involved. Its absence also encourages the further continuation of a series of sterile debates like those concerning the rival benefits which Arabs and Jews might be said to have derived from government economic policies, debates to which there can be no satisfactory answer in economic terms alone.

The third frame of reference, that of a capitalist sector interacting with a pre-capitalist one (either directly or via the mediation of the state) provides a necessary, though only partial correction.¹⁴ It has the great virtue of directing attention towards the Palestinian economy as a whole and towards the major forces which were exerting an influence upon it. It also opens a way – little utilised as yet – of getting behind the all-pervasive national labels ('Jewish' industry, 'Arab' capital) to reach a better understanding of the dynamics involved in such central processes as the development of industry and the creation of a Palestinian working class. While it is true for example that the great majority of the larger industrial firms using the greatest amount of machinery and horsepower were in Jewish hands, some of the same conditions which encouraged Jewish entrepreneurship (the growth of the domestic market, the protection afforded by the government's tariff policies) must certainly have worked to encourage Arab enterprise as well, as can be seen from the fact that Arab-owned industry was certainly more developed in Palestine in 1945 than it was in a number of neighbouring Arab states with the exception of Egypt. Finally, as Graham-Brown's contribution to this volume shows, the notion of capitalist penetration of the countryside via the greater use of money and exchange, the creation of a market in land and labour and the introduction of certain contractual features into tenancy relationships is vital to an understanding of the forces promoting rural change.

Nevertheless, it is also well known that the simple dichotomy, capitalist/pre-capitalist has significant drawbacks when it comes to the analysis of the specific features of this process to be found in most countries of the non-European world. Some of these stem from difficulties involving the concepts themselves and their general lack of theoretical elaboration. But others relate specifically to Palestine itself. There are problems, for example, in identifying the expansion of Jewish settlement too closely with the logic of a dynamic capitalist sector. To a considerable extent the success of the Zionist project was heavily dependent on being able to subordinate normal considerations of profit and loss to the larger task of maintaining as many Jews as possible in Palestine at a standard of living high enough to encourage people of European origin to settle permanently. This led straight to attempts to enforce a Jewish-only labour policy on Jewish employers which, though not as immediately successful as some historians would obviously like to believe, led to a significant confrontation with industrialists and others wanting to profit from their ability to find Arabs willing to work for low wages.¹⁵ The same type of point could be made in connection with Graham-Brown's argument concerning the way in which Jewish concern with Jewish labour, and the government's willingness to allow Arab workers to be paid at lower rates than Jews, was one of the factors acting to inhibit the development of an Arab working class.

If the argument so far is correct it will have become clear that a large part of the difficulty involved in analysing the socio-economic transformation of Palestine stems, not surprisingly, from the employment of over simplistic or reductionist modes of explanation. By the same token what is needed is an ability to assign the right weight to aspects of each of the three types of approaches which have just been outlined. For reasons which have already been argued it would seem to me that the context within which the Palestinian economy developed after 1918 was one largely defined by its near colonial status and by its further incorporation within the world economic system. But that the way in which this process actually took place was greatly affected by the presence of a well-organised Jewish community with its own special national goals. The contributions of Graham-Brown to the political economy of one part of Palestine's hill region, the Jabal Nablus, and by Tamari on the relationship between class and faction in the organisation of Palestinian Arab society are both conceived within this general formula.

The events of 1948 represent a second occasion on which the

existing process of economic and social change was rudely interrupted by the creation of a new political order, both in the new Israel and in those parts of Palestine which now passed under Jordanian control. Although developments in the previous decade, 1939–48, have been almost entirely ignored by historians, Plascov is certainly right to suggest that by then, the dynamic sector of the Palestinian economy was located on the coast round Jaffa/Tel Aviv and Haifa/Acre. And thus that with the establishment of the Demarcation Line between Israel and Jordan in 1948/9 the villages of what was to be called the West Bank suffered a double loss: they were cut off from their access to markets and places of work along the Mediterranean and they were placed under the rule of a regime which was quite happy to see the Transjordanian towns of Amman and Kerak and elsewhere develop at the expense of such Palestinian towns as Ramallah, Nablus and East Jerusalem. That they also lost much of their agricultural lands and were forced to absorb large numbers of new immigrants from across the new border only made matters worse. The painful nature of this forced readjustment to new political circumstances is the main subject of Plascov's analysis. It was to be repeated, even more traumatically, after 1967.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For example, C.Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1966), pt.iv, ch.3. See also, R.Owen *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914* (London, 1981) chs.6, 10.
2. For references see S.Graham-Brown, 'The Political Economy of the Jabal Nablus, 1920–1948', p.171. Also, B.J.Smith, 'British Economic Policy in Palestine towards the Development of the Jewish National Home, 1920–1929', D.Phil. (Oxford, 1978) pp.224–6.
3. For example, Sir John Hope-Simpson, *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (London, 1930) pp.31ff.
4. Y. Firestone, 'Land Equalization and Factor Scarcities: Holding Size and the Burden of Impositions in Imperial Central Russia and the late Ottoman Levant', *Journal of Economic History*, XLI, 4 (December 1981) and his 'Faddan and Musha: Agricultural Holdings and the Burden of Impositions in Late Ottoman Palestine', mimeo of paper presented to Middle East Economic History Conference (Princeton University, 1974).
5. For example, A.Latron, *La vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, 1936) pp.14–18, 182–203 and J.Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient* (Paris, 1946).
6. For example, S.Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel*

- (London, 1978) chs.3–5; D.Giladi, 'The Agronomic Development of the Old Colonies in Palestine, 1882–1914', in M.Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975) pp.175–89.
7. Smith, 'British Economic Policy', pp.2–40.
 8. N.T.Gross and J.Metzer, *Public Finance in the Jewish Economy in Interwar Palestine* (The Marice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, Discussion Paper no.776, Jerusalem, July 1977) pp.81–6.
 9. For example, Y.N.Miller, 'Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The Impact of British Norms on Arab Community Life, 1920–1948', in J.S. Migdal (ed.), *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton, NJ, 1980) pp.124–45.
 10. D.Horowitz and M.Lissak, *Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine under the Mandate* (Chicago and London, 1978) pp.3–4, 34; Smith 'British Economic Policy', Conclusion.
 11. For example, Horowitz and Lissak, ch.2; R. Szereszewski, *Essays on the Structure of the Jewish Economy in Palestine and Israel* (Jerusalem, 1968), pp.1ff.
 12. *Ibid.*, p.1.
 13. For example, D.Horowitz, 'Arab Economy in Palestine', in J.B.Hobman (ed.), *Palestine's Economic Future* (London, 1946).
 14. For example, T.Asad, 'Class Transformation under the Mandate', *MERIP* (Washington) 53 (December 1976) pp.3–8.
 15. For the implications of the Jewish labour policy see Smith, 'British Economic Policy', pp.285ff. For the continued employment of Arabs by Jews see R.Taqqu, 'Peasants into Workmen: Internal Labour Migration and the Arab Village Community under the Mandate' in Migdal (ed.) *Palestinian Society*, Table 14, p.264.

1 European Penetration and the Economic Development of Palestine, 1856–82

ALEXANDER SCHÖLCH

INTRODUCTION

In order to satisfy the increased interest of the European public in the Holy Land, a special report on the products of Palestine to be found among the exhibits of the Ottoman Empire at the Vienna World Exhibition was published in 1873.¹ Three categories of products were described as being on view: agricultural goods, articles for the souvenir trade, and models of the holy places. Among the first category were wheat and barley, sesame and dura, pulse and tobacco, wine and oil. In the second category were a whole variety of articles of olivewood, mother of pearl, and glass manufactured in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron. The third category included a model of the holy city made of zinc, and wooden models of Christian, Jewish and Muslim holy places in and around Jerusalem.

On the one hand, these exhibits demonstrated the role of Palestine as a supplier of primary goods within the general movement of European economic penetration of the whole Ottoman Empire; on the other hand, they signified that Palestine, as the Holy Land, occupied a special position in this process. Without the holy places, European interest in Palestine as an economic and geographic entity would have been only marginal.

Thus, when we come to analyse the economic development of the country during the period of the accelerated European expansion

into the southern and eastern Mediterranean periphery from the end of the Crimean War up to the British occupation of Egypt and the beginnings of the first Jewish *Aliyah* into Palestine, we have to keep two factors equally in view: first, the economic aspect; second, the religious penetration, the peaceful crusade of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox Christians and the movement for the restoration of the Jews both in its Gentile and Jewish variants. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the majority of the most popular peaceful crusaders propagated more than purely religious and spiritual aims in their writings. Many were genuine representatives of the expansionist societies of their time, some even unconcealed, often militant, colonialists. If it had been up to them, Palestine would soon have been transformed into a conglomerate of European settler colonies. For these reasons, the religious penetration of Palestine was directly and indirectly connected with the domination of the country by the core metropolises of developing European capitalism.

In this study, I propose to examine how Palestine was affected by this development and what the results were in the fields of trade, agrarian production, land tenure, urban development, and the economies of the towns. The first part will concern the development of agricultural production and of the export and import trade which was carried on through the ports of Jaffa, Haifa and Acre. In addition, three other particular problems will be discussed. The first is the validity of the conventional wisdom of an economically stagnating, unproductive and neglected Palestine before 1882 (i.e. before the beginnings of foreign colonisation on a significant scale). Second, it will be necessary to examine the position of Palestine within the Syrian economy with particular regard to the deficit of Syria's balance of trade with Europe in the nineteenth century.² Did Palestine occupy a special position in this respect? Finally, the question of the effects of the economic development on land tenure has to be raised. The main sources for this first part of the study are the commercial reports of the English, German, Austrian and French Consuls in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre. Everybody working in the field of Middle East economic history in the nineteenth century will be aware of the inherent problems of this kind of material. Most of the data can only be regarded as estimates, whether they were compiled by the Consuls themselves, in the local customs houses, or by European merchants. Moreover, there exist considerable discrepancies among the statistical tables of the various consulates as their calculations were not always based on the same criteria.³

Though these quantitative data cannot be regarded as exact, it is possible to use them to indicate some of the trends and some of the characteristics of Palestine's economic development.

In the second part, the development of the Palestinian towns and of urban production during the period of accelerated European penetration will be traced. It should be noted, however, that we should not expect any dramatic transformations of the urban economy. If we leave aside the production of soap and some specialised branches of manufacturing, there was no flourishing local industry in Palestine which could have been endangered, forced to restructure, or wiped out by European mass production. Nevertheless, we have to look out for possible external stimuli or structural changes. A survey of urban production during this period will also be important for an analysis of the later development of the Palestinian economy.

As in the first case, the second part is based almost exclusively on European sources: on consular archives and on the extensive writings of contemporary 'Palestine explorers' of various kinds. Unfortunately, local Arab historiography offers us only very little information on our present topic and period. The same holds true for Dabbag's monumental encyclopaedia *Biladuna Filastin* and for the Ottoman provincial *salnames*. So there is no reason to feel contempt for the socio-economic surveys of the European 'men on the spot', some of which were astonishingly detailed.

TRADE AND AGRICULTURE

Export-orientation of agricultural production

During the period we are concerned with Palestine produced a relatively large agricultural surplus which was marketed in neighbouring countries, such as Egypt or Lebanon, or, increasingly, exported to Europe. The agents of transmission for European demand and for adjusting production to the requirements of the European market after 1850 were the European consular agents (the majority of whom were themselves merchants, entrepreneurs, land-owners and even tax-farmers), the representatives of European commercial houses in the ports, and their partners and middlemen inland.

The produce of southern Palestine was mainly exported through

Jaffa, that of the northern part of the country through Haifa and Acre. With regard to the Jabal Nablus, it is difficult to ascertain how much of its produce destined for export went to Jaffa and how much to Haifa. Furthermore, Acre was the main port for that part of the Hauran grain which was not consumed within Syria.

Jaffa's main export commodities through the period 1856–82 were (in a changing order of priority which will be explained): wheat, barley and dura; sesame; olive oil and soap; oranges, other fruits and vegetables.⁴ The main buyers were France, which took the largest share of the sesame and a considerable part of the olive oil, grain and, for a time, cotton; Egypt, which imported most of the soap as well as olive oil, fruits and vegetables; and England, which took nearly all of the dura and a considerable share of the wheat and barley. Grain, fruits, vegetables and soap were also shipped to northern Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, Italy and Malta.

The most important export commodities of Haifa and Acre were wheat, barley, dura, sesame and olive oil. Wheat went to Italy (for the pasta), France, England and Greece, and also to Lebanon and Asia Minor; barley was sent to Lebanon, and also to England and France; dura mainly to England and France; sesame nearly exclusively to France, olive oil to Egypt, France and Asia Minor.⁵ In some years cotton was exported to France. The greater part of the wheat shipped from Acre came from the Hauran, for example in 1876 1 000 000 out of 1 500 000 *kiles*, in 1879 about 1 000 000 out of 1 750 000 *kiles*, in 1881 (because of the crop failure in the Hauran) only 10 000 out of 250 000 *kiles* (1 *kile* equalled approximately 36 litres). We may thus presume that about two-thirds of the wheat exported in Acre originated from the Hauran and one-third from northern Palestine, that is from the districts of Acre, Nazareth and Tiberias.

Table 1.2 (at the end of the chapter) gives an impression of the relative importance of the three ports for the export of the main commodities. The figures, however, do not allow an exact comparison, as Jaffa's nine-year export period is not identical with that of Haifa and Acre.

During the years 1856–82, the main export products of Palestine remained unchanged. The short-term fluctuations and the long-term shifts of importance within the lists of export goods can be seen in Tables 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 (at the end of the chapter). Three factors caused these fluctuations and shifts:

1. natural conditions, above all crop failures because of insufficient rainfall or plagues of locusts;⁶
2. market conditions, above all changing demand and, as a result a rise or decline in prices;
3. political conditions, such as wars and disturbances in the region itself, in Europe, and in America, with which market conditions were, of course, directly connected.

The stimuli from external markets will be illustrated by the example of cotton-growing. After that the export fluctuations in Acre and Haifa and in Jaffa will be explained.

Northern and central Palestine (the district of Acre and the Jabal Nablus) were traditionally among the most important cotton-growing districts of Syria. Nearly all of the cotton which was not processed locally or marketed in central Syria, notably in Damascus, was exported to France. From 1852, however, French demand for sesame (for oil extraction) increased strongly. Agricultural production was therefore concentrated on this commodity. It was easy to convince the peasants to do so as the growing of sesame required much less labour than that of cotton and as the sesame seed was less dependent on the weather. Furthermore, after the outbreak of the Crimean War and the suspension of the grain supply from South Russia, there was suddenly a great demand for wheat and barley.⁷ Thus the export of cotton was brought to a standstill (see Tables 1.7 and 1.8 at the end of the chapter).

A new reorientation took place, however, when the price of raw cotton rose towards the end of the 1850s – because of higher English demand, and then again after the outbreak of the American Civil War. As a result, in the spring of 1863, agriculturalists in northern Palestine sowed three times the amount of cotton they had grown in the preceding year. Even the remote and swampy corner round Lake Hula was affected by the boom. According to Tristram, Damascene Jews invested capital in cotton-growing in this area.⁸ Thus, in 1863 and 1864, cotton regained its position as an important export commodity. This boom was short-lived, however: European demand subsided in the second part of the 1860s, while from 1865 to 1872 one bad harvest followed another in northern Palestine. Only in 1869 was a considerable quantity of cotton exported once again.⁹ But in the 1870s the product lost its importance for good. Whereas in some good years in the 1860s 1 000 000 *okes* were exported from northern Palestine, in 1871 only 184 545 *okes* were exported (one *oke* was

equivalent to 1.28 kg).¹⁰ A year later, the German Consul-General estimated Acre's cotton exports at 100 000 *okes*.¹¹ In 1876, the figure was a mere 32 489 *okes*.¹²

A similar development took place in the district of Jaffa. French demand for sesame, the rise of grain prices during the Crimean War, and the beginnings of a regular export of oranges in the late 1850s, had brought cotton-growing to a standstill there as well. Instead, orange groves were expanded in the area surrounding the town, while grain and sesame was grown in the hinterland. In an attempt to reverse this trend, the Cotton Supply Association of Manchester and British consular agents on the spot (Finn in Jerusalem and Kayat in Jaffa) tried to stimulate a revival of cotton-growing. Egyptian and American seed was sown on a trial basis in various parts of southern Palestine with excellent results. But only the high prices of the American Civil War were able to revive cotton-growing and export on a large scale. In 1863 the area sown with cotton in southern Palestine was four times as large as in 1862, and this in spite of the fact that none of the seed which the Ottoman authorities are alleged to have ordered to be distributed actually reached the area.¹³ Consul Kayat reported that seven villages in the district of Jaffa had reserved two-thirds of their arable land, on which they had formerly mainly grown sesame, for cotton. As a result exports increased by nearly ten times over the preceding year and some merchants had to import gins as the less sophisticated local machines could not cope with these quantities. In 1864 there was hardly any village in the district which did not sow cotton on a considerable part of its land, and there was a further six-fold increase in production. Even the Bedouin took part in this profitable undertaking. The reversal set in with the collapse of prices in the autumn of 1864 (they fell by more than 100 per cent), with the end of the American Civil War, and with a plague of locusts in 1865 and 1866.¹⁴ The export of cotton came to an end at the beginning of the 1870s (see Table 1.3 at the end of the chapter). Only in the district of Nablus was cotton-growing continued for a short period and then only for the local and Syrian markets. During the period 1866–74, the annual harvest was estimated at 600 000–700 000 *okes*, but in this district too cotton was then given up as unprofitable. As British consuls had long pointed out, the Ottoman government made no serious effort to promote its production.¹⁵

For the rest, the conspicuous fluctuations in the quantities exported from Acre and Haifa during the nine years 1872–80 (Tables 1.5 and 1.6) have to be explained by natural and political conditions. 1873

was a year of generally bad harvests. The 1876 crop was characterised as average but exports dropped off because of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. In 1877 a meagre harvest, especially in the Hauran, made matters worse. In 1878, on the other hand, the Hauran experienced an excellent wheat harvest, but there was only a minor one in northern Palestine and the summer crops (*dura* and sesame) were destroyed by locusts. In 1879 the harvest was extremely bad because of insufficient rain. In 1880 yields were very good in northern Palestine (except for olives), but there was a complete crop failure in the Hauran. It is therefore not at all surprising that the years 1877–9 were regarded as the worst in living memory, with recruitment for military service exaggerating an already precarious economic situation.

An examination of the exports of Jaffa is even more revealing (Table 1.3). Here we have relatively coherent figures for the first and third parts of the period under consideration, all derived from the same source and compiled according to homogeneous criteria. We are thus able to make comparisons and to look for trends.

To begin with, conditions similar to those in northern Palestine affected the export of various commodities. Because of lack of rain hardly any grain could be harvested in southern Palestine in 1859 and 1860. Later, in 1865 and 1866, cotton and sesame were destroyed by locusts and considerable damage was done to olive and fruit trees. Only the grain crop was spared, having been either too ripe or already harvested by the time the insects arrived.¹⁶ From 1877–9 the same natural and political conditions that prevailed in the north caused hardship and misery to the inhabitants of southern Palestine as well, even forcing the import of grain and flour. The considerable fluctuations in the export of olive oil and soap also had a natural cause: apart from droughts and plagues of locusts, there was only a good or excellent olive crop every second or third year, while the yield in other years was usually mediocre or extremely bad.¹⁷ According to contemporary estimates, an average of about half of the extracted oil was used for soap-making,¹⁸ one-quarter for eating and lighting, and one-quarter exported.¹⁹

Table 1.4 lists the three most important exported goods which together provided between 62 per cent and 95 per cent of total exports in terms of value. It also shows that the nature of agricultural production (which was more diversified in the south than in the north) made it possible to neutralise to some extent the effects of a bad or mediocre harvest of one product by the good or excellent yield of another. Only in 1859 and 1877 were there total failures of all crops.

The long-term change in the export structure, which is recognisable in Table 1.9, stemmed from changes in external markets and in the socio-political situation of Palestine itself. The table shows the quantitative increase in the export of southern Palestine's main commodities from the first to the third part of the period under examination. The overall increase in exports (shown in Table 1.10 in value terms) was not caused primarily by an intensification of agriculture, by improved methods of production, by the development of an agrarian infrastructure, or even by changes in the mix of crops produced. Undoubtedly the main factor was the extension of the area under cultivation, including the creation of sizeable new olive and orange plantations.²⁰ This was made possible by the prevention of Bedouin incursions and the suppression of feuds in the *jabals* (in which the cutting down of olive trees had been a much used method of warfare) as well as by the increasing sales prospects for Palestinian products on external markets.

The increase in the production of wheat, sesame, olive oil and soap can be explained by the growing demand for these commodities in France, Egypt and elsewhere. After the Egyptian cattle plague of 1863 livestock became an important export commodity from Palestine especially in the years 1864, 1873 and 1877, producing large profits for the Bedouin among others. The extraordinary increase in the export of wool, which constituted a significant export commodity during the last third of our period, also points to a growing participation of the Bedouin in the export-oriented economic activities of Palestine.²¹

Finally, some remarks on the Jaffa orange have to be made. Regular export began after the Crimean War, mainly organised by the Greek coastal shippers. In 1856 the average annual yield was already put at 20 000 000 oranges.²² Two decades later, in 1873, there were 420 orange groves in the vicinity of Jaffa, yielding 33 300 000 oranges annually. One-sixth of them were consumed in Palestine, the rest were shipped to Egypt and Asia Minor on Greek ships.²³ From 1875, Jaffa oranges were also exported to Europe (Russia, Austria, Germany and France) on a significant scale. This long-range trade increased markedly when the oranges were packed more carefully and exported in boxes. For shipping to Europe only the egg-shaped and thick-skinned *shamutis* were suitable, leaving the round and smaller *baladis* to be sold on the local and regional markets. The volume of the 1880 harvest was 36 000 000 oranges.²⁴ And in his report for the year 1881, the British Consular-Agent remarked that

orange gardens were now regarded as the best form of capital investment where annual net returns of 10 per cent on invested capital could be expected.²⁵

The Value of Exports and Profits

If we examine the increase in the *value* of Jaffa's exports (Table 1.10 at the end of the chapter) we find that in the third part of the period 1856–82 the value of goods had doubled as compared with the first. This was helped in part by the reduction of the general export duty from 12 per cent to 8 per cent *ad valorem* in 1861. This rate was then lowered by 1 per cent annually until 1869 when it remained at just 1 per cent.

The general trend in prices is shown in Tables 1.11 and 1.12 (at the end of the chapter). These fluctuated according to actual market conditions. But taken overall, the average level of export prices showed little significant movement between the years 1856–63 and 1873–82 (see Table 1.12). Meanwhile, what difference existed in the prices shown for Acre, Haifa and Jaffa (see Table 1.13) was due mainly to differences in quality and transport costs. These findings are corroborated in Table 1.14 which points to a uniform level in the overall cost of living in Jerusalem. The figures for this table come from two years, 1858 and 1880, which can be compared without hesitation as their general socio-political and economic background was more or less the same: both were years following a war and in both there was no crop failure.

The growing prosperity of Palestine was undeniable, but only a small part of the profits from trade accrued to the immediate producers, i.e. the peasants. Some of it went straight to merchants, middlemen, big landowners and tax-farmers who had invested capital in trade and agriculture. But undoubtedly the largest share was taken by the Treasury as the fiscal administration continually devised new ways of siphoning off the agricultural surplus by increases in taxes, special imposts, and monetary and other financial manipulations, offering little of general benefit in return.

Nevertheless, during the grain boom of the 1850s and the cotton boom of the 1860s some peasant profit was observed. As Consul Finn reported in 1856, increased exports meant that:

coin is poured in from abroad for payment. An Ionian merchant of Caiffa (Haifa) (Avicrino, the Vice Consul for Russia and Greece)

assures me that last year no less a sum than half a million Sterling passed through his hands between the ships of that Port and the Bedaween of the Hauran, who have on their side imported no merchandise. It is the same with the peasantry of the villages, they export grain, they greedily grasp the coin in return, and then hide it in the ground often dying without revelation of their secret.²⁶

Two years later he reported:

Of late an export trade of grain from this country to Europe has been opened up, from which the peasantry notwithstanding the losses sustained by extortion of their own Shaikhs, and of the tax-farmers, have accumulated an unprecedented degree of wealth – but they bury the coin in holes, they purchase arms, and they decorate their women.²⁷

During the short-lived cotton boom, Consul Kayat observed that the peasants who profited from it bought English goods, and that their women put on gold and silver coins.²⁸ The growing prosperity of Palestinian districts and towns, not only of Jerusalem and Haifa, was stressed repeatedly. Thus, in his commercial report on the Syrian coast for the year 1880, the British Vice-Consul in Beirut felt bound to say: ‘Of the outlying districts I may remark that the state of Jaffa seems the most satisfactory.’²⁹

Imports and the Balance of Trade

With her agricultural surplus, Palestine contributed to the supply of neighbouring countries, especially Egypt, Lebanon and the west coast of Asia Minor. By the same token, she made a contribution towards equilibrating the overall balance of Syrian trade. The excess of exports over imports in the trade of Palestine (i.e. the trade through the ports of Acre, Haifa and Jaffa) was the most remarkable aspect of the economic situation in the eyes of the European Consuls at the time. This disproportion was the more astonishing as an increasing volume of imports was required to satisfy the needs of those Europeans and European institutions established in the country who, with the possible exception of the Templars, contributed little to the rise in exports. Nevertheless, if indirect imports to Palestine are added to the total the surplus begins to look very much smaller. Hardly any goods were supplied directly from Europe through Acre

and Haifa until the second half of the 1870s. In these ports the larger Arab merchants and the representatives of French, Italian and Greek mercantile houses mainly concerned themselves with the organisation of goods for export. Many Greek and Italian firms even carried on their trade without local agents, using instead captains of merchant vessels as their buyers. Against this, imports from Europe were obtained nearly exclusively by small local merchants from larger firms up the coast in Beirut. These were transported over land in small quantities. In the 1870s, for example, there was only one hardware store in Haifa, run by German colonists, dealing with Europe direct. And when in 1878 other German merchants established themselves in the town, they were quick to deplore the absence of a direct shipping connection with Germany.

The main (indirect) imports into northern Palestine were: rice from Italy and Egypt, sugar from France, coffee from South America and from Arabia, cotton manufactures from England and Switzerland, cloth from Switzerland and Germany, hardware from Germany, England, Austria and France, and timber from Asia Minor. But in spite of this variety, as all the Consuls were agreed, the total value of indirect, and the small amount of direct, imports did not remotely come near to the value of exports.

In Jaffa, to the south, even the British Consuls, who wrote the most elaborate trade reports of all, did not compile import statistics before 1874 on the grounds that in most cases the incoming cargoes had already cleared customs in Beirut or Alexandria. In these cases, the ships could be unloaded after presentation of the customs permit (*refdiyye*) without further formalities and the goods transported to the interior. It follows that Palestine's imports mostly appeared in the Ottoman customs registers for Beirut.

The most valuable of Jaffa's import goods for the years 1874–82 have been listed in Table 1.15. It should be noted, however, that there are considerable discrepancies between the various consular reports for the years 1879–82 which probably have to be explained in terms of the different ways they treated indirect imports.

Jaffa's main imports were: rice from Egypt, Italy, France and India, sugar from France, Egypt, Austria and England, coffee from South America and Arabia, cotton manufactures (mainly) from England, timber from Asia Minor and the Balkans, wine from Cyprus and France, petroleum from America, and coal from England. Luxury goods, silk cloth, hardware and household articles, glass, paper and spirits came from various European countries –

France, England, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy and Greece.

There was no change in the structure of what was imported into Jaffa during the period 1856–82. What did change was the increased significance attached to the import of petroleum and of so-called luxury goods. Among the latter were watches and clocks, porcelain, perfume, jewellery and other ‘fancy goods’, mostly destined for Palestine’s European residents. But their import also points to the increasing wealth and changing tastes of the local middle and upper classes which began to imitate the Europeans with regard to dress and footwear, luxury food and furniture. In the same way, European merchants and artisans settled in Palestine not only catered to the needs of their fellow foreigners but also to those of well-to-do Palestinians.³⁰

Land Tenure

The profitability of export-oriented agricultural production and the possibility of extending the cultivated area as a result of the greater rural security after the Crimean War, resulted in a new evaluation of individual landed property, both on the part of the central government and on that of the dominant social groups in Palestine. A legal framework which was intended to constitute and to guarantee individual rights of disposal over land was established with three waves of laws in the late 1850s, the late 1860s and the mid 1870s, to some extent under European pressure. Of these laws, the best known are the Land Law of 1858 and the Law of 1867 granting foreigners the right to own landed property in the Ottoman Empire. It has to be stressed, however, that the law of 1858 did not change the legal basis of ownership, rather it codified existing conditions in a comprehensive way. Its aim was to establish a clear basis for the realisation of one of the central government’s principal objectives: the fiscal *mise en valeur* of the land, especially of *miri* land. To this end the Porte strove for the individual registration of all possessory titles, the extension of the right of inheritance, and the break-up of all forms of communal ownership (especially the *mushaa* system). A number of laws and regulations concerning cadastral registration and the issue of title deeds followed. Finally in 1874 and 1876, it was decreed that new title deeds had also to be obtained for *mulk* and *waqf* property.³¹

Through these measures, the central government hoped for both direct and indirect fiscal profit. Directly, tax yields could be expected to rise in three ways: from fees for the issue of documents, from the

disposal of state land, and from the fact that the fiscal administration could now hold each individual bearer of title deeds liable for the required tax. Indirectly, secure and transferable title deeds would increase production and thus tax returns.

We know that in Palestine the result of these laws was not the wide dissemination of title deeds to those peasants who actually cultivated the *miri* land. Instead much of this land was registered in the names of members of dominant social groups, thus creating large landed properties. The reasons for this have often been described: the peasants' inability to secure the documents for themselves, their fear of unhappy consequences with regard to recruitment and fiscal demands, and their desire to be protected by powerful men from arbitrary oppression at the hands of tax-farmers, tax officials, soldiers and money-lenders.³² Nevertheless, in spite of the emergence of large landed properties, the *mushaa* system was not eliminated and probably even spread with the extension of the cultivated area in the coastal and inland plains. If *de jure* the land remained *miri* to a very large extent, *de facto* its control by the rich and powerful meant that it approximated very closely to *mulk*.

In our present context, we are especially interested in one particular aspect of this process: the first signs of a commercialisation of landed property and of capitalist penetration into agricultural production. Even if absolute property rights were still lacking, land could now be acquired by purchase on a large scale. On the one hand, land regarded as uncultivated was offered for sale by the government. On the other, indebted peasants or whole villages were ready to accept new owners who redeemed their debts, paid their tax arrears, and took the burden of fiscal responsibility off their shoulders.

In the late 1860s and early 1870s land which was not permanently cultivated was offered to the public all over Palestine, but especially in the North.³³ Interested buyers were provided with information about land on offer. In 1874, for example, Montefiore published a list of twelve plots near the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem, more than 25000 *dunums*, which the government wished to dispose of (1 *dunum* equalled roughly a quarter of an acre).³⁴ In the late 1870s, the extreme distress of the peasants caused by the Russo-Turkish war and by bad harvests produced a wave of sales of another kind, from which money-lenders and merchants were able to profit.³⁵

This brings us to the question of who was able to appropriate the land. We can distinguish three main groups. The first consisted of notable families who became medium and large landowners by the

simple process of registering local land in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations. Thus heads of dominant clans in the *jabals* and urban *effendis* obtained the title deeds to properties in and around the mountains as well as in the environs of coastal towns where agriculture was already intensively practised. We also hear that the Abd al-Hadis had used their land to practise horticulture after the example of the Templars at the foot of the hill between 'Arraba and Jenin.³⁶

The second group was formed by members of the new, and slowly emerging, commercial bourgeoisie of the coastal towns and of Jerusalem, consisting mainly of local and Lebanese Christians, of Jews, and of Europeans and European protégés. From 1867 in particular, they acquired plots in the vicinity of the towns and large stretches of land in the coastal and inland plains, either by direct purchase or as a result of peasant indebtedness. A number of examples could be cited: one file in the German consular archives contains documents on two dozen cases of property transfer around Jerusalem during the years 1872 and 1873 in which German merchants and bankers as well as Jewish protégés were mainly involved.³⁷ Loehnis lists a number of other Jerusalem businessmen who had invested capital in landed property.³⁸ An English consular report names two merchants from Acre who had acquired land near Tiberias.³⁹ According to Conder, the coastal plain around Jaffa was bought up by Jewish, Greek and Maronite 'capitalists'.⁴⁰ The Marj Ibn 'Amir will be discussed later. In short, by the end of the 1870s, merchant and banking capital had already begun to penetrate into the Palestinian countryside.

The third group interested in land acquisition consisted of foreign colonists, above all the Templars and the Jews. The Templar colonies are discussed briefly below. Jewish colonisation only became important after 1882 and need not be considered in the present chapter.

One consequence of these developments should be noted: the rise in the price of land not just in the towns and their environs but throughout the country. It is true that, except for plots in and around the towns, land could still be bought cheaply – sometimes for a pittance in the eyes of Europeans – until the early 1880s. Nevertheless, the rise in price is a reflection of the increased value of this new commodity.⁴¹

We have already spoken of the amassing of title deeds by large landed proprietors. At the beginning of the twentieth century it was estimated that only 20 per cent of the land in Galilee and 50 per cent

in Judea was in the hands of the peasants.⁴² Figures are available which indicate the situation towards the end of the period of Ottoman rule. According to official data for 1909, 16 910 families worked 785 000 dunums in the *sanjaks* of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, or an average of 46 dunums each. A register from the second decade of this century listed 144 large landed proprietors in Palestine owning 3 130 000 dunums, or an average of 22 000 dunums each.⁴³ But for the period we are concerned with, no such figures exist. The best that can be done is to deal in detail with two large landowners who came to prominence in the 1870s.

In 1869, the Ottoman government sold the land of 17 villages in the Marj Ibn 'Amir, including Nazareth, to the Beirut businessmen Habib Bustros, Niqula Sursuq, Tuwaini and Farah. Later, by taking over the Bustros share, Sursuq secured the greater part of this land for himself. The Nazarenes, who in 1868 had already protested against the Templar settlement near Sammuniya vehemently resisted this sale.⁴⁴ Thus, in 1870, part of their land was returned to them and the Beirut merchants indemnified accordingly. We suppose that the leaders of this protest were members of that 'respected class of big landowners and grain merchants' of the town who we shall come across again (see Table 1.21 at the end of the chapter). Two years later, in 1872, the Porte sold the land of a further five villages in the same area. The biggest share was again secured by Sursuq, the rest by Salim al-Khuri.⁴⁵ This was the beginning of the Sursuq involvement in Palestine which is our first case.⁴⁶

The Sursuq brothers, Greek Christians from Beirut, owned one of the biggest local firms in Syria. They were bankers, proprietors of a modern, steam-powered silk factory, and owners of an important mercantile house involved in, among other things, the export of grain, wool and cotton from Syria.⁴⁷ Their land near Nazareth and in the Marj Ibn 'Amir is said to have amounted to 230 000 dunums and to have been acquired for £20 000.⁴⁸ Due to the large profits which they drew from it, this capital was quickly amortised. They recruited peasants from other districts, equipped them with the necessary implements, engaged local managers and agents, and took over the tax-farm of the area. The bulk of the peasants worked the land as tenants, while the Sursuqs faced them not only as landowners, tax-farmers and money-lenders, but also as 'protectors'. In 1872, Conder complained that the local authorities did not dare to take action against some peasants who had attacked members of the Palestine Exploration Fund survey party on Sursuq land because the officials

were afraid of this powerful family.⁴⁹

The Sursuqs also took other steps towards a *mise en valeur* of their land. As early as 1871 they instructed the German architect Schumacher to survey the terrain, as they intended to have a road built to Haifa.⁵⁰ Nothing seems to have resulted from this, however, as the Templars later claimed to have built the road from Haifa to Nazareth largely at their own expense. In 1882, the Sursuqs acquired the concession for the construction of a railway from Acre via Haifa to Damascus which was to cross their 'territory', although they were unable to raise the necessary capital in England before the concession expired.⁵¹ Nevertheless, during the years we are investigating, the Sursuq enterprise was extremely profitable, and it certainly changed the face of the Marj Ibn 'Amir.⁵²

Our second case is that of the Jewish banker, merchant, factory owner, and landed proprietor Bergheim, a German protégé in Jerusalem. The Bergheims had established the first real bank in the Holy City, acting for the Imperial Ottoman and for some London banks. In addition, in the late 1840s, they had started to acquire land near Jaffa and around Jerusalem. They also owned a soap factory in Ramle. In 1877, the German Consul estimated their capital at 400 000 Marks, half of which they had invested in the estate of Abu Shusha south-east of Ramle.⁵³ This estate is said to have comprised 5000 acres. Melville Bergheim was able to acquire it in 1872 for the amount of the tax arrears owed by the inhabitants of Abu Shusha village, i.e. for PT 46 000 (PT = Tariff Piastres). Fifty-one peasants were involved in this transaction and 153 title deeds passed over into the hands of Bergheim. The peasants remained on the land as tenants, continuing to work it according to the *mushaa* system. It was thus not parcelled out into permanent individual plots. Nevertheless, the Bergheims themselves managed their estate directly. They erected new farm buildings and a pump, and improved methods of cultivation. Their enterprise was described as economically successful and highly profitable.⁵⁴

But the Bergheims did have to struggle against difficulties of another sort. As they were not an influential local family, their new property remained in precarious state from both a political and a legal point of view until the First World War. This meant that they had constantly to defend it on two sides: against attacks from members of the local upper class and against the peasants of Abu Shusha. The long series of judicial disputes (which need not be summed up here) began, it is said, when the Bergheims refused to

pay the considerable *bakshish* which the land registrar (Umar Effendi al-Husaini) demanded in the context of the original registration. The dispute with the peasants started as soon as they realised that they were in danger of becoming mere agricultural labourers of a European landlord. A climax was reached when Peter Bergheim was murdered by some inhabitants of Abu Shusha in 1884.⁵⁵

We should regard these disputes as early protests against European settlement. Apart from the difficulties of the Templars, another example would be the vehement protests of the peasants of the village of Yazur, south-east of Jaffa, part of whose land had been made over to the founders of the agricultural school of Mikveh Israel in 1870.⁵⁶ From its inception, foreign colonisation contained the seeds of future conflict.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN ECONOMIES

While we were able to show general trends in agricultural production by way of export statistics we lack similar sources for urban production, which was oriented mainly towards local and Middle Eastern markets. Only some local and fragmentary quantitative data are at our disposal. But we are confident that the general conclusions we hope to arrive at will be regarded as well documented.

As far as our material allows, we will now examine the building development, the occupational structure, the production, and the role in local and regional trade of those eleven towns which appear in contemporary sources as the principal centres of urban life. In order to evade the difficult problem of demographic data which would otherwise have to be discussed on a case by case basis, we would like simply to borrow Ben-Arieh's statistics (Table 1.1) for twelve Palestinian towns, though his periodisation is slightly different from ours. We shall deal with all the places listed in it with the exception of Ramle.

We shall make a preliminary effort at classification, in the light of our question as to the effects of European penetration. Accordingly, we will first deal with those places whose face changed most immediately under foreign influence: Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth – with their Christian holy places, and the ports of Jaffa and Haifa, which developed rapidly as a result of rising exports and of the 'peaceful crusade'. We next turn to the towns of Acre, Safad and Tiberias in the north, which were on the periphery of this develop-

ment. In the case of Acre we have to ask how the downward trend in population shown in Table 1.1 can be reconciled with the fact that during our period the town remained the most important export centre for the Hauran grain. Nablus, Hebron and Gaza – centres of population, trade and local production – form our third group. As in the case of Acre, these three towns were exposed to European influence, but they were not affected by it to the same degree as the towns of our first category. Nevertheless, unlike the places in our second group, a clear upward trend in their development can be observed. It seems appropriate that we begin our survey with Jerusalem.

Jerusalem

During the decades we are examining, Jerusalem was not an important centre of commerce or production within the Palestinian economy. The city lived mainly off and for the Muslim, Jewish and Christian holy places, for the institutions which existed or were established for their sake, and from the pilgrims and travellers who visited them. The stream of pilgrims, tourists, ‘Palestine explorers’, and, finally, colonists increased continuously from the end of the Crimean War. Denominational associations which were founded in many European countries organised pilgrimages under clerical guidance – from Marseilles since 1853, from Trieste since 1855.⁵⁷ From the 1870s onwards, travel agents took care of those who either did not want to journey on their own or as members of the ‘peaceful crusade’. As the pilgrims were accommodated almost exclusively in monasteries and hospices owned by religious institutions which kept an account of their services, we have exact figures for some years and some institutions. While in 1845 about 5000 pilgrims visited the Holy Land, in February 1858 the number had reached 9854 and in March of the same year there were 13 475 pilgrims.⁵⁸ During the ten years from 1850–9 the Franciscans registered 55 763 pilgrims (1850: 3611, 1859: 7116) and 229 346 overnight travellers in their Palestinian hostels.⁵⁹ During the 1870s, Jerusalem had to cope with an average of 10 000 to 20 000 pilgrims a year during the pilgrimage seasons.⁶⁰

It should not be supposed, however, that the pilgrims constituted an important economic asset, to be compared with present-day tourists. The great majority of them were Eastern European and Near-Eastern Christians, while the largest single contingent was formed by Russian pilgrims who were anything but prosperous.⁶¹

Only in one year, 1882, was the French troop of pilgrims made up of more than 1000 persons, half of them approaching the Holy City from Haifa, the other half from Jaffa – both in the footsteps of the crusaders.⁶² These pilgrimages were a manifestation of the ‘peaceful crusade’, of the ‘taking possession’ of the Holy City by Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christians. But the real ‘taking possession’ was the work of those Jews who, from the early 1870s, had come to Jerusalem to stay.

As to the number of Europeans who settled in Palestine after the Crimean War, without becoming subject to the Sultan – in addition to the monks and nuns, missionaries, merchants and consular staff already there – we have to make do with some general estimates. *La Terre Sainte* spoke of 40 000, later of 30 000, such persons during the two decades from the mid-1850s to the mid-1870s.⁶³ According to Neumann, 5000 foreigners and foreign protégés, many of them Jews, were living in Jerusalem in the second half of the 1870s.⁶⁴

Together with the non-Palestinian Ottoman subjects (Greeks, Jews, Lebanese, Armenians, etc.) who also settled in Palestine, the Europeans and their protégés formed a group which played an important role in the banking and credit system, in the import and export trade, as tax-farmers and house agents, and finally as landowners. They transformed the city, influencing the urban economy through their building activities, through the great number of workshops and service trades they established, and through the imports from Europe which they induced.

The development of the city of Jerusalem after the Crimean War, and especially of the European building activities, has only recently been described and analysed.⁶⁵ Here we only want to point to the enormous boom experienced by the building industry as a result of the erection of a multitude of monuments of stone. In the middle of the nineteenth century the city wall constituted the boundary of Jerusalem. Within this area there were still mounds of rubbish and empty, half-ruined houses and plots of cultivated land. English and German Protestants erected the first European buildings within the wall in the 1840s, notably Christ Church which was consecrated in 1849. Then, during the Crimean War, the first new houses appeared in the immediate vicinity of the city. But the real boom set in after the war. During the following ten years, 24 building projects inside and outside the wall were completed, among them the Russian complex of buildings on the *maidan*, the former parade ground of the Ottoman garrison west of the city. As Wolff wrote irreverently, this

complex, with dimensions hitherto unknown in Jerusalem, ‘from a distance appears to the stranger like a large central [railway] station’.⁶⁶

The erection, rebuilding and extension of churches, monasteries, hospices, schools, hospitals, hotels and consulates continued without interruption through our period. From the late 1860s, new residential buildings were erected within the city or extra stories added to existing structures, while Jewish residential ‘colonies’ sprang up outside the wall. In the 1870s, several Jewish building societies were founded which erected blocks or serial houses – uniform and ‘barrack-like’ as some contemporaries felt – in order to provide homes for Jewish immigrants.⁶⁷

This building boom had an important economic effect on Jerusalem and the surrounding villages. The necessary funds came mainly from Europe, providing wages and profits from the sale of building materials to the local population. Lime-burners and quarrymen experienced permanent boom conditions. Long lines of camels approaching Jerusalem with heavy loads of lime and stones, grain and wood, were a daily spectacle.⁶⁸ Masons and stone-cutters had first to be recruited from outside Palestine, for example from Malta when Christ Church was being erected. But when the building boom began in earnest in the early 1860s, the demand for skilled labour could be met locally,⁶⁹ though not from Jerusalem itself. It was in Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Nazareth above all that an occupational specialisation took place, in order to profit from this boom. Skilled construction workers earned very good wages (for example, Table 1.16 at the end of the chapter shows the daily wages paid on an Austrian building site in the early 1860s). Bethlehemites were at the forefront of those who built the new Jerusalem. At the beginning of the 1890s, 30 masons, 250 stone-cutters, 50 quarrymen, 6 plasterers and 40 cameliers (organising, among other things, the transport of lime and stone) were counted among the 792 artisans, traders and ‘entrepreneurs’ of Bethlehem. Thus, about half of the town’s labour force worked in the building industry (see Table 1.20). But in Jerusalem itself, in the late 1870s, there were only 8 stone-cutters, 2 masons, 2 indigenous and 2 European architects, as well as 7 Jewish building contractors (see Table 1.17).

Timber⁷⁰ (see Table 1.15) and tiles⁷¹ had to be imported. Once the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem had been reconstructed by the end of the 1870s, making it possible to transport building materials without difficulty on carts, a new Europeanised method of building could be

introduced. From 1880, the walls of the new buildings erected outside the city became less massive: the rooms had board floors and a covering of wooden beams, or, later of iron girders and stone slabs; while the roof frames were covered with tiles.⁷² Towards the west and north-west a new town built in the 'European' style began to emerge side by side with the Oriental city of Jerusalem. One result was that the old wall became obsolete; from the early 1870s the gates remained open during the night and they were no longer closed during the noon-time Muslim prayers on Friday.

Jerusalem was thus a lively and rapidly changing city, but it was still not an economically active place. Neither with regard to the production nor to the distribution of goods was it of great importance in the wider Palestinian market. The main economic influences of the city were rather in terms of its demand for goods from outside and of its supply of a great number of services. This is shown in Table 1.17 which was compiled from the detailed, but unsystematic, information about the occupational structure of the population of Jerusalem in 1877 given by Luncz. It should be noted that these figures are probably only reliable and complete with respect to the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem.⁷³ In the case of Muslims and Christians, they show obvious gaps in the spheres of services and crafts. According to Warren, quoted by Arif al-Arif, there were a total of 1920 persons working in trade, manufacture and services in Jerusalem in 1876, among them 807 Muslims, 612 Christians, and 501 Jews. According to this same source, there were 206 Muslim food dealers of various kinds, 12 grain merchants, 52 bakers, 24 coffee grinders and coffee roasters, 18 millers, 27 dyers, 51 shoemakers, 50 soap-boilers, 29 manufacturers of sesame oil, 29 manufacturers of sweetmeats, and 37 bath attendants. Among the Christians were 96 shoemakers, 33 joiners, and 26 soap-boilers.⁷⁴

To look further at Luncz's ethnic breakdown of the occupational structure, we can see that in the Sephardic and Christian communities the numbers of retailers and artisans balanced each other, while in the case of the Ashkenazim, artisans, and in the case of the Muslims, retailers, were preponderant. In comparison to the Sephardim and Muslims, Ashkenazim and Christians carried on the more modern and complicated crafts. Finally to speak very generally, the craft sector, which was characterised by a labour surplus, was dominated by the Ashkenazim. And it was because of this surplus that in Jerusalem it was only partially true to say that a trade in hand finds gold in every land: wages were low, and income was modest.⁷⁵ Only a

minority, at least among the Jewish artisans, was able to prosper. Many skilled Ashkenazi craftsmen were unable to support their families and were forced to emigrate to Egypt to practise their trade.⁷⁶

Jewish merchants and retailers were generally better off. According to Luncz, the Sephardim largely controlled the trade in cotton manufactures as they were familiar with the language and manners of the country. They obtained their goods mainly from Istanbul, Alexandria, Beirut and other ports of the Ottoman Empire and only a few European and Muslim merchants who dealt in those fabrics which were favoured by the local population were able to compete with them. Similarly, the business of money-changing, which was not unimportant in a city overflowing with coins from all over the world, was almost exclusively in the hands of Sephardim. Others of the same community traded in the products of Palestine, the richest among them lending money to the peasants against part of the crop. Others were purveyors to the government.⁷⁷ As to the Ashkenazi merchants, the same source states that they generally dealt in goods of daily use which they obtained from local wholesale merchants. But a few imported their merchandise from Beirut and Istanbul; even fewer brought goods from Europe while carrying on a very modest export business. The persons belonging to this class, says Luncz, were all well off.⁷⁸ Finally, the bulk of the import trade was in the hands of a few Europeans and local Christians. There was no real native wholesale trade in Jerusalem. And, given the demographic expansion and the building development in the Holy City, it was only natural that an increasing share of the imports of Jaffa should be destined for Jerusalem. However, it is impossible to tabulate the data for the imports into Jerusalem as they are neither uniform nor precise.⁷⁹

Apart from the fact that some products from Bethlehem and Hebron, together with articles manufactured within its own walls like soap, were sold to pilgrims in Jerusalem, the local and regional trade was mainly focused on the supply of food and materials for the city. Jerusalem obtained vegetables, poultry, eggs and milk, sesame, tobacco, wood and other products from the surrounding villages. Charcoal came mainly from the Hebron area, fruits from the gardens of Jaffa, salt, potash and asphalt from the Dead Sea, coats of sheep's wool and camel-hair from the local towns (for example, from Bethlehem), woollen coats of a better quality from Damascus and Baghdad, silk cloth from Damascus and Aleppo, and grain, animals

for slaughter, and sheep's wool from beyond the Jordan. Sheep themselves were sometimes brought from even further away.⁸⁰

The central trading place for Jerusalem and Nablus beyond the Jordan was Salt.⁸¹ The Baldensperger diary contains a lengthy report on a caravan which assembled in Jerusalem in order to buy wheat there and which the diarist joined in August 1858.⁸² Even after the rise of grain production on the coastal plain, the fast-growing city of Jerusalem remained an important market for sheep and grain from east of the Jordan.⁸³ To facilitate communications with this region, a ferry began running between the two banks of the Jordan just north of the Dead Sea from the early 1870s: 'a large, flat-bottomed boat, passed by a rope from shore to shore, not more than 60 yards across at this spot'.⁸⁴

The productive activities of Jerusalem remained very modest. As in Nablus, Jaffa, Ramle, Lydda and Gaza, soap was manufactured there as well, but production seems to have declined in the course of our period. There were ten soap factories in Jerusalem in 1847.⁸⁵ According to Mrs Finn, the olive yield of Beit Jala was completely pledged to some Jerusalem effendis; she gives six names, among them Sulaiman and Musa al-Asali and Abdallah al-Khalidi.⁸⁶ She also mentions an effendi who wanted to let a house for 15 years and to take the whole rent in advance (PT 45 000) as he needed capital to establish a soap factory.⁸⁷ According to Neumann, there were still nine or ten soap factories in Jerusalem in the mid-1870s, each of which produced soap worth about PT 500 000 a year. Their product was much in demand, particularly during the Easter season. The cakes were usually shaped like a disc or a hemisphere and often had the Crescent, the Mount of Olives, or Rahel's Tomb depicted on them. The more refined varieties were mixed with musk and ambergris.⁸⁸ This soap had become something of a souvenir. But it is doubtful whether all the factories were still at work at the end of our period.⁸⁹ Gatt, who lived in Palestine for many years, and whose information appears to be exact and reliable, wrote in 1877 that the production of soap had greatly fallen off in Jerusalem and that some factories had been shut down.⁹⁰ This is also reported by Warren, as quoted by Arif al-Arif, who says that there were seven soap factories employing 76 persons in 1876, of which five were owned by Muslims and two by Christians.⁹¹ These reports support the figures given by the British Consul according to which Jerusalem exported soap worth £6000 in 1874 but only £1500 in 1879.⁹²

There were other export products of the Holy City, however,

which gained steadily in importance in the 1870s. One category consisted of devotional articles of all kinds with exports worth £3300 in 1874 and £11 000 in 1877.⁹³ But only some of these were manufactured in Jerusalem itself, with the bulk of them coming from Bethlehem. As in the case of Hebron glassware, Jerusalem was important mainly as the place of sale. The manufacture of sesame oil for culinary purposes also gained some importance in the 1870s when olive oil became scarce and more expensive. Seven Muslim manufacturers are listed in Table 1.17 while Neumann spoke of 15 presses and Arif al-Arif, quoting Warren, of 32 persons employed in this branch of activity.⁹⁴

The story of silk production is a less happy one. This activity had begun to gain a foothold in Jerusalem in the 1840s and early 1850s. At the same time, large mulberry plantations were planted near the city and above all around Jaffa, obviously on Lebanese initiative.⁹⁵ A local acquaintance of the banker Bergheim, resident in Ramle, is reported to have owned 14 000 mulberry trees there; in 1850 he was looking for a partner for silkworm raising.⁹⁶ At first, the cocoons were transported to Beirut and Damascus for processing. But in 1854 a filature was erected near Jerusalem, described as ‘un vaste établissement’ by one source.⁹⁷ However, all such efforts to introduce silkworm breeding and silk production came to an end in the early 1860s. The reasons are not known. One author speaks of disease and of the unsuitable climate.⁹⁸ But perhaps there was also not enough local interest in Jerusalem, while in Jaffa all economic energies were absorbed by the production of grain, cotton and oranges.

Jaffa and the connection with Jerusalem

As the only landing place in southern Palestine and as the port of Jerusalem, Jaffa was the town most directly affected by the European rush to the Holy Land – after the Holy City itself. During the period we are investigating, Jaffa remained the most important point of entry for pilgrims and tourists and the main centre for the country’s foreign trade. Europeans were therefore particularly interested in the development of the town. After the Crimean War, the European residents complained frequently, and vociferously, about the absence of a proper harbour, the constricting effects of the city wall and gates, and the lack of a satisfactory connection with Jerusalem. During the following decades, a road to Jerusalem was constructed with a regular carriage service while the wall had to give way to the further

development of the town. But none of the many projects for a proper harbour or the construction of a railroad were realised during the period in question.

In these circumstances the shipping and unloading of goods and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers was always something of an adventure, if indeed it could take place at all.⁹⁹ Reefs rose above the water offshore to the north-east, the longest of which formed a natural breakwater 300 metres in length. A small passage at its northern end was the entrance to the 'harbour' of Jaffa into which only small sailing ships and boats dared venture because of its shallows. Larger ships had to anchor at least half a mile away from the reefs so that, when the sea was rough, they could neither discharge nor load their freight and often had to sail on without having landed anything. Even when the sea was only mildly troublesome, it required a considerable effort by the eight to ten oarsmen of the small boats which maintained the connection between the ships lying in the roadstead and the landing place if they were not to miss the passage and wreck themselves on the reef. The history of the port of Jaffa was therefore a history of catastrophes great and small. In May 1873, for instance, eight pilgrims were drowned on their way to their steamers and in 1875 eight vessels were destroyed after being stranded on the shore.¹⁰⁰ The lack of a landing stage and of adequate storage space accessible to carts added to the port's shortcomings. When the water-level was low, men and goods had to be carried ashore from the boats on the backs of porters. The goods were then brought into the narrow customs depot where they were stored. In 1880 the customs office was still described as a 'miserable wooden shack' and the customs storehouse as a 'dark and damp vault in the lower floor of the Greek monastery with only one window'.¹⁰¹ When several ships arrived together, the entrances to the town and the narrow quay were usually blocked by pieces of luggage, boxes of oranges, barrels of oil, sacks of grain and other obstacles.

In the early 1880s the numbers of passengers passing through Jaffa was estimated at 80 000 persons annually.¹⁰² But long before this the call for the construction of a proper harbour had become louder and louder. In 1864 a French company had erected a lighthouse and the Ottoman authorities had had the quay repaired,¹⁰³ but with the increase in traffic these measures were no longer regarded as sufficient. The trouble was, however, that before the end of the 1870s the Porte simply did not think in terms of 'development programmes' for the Ottoman Provinces. And in Hasan Fahmi's well-known report

of 1880, in which he called upon European ‘capitalists’ to participate in the improvement of the infrastructure of Turkey and the Fertile Crescent, there was only one project itemised for Palestine: the construction of a breakwater at Jaffa to cost £T174 000 out of a total expenditure for the Empire of £T52 463 602 (£T1 = 0.909 sterling).¹⁰⁴

When we ask why not one of the numerous harbour (and railway) projects was instituted during this period, we have to distinguish two kinds of reasons. On the one hand, Ottoman governments did not and could no longer pursue an autonomous economic policy when it came to infrastructural development. On the other hand, these projects required capital, and potential European investors were more concerned with possible profit than with the welfare of pilgrims or of services to Christianity. The result of their calculations was not very encouraging, however. Those anxious to develop the port facilities were also faced with numerous discouraging examples. One of these involved a number of Jaffa merchants who, becoming impatient at the lack of a harbour, founded a company in November 1875 for the purchase of a small tugboat which they bought in Marseilles and put into service between the landing-place and the ships at anchor in the roadstead. But this investment did not pay and the boat was soon sold and the company dissolved.¹⁰⁵

In August 1878 a French company obtained the concession to construct a harbour at Jaffa. De Saulcy, the President of the Comité Fondateur, addressed the Marseille Chamber of Commerce in September 1880 in order to win support for the project. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, he wrote, to raise the necessary 15 million francs from private sources without direct government support. His plan was therefore to offer the French authorities a naval base at Jaffa as well.

*La marine de l'état aurait dans le port de Jaffa un emplacement réservé à ses navires, et de vastes terrains pour y établir des dépôts de combustible et de matériel de rechange, en outre le Pavillon Français bénéficierait d'une réduction sur les tarifs des droits de port fixés par les décrets de concession.*¹⁰⁶

The Marseille Chamber of Commerce felt bound to support this ‘useful project’.¹⁰⁷ But one can hardly reproach the Ottoman government for its lack of enthusiasm for such undertakings.

Efforts to construct a carriage road to Jerusalem had already begun by 1860. It seems to have been Count Pizzamano, the Austrian

Consul in Jerusalem 1847–61, who obtained the first concession. He tried to associate Montefiore with his project but his plans did not materialise.¹⁰⁸ Later, in 1867, while Europeans were still competing with one another for the concession, the Ottoman authorities themselves built a road, using *corvée* labour, which was opened in 1868.¹⁰⁹ But before this, in the 1850s, block houses had been erected at regular intervals along the way to Jerusalem to protect travellers. These military posts, ‘a number of towers, painted black, with narrow embrasures and enclosed with crenellated walls’,¹¹⁰ were now repaired and restored. Moreover, Yusuf Effendi al-Khalidi relates in his autobiography that for three months when he was President of the Jerusalem municipality he organised a regular carriage service along the new road. But when the new Mutasarrif, Kamil Pasha, arrived in autumn 1869, he was ordered to sell the carts and draught animals.¹¹¹ This contradicts the Templars’ claim to have introduced the idea of such a carriage service. We also hear about the introduction of carriages by Count Caboga, another Austrian Consul in Jerusalem, 1867–82, and by an American living in Jaffa. But the first company which was able to maintain a regular daily service between Jaffa and Jerusalem was indeed founded by the Templars in 1875, after the road had been repaired in 1874 and after they had been encouraged to establish such a service by the Ottoman Mutasarrif. They were followed, almost at once, by Arabs and Jews who entered into competition with the Swabian carters.

Under the supervision of German architects, the Jerusalem road was improved and relocated in places from 1876 to 1879. A Beirut group, a French group, and the Templars then applied for a formal transport concession. But, supported by Yusuf al-Khalidi, only the Templars obtained a contract. After the road had again been repaired in 1881, 30 to 40 carts were employed regularly on this route. Later on, however, the Templars had to leave the field to their Arab and Jewish competitors.¹¹²

The Templars always pointed to their carts as visible proof of their ‘civilising mission’ in Palestine, overlooking Yusuf al-Khalidi’s earlier initiative. It thus seems appropriate to comment on the spirit in which they fulfilled their mission. For example, in the first half of the 1870s, they were involved in a quarrel with Jaffa’s local authority which thought that it was not in the public interest for the Templars to drive their carts through the narrow and crowded streets down to the quay. For the chairman of the Templars, Hoffmann, the nature of the complaint and its remedy were equally clear. ‘It is simply the

resistance of barbarism to the advance of culture', he wrote to the German Consul in Jerusalem. 'I have therefore to take refuge with the might of the German Empire.'¹¹³ Through the mediation of the same Consul, a compromise was reached in November 1874, according to which the Templars were allowed to pass through the main street for three hours a day until such time as a road to the landing-place would have been completed which bypassed the town.

The first plan to construct a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem was directly connected with the British project for a line from the Mediterranean through Syria and the Euphrates valley to the Persian Gulf.¹¹⁴ In 1862 a special company for the Jaffa–Jerusalem Railway was founded, with Lord Dufferin, General Chesney and Cyril Graham among its directors.¹¹⁵ However, the Ottoman government refused to grant a concession.¹¹⁶ British experts on Turkey had also advised against the project. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who had doubted the profitability of such a line, and Sir Arthur Slade, an Admiral in the service of the Sultan, were both of the opinion that such a railway would serve neither British nor Ottoman interests.

There would be a repetition of the Crusades under a milder aspect, and demands for extra-territorial rights would follow. The pilgrims would chiefly belong, as now, to the Roman Catholic Church and to the Eastern Churches, with a sprinkling of Hebrews. Protestants would be too few to influence opinion on the matter.¹¹⁷

The 1864 project of the Austrian railway engineer and millenarian, Zimpel, fared no better.¹¹⁸ Doubts about profitability precluded the procurement of the necessary capital and the Ottoman government showed no real interest. The promoter himself was told in Istanbul that the Porte intended to construct a road between Jaffa and Jerusalem on its own account. Zimpel later quoted a comment allegedly made by the Grand Vizir, Fuad Pasha: 'I shall never concede to these crazy Christians any road improvement in Palestine as they would then transform Jerusalem into a Christian mad-house.'¹¹⁹ It is indeed strange to see the very same people who preached the idea of the 'peaceful crusade' so loudly also requesting Ottoman government support for their endeavours.

A French concessionaire who tried to make a new start in 1873 also came quickly to grief.¹²⁰ Then, in the middle of the 1870s, a new French company for the construction of a harbour at Jaffa and a railway to Jerusalem was founded. The architect and promoter,

Pierotti, even received Papal blessing for this project. Preliminary capital requirements were estimated at 30 million francs. 'In three years at the most, the first iron horse is expected to arrive, snorting, at the walls of the Holy City', *Das Heilige Land* announced – but in vain. The 'croisade financière', which *La Terre Sainte* tried to organise once the concession for the railway (but not for the harbour) had been granted, came to nothing. And the finance and construction companies, which had been asked to carry out the project (the Comptoir d'Escompte, the Société des Batignolles, and Gouin et Cie – all of them well known from North African speculations) obviously saw no reason to push it on their own.¹²¹ There were regular estimates that no large profit could possibly accrue from such a railway. According to a French calculation of the traffic between Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1877, 10 000 pilgrims, 4000 tons of imported goods, 1500 tons of exports, 1500 tons of fruit and vegetables for the Jerusalem market were then being carried on the existing road.¹²² Table 1.18 gives information about the type of transport and the road toll for this same year. The annual income from transport as calculated in 1881 is shown in Table 1.19.

It was always argued that only a proper infrastructure would encourage a more active carrying trade. But this was a long-term and uncertain matter, at a time when European investors were only interested in short-term, speculative ventures in the Ottoman Empire.¹²³

The harbour, the road, the railway: these were urgent problems for Jaffa as the economic life of the town centred mainly on trade and on pilgrims. An ancillary activity was the production, processing and export of crops like oranges and cotton.¹²⁴ According to the British Consular Agent, 5000 persons were employed daily in picking and packing oranges during the 1879 season.¹²⁵ Finally, together with Ramle and Lydda, Jaffa formed a centre of soap and oil (sesame and olive) production second in importance to Nablus. Ramle and Lydda were situated amid extensive olive groves.¹²⁶ But the production of soap seems to have been the only significant industrial activity in the area. In Jaffa, five soap factories were counted in 1872.¹²⁷ Meanwhile, the large ash mounds of Ramle, the waste product of the soap factories, passed into the contemporary literature of Palestine, as the summer winds blew the fine, pungent dust into the eyes of the local inhabitants and European travellers on their way to Jerusalem.¹²⁸

Trade and agriculture caused Jaffa to prosper and to expand. Before bursting at the seams in the 1870s,¹²⁹ the town, rising in

terraces from the sea, was enclosed by a wall with only one gate and a ditch, and crowned by a citadel. All around was a belt of gardens several kilometres wide, causing European travellers who passed through it to feel as though they had entered the Garden of Eden.¹³⁰ But soon the fortifications reconstructed under Abu Nabbut (1807–18) had to give way before the steady expansion of the town, until the walls had been completely pulled down and the ditch filled in.¹³¹ Even before this development had been set in train in the 1860s, villas had been built in the surrounding gardens and rural suburbs had emerged. Then, in 1864, a new gate was opened. In 1869 a portion of the wall in the south-east, towards the Quarantine Building and the Greek convent, was torn down. In 1872 the German Consular Agent reported that it was intended to sell the fortifications, which had collapsed in some places on the seaward side, for stone, and that the ammunition, stored in the powder magazine of the Citadel since Ibrahim Pasha's days, was to be taken to Acre. This was eventually done in 1874 while, early in 1876, the Citadel was sold to the Latin convent. By breaching the wall, four further exits from the town were made in May and June 1874. From then on the authorities began to sell the wall with its fortifications piece by piece. The stones were used to erect shops and houses, many outside the former wall. By the end of 1875, the paving of the main street, Jaffa's bazaar, had begun. This work dragged on for more than a year. The marketplace was then extended through the area on which the former city gate and part of the fortifications had stood. Later, it was continued outside the town, along the roads to Nablus and Jerusalem, as a place for selling vegetables, fruits and grain. Viewed from the landward side, Jaffa had greatly changed its appearance within only a few years.

Bethlehem¹³²

When we examined the development of Jerusalem, we discovered that the Bethlehemites had played a direct part in it. By the middle of the century, Bethlehem itself was still a large village set amid olive groves, vineyards, forests of almond and fig trees, and fields of grain. The chief commodities were wine and honey. Sheep-breeding was also important. The village had close connections with the Taamira Bedouin whose lands were adjacent to that of Bethlehem on the south and for whom the place was a kind of economic centre.

At the beginning of the 1890s, more than a quarter of the inhabitants still made their living from agriculture, but by the middle

of the century, Bethlehem had begun to grow into a prosperous little town. That part of its population which profited from the European presence, and particularly from the building boom and the flourishing trade in 'Bethlehem ware', achieved a modest wealth. There were also building activities in the town itself and in neighbouring Beit Jala.

Apart from agriculture and the building industry, the most important source of income was the manufacture of devotional articles and souvenirs. Crosses and rosaries were made of various materials, especially olive wood and kernels of the dum palm which came from the Arabian Peninsula. Quantities of mother-of-pearl were obtained from the Red Sea and made into crosses, rosaries and lockets. From the Dead Sea came the so-called 'Stone of Moses' (*hajar musa*), a shiny, blackish-grey, bituminous limestone with a strange smell, which was worked into bowls, cups and inkpots. The sale of such articles was promoted by the assertion that liquids drunk from them possessed healing powers. Sales were made partly to pilgrims, partly in Europe – above all, Russia. Through the Latin monasteries, Bethlehem's goods also reached the Catholic countries of Southern Europe and South America. From the 1870s, if not before, enterprising merchants from Bethlehem undertook long commercial trips to Europe and America to sell the products of their town and to find imports to retail on their return.¹³³ They even established a stall at the 1873 World Exhibition in Vienna.¹³⁴ In 1886 the French Consul estimated the annual return from the manufacture of devotional articles in Bethlehem and Jerusalem at 600000 francs.¹³⁵

Table 1.20 (at the end of the chapter) contains Palmer's information about the occupational structure of Bethlehem at the beginning of the 1890s. We may assume that it had not changed much since the early 1880s.

Nazareth and the Khan al-Tujjar

The development of Nazareth since the 1850s was determined by three factors. The first was the increase in population brought about by the influx of peasants from the plains anxious to exchange their precarious existence – at least until the second part of the 1860s – for the security of the town. Nazareth had no city walls, but the geographical location of the town afforded them some protection. Moreover, Nazareth lay under the unspoken 'protection' of Christian

Europe, particularly that of Catholic France.¹³⁶ The second factor stemmed directly from this European interest. Like Jerusalem, the town witnessed considerable building activity after the Crimean War.¹³⁷ Very soon, none of the destruction wrought by the earthquake of 1837 remained.¹³⁸

The third factor was the flourishing trade with Europe, which created new opportunities particularly for the Christians of the town. The annual grain caravans from the Hauran, which passed so close to Nazareth on their way from the Majami Bridge to Haifa and Acre, also provided a stimulus to enter into trade with the regions east of the Jordan. It is therefore not surprising that five khans were mentioned as being amongst the most important buildings of the town: Khan al-Basha, Khan Dair al-Latin, Khan al-Katulik, Khan Azar Habib and Khan Tannus Qawar.¹³⁹

For the direct exchange of products from both banks of the Jordan, a large market was held every Monday just east of the town, near Mount Tabor, in the unoccupied but formerly fortified Khan al-Tujjar (also called Suq al-Khan).¹⁴⁰ We would like to quote Thomson's vivid description of a market day *in extenso*:

On Monday of each week a great fair is held at the khans, when, for a few hours, the scene is very lively and picturesque. These gatherings afford an excellent opportunity to observe Syrian manners, customs, and costumes, and to become acquainted with the character and quality of Syrian productions. Thousands of people assemble from all parts of the country, either to sell, trade, or purchase. Cotton is brought in bales from Nablus; barley, and wheat, and sesamum, and Indian corn from the Huleh, the Hauran, and Esdraelon. From Gilead and Bashan, and the surrounding districts, come horses and donkeys, cattle and flocks, with cheese, *leben*, *semen*, honey, and similar articles. Then there are miscellaneous matters, such as chickens and eggs, figs, raisins, apples, melons, grapes, and all sorts of fruits and vegetables in their season. The pedlars open their packages of tempting fabrics; the jeweller is there with his trinkets; the tailor with his ready-made garments; the shoemaker with his stock, from rough, hairy sandals to yellow and red marocco boots; the farrier is there with his tools, nails, and flat iron shoes, and drives a prosperous business for a few hours; and so does the saddler, with his coarse sacks and gaily-trimmed cloth. And thus it is with all the arts and occupations known to this people. . . . But long before sunset not a

soul of this busy throng remains on the spot. All return home, or take refuge in some neighbouring village.¹⁴¹

Around 1880 the market at the Khan al-Tujjar was still the most important in Palestine. On one day, for instance, up to 200 head of cattle were offered for sale.¹⁴²

The Christian merchants of Nazareth profited considerably from the central location of the town. They looked to the east, the coast, and then further afield to Europe.¹⁴³ Thus, the march of 'progress' could not fail to affect the town. Mary Rogers described her visit to a rich Nazarene who had built a new house of blocks of hewn stone and who had travelled to Marseilles (probably before the end of the 1850s) to buy European furniture and other articles. He furnished one room with marble tables and mirrors, in the style of a French salon, basking in its splendour while for some time his fellow citizens regarded him as a prophet.¹⁴⁴ The wealthy middle class, according to a reliable authority, was more numerous in Nazareth than in Haifa or Acre.¹⁴⁵

Apart from trade, the pilgrims, and the Christian institutions, agriculture was also of great importance to Nazareth both directly and indirectly. On the one hand, part of the population consisted of peasants; on the other, the town became a supply centre for agricultural implements. Most probably this latter business began to flourish in the 1870s.

Nazareth's occupational structure is given in Table 1.21. Once again we assume that these figures from 1890 refer also to the conditions which existed a decade earlier. They show that one-third of the population of Nazareth lived on agriculture, and two-thirds on trade and manufacture. Out of the 550 self-employed persons in the spheres of trade, crafts and services, about one-fourth (154) were merchants and about one-fifth (112) were engaged in the building industry. A considerable proportion of the artisans worked for the needs of the agricultural population of the area. The manufacture of ploughs and yokes was a special local craft. Others to be mentioned in this connection were the blacksmiths and the makers of saddles, reins and felt covers.

Haifa and the Templar Colonies¹⁴⁶

Haifa is the last of the five towns whose development was directly affected by the European penetration of Palestine. But its rise, from

the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, also involved the decline of Acre. Both places had specific advantages to offer: Haifa – the better harbour, Acre – the greater security. However, the destruction wrought in the latter during the Egyptian occupation and the growing importance attached to the quality of port facilities by European captains combined to shift the centre of gravity towards Haifa. Already in 1850, 162 vessels called there of which 82 were Greek, 24 French, 17 Ottoman, 16 English and 11 Sardinian.¹⁴⁷ During the next decade, European passenger steamers made regular visits. At the same time, the Russian government financed the construction of a mole, 30 metres long, for the benefit of pilgrims who had landed at the port on the way to Nazareth and Jerusalem.

Until the beginning of the 1870s, travellers still tended to describe the town within the wall as something of a dirty hole.¹⁴⁸ But in the 1850s building activity had begun, and in 1858 this had extended to areas outside the wall. The new Carmelite convent provided a nucleus for a number of churches and Christian institutions, all under the protection of the European Consuls who arrived at about the same time. The population tripled from 2000 to 6000 in the three decades up to 1882, augmented by an influx of Christians and Jews from Turkey and North Africa. As a result, the native Muslims now became a minority in the town.¹⁴⁹ In 1869 the Templars founded their first settlement close to Haifa (see below). In the 1870s, some inhabitants from other less active towns in the north also moved in, in particular Christians and Jews from Acre, Safad and Tiberias.

The main features of Haifa's rise are clear: the increase in export activity, the town's role as a base for the 'peaceful crusade', the foundation of the Templar colony. That part of the population of the town which did not earn its living directly from its association with these developments, lived from agriculture, craft production and the retail trade. Unfortunately, however, we only have statistical information relating to the economic effects of trade and of Templar settlement, and it is to this we will now turn.

No matter how such a religious colonising enterprise is judged, it would be foolish to deny that the Templars represented a factor in the material advance of Haifa.¹⁵⁰ However, the unceasing war which these colonists felt it necessary to wage against both the Ottoman authorities and the local population showed them to be something of a mixed blessing. The Templars themselves, however, were firmly convinced of their civilising mission. The point is well illustrated by Paulus's comment about the 28 craftsmen belonging to the colony

founded near Jerusalem in 1873: 'The Holy City owes its industrial progress to these artisans trained in the German manner.'¹⁵¹ Many of the British and German advocates of colonisation in Palestine viewed the Templars' enterprise in much the same way, and the evident bias of contemporary European reports makes it difficult to judge the success of the Templars' efforts or to decide whether this small community, consciously separating itself from the local population in pietistic enclaves and aiming to be economically self-supporting as far as possible, offered anything more than the example of 'German diligence and tidiness'.¹⁵²

Four Templar colonies were founded during our period: Haifa (1869), Jaffa (1869), Sarona, north of Jaffa (1871), and Jerusalem (1873). Individual Templars also settled in Beirut, Nazareth, Ramle and Bethlehem. In 1882 the economic structure of these settlements was as follows:¹⁵³

1. The Haifa colony consisted of 350 persons. There were 17 peasants, 12 viticulturists, 21 persons for whom agriculture provided a supplementary income and 20 craftsmen (cartwrights, blacksmiths, saddlers, tailors, shoemakers, locksmiths and joiners). The colony had a windmill, a soap factory, three wholesale and retail firms, a public bar, a hotel and a doctor.
2. The Jaffa/Ramle colony comprised 205 Templars, most of them artisans (2 tailors, 4 millers, 3 joiners, 2 bakers, 2 shoemakers, 1 saddler, 1 butcher, 1 watchmaker, 1 mechanic, 1 mason, 2 gardeners and 2 peasants). There were two important wholesale firms (Breisch and Friedel), 3 mills, a chemist, a doctor, a public bar and a hotel.
3. Sarona, the only real agricultural colony counted 194 persons. Apart from the peasants, there were 2 wine merchants, 1 grocer, 1 butcher, 1 carpenter, 2 joiners, 2 masons, 1 blacksmith and 1 shoemaker.
4. The colony near Jerusalem (257 persons) consisted mainly of craftsmen: 4 masons, 3 joiners, 1 timber merchant, 2 locksmiths, 2 millers, 1 baker, 2 butchers, 3 shoemakers, a tailor, a saddler, a plumber, a cutler, a sculptor, a chemist, an architect, a gardener and 2 doctors. There was also a restaurant and a public bar.

Three conclusions can be drawn concerning the effects of this colonising enterprise. In the first place, the Templars provided potential imitators with proof that European colonies could indeed

be established successfully in the Holy Land. This was of great importance in the case of Jews who were anxious to settle in Palestine – something about which the local population could not feel any great satisfaction. Second, the Templars augmented the class of skilled urban craftsmen working to satisfy the needs of the Europeans and of the local middle and upper classes. However, the modern agricultural and industrial machines which the Templars introduced were exclusively for their own use and seem to have had little demonstration effect. Third, we must acknowledge that contribution to the advancement of ‘civilisation’ in Palestine which consisted of such things as the improvement of the Haifa–Nazareth road and of the carriage service on the route from Haifa to Acre, Haifa to Nazareth, and Jaffa to Jerusalem; although we have already mentioned that the Templars were not able to hold out for very long against local Arab and Jewish competitors in this field.¹⁵⁴

Acre

Acre was the only town in Palestine whose population seems to have decreased during our period. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to illustrate this process statistically. And, while it is possible to compile tables for the exports through Acre, we have only very scanty information about the economic situation of the town itself.

Although – or perhaps even because – Acre was a centre of administration, containing a fortress, a military garrison, and a prison known to terrified convicts as ‘the Bastille of the Near East’,¹⁵⁵ it continued to make a depressing impression on visitors during the decades we are concerned with. There was only one gate on the land side and another towards the harbour. Building outside the wall was not allowed. But there was no need for it anyway: nobody had bothered to clear away the remains of the 1840 bombardment inside the town. As late as the 1850s and 1860s many houses were still in ruins. The partly-destroyed fortifications were impressive, but the guns were hopelessly antiquated.¹⁵⁶ Yet the Ottoman garrison dominated life in the town, even though Oliphant’s assertion that three-quarters of the houses were barracks and government buildings was certainly a great exaggeration.¹⁵⁷ Conder wrote about the Acre of the 1870s: ‘Its trade is now much reduced, and the bazaars are deserted . . . I found many of the bazaars turned into cavalry stables and only about one shop in ten inhabited.’¹⁵⁸ Against this, as we have seen, Acre remained an important export outlet, especially for the

Hauran grain. During the season, thousands of loads were brought to the port and the shore between the town and the Nahr al-Naamin was transformed into a vast encampment of camels.¹⁵⁹

Little attempt is usually made to reconcile these contradictory facts: decline on the one hand and Acre as an emporium of the grain trade, on the other. What we have instead are general statements to the effect that trade and commerce could not develop in the shadow of the Ottoman garrison and that, while the old harbour had silted up, the bay at Haifa was deeper and more secure.¹⁶⁰ As one citizen of Acre lamented, the steamers 'were the beginning of the end' for the town.¹⁶¹ The 'end', however, did not come suddenly. Until the end of the nineteenth century, more vessels called at Acre than at Haifa – though they were of lower tonnage.¹⁶² Meanwhile, the steamship companies seemed to have divided up the Palestinian ports between them. In the first half of the 1870s, the Austrians touched at Jaffa and Haifa, the Russians at Jaffa and Acre, and the French at Jaffa only.¹⁶³ For all these reasons, some other explanation for the prolonged decline of Acre must be found.

For our part, we would like to draw attention to two facts. The first is that over time the more important commercial and financial transactions of Acre fell into the hands of members of the active new bourgeoisie of Beirut, the same group which had also begun to control part of the agricultural production of northern Palestine. It has already been noted that the import business of the Syrian coast was dominated by large Beirut firms.¹⁶⁴ But they had also come to dominate the export of Acre's main staples (cotton – until the early seventies – and grain):

The most important export firms in Beirut which control the grain trade of the Syrian ports, are Sursok frères, Bustros et neveux, Touaini, Tasso, Hassan Hoss, Sagrandy, Scrini, Massauti, and Parodi. . . . Most cotton houses in Acre and Lattakia are branches of the Beirut firms of E.Peyron, Sagrandi, Assad, Melheme, Sursock frères, Toueini, Boustros et neveu. Independent houses in Acre and Caifa worth mentioning are Datodi, Petrocochino and Schiropina, Avimino Christo, M.A.Sropinich, Selim Huri.¹⁶⁵⁻⁷

By the late 1870s, tax-farming in the district of Acre was also in Beirut hands. Nominally, the tax-farmer was a certain Yusuf al-Mamluk from Sur (Tyre), but he was only an agent for some Christian Beirut houses. They are reported to have put between

£30 000–40 000 at his disposal in 1878 so that he could get the award.¹⁶⁸ Thus, not only was Acre dominated by Beirut merchants but they were also in a position to ensure that a large proportion of the profits from its exports and neighbouring tax-farms flowed to their own home town. For these reasons Thomson's argument that Acre was depressed by its military character¹⁶⁹ is only part of the truth.

The second point is that while Acre was dominated by the Beirutis it was Haifa which became the main focus for European interests. It was there that the Consuls settled, even if they had to travel to Acre for every important act of official business with the Ottoman authorities. It was there too that the commercial interests of Europeans and their protégés could be more securely pursued under the eyes of the same European Consuls than under those of the military commander and of the Mutasarrif of Acre. Thus, although Acre remained important for commercial and administrative reasons, it became more and more subordinate to the fast-growing ports of Haifa and Beirut.

Safad and Tiberias

Together with Jerusalem and Hebron, Safad and Tiberias¹⁷⁰ comprised the four Jewish holy cities of Palestine. In our period, they offer a spectacle of stagnation. In the eighteenth century, they had been centres of power of the Zaidanis, both of them crowned by citadels, and Tiberias also fortified with a wall. But both towns had been destroyed by the earthquake of 1837 and neither was rebuilt in a systematic way. In Tiberias, for example, instead of the old southern gateway, a footpath came into use which led *across* the ruins of the wall into the town.

As for economic activity, there is nothing to report in the case of Tiberias. And with regard to Safad, we have only scanty hints about the processing of olives, cotton and grapes. Because of the hugely differing population figures, it is not possible to be certain when, or even if, the Jews formed a majority of the inhabitants of these two towns during our period.¹⁷¹ It is certain, however, that after the earthquake both places revived through Jewish immigration and that the Jews gave a special character to each.

European travellers were unimpressed, however. The Jewish inhabitants were hardly prosperous and lived mainly on alms, small trade, small-scale financial transactions and peddling. Between 400

and 500 Jewish families were Austrian subjects, coming mainly from Galicia and from the Bukovina. It is true that in 1858 an Austrian Consular Agent (Miklasiewicz),¹⁷² resident in Safad, was appointed to look after their interests. But, apart from this, Europe took little notice of either of these two towns or of the 'dead angle' of Palestine in which they were situated.

For their part, the Ottoman authorities tried to settle first Algerian, and then, in 1878, Circassian immigrants from Bulgaria and Rumelia in the area, probably with the double intention of establishing them in a remote district where their presence would not provoke trouble while at the same time using them for purposes of development and control. Algerians who had followed Abd al-Qadir into exile were settled in Safad and the area north of Lake Hula in the late 1850s.¹⁷³ By the 1870s, they are said to have constituted half the Muslim population of Safad.¹⁷⁴ The Circassian settlements on the Jaulan and in Transjordan (Amman) are well known.¹⁷⁵ Attempts were made to establish similar villages near Tiberias and Safad, but without success. Many Circassians who did not immediately become victims of the climate emigrated once again. Those who remained were described as 'the terror of the peasants'. Meanwhile, their 'noble' families moved into the two towns themselves, where they were supported financially by the government and where they allegedly lived off the plunder they had brought from Bulgaria – at least according to Miklasiewicz, echoing the *vox populi*.¹⁷⁶ Be that as it may, these Ottoman attempts at colonisation do not seem to have given any significant impetus to the economic development of Safad and Tiberias or to the northern region of Palestine as a whole.

Nablus¹⁷⁷

Lying embedded between two mountains at the end of a fertile valley abounding in water, Nablus appeared to European visitors as a gem among towns. The last traces of the 1837 earthquake had long disappeared. The town was surrounded by an ineffectively fortified wall with two main gates. More imposing were the palaces of the noble families of Nablus, 'fortresses with iron gates',¹⁷⁸ 'to be compared to the medieval family palaces in Italian cities'.¹⁷⁹ It was said that the largest building, the Tuqan Palace, could accommodate 1000 soldiers.¹⁸⁰ In the early 1860s, the new palace of the Governor, planned by Mahmud Abd al-Hadi himself, was described by Mary Rogers as: 'la plus belle habitation que j'ai vu en Palestine. Elle est

bâtie avec de belles pierres bien taillées et enrichie de pavés de marbre, de colonnes et d'arcades.¹⁸¹ The solidly built houses of the town, many with two and even three stories; the numerous mosques, including five large ones; the large vaulted bazaar; the great number of fountains and springs in and outside the town and of brooks driving water-mills; the location amid vegetable gardens, fruit plantations and olive groves: all this delighted European travellers.

(Nablus) is unrivalled in Palestine for beauty and luxuriance. . .¹⁸²

Its beauty can hardly be exaggerated . . . Clusters of white-roofed houses nestling in the bosom of a mass of trees, olive, palm, orange, apricot, and many another varying the carpet with every shade of green . . . Everything fresh, green, soft, and picturesque, with verdure, shade, and water everywhere. There is a softness in the colouring, a rich blue haze from the many springs and streamlets, which mellows every hard outline.¹⁸³

The conspicuous prosperity of Nablus rested on trade and manufacture. During the period 1856–82, Nablus remained Palestine's most important centre for local and regional trade and for the manufacture of soap, oil and cotton goods. Standing close to those districts which, up to the 1870s, were the most economically active in the country, the town was also at the intersection of the important north–south and east–west trade routes running from Damascus to Jerusalem and southern Palestine and from the coast to the districts east of the Jordan – though, as we have seen, Nazareth was something of a competitor as far as trade between Haifa/Acre and Transjordan was concerned. In the first half of the 1860s, returns from the Octroi are said to have often amounted to PT 10 000, and sometimes even to PT 20 000, a day.¹⁸⁴ Although the great Khan of the town was in a state of decay in the 1850s, its place had been taken by a large trade hall in the middle of the impressive bazaar street which ran the length of the town. The main bazaar was described by Mary Rogers as:

La plus belle arcade de la Palestine. Il est plus large et beaucoup plus élevé que l'Arcade de Lowther à Londres, et cinq ou six fois aussi long. Là, sont déployées les marchandises européennes, telles que les indiennes imprimées de Manchester, la coutellerie de Sheffield, les perles et les bijoux français, de très-petits miroirs, des

bouteilles en verre de Bohême pour les narghilés, des mouchoirs de Suisse imitant les mundîls de Constantinople, des fayences et des tasses à café de porcelaine. Mais les boutiques les plus brillantes sont celles où s'étalent les soieries de Damas et d'Alep, les vestes et les tarbouches brodés de Stamboul, et quantité de pipes turques, de rosaires d'ambre et de bracelets d'Hebron.¹⁸⁵

In addition to its function as a trading centre, Nablus contained the region's most important textile industry.¹⁸⁶ The cotton of Nablus was praised as the best in Syria,¹⁸⁷ and during the American Civil War boom Nablus became a centre of cotton-processing for export: 'The busy hum of the cotton gins greeted us on all sides, and heaps of cotton husks lay about the streets . . . Though we had seen everywhere the signs of a nascent cotton-trade, yet in no place was it so developed as here'.¹⁸⁸ Even after the boom, the quality of Nablus cotton was such that it continued to find a ready market in Palestine, Transjordan and Central Syria. The same holds true for the cotton, wool and camel-hair fabrics and for the silk *passementeries* manufactured in the town, though in their case the quantity of production may well have decreased. In addition to the weavers and dyers, silversmiths and goldsmiths sold their products east and west of the Jordan, and there were a number of manufacturers of olive oil, which also had a high reputation for quality.

The most important industry, however, was the production of soap. What was not consumed locally was exported – particularly to Egypt and Anatolia. For the year 1860, Rosen spoke of 15 factories with an annual production of about 4500 quintals.¹⁸⁹ Guérin reported an annual export of Nablus soap of 4000–5000 quintals.¹⁹⁰ The British trade report for the year 1882 gives 30 soap factories in the town,¹⁹¹ a figure which is repeated in Dabbag's work for the last years of the nineteenth century.¹⁹² According to a French consular report for the year 1886, there were 40 soap factories in Nablus, Jerusalem, Ramle, Lydda and Jaffa, with a total annual production of 40 000 quintals.¹⁹³ Probably three-quarters of these factories were located in Nablus. With this doubling of the Nablus factories during our period went a doubling of the soap exports from Jaffa during the same years (see Table 1.3, at the end of the chapter). The biggest share of the profits must certainly have accrued to Nablus itself.

The economic rise of Nablus during the period found another expression in building activity, An arsenal, a Latin convent, and a Protestant school and chapel were soon erected as were a new Khan

and a number of houses which 'bear witness to the growing prosperity of the town',¹⁹⁴ a new street to the town centre opened in 1875.¹⁹⁵ Although the economic development of Nablus was not connected directly with the European penetration of Palestine, the town showed a steady expansion during the period as it held, and even improved, its position as a centre of production and trade, and as the merchants of Nablus continued to participate in the export of Palestinian products.

Hebron

Hebron was sited at a higher altitude than any other town in Palestine. Its four quarters were grouped in pairs opposite each other on two sides of a wadi.¹⁹⁶ There was no town wall but the outer house fronts of the quarters more or less fulfilled the same function, and entry to the main streets could be closed by gates. By the middle of the century, Hebron was correctly described as a tetrapolis. At the same time, the town began to recover from the disasters which had befallen it during the two preceding decades.¹⁹⁷ In 1834 it had been looted and partially destroyed by Ibrahim's Egyptian troops with a loss of part of the population and the forcible recruitment of hundreds more into the army. The 1837 earthquake had also affected the town. Later, in the 1840s and early 1850s, Hebron was heavily involved in the numerous power struggles and revolts in the Jabal al-Khalil; in 1846, for example, it was sacked by Ottoman troops. These disturbances had a drastic effect on the numbers of livestock in the area: according to Rosen, only one flock of goats survived.¹⁹⁸ If the end of local feuds after the Crimean War did not bring an economic boom, at least it allowed the inhabitants of the town to develop their traditional economic activities, above all viticulture and the manufacture of water bags and glass articles.¹⁹⁹

Beside its own mosque, Hebron was nearly as well known to Europeans through its glassware – coloured lamps, bracelets, earrings and necklaces. But in the 1860s and 1870s the manufacture of glass was no longer of the same importance as at the beginning of the century – when Seetzen reported about 150 persons employed in this branch²⁰⁰ – because of the fact that Hebronites had to compete with imports of European glass in the markets of Egypt and Syria. Even in the shops of Jerusalem and Nablus, glassware from Bohemia appeared next to Hebron glass in the decades following the Crimean War. However, it is not true, as Karmon asserts, that by the middle

of the century 'glass manufacture had almost completely disappeared'.²⁰¹ Throughout the period, the products of Hebron were still being sold in great quantities to the poorer population of Palestine's towns and villages – for example, by the local Jewish pedlars.²⁰² Hebron's glassware was also sold in regional markets and to the Bedouin and to the Near Eastern and East European pilgrims visiting the Holy Land, and the town was also represented at the Vienna World Exhibition of 1873 with ornaments of coloured glass.²⁰³ Thus, even though this industry seems not to have expanded, it remained a not insignificant source of income for the town: As an official French report for 1886 indicates, four glass factories then yielded a profit of 60 000 francs a year.²⁰⁴

But other economic activities were more important. Hebron lived largely on its viticulture, on sheep- and goat-breeding and on its trade with the Bedouin of the regions to the south and east of the Jabal al-Khalil who marketed their products – sheep, wool, camel-hair and hides – in the town²⁰⁵ where they were locally processed. Because there were various locations along slopes and valleys, the vintage around Hebron lasted for nearly half the year.²⁰⁶ Thus, for almost six months fresh grapes could be sold in the market. Those grapes not consumed locally were dried or crushed and marketed as raisins or *dibs* (a kind of syrup) both in and outside Palestine. Unlike the Christians of Bethlehem and Beit Jala, the Muslims of Hebron did not, of course, make wine. By the mid-1880s, the total area of vineyards around the town was estimated at 800 hectares as opposed to some 500 hectares around Jerusalem and Bethlehem.²⁰⁷ The process of tanning and the manufacture of water bags were also of great significance. Other economic activities mentioned in the sources – like dyeing and weaving – were of only minor importance.

That Hebron made some progress during our period can also be seen from the fact that at the beginning of the 1880s the four quarters of the old city had largely grown together to form one urban unit.²⁰⁸

Gaza

The economic activities of Gaza, the second largest town of Palestine, were determined by its geographic position, the agricultural production of its hinterland, and the occupational specialisation of its inhabitants. Like Jaffa, Gaza was situated amid an extensive, irrigated and picturesque landscape of gardens and groves, dominated by the olive tree. Part of the town lay on a hill-top; at its foot,

the other quarters, like a group of peasant villages, merged into the gardens and the palm, fruit and olive plantations which stretched for several kilometres in all directions. The old wall and its gates had long fallen into ruin.²⁰⁹

With the 1850s boom in grain export, the district of Gaza became an important wheat and barley growing area. Bedouin also took part in grain production. 'Wheat, wheat, a very ocean of wheat', Thomson exclaimed near the town.²¹⁰ From then on the town became a centre for the grain trade, with an important market and many granaries. But it had no harbour and, therefore, as no steamers and only a few foreign sailing ships were willing to anchor there, export was mainly carried on through Jaffa. All import goods were also obtained from there. In 1872, 20 European and 5 Ottoman sailing ships, as well as 96 coasters, called at Gaza. But in 1873, because of a poor harvest, only nine foreign sailing ships called at the town.²¹¹ As a rule, the grain export of Gaza was in the hands of Jaffa merchants.²¹²

After the establishment of a regular shipping connection between the Egyptian and Syrian ports, and after the opening of the Suez Canal, caravan traffic to and from Egypt through Gaza greatly diminished.²¹³ But the town remained an important trade and local market centre, not the least for the Bedouin of the Sinai and Negev deserts.²¹⁴ The bazaars of the town were still described as particularly varied and rich.

Industrial production in Gaza was concentrated on weaving, pottery and the manufacture of soap.²¹⁵ The products of the first two branches were marketed in Palestine and among the Bedouin; soap was sold mainly in Egypt. Of the three, pottery was the most conspicuous activity, as the potters had their own quarter in the upper town. At the beginning of the 1880s there were 16 workshops with three ovens and four wheels each, in which a great variety of jugs and bowls, small lamps, and earthenware pipes were made. The last were used in Gaza and other Palestinian towns for house-building – for parapets of terraced roofs and for domed roofs. A speciality of the potters of Gaza was their use of sheep and camel dung for baking. This made their earthenware blackish grey and more durable, and thus more in demand all over Palestine and among the Bedouin. 'Coasters which bring goods to Gaza, usually take on a load of earthenware there', wrote Gatt, who also reported a pottery merchant said to have earned a fortune of 30 000 francs.²¹⁶

But if the 'black jar' was the speciality of Gaza, weaving was more important. The number of workshops was estimated by Gatt to be at

least 100, with 200–300 looms.²¹⁷ Most of them manufactured cloth for striped coats; about one-third also wove linen; a few made cotton cloth. Wool was provided by the Bedouin, flax and cotton came from Egypt.

Lastly there were three large soap factories in Gaza. Two were run by Christians (by the former Austrian consular agent Basala and by the former Prussian consular agent Madbak), the third by the Muslim merchant, Abu Shaban. Olive oil came from Gaza and its environments, potash was obtained from the Bedouin, and lime from the peasants of the Jabal al-Khalil. The three factories worked only during the winter: in the summer months they served as granaries. In the years when the olive crop was satisfactory they could produce about 200 000 kg of soap, worth 100 000 francs.²¹⁸ When Gatt wrote his report, export to Egypt was no longer only by land but went mainly by sea via Jaffa. Gatt made some interesting remarks on the organisation of production which we would like to quote in conclusion:

First the owner of the soap factory uses up, of course, his own stock [of oil]; then he satisfies his clients. He provides lime and potash and organizes the production, the clients have to supply the oil. The factory owner receives a certain percentage of the soap as payment. The rest is handed over to the clients. Whoever is not able to raise a takha (lot for boiling) himself, can join with somebody else. The work is done by mobile groups of experts under the leadership of a master called ra'is. They go from one soap factory to the other, wherever they find work; they are Muslims. Their wage does not consist in money, but in percentages of the soap which they then sell.²¹⁹

CONCLUSIONS

The economic development of Palestine during the second Tanzimat period has to be seen within the framework of the efforts of the Ottoman government to establish effective control over its Syrian provinces, of European interest in the Holy Land, and of European economic penetration of the southern and eastern Mediterranean periphery. In this study we have taken for granted the success of the Porte in establishing favourable political and administrative conditions for economic development, for example, the suppression of local feuds and of Bedouin incursions. Here we have been interested mainly in the effects of European penetration.

The data we have compiled and the material we have analysed show that Palestine experienced a remarkable economic upswing in the two and a half decades following the Crimean War. Apart from the building industry, the production of soap, and the manufacture of devotional articles, however, it was mainly the agrarian sector which increased its output on a significant scale. It had already been stimulated by the pull of external markets before the Crimean War, but after the 1850s it became more and more export oriented. The cultivated area was extended and an agricultural surplus was produced for regional and European markets. Production remained flexible and diversified. Palestine was spared the development of a monoculture which could have been disastrous in view of the natural, and especially climatic, conditions. Thus it was not only able to contribute to the food supply of northern Syria, but also made a contribution to the 'invisible' balancing of Syrian trade, as commerce through the ports of Acre, Haifa and Jaffa was characterised by a considerable export surplus.

The towns which were the centres of commercial activity and of European religious and cultural penetration (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jaffa and Haifa) experienced considerable growth and relative prosperity. But, with the exception of Acre, the other urban centres in which the Europeans were not directly interested (Nablus, Hebron and Gaza) also took part in the general development of the country, whether on the basis of their place in local and regional trade or of their specialised production for local and regional markets – pottery and weaving in Gaza; viticulture and the manufacture of water bags and of glassware in Hebron; the manufacture of soap and cotton-processing in Nablus. In this context, we should also re-emphasise Bethlehem's specialisation in construction and the manufacture of devotional articles and Nazareth's specialisation in the building trade and the manufacture of agricultural implements.²²⁰

In the period we have studied, we can thus observe a general expansion of production for the local, regional and European markets, as well as shifts of importance in the production of various agrarian products in accordance with changing market conditions. But neither in the sphere of agriculture nor of manufacture did hitherto unknown products or new methods of production make their appearance. In both sectors the introduction of new implements and machinery can be regarded as a *quantité négligeable*. In addition there was no significant increase in the use or export of those mineral resources which were already known to exist, for example in the Dead Sea area.

In a narrower sense, no basic economic restructuring through European penetration took place. It is true that the import of (mainly English) cotton manufactures had an effect on Palestinian textile production, as everywhere else in the Middle East.²²¹ But this was not a fundamental economic problem for Palestine. None of the Middle East's main centres of textile manufacture were situated within its borders and it had to import part of the cloth it needed from other Syrian towns. Second, at the end of our period demand by the rural population was still met partially by local weavers in the villages.²²² Third, weaving remained an important source of local income wherever the products were adapted to local needs and tastes.

However, the integration of Palestine into an international market dominated by the economies of capitalist Europe had two socio-economic-effects which were important for the further development of the country. One was the change in the structure of land tenure – above all the creation of large areas of landed property. The other was the appearance of a commercial bourgeoisie whose capital infiltrated into the sphere of agrarian production to a significant extent. As a result, the preconditions for a peripheralisation of the economy were established in so far as these social groups were destined to take the lead along the path towards that predominantly outward orientation of 'undeveloped' economies which results in foreign control and in the increased emphasis on the import of luxury goods.

Nevertheless, in the period we are considering, a relative diversification of agriculture and an orientation of manufacture towards local needs were preserved. Peripheralisation was also inhibited because, in quantitative terms, Palestine could not interest Europe in its primary products or in its role as a market for European goods to the same degree as, for example, Egypt, Mount Lebanon, Central Syria and Damascus or Turkey. For this reason, potential European investors saw little chance of making short-term profits and European governments were less interested in intensive economic penetration than they were in political control.

Finally, Palestine was also a special case in that the 'peaceful crusade' directed significant sums of money into the country by way of building activities and support for religious, cultural and welfare institutions which are best seen as 'political investments'. But the rival European claims to control of Palestine, together with the establishment of settlements of European colonists, laid the foundations of a conflict which has continued until the present day.

TABLE 1.1 *Population of the towns of Palestine in the nineteenth century*

| City | 1800 | 1840 | 1860 | 1880 | 1922 |
|-----------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| Jerusalem | 9 000 | 13 000 | 19 000 | 30 000 | 62 500 |
| Acre | 8 000 | 10 000 | 10 000 | 8 500 | 6 400 |
| Haifa | 1 000 | 2 000 | 3 000 | 6 000 | 24 600 |
| Jaffa | 2 750 | 4 750 | 6 520 | 10 000 | 47 700 |
| Ramle | 2 000 | 2 500 | 3 000 | 3 500 | 7 400 |
| Gaza | 8 000 | 12 000 | 15 000 | 19 000 | 17 500 |
| Hebron | 5 000 | 6 500 | 7 500 | 10 000 | 16 600 |
| Bethlehem | 1 500 | 2 500 | 3 570 | 4 750 | 6 600 |
| Nablus | 7 500 | 8 000 | 9 500 | 12 500 | 16 000 |
| Nazareth | 1 250 | 2 250 | 4 500 | 6 000 | 7 500 |
| Tiberias | 2 000 (3500)* | 2 000 | 2 500 | 3 000 | 7 000 |
| Safed | 5 500 (7500)* | 4 500 | 6 500 | 7 500 | 8 800 |
| Total | 54 000 | 70 000 | 90 000 | 120 750 | 228 600 |

* before the earthquake.

SOURCE Y. Ben-Arieh, 'The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine during the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century according to Western Sources' in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, p.68.

TABLE 1.2 *Average annual export of the main articles from Jaffa, Haifa and Acre (quantities in millions)*

| | Jaffa (1873–7, 1879–82) | Haifa (1872–80) | Acre (1873–80) |
|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Wheat (Kiles) | 0.279 | 0.429 | 1.291 |
| Barley (Kiles) | 0.102 | 0.111 | 0.203 |
| Dura (Kiles) | 0.062 | 0.233 | 0.625 |
| Sesame (Okes) | 2.059 | 0.800 | 1.000 |
| Olive oil (Okes) | 1.027 | 0.053 | 0.260 |
| Soap (Okes) | 0.904 | | |
| Wool (Okes) | 0.115 | | |
| Oranges (Numbers)* | 19.650 | | |

*Average of the years 1873–7 and 1879 only, as from 1880 onward the quantity was stated in boxes.

SOURCE Our calculations based on sources listed in notes 4 and 5.

TABLE 1.3 *Main export articles of Jaffa (by quantity)*

| | Wheat (kiles) | Barley (kiles) | Dura (kiles) | Sesame (okes) | Olive oil (okes) | Soap (okes) | Oranges (numbers) | Wool (okes) | Cotton (okes) |
|------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1857 | 45 455 | 245 011 | 39 392 | 503 000 | 20 000 | 1 000 000 | 6 000 000 | 10 000 | — |
| 1858 | 18 000 | 143 444 | 166 712 | 820 000 | 100 000 | 800 000 | 3 000 000 | 4 000 | — |
| 1859 | 30 000 | 30 000 | 25 000 | 400 000 | 100 000 | 500 000 | 6 000 000 | — | — |
| 1860 | — | — | — | 1 000 000 | 2 040 000 | 50 000 | 5 000 000 | 5 500 | 20 000 |
| 1862 | 79 928 | 117 661 | 57 810 | 1 856 078 | 1 673 696 | 100 000 | 8 000 000 | 2 000 | 20 000 |
| 1863 | 176 614 | 192 139 | 113 750 | 2 893 449 | 300 050 | 70 000 | 8 300 000 | 38 517 | 190 678 |
| 1873 | 310 000 | 110 000 | 25 000 | 3 000 000 | 250 000 | 600 000 | 27 750 000 | 100 000 | 40 000 |
| 1874 | 212 000 | 120 000 | 115 000 | 2 000 000 | 130 000 | 1 000 000 | 25 500 000 | 120 000 | 10 000 |
| 1875 | 448 000 | 288 000 | 70 500 | 2 800 000 | 1 000 000 | 1 300 000 | 10 200 000 | 50 000 | 5 000 |
| 1876 | 430 000 | 25 000 | 80 000 | 2 350 400 | 3 500 000 | 246 000 | 14 000 000 | 150 000 | — |
| 1877 | — | — | 16 000 | 1 870 000 | 1 000 000 | 220 000 | 14 200 000 | 120 000 | — |
| 1879 | — | — | — | 1 100 000 | 2 000 000 | 1 350 000 | 26 250 000 | 130 000 | — |
| 1880 | 189 500 | 100 500 | 25 300 | 1 700 000 | 800 000 | 1 450 000 | 145 000* | 105 000 | — |
| 1881 | 440 000 | 255 000 | 80 000 | 1 420 000 | 160 000 | 850 000 | 170 500* | 135 000 | — |
| 1882 | 482 905 | 18 270 | 143 302 | 2 292 844 | 406 115 | 1 124 000 | 116 350* | 129 000 | — |

*Boxes

SOURCE See note 4.

TABLE 1.4 *Value of the three main export articles of Jaffa in various years and their percentage of total exports*

| Year | Export articles (in PT) | | | Percentage of total exports |
|------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1857 | Soap 6 000 000 | Barley 3 515 908 | Sesame 1 760 500 | 72.4 |
| 1858 | Soap 4 480 000 | Sesame 2 255 000 | Dura 1 908 852 | 70.6 |
| 1859 | Soap 2 500 000 | Oranges 1 200 000 | Sesame 1 000 000 | 63.6 |
| 1860 | Olive oil 10 200 000 | Sesame 3 000 000 | Oranges 1 000 000 | 94.9 |
| 1862 | Olive oil 10 879 024 | Sesame 5 568 234 | Wheat 1 880 200 | 81.8 |
| 1863 | Sesame 8 680 347 | Wheat 3 887 508 | Cotton 3 813 560 | 62.9 |
| 1873 | Wheat 9 300 000 | Sesame 9 000 000 | Oranges 3 607 500 | 69.8 |
| 1874 | Soap 6 000 000 | Sesame 6 000 000 | Wheat 4 876 000 | 63.5 |
| 1875 | Wheat 8 960 000 | Sesame 7 000 000 | Soap 5 580 000 | 65.2 |
| 1876 | Olive oil 24 500 000 | Soap 11 030 000 | Wheat 9 030 000 | 79.2 |
| 1877 | Sesame 6 077 500 | Olive oil 5 500 000 | Oranges 1 230 666 | 81.3 |
| 1879 | Olive oil 10 000 000 | Soap 7 425 000 | Oranges 3 380 000 | 82.3 |
| 1880 | Soap 7 612 500 | Oranges 5 800 000 | Wheat 5 685 000 | 62.2 |
| 1881 | Wheat 11 000 000 | Oranges 6 820 000 | Soap 5 100 000 | 68.3 |
| 1882 | Wheat 9 899 552 | Oranges 8 144 500 | Soap 6 182 000 | 64.1 |

SOURCE Our calculations plus sources listed in note 4.

TABLE 1.5 *Main export articles of Acre, 1872–80 (by quantity)*

| | Wheat (kiles) | Barley (kiles) | Dura (kiles) | Sesame (okes) | Olive oil (okes) |
|------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1872 | 1 500 000 | 500 000 | 600 000 | 2 000 000 | 1 000 000 |
| 1873 | 400 000 | 50 000 | — | 500 000 | — |
| 1874 | 2 000 000 | 500 000 | 2 000 000 | 2 000 000 | 300 000 |
| 1875 | 3 500 000 | 600 000 | 2 500 000 | 3 000 000 | 600 000 |
| 1876 | 1 500 000 | — | 20 000 | 400 000 | 200 000 |
| 1877 | 500 000 | 100 000 | 400 000 | 300 000 | 1 200 000 |
| 1878 | 1 750 000 | — | — | — | — |
| 1879 | 211 219 | — | 4 780 | — | 40 307 |
| 1880 | 260 000 | 80 000 | 100 000 | 800 000 | — |

SOURCE See note 5.

TABLE 1.6 *Main export articles of Haifa, 1872–80 (by quantity)*

| | Wheat (kiles) | Barley (kiles) | Dura (kiles) | Sesame (okes) | Olive oil (okes) |
|------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1872 | 800 000 | 300 000 | 350 000 | 1 500 000 | 100 000 |
| 1873 | 400 000 | 100 000 | — | 500 000 | — |
| 1874 | 800 000 | 150 000 | 600 000 | 1 000 000 | 50 000 |
| 1875 | 1 000 000 | 200 000 | 700 000 | 2 000 000 | 30 000 |
| 1876 | 100 000 | 25 000 | 150 000 | 500 000 | 150 000 |
| 1877 | 80 000 | 20 000 | 150 000 | 200 000 | 150 000 |
| 1878 | 200 000 | 100 000 | — | — | — |
| 1879 | 81 320 | — | — | — | — |
| 1880 | 400 000 | 100 000 | 150 000 | 1 500 000 | — |

SOURCE See note 5.

TABLE 1.7 *Cotton exports from Acre and Haifa, 1852–62*

| Year | Okes |
|------|---------|
| 1852 | 446 545 |
| 1853 | 294 545 |
| 1854 | 37 091 |
| 1855 | 3 819 |
| 1856 | — |
| 1857 | — |
| 1858 | — |
| 1859 | 5 237 |
| 1860 | 69 455 |
| 1861 | 58 909 |
| 1862 | 55 273 |

SOURCE Calculated from Caiffa, 24 July 1863, F.O. 195/771.

TABLE 1.8 *Estimate of the average proportion of northern Palestine's cultivated area devoted to certain crops, 1858–62 (%)*

| | |
|---------------------------------|----|
| Wheat | 40 |
| Barley | 9 |
| Dura | 7 |
| Sesame | 13 |
| Cotton | 6 |
| Lentils, beans and peas | 5 |
| Tobacco | 2 |
| Watermelons, vineyards, figs | 4 |
| Olives | 14 |

SOURCE As Table 1.7.

TABLE 1.9 *Increase in exportation of main export articles from Jaffa (by quantity)*

| | Average annual exports in the years 1857–60 and 1862–3 | Average annual exports in the years 1873–7 and 1879–82 | Increase/decrease (multiples) |
|--------------------|--|--|-------------------------------|
| Wheat (kiles) | 58 333 | 279 156 | 4.79 |
| Barley (kiles) | 121 371 | 101 863 | 0.84 |
| Dura (kiles) | 67 111 | 61 678 | 0.92 |
| Sesame (okes) | 1 245 421 | 2 059 249 | 1.65 |
| Olive oil (okes) | 705 624 | 1 027 346 | 1.46 |
| Soap (okes) | 420 000 | 904 444 | 2.12 |
| Wool (okes) | 10 003 | 115 444 | 11.54 |
| Oranges (numbers)* | 6 050 000 | 19 650 000 | 3.25 |

*Average of the years 1873–7 and 1879 only, as from 1880 onward the quantity was stated in boxes.

SOURCE Our calculation based on sources listed in note 4.

TABLE 1.10 *Exports and imports of Jaffa (Value in PT)*

| Year | Exports | Imports |
|------|------------|------------|
| 1857 | 15 583 350 | |
| 1858 | 12 244 040 | |
| 1859 | 7 384 200 | |
| 1860 | 14 968 500 | |
| 1861 | | |
| 1862 | 22 408 348 | |
| 1863 | 26 039 100 | |
| 1873 | 31 369 000 | |
| 1874 | 26 562 000 | 14 575 500 |
| 1875 | 33 056 750 | 14 166 500 |
| 1876 | 56 283 900 | 29 776 575 |
| 1877 | 15 749 966 | 26 239 745 |
| 1878 | | |
| 1879 | 25 272 500 | 31 642 000 |
| 1880 | 30 725 600 | 29 635 500 |
| 1881 | 33 570 250 | 32 534 000 |
| 1882 | 37 802 744 | 36 964 663 |

Average annual exports (value in PT):

1857–60, 1862–3: 16 437 923

1873–7, 1879–82: 32 265 855

SOURCE See note 4.

TABLE 1.11 *Value of exports and imports of Jaffa, 1876–82, according to non-British consular reports*

| | Exports | Imports | Consular Report |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| 1.3.1876– | | | |
| 1.3.1877 | 10 541 444 Francs | 8 697 660 Francs | French |
| 1876 | 4 350 000 Gulden | 2 144 000 Gulden | Austrian |
| 1879 | 4 024 000 Franken | 2 954 250 Franken | German |
| 1880 | 2 015 000 Gulden | 1 303 000 Gulden | Austrian |
| 1881 | 3 069 000 Gulden | 1 005 200 Gulden | Austrian |
| 1882 | 5 408 750 Franken | 2 647 875 Franken | German |

SOURCES *MAE*, CCC Jer.4 (Jerusalem, 31.7.1879); *ASA*, Archiv Jaffa, Fasz.6 (Jaffa, 12.1.1877) and Fasz.7 (Jaffa, 20.5.1881 and 15.5.1882); *AGCJ*, A.III, vol.1 (Jaffa, 7.3.1883) and A.xxxxix.4 (Jaffa, 31.3.1880).

TABLE 1.12 *Average value of export prices at Jaffa by quarter and year (in PT)*

| Quarter year | Wheat (per kile) | Barley (per kile) | Dura (per kile) | Sesame (per oke) | Olive Oil (per oke) | Cotton (per oke) |
|--|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| I/1856 | 34.5 | 23.5 | 23.5 | 3.125 | | |
| III/1856 | 26.5 | 10.75 | 15.25 | 2.75 | | |
| IV/1856 | 28.5 | 14.5 | 17.25 | 2.875 | | |
| III/1857 | 24 | 12.5 | 17 | | | |
| IV/1857 | 21.5 | 13.5 | 17 | 3.25 | 5.5 | |
| I/1858 | 20 | 9.5 | 11 | 3.125 | 5.25 | |
| II/1858 | 16 | 9 | 9 | 2.75 | 4.25 | |
| III/1858 | 13.75 | 9.5 | 10.5 | 2.5 | 5.25 | |
| IV/1858 | 16.5 | 10.5 | 11.5 | 2.75 | 5.25 | |
| I/1859 | 18.5 | 11.5 | 12.5 | | 5.125 | |
| II/1859 | 22 | 12.5 | 14 | | 5 | |
| III/1859 | 24.5 | 13.5 | 16 | 2.625 | 5 | |
| IV/1859 | 37.5 | 17.5 | 22.5 | 2.875 | 5 | |
| I/1860 | 40 | 17.5 | 27.5 | 3.125 | 5.5 | 7 |
| I/1861 | 38.75 | 16.5 | 23.75 | 3.125 | 6.75 | 7 |
| IV/1861 | 25 | 12.5 | 13.25 | 3.375 | 6 | 9.5 |
| 1862 | 25 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 6.5 | 15 |
| 1863 | 22 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 6 | 20 |
| 1873 | 30 | 13 | 15 | 3 | 6 | 7.5 |
| 1874 | 23 | 12.5 | 16 | 3 | 4.5 | 8 |
| 1875 | 20 | 11 | 13.5 | 2.5 | 5 | 6.5 |
| 1876 | 21 | 12 | 11.5 | 2.75 | 4.75 | |
| 1877 | | | 35 | 3.25 | 5.5 | |
| 1879 | | | | 3 | 5 | |
| 1880 | 30 | 13 | 17 | 3 | 5 | |
| 1881 | 25 | 12.5 | 16.5 | 2.75 | 5.5 | |
| 1882 | 20 | 12 | 16 | 2.625 | 5 | |
| Average of the available figures of the years: | | | | | | |
| 1856-63 | 25.25 | 13.04 | 15.86 | 2.95 | 5.46 | |
| 1873-82 | 24.14 | 12.29 | 17.56 | 2.875 | 5.14 | |

SOURCES Figures for 1856-61 calculated from *PRO*, F.O. 78/1221 (Jaffa, 31.3, 30.9 and 31.12, 1856), 78/1296 (Jaffa, 30.9 and 31.12, 1857), 78/1387 (Jaffa, 31.3, 30.6, 30.9 and 31.12, 1858), 78/1449 (Jaffa, 31.3, 30.6, 30.9 and 31.12 1859), 78/1537 (Jaffa, 31.3 1860) and 78/1605 (Jaffa, 31.3 and 31.12, 1861). Figures for 1862-82 calculated from sources listed in note 4.

TABLE 1.13 *Average annual export prices at Acre, Haifa and Jaffa (in PT)*

| | | Wheat (per kile) | Barley (per kile) | Dura (per kile) | Sesame (per oke) | Olive oil (per oke) |
|------|-------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1874 | Acre | 27 | 14 | 18 | 3 | 5 |
| | Haifa | 24 | 14 | 18 | 3 | |
| | Jaffa | 23 | 12.5 | 16 | 3 | 4.5 |
| 1875 | Acre | 25 | 12 | 17 | 2.5 | 5 |
| | Haifa | 24 | 12 | 18 | 2.25 | |
| | Jaffa | 20 | 11 | 13.5 | 2.5 | 5 |
| 1876 | Acre | 22 | | 11 | 2.125 | 4.5 |
| | Haifa | | | | | |
| | Jaffa | 21 | 12 | 11.5 | 2.75 | 4.75 |
| 1877 | Acre | 36 | 20 | 22 | 3 | 6 |
| | Haifa | 34 | 20 | 22 | 3 | 6 |
| | Jaffa | | | 35 | 3.25 | 5.5 |
| 1878 | Acre | 38 | | | | |
| | Haifa | 30 | 14 | | | |
| | Jaffa | | | | | |
| 1879 | Acre | 40 | | 16 | | 5.5 |
| | Haifa | 35 | | | | |
| | Jaffa | | | | 3 | 5 |
| 1880 | Acre | 30 | 12 | 16 | 2.75 | |
| | Haifa | 30 | 12 | 16 | 2.75 | |
| | Jaffa | 30 | 13 | 17 | 3 | 5 |

SOURCE Jaffa – from Table 1.12; Acre/Haifa – calculated from sources listed in note 5.

TABLE 1.14 *Consumer prices in Jerusalem, 1858 and 1880 (in PT)*

| | 1858 | 1880 |
|--------------------------|--------|-----------|
| 1 ratl of lime | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| 1 camel-load of firewood | 18-25 | 30 |
| 1 ratl of coal | 3 | 1.5 |
| 1 ratl of soap | 13-15 | 12 |
| 1 Arab coat | 90-100 | 80 |
| 1 pair of Arab shoes | 22-24 | 10 |
| 1 cauliflower | 1-2 | 1.5 |
| 1 ratl of cabbage | 3 | 3 |
| 1 ratl of carrots | 2 | 2 |
| 1 ratl of turnips | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| 1 ratl of cucumbers | 4 | 2 |
| 1 ratl of onions | 3-4 | 3.5 |
| 1 pomegranate | 0.5 | 0.25 |
| 8 oranges | 1 | 1 |
| 1 ratl of figs | 3-4 | 1.5-3 |
| 1 ratl of almonds | 12-16 | 10 |
| 1 ratl of raisins | 10-12 | 6 |
| 1 ratl of olive oil | 10 | 15 |
| 1 ratl of sesame oil | 15 | 22.5 |
| 1 ratl of beans | 4-6 | 7 |
| 1 ratl of lentils | 3 | 8 |
| 1 ratl of rice | 7-9 | 8-9 |
| 1 tumniya of wheat | 10-12 | 5-11.25 |
| 1 tumniya of barley | 6.5 | 3-6.25 |
| 1 tumniya of dura | 7 | 2.75-6.75 |
| 1 ratl of flour | 5.5 | 4-10 |
| 1 ratl of butter | 54 | 36 |
| 1 ratl of cheese | 16-24 | 18 |
| 1 ratl of mutton | 15 | 12-18 |
| 1 chicken | 6-7 | 8 |
| 4 eggs | 1 | 0.5 |
| 1 pigeon | 2 | 2 |
| 1 ratl of salt | 2 | 3 |
| 1 ratl of vinegar | 6 | 3 |
| 1 ratl of honey | 30 | 36 |
| 1 ratl of sugar | 22-23 | 16 |
| 1 ratl of coffee | 24 | 33 |
| 1 ratl of local wine | 10-13 | 9 |

SOURCE Figures for 1858 from *Titus Toblers dritte Wanderung nach Palästina im Jahre 1857* (Gotha, 1859), pp.331-3. For 1880 from A. M. Luncz, *Jerusalem. Jahrbuch zur Beförderung einer wissenschaftlich genauen Kenntniss des jetzigen und des alten Palästinas*, (1. Jahrgang, 1881), (Wien, 1882) pp.11-6. Conversion of weights and measures from Leonhard Bauer, *Das Palästinische Arabisch*, 4th edn (Leipzig, 1926) p.256 (1 oke = 1.28kg; 1 ratl = 2.88kg; 1 tumniya = 2.25 litres; 1 kile = 36 litres).

TABLE 1.15 *Main imports at Jaffa, 1874-7 and 1879-82 (in PT)*

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1874 | Coffee 3 920 000 Coffee | Rice 3 397 500 Sugar | Sugar 2 400 000 Rice | Cotton manufactures 2 240 000 Cotton manufactures 1 920 000 | Timber 1 540 000 Timber | Wine 573 000 Wine | Cloth 295 000 Cloth |
| 1875 | 4 040 000 Coffee | 2 990 000 Sugar | 2 447 500 Cotton manufactures 3 934 500 | Rice 3 574 175 Cotton manufactures 3 362 145 | 1 869 500 Fancy-goods | 515 000 Petroleum | 360 000 Cloth |
| 1876 | 10 802 000 Sugar | 6 924 000 Coffee | 3 934 500 Rice | 3 574 175 Cotton manufactures 3 362 145 | 1 156 250 Fancy-goods | 850 000 Wheat | 709 400 Dura |
| 1877 | 5 390 000 | 5 169 000 | 3 869 250 | 3 362 145 | 2 130 000 | 1 925 000 | 875 000 |
| 1879 | Sugar 10 350 000 Sugar | Rice 3 992 500 Rice | Wheat and Flour 3 868 000 Coffee | Coffee 3 760 000 Cotton manufactures 3 250 000 | Cotton manufactures 2 800 000 Fancy-goods | Fancy-goods 2 295 000 Petroleum | Cloth 939 000 Cloth |
| 1880 | 10 500 000 Sugar | 4 757 500 Fancy-goods | 4 140 000 Rice | 3 250 000 Cotton manufactures 3 220 000 | 2 080 000 Coffee | 1 600 000 Petroleum | 1 067 000 Timber |
| 1881 | 10 125 000 Sugar | 5 985 000 Rice | 4 099 500 Fancy-goods | 3 220 000 Cotton manufactures 3 536 000 | 3 162 500 Coffee | 1 980 000 Petroleum | 1 215 000 Timber |
| 1882 | 9 421 500 | 6 683 350 | 5 578 325 | 3 536 000 | 3 261 000 | 2 880 000 | 1 680 000 |

SOURCE See note 4.

TABLE 1.16 *Daily wages in the building industry in Jerusalem, 1861–3*

| | Masons | Stonecutters | Unskilled workers |
|--------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|
| October 1861 | 24 PT | 11–16 PT | 2–5 PT |
| May 1862 | 25 PT | 13 PT | 3–6 PT |
| August 1863 | 28 PT | 18 PT | 3.5–6 PT |

SOURCE ASA, Archiv Jerusalem, n.16 Kurrentakten 1850–59 samt Nachrichten, Dossier 'Neweh Scholom, Israelitisches Pilger-und Armenhaus auf Zion'.

TABLE 1.17 *Occupational structure of the population of Jerusalem in 1877*

| | Sephardim | Ashkenazim | Muslims | Local Christians | Europeans |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|------------|---------|------------------|-----------|
| Grocers | 49 | 47 | 41 | 48 | |
| Greengrocers | 5 | | 39 | 11 | |
| Spice dealers | | | 35 | | |
| Poultry and egg dealers | 7 | | | | |
| Milkmen | | 16 | | | |
| Flour dealers | | 20 | | | |
| Grain dealers | | 7 | | | |
| Wine and spirits dealers | 5 | 21 | | | |
| Butchers and meat vendors | 17 | 10 | 17 | | 1 |
| Bakers* | 12 | 23 | 6 | 6 | 2 |
| | (23) | | | | |
| Millers | 1 | 12 | 2 | 4 | |
| | (3) | (18) | | | |
| Manufacturers of sweets | | | 8 | | |
| Coffee grinders and coffee roasters | 2 | 9 | 6 | 1 | |
| Tobacconists | 4 | 10 | 36 | 38 | |
| Manufacturers of tobacco | 1 | | | 6 | |
| Manufacturers of sesame oil | | | 7 | | |
| Soap-boilers | | | | 2 | |
| Textile merchants | 58 | 3 | 54 | | |
| Haberdashers | 18 | 9 | 8 | | |
| Dealers in household utensils | 6 | 2 | 7 | 7 | |
| Charcoal dealers | 6 | 2 | 8 | | |
| Dealers in leather | | 9 | | | |
| Second-hand dealers and pedlars | 26 | 4 | | | |
| Booksellers | 3 | 4 | | | 1 |

TABLE 1.17 *continued*

| | Sephardim | Ashkenazim | Muslims | Local Christians | Europeans |
|---------------------------------|-----------|------------|---------|------------------|-----------|
| Cotton merchants | 2 | | 2 | | |
| Timber merchants | | | | 3 | |
| Ironmongers | | 1 | | | |
| Dealers in glassware** | | | 4 | | |
| Candle dealers | | | | 6 | |
| Dealers in mother-of-pearl ware | | | | 8 | |
| Wholesale merchants | | | | 2 | 5 |
| Tailors | 27 | 46 | | 8 | 4 |
| | | (8) | | | |
| Shoemakers | 48 | 45 | 21 | 54 | 2 |
| | | (17) | | | |
| Hat makers | 3 | 3 | | | 1 |
| Furriers | | 5 | | | |
| Manufacturers of mattresses | 8 | | | | |
| Joiners and wood turners | 3 | 77 | | 12 | 4 |
| | | (53) | | | |
| Plumbers | 21 | 11 | | 2 | |
| Locksmiths | 2 | | | | |
| Gunsmiths | 1 | | | 2 | |
| Blacksmiths | | 6 | | 6 | 2 |
| Gold- and silversmiths | 9 | 14 | | 14 | |
| | | (4) | | | |
| Coppersmiths | 4 | 3 | | 10 | |
| Engravers | | 6 | | | |
| Potters | | 2 | | | |
| Glass-workers | | 5 | | | |
| Mirror manufacturers | | 1 | | | |
| Bookbinders | 3 | 11 | | | |
| | | (4) | | | |
| Typesetters | 4 | 12 | | | |
| Printers | | 10 | | | |
| Dyers | | 3 | 11 | | |
| Weavers | | 2 | | | |
| Saddlers | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Umbrella makers | | 4 | | | |
| Pipe makers | | | 2 | | |
| Menders of waterbags | | | 4 | | |
| Brush makers | 1 | | | | |
| Brass founders | 3 | 2 | | | |

TABLE 1.17 *continued*

| | Sephardim | Ashkenazim | Muslims | Local Christians | Europeans |
|--|-----------|------------|---------|------------------|-----------|
| Painters | | 2 | | | |
| Paperhangers | | 2 | | | |
| Whitewashers | 5 | 10 | | | |
| Stone-cutters | 1 | 3 | | 4 | |
| Masons | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Architects | | | 2 | | 2 |
| Building contractors | | 7 | | | |
| Watchmakers | | 11 | | | |
| | | (3) | | | |
| Sewing machine workers | | 5 | | | |
| Photographers | | | | 2 | |
| Chemists | | 12 | | 5 | 4 |
| Barbers | 3 | 8 | 9 | 14 | |
| Auctioneers | 3 | | 3 | | |
| Brokers | | 10 | | | |
| Interpreters and dragomans | 3 | 2 | | | |
| Scribes | 10 | 22 | 10 | | |
| Money changers | 24 | 3 | | | |
| Bankers | 2 | 2 | | | 2 |
| Proprietors of a coffeehouse | 2 | | 23 | 6 | |
| Proprietors of restaurants and public bars | 13 | | 17 | 21 | |
| Hotel proprietors | | | | | 3 |
| Domestic servants | 12 | 6 | | | |
| Day labourers | | 157 | | | |
| Porters | 57 | 6 | | | |
| Street sweepers | 5 | | | | |
| Muleteers and coachmen | 4 | 3 | | | |
| Musicians | 3 | | | | |
| Employees of the Jewish communities† | 88 | 255 | | | |
| Khakhamim | 290 | | | | |
| Beggars | 120 | 25 | | | |

* Apprentices and assistants in brackets.

** Probably Hebron glassware.

† Among them 17 Sephardic meat vendors.

SOURCE Luncz, *Jerusalem: Jahrbuch zur Beförderung*, pp. 33–60.

TABLE 1.18 *Traffic between Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1877*

| | Charged | Not charged | Road toll to be paid |
|------------------|---------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Carriages | 1 550 | 850 | 26 550 PT |
| Horses and Mules | 22 000 | 11 000 | 27 500 PT |
| Camels | 21 000 | 8 300 | 37 725 PT |
| Donkeys | 25 200 | 23 500 | 18 475 PT |
| | | | <u>110 250 PT</u> |

SOURCE Jerusalem, 24 Oct. 1879, *MAE*, CCC. Jerusalem 4.

TABLE 1.19 *Annual income from transport between Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1881 (£T)*

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| Passenger and freight carriages | 6 640 |
| Transport of goods on camels | 10 660 |
| Riding horses and mules | 3 500 |
| Transport of goods and men on donkeys | <u>3 150</u> |
| | <u>23 950</u> |

SOURCE Loehnis, *Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer Informationsreise in die Levante*, p. 242.

TABLE 1.20 *Occupational structure of Bethlehem (about 1890)*

| | |
|---|-----|
| Peasants and sheepfarmers | 300 |
| Masons | 30 |
| Stonecutters | 250 |
| Quarrymen | 50 |
| Plasterers | 6 |
| Cameliers | 40 |
| Carters | 8 |
| Manufacturers and salesman of 'Bethlehem ware' | 129 |
| Dealers in fat, oil and cheese | 69 |
| Cheese-makers | 10 |
| Sheep merchants | 16 |
| Grain merchants | 8 |
| Wine merchants | 6 |
| Greengrocers | 5 |
| Millers | 41 |
| Bakers | 8 |
| Butchers | 7 |
| Textile merchants | 19 |
| Dealers in silk and passementerie | 8 |
| Weavers | 4 |
| Dyers | 4 |
| Shoemakers | 21 |
| Leather workers | 6 |
| Makers of waterbags | 3 |
| Basket makers | 2 |
| Joiners | 5 |
| Cartwrights | 5 |
| Gunsmiths | 6 |
| Plumbers | 2 |
| File cutters | 5 |
| Blacksmiths | 7 |
| Gold- and coppersmiths | 4 |
| Gardeners | 2 |
| Porters | 1 |
| Barbers | 5 |
| Proprietors of a coffeehouse | 5 |
| Hotel proprietors | 1 |
| Money changers | 3 |
| Doctors | 2 |

SOURCE Palmer, 'Das jetzige Bethlehem', pp. 91-4.

TABLE 1.21 *Occupational structure of Nazareth 1890*

| | |
|--|------|
| Peasants | 300 |
| Grain merchants and large landed proprietors | 24 |
| Grocers, and dealers in fat, oil and cheese | 56 |
| Greengrocers | 15 |
| Bakers, confectioners and proprietors of restaurants | 6 |
| Textile merchants | 43 |
| Dealers in household utensils | 10 |
| Butchers | 8 |
| Millers | 9 |
| Joiners | 15 |
| Cartwrights | 8 |
| Blacksmiths | 20 |
| Cutlers | 18 |
| Coppersmiths | 7 |
| Goldsmiths | 6 |
| Saddlers and felt makers | 25 |
| Gunsmiths | 8 |
| Pipe makers | 7 |
| Sieve makers | 3 |
| Plumbers | 8 |
| Weavers | 10 |
| Tailors | 6 |
| Dyers | 10 |
| Tanners | 12 |
| Shoemakers | 39 |
| Soap-boilers | 1 |
| Masons | 16 |
| Stone-cutters | 53 |
| Quarrymen | 22 |
| Lime-burners | 6 |
| Plasterers | 15 |
| Hirers of horses and donkeys | 8–10 |
| Gardeners | 24 |
| Barbers | 16 |
| Proprietors of a coffeehouse | 3 |
| Proprietors of a public bar | 10 |
| Hotel proprietors | 2 |

SOURCE Schumacher, 'Das jetzige Nazareth', pp. 243–5. Compare also Mansur, pp. 285–6.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|--|
| AGCJ | Archives of the German Consulate in Jerusalem (the original documents are kept in the Israel State Archives) |
| AGFO | Archives of the German Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn) |
| ASA | Austrian State Archives (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna) |
| MAE | Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris |
| PEFQS | Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statements |
| PP | (British) Parliamentary Papers |
| PRO | Public Record Office, London |
| SWP | Survey of Western Palestine, 6 vols, Jerusalem 1970 (reprint of the Galilee, Samaria, Judaea, Jerusalem, and General Index volumes, originally published in London 1881–8) |
| ZDMG | Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft |
| ZDPV | Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins |

Die Warte This was the Templars' paper, the full title of which was *Süddeutsche Warte* until 1877 when it was changed to *Die Warte des Tempels*. This chapter quotes solely from the following collection of *Warte* articles: Alex Carmel (ed.), *Palästina-Chronik 1853 bis 1882* (Ulm, 1978)

Baldensperger Diaries These diaries (1848–75) are to be found among the Granqvist Papers, 52A, in the Archives of the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) in London. I am most grateful to Mrs G. Webster of the PEF for allowing me to consult this material.

In this chapter I have presented some results of a study on the socio-economic development of Palestine during the period 1856–82 on which I have been working in the context of a research project at the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Free University of Berlin. The study was financed by the Volkswagen Foundation.

1. H. Zschokke, 'Palästina auf der Weltausstellung in Wien 1873', *Das Heilige Land*, xviii (1874) pp.4–8.
2. Cf. Dominique Chevallier, *La Société du Mont Liban à l'Époque de la Révolution Industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971) chap. xiii; Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, 'Ein Modellfall indirekter wirtschaftlicher

- Durchdringung: Das Beispiel Syrien', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 1 (1975) pp.482–505.
3. Furthermore, there are numerous arithmetical errors in the original reports of British consuls in Jaffa, and additional misprints in the tables reproduced in the parliamentary papers. Thus, the final amounts appearing in those tables of this paper which are based on British consular reports are not always identical with the sum totals given in PRO or PP documents.
 4. If no other sources are given, all data and statements on the trade of Jaffa are based on the following annual reports of British consuls: 1857: PRO, F.O.78/1296 (Jaffa, 31.12.1857); 1858: PRO, F.O.78/1387 (Jaffa, 31.12.1858); 1859: PRO, F.O.78/1449 (Jaffa, 31.12.1859); 1860: PRO, F.O.78/1537 (Jaffa, 31.12.1860); 1862: PP 1863/LXX (Jaffa, 27.1.1863); 1863: PP 1864/LXI (Jaffa, May 1864); 1873: PP 1874/LXVII (Jaffa, February 1874); 1874: PP 1875/LXXVII (Jaffa, April 1875); 1875: PP 1876/LXXV (Jaffa, February 1876); 1876: PP 1877/LXXXIII (Jaffa, March 1877); 1877: PP 1878/LXXIV (Jaffa, May 1878); 1879: PP 1880/LXXIV (Jaffa, February 1880); 1880: PP 1881/XC (Jaffa, March 1881); 1881: PP 1882/LXXI (Jaffa, May 1882); 1882: PP 1883/LXXII (Jaffa, March 1883).
 5. If no other sources are given, all data and statements on the trade of Acre and Haifa are based on the following annual reports of the German consuls in Haifa/Acre: 1872: AGCJ, A.xxxix.1 (Haifa, 5.3.1873); 1873: AGCJ, A.xxxix.2 (Haifa, 23.4.1874); 1874: AGCJ, A.xxxix.2 (Haifa, 27.1.1875); 1875: AGCJ, A.xxxix.2 (Acre, 24.2.1876); 1876: AGCJ, A.xxxix.3 (Haifa, 25.1.1877); 1877: AGCJ, A.xxxix.3 (Haifa, 19.1.1878); 1878: AGCJ, A.xxxix.4 (Haifa, 20.1.1879); 1879: AGCJ, A.xxxix.4 (Haifa, 10.1.1880); 1880: AGCJ, A.xxxix.4 (Haifa, 7.1.1881); for 1856 see PP 1857/Sess.2/xxxviii (Jerusalem, 31.12.1856).
 6. On the correlation between rainfall and grain prices see Thomas Chaplin, 'Das Klima von Jerusalem', *ZDPV*, xiv (1891) pp.99–100; Gustaf Dalman, *Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina*, 7 vols, Gütersloh 1928–41, vol.1/1, p.132 and vol.1/2, pp.300–1. On Palestinian 'locust years' see Dalman, op.cit., vol.1/2, p.393.
 7. The participation of an influential family in the Jabal Nablus in this export boom by investing capital in the grain trade during the years 1853–8 has been described in detail by Ya'akov Firestone: 'Production and Trade in an Islamic Context: Sharika Contracts in the Transitional Economy of Northern Samaria, 1853–1943 (i)', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975) pp.191–5.
 8. H.B.Tristram, *The Land of Israel* 4th edn. (London, 1882) pp.577–8; Y.Karmon, 'The Settlement of the Northern Huleh Valley since 1838', *Israel Exploration Journal*, 3 (1953) p.11.
 9. On the development of cotton growing in northern Palestine see above all PRO, F.O.78/1384 (Caiffa, 20.11.1857); PRO, F.O.195/771 (Caiffa, 24.7.1863); PP 1872/LVII (Beyrout, March 1872); Julius Zwiedinek von Südenhorst, *Syrien und seine Bedeutung für den Welthandel* (Wien, 1873) pp.52–6.
 10. Calculated from PP 1872/LVII (Beyrout, March 1872).

11. *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.1 (Haifa, 5.3.1873).
12. *PP* 1878/LXXIII (Beyrout, 16.8.1877).
13. Alexander Dorn, *Die nationale Ausstellung zu Constantinopel 1863* (Leipzig, 1864) p.88.
14. On this development see: *PP* 1857 Sess.2/xxxvii (Beyrout, 21.5.1857); *PRO*, F.O.78/1296 (Jaffa, 22.12.1857); *PRO*, F.O.78/1384 (Jerusalem, 28.1.1858); *PRO*, F.O.78/1537 (Jaffa, 6.6.1860); *PRO*, F.O.78/1605 (Jerusalem, 26.9.1861); *PP* 1863/LXX (Jaffa, 27.1.1863); *PRO*, F.O.78/1775 (Jerusalem, 26.8.1863); *AGCJ*, A.iii.4 (Jerusalem, 25.11.1863); *PP* 1864/LXI (Jaffa, May 1864); *PRO*, F.O.78/1834 (Jaffa, 15.3., 15.4., 7.6., and 7.11.1864); *PRO*, F.O.78/1874 (Jaffa, 13.6.1865); *PRO*, F.O.78/1929 (Jerusalem, 11.6.1866).
15. Cf. *PP* 1865/LIII (Jerusalem, March 1865); *PP* 1866/LXX (Jerusalem, March 1866); *PP* 1867/LXVII (Jerusalem, 16.1.1867); *PP* 1867/8/LXVIII (Jerusalem, January 1868); *PP* 1872/LVIII (Jerusalem, 25.4.1872); *PP* 1874/LXVI (Jerusalem, 12.9.1873); *PP* 1874/LXVII (Jerusalem, February 1874).
16. Cf. *PRO*, F.O.78/1537 (Jaffa, 31.12.1860); *PRO*, F.O.78/1874 (Jaffa, 13.6.1865); *PRO*, F.O.78/1929 (Jerusalem, 11.6.1866).
17. On olive cultivation see Leo Anderlind, 'Die Fruchtbäume in Syrien, insbesondere Palästina', *ZDPV*, xi (1888) pp.69–77; F.A. Klein, 'Mittheilungen über Leben, Sitten und Gebräuche der Fellachen in Palästina', *ZDPV*, iv (1881) pp.81–2.
18. On the process of production see G.Gatt, 'Industrielles aus Gaza', *ZDPV*, viii (1885) pp.77–9; Dalman, *op.cit.*, iv, pp.273–7; Ihsan al-Nimr, *Ta'rikh Jabal Nablus wal-Balqa'* vol.ii (Nablus, 1961) pp.288–91.
19. Zwiedinek, *op.cit.*, p.46; Anderlind, 'Die Fruchtbäume', *loc.cit.*, pp.76–7; Claude Reignier Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine*, 2 vols (London, 1878) vol.ii, p.325.
20. On the extension of olive plantations see *PP* 1863/LXX (Jaffa, 27.1.1863) and *PP* 1872/LVII (Beyrout, March 1872); Zwiedinek (*op.cit.*, p.46) was given the information that 500 000 olive trees would be planted in Syria annually. It took about ten years until a new plant bore fruit (Anderlind, 'Die Fruchtbäume', p.70). On orange plantations see below.
21. Cf. Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.ii, p.325; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, p.141; Zwiedinek, *op.cit.*, pp.47–51.
22. *PRO*, F.O.78/1419 (Jaffa, 17.5.1856 – Answers to queries).
23. *PP* 1874/LXVII (Jerusalem, February 1874).
24. *PP* 1881/XC (Beyrout, 19.3.1881).
25. *PP* 1882/LXXI (Jaffa, May 1882). The same calculation is to be found in W.M.Thomson, *The Land and the Book* (London, 1894) p.519. On orange cultivation see also Anderlind, 'Die Fruchtbäume', pp. 84–8 and *Die Warte*, 18.6.1874.
26. *PRO*, F.O.78/1294 (Jerusalem, 1.1.1857).
27. *PRO*, F.O.78/1383 (Jerusalem, 9.10.1858).
28. *PRO*, F.O.78/1834 (Jaffa, 15.3.1864).
29. *PP* 1881/XC (Beyrout, 19.3.1881).
30. See e.g. *Das Heilige Land*, xvii (1873) p.188; *Die Warte*, 2.4. and

- 11.6.1874; Ph. Wolff, 'Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems. Von 1843–84', *ZDPV*, VIII (1885) pp.12–13.
31. Texts of the various land laws of our period in: I. de Testa (ed.), *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissances Étrangères*, 11 vols (Paris, 1864–1911) vol.vii, pp.729–55; Grégoire Aristarchi (ed.), *Législation Ottomane*, 7 vols (Constantinople, 1873–88) vol.i, pp.19–26, 57–240, 254–66; George Young (ed.), *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, 7 vols (Oxford, 1905–6) vol.i, pp.334–45, vol.vi, pp.45–107; Stanley Fisher (ed.), *Ottoman Land Laws* (London, 1919) pp.1–80; Interpretation of the law of 1858 (29 pages) in *ASA*, P.A.XII, Karton 64 (Constantinople, 27.8.1858); translation of and comments on the 1874 law of title deeds (24 pages) in *AGCJ*, A.XXII.4. Studies: Ed. Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882) vol.i, pp.205–14, vol.ii, pp.124–8; A.Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London, 1952); Paul J.Klat, 'The Origins of Landownership in Syria', *Middle East Economic Papers* (Beirut, 1958); G.Baer, 'The Evolution of Private Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent', in Charles Issawi (Ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914* (Chicago, 1966); Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*, 2nd edn (New York, 1973) pp.99–100 and 256–62.
 32. Cf. 'Der Ackerbau in Palästina', *Das Heilige Land*, xvi (1872) pp.44–7 and 116–19; Granott, op.cit., chap.iii.
 33. *AGFO*, Botschaftsakten Konstantinopel: Gen.76.K.18.d (Beirut, 12.4.1868); Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria*, 2 vols (New York, 1910) vol.ii, p.423; *Translations of a letter addressed by Sir Moses Montefiore ... to the Jewish congregations in the Holy Land, on the promotion of agriculture and other industrial pursuits in that country, and of the replies received thereto* (London, 1874) pp.15, 29, 31–2, 34, 38–9, 45, 53, 63–5, 79.
 34. *Translations of a letter addressed by Sir Moses Montefiore*, p.32; Adolphus Rosenberg, 'The Condition of Palestine', *Fraser's Magazine*, N.S.xii (1875) p.125.
 35. Claude Reignier Conder, *Heth and Moab. Explorations in Syria in 1881 and 1882* (London, 1883) pp.366–7.
 36. Georg Ebers and Hermann Guthe, *Palästina in Bild und Wort*, 2 vols (Stuttgart and Leipzig s.d. [1882]) vol.i, p.271.
 37. *AGCJ*, A.xxxvii.5.a; see also *An open letter addressed to Sir Moses Montefiore ... together with a narrative of a forty days' sojourn in the Holy Land ...* (London, 1875) pp.63–4; L.Loewe (ed.), *Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore*, vol.ii (London, 1890) p.180 and 274–5.
 38. H.Loehnis, *Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer Informationsreise in die Levante an Bord des Dampfers 'Lucifer'* (Leipzig, 1882) p.254.
 39. *PRO*, F.O.195/1369 (Beirut, 23.7.1880).
 40. Conder, *Heth and Moab*, p.368.
 41. Some figures for the 1870s and the first half of the 1880s are to be found in Leo Anderlind, 'Ackerbau und Thierzucht in Syrien, insbesondere in Palästina' *ZDPV*, ix (1886) pp.52–4; see also *PRO* F.O.195/1202 (Jerusalem, 23.11.1878); James Neil *Palestine Re-Peopled; or, Scattered Israel's Gathering*, 3rd edn (London, 1877) pp.13–16.

42. Hubert Auhagen, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Landesnatur und der Landwirtschaft Syriens* (Berlin, 1907) p.52.
43. Granott, *op.cit.*, pp.38–9.
44. *AGFO*, Botschaftsakten Konstantinopel: Gen.76.K.18.d (Beirut, 12.4.1868).
45. Head of an influential merchant family in Haifa; see quotation on p.46 and Granott, *op.cit.*, p.81; Alex Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas in der türkischen Zeit 1516-1918* (Wiesbaden, 1975) p.131.
46. All details of these land transfers according to As'ad Mansur, *Ta'rikh al-Nasira* (Cairo, 1924) pp.287–8.
47. Zwiedinek, *op.cit.*, pp.25, 51, 56, 67–8.
48. On the Sursuq enterprise see *Personal Recollections of Turkish Misrule and Corruption in Syria* (London, 1877) p.14; Conder, *Tent Work* vol.I, pp.165–6, vol.II, p.328; C.R.Conder, 'The Present Condition of Palestine', *PEFQS* (1879) pp.10 and 13; Laurence Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead* (Edinburgh, 1880) pp.328–32; *SWP*, Galilee, p.356; Loehnis, *op.cit.*, p.253; Wm.Wright, 'Syrian Colonization', *Contemporary Review*, 43 (1883) p.133; Anderlind, 'Ackerbau', *loc.cit.*, p.53; Alfred Bonne, *Palästina – Land und Wirtschaft* (Leipzig, 1932) pp. 144–5; Granott, *op.cit.*, pp.39, 80–1, 83.
49. *PRO*, F.O.78/2282 (Haifa, 28.12.1872).
50. *Die Warte*, 29.6.1871.
51. Cf. Martin Hartmann, 'Das Bahnnetz Mittelsyriens', *ZDPV*, xvii (1894) p.57; Young, *op.cit.*, vol.IV, p.242; Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, p.112.
52. See e.g. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.478–9; Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.I, pp.112–13; Fr.v.Hellwald and L.C.Beck, *Die heutige Türkei*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1878–9) vol.II, p.256; Ebers and Guthe, *op.cit.*, vol.I, p.276.
53. Cf. Archives of the Palestine Exploration Fund, Granquist Papers, 52A: *Baldensperger Diaries 1848-1875*, entry of 30.9.1850; *PRO*, F.O.78/1605 (Jerusalem, 13.1.1861); *Die Warte*, 8.11.1866; *AGCJ*, A.xxxvii.5.a (Jerusalem, 6.11.1872 and 25.7.1873); *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.3 (Jerusalem, 20.3.1877); *AGCJ*, A.xxii.1.c (Jerusalem, 2.5.1883: the Governor to the Consul).
54. *Die Warte*, 2.12.1875; *Das Heilige Land* xx (1876) pp.82–3; Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.II, pp.256 and 328–9; *La Terre Sainte*, 1879–80–81, pp.147–8; *SWP*, Samaria, pp. 407 and 444; *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.4 (Jerusalem, 24.3.1881); William M.Thomson, *Southern Palestine and Jerusalem* (London, 1881) p.115; James Neil, 'Land Tenure in Ancient Times, as Preserved by the Present Village Communities in Palestine', *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, 24 (1890) p.189; Granott, *op.cit.*, pp.84 and 287–8.
55. *Die Warte*, 2.12.1875; *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.2 (Jerusalem, 3.5.1876); *AGCJ*, B.I.82.c (Jerusalem, 28.8.1909: Denkschrift Abou-Schousche betreffend).
56. Cf. *Die Warte*, 29.9.1870; *SWP*, Samaria, p.256; André Chouraqui, *L'Alliance Israélite Universelle et la Renaissance Juive Contemporaine (1860-1960)* (Paris, 1965) pp.357–63 and 494–5.

57. Dr Sepp, *Jerusalem und das Heilige Land*, 2 vols (Schaffhausen, 1863) vol.1, p.xxv; *Titus Toblers dritte Wanderung*, p.361.
58. Sepp, op.cit., vol.1, p.xxvi; *Titus Toblers dritte Wanderung*, p.369; see also MAE, CPC, Jerusalem 5 (Jerusalem, 14.4.1857); MAE, CPC, Jerusalem 8 (Jerusalem, 1.5.1864); PRO, F.O.78/1383 (Jerusalem, 13.4.1858); PRO, F.O.78/1448 (Jerusalem, 27.4.1859); ASA, Archiv Jerusalem, 47: Korrespondenzen 1865 (Jerusalem, 11.5.1865).
59. Ermete Pierotti, *Jerusalem Explored*, vol.1 (Cambridge, 1864) p.275.
60. *Die Warte*, 13.6.1872 and 22.5.1873; Bernhard Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt und deren Bewohner* (Hamburg, 1877) p.216; *Das Heilige Land*, xxiv (1880) p.201; a partial, but detailed survey of the pilgrims accommodated in Jerusalem convents, hospices and hotels during the 1879/80 season is to be found in Luncz, op.cit., pp.138–41.
61. On Russian pilgrims see Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843–1914* (Oxford, 1969) *passim*, especially pp.103 and 116, n.5.
62. *Die Warte*, 8.6., 29.6. and 20.7.1882.
63. *La Terre Sainte 1875–76–77–78*, pp.240–2 and 830–1.
64. Neumann, op.cit., p.217. Early in 1874, the British consul had spoken of 3000 foreigners and protégés in Jerusalem: PRO, F.O.195/1047 (Jerusalem, 21.2.1874).
65. Cf. Y.Ben-Arieh, 'The Growth of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century', *Annals of the American Association of Geography*, 65/2 (1975); Y. Ben-Arieh, 'Patterns of Christian Activity and Dispersion in Nineteenth-Century Jerusalem', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 2/1 (1976). But see also Wolff, op.cit.; C.Schick, 'Die Baugeschichte der Stadt Jerusalem, Teil VII', *ZDPV*, xvii (1894); Leonhard Bauer, *Volksleben im Lande der Bibel* (Leipzig, 1903) pp. 329–42 (Jerusalem in the nineteenth century); 'Arif al-'Arif, *Al-mufasssal fi tarikh al-Quds* (Jerusalem, 1961) pp.303–4.
66. Wolff, op.cit., p.7.
67. Cf. *Das Heilige Land*, xx (1876) pp.83–4; Neil, *Palestine Re-peopled*, pp.28–31; Luncz, op.cit., p.192; Schick, op.cit., p.268.
68. G.Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem und seine Umgebung* (Waldsee, 1877) p.304.
69. *Titus Toblers dritte Wanderung*, p.112; Klein, 'Mittheilungen', *ZDPV*, III (1880) p.108; Schick, op.cit., p.267; J.E.Hanauer, 'Notes on the History of Modern Colonisation in Palestine', *PEFQS* (1900) pp.125–6.
70. About the rise of the timber trade see *Die Warte*, 2.4.1874.
71. In 1881, Luncz (op.cit., pp.195–6) told of a Jew who had returned from Vienna where he had learned the manufacture of tiles. He was given a credit from the Montefiore Testimonial Fund to enable him to establish a workshop in Jerusalem.
72. Schick, op.cit., pp.270–1.
73. Compare also the detailed survey of the occupational structure of those Jews of Jerusalem who were Austrian subjects (1207 persons, plus 58 Christians): ASA, Archiv Jaffa, Faszikel 6 (Jerusalem, 26.9.1877).
74. 'Arif al-'Arif, op.cit., pp.348–50.
75. Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, pp.303–5.

76. Luncz, op.cit., p.54.
 77. Ibid., pp.40–1.
 78. Ibid., p.52.
 79. Compare the reports of the British consul in *PP* 1874/LXVI (Jerusalem, 12.9.1873); *PP* 1874/LXVII (Jerusalem, February 1874); *PP* 1880/LXXXIV (Jerusalem, March 1880); and the tables which the firms Duisberg and Bergheim prepared for the German consul: *AGCJ* A.xxxix.2 (Jerusalem, 11.1.1875, 2.4.1875, 19.1.1876); *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.3 (Jerusalem, 3.2.1877, 18.1.1878).
 80. Cf. *PRO*, F.O.78/1294 (Jerusalem, 24.11.1857); *Das Heilige Land*, XI (1867) p.89; James Finn, *Byeways in Palestine* (London, 1868) pp.41 and 45–6; Zwiedinek, op.cit., p.52; Neumann, op.cit., p.223; Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p.303; H.B.Tristram, *Pathways in Palestine*, 2 vols (London, 1881–2) vol.I, p.116; ‘The Belka Arabs’, *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine*, cxxxiv (1883) p.173; description of the bazaars of Jerusalem in Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.I, pp.34–42.
 81. On Salt as a centre of trade see Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.141 and 545; Oliphant, op.cit., pp.200–5.
 82. *Baldensperger Diaries*, entries from 9 to 16 August 1858.
 83. *Die Warte*, 9.8.1877; Klein, ‘Mittheilungen’, *ZDPV*, IV (1881) p.78.
 84. H.B.Tristram, *The Land of Moab* (London, 1873) pp.360–1; Selah Merrill, *East of the Jordan* (London, 1881) p.220.
 85. *MAE*, CCC, Jérusalem 2 (Jerusalem, 1.7.1847).
 86. Mrs Finn reported the story of a woman from Bait Jala whose family had become dependent on Sulaiman al-‘Asali, the owner of a soap factory in Jerusalem, twelve years earlier when the father of her husband could not pay his taxes:
 He pledged his olive trees for 500 Piastres, and wrote a bond upon himself to pay fifteen jars of oil to Sulaiman Assali; and if there is any deficient, he was to pay two jars of oil next year for every one. That year was also a bad one, and our olives were stolen, and we had only three jars of oil; so Sulaiman wrote a bond upon my father-in-law for twenty-four jars of oil for the next harvest, and if any were deficient, two were to be given for every one . . . We now owe him still eighty jars of oil.
 Mrs Finn, *Home in the Holy Land* (London, 1866) pp.350–3.
 87. Ibid., p.93. Consul Finn, her husband, reported about a rich Jerusalem soap-merchant who by marriage became allied to the Samhan clan of the Jabal al-Quds: *PRO*, F.O.78/1032 (Jerusalem, 24.II.1854).
 88. Neumann, op.cit., p.222.
 89. The fact that the relevant paragraph in Neumann’s book reminds one of a similar passage in Edward Robinson, *Biblical Researches in Palestine and the Adjacent Regions*, 3 vols (Jerusalem, 1970) (reprint) vol.I, p.428, gives reason to be sceptical.
 90. Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p.302.
 91. ‘Arif al-‘Arif, op.cit., pp.346 and 349.
 92. *PP* 1875/LXXVI (Jerusalem, February 1875) and *PP* 1880/LXXIV (Jerusalem, March 1880).

93. Compare the reports by German merchants in *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.2 (Jerusalem, 11.1.1875) and A.xxxix.3 (Jerusalem, 13.2.1877 and 18.1.1878); see also the English reports quoted in footnote 92.
94. Neumann, *op.cit.*, p.222; 'Arif al-'Arif, *op.cit.*, p.349; Klein, 'Mittheilungen', *ZDPV*, iv (1881) p.82.
95. W.F.Lynch, *Narrative of the United States' Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea* (Philadelphia, 1858) p.289; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.515 and 524; S.Tolkowsky, *The Gateway of Palestine. A History of Jaffa* (London, 1924) p.160.
96. *Baldensperger Diaries*, entry of 30.9.1850; see also *Die Warte*, 29.12.1853.
97. Albert Gaudry, *Recherches Scientifiques en Orient Entreprises par les Ordres du Gouvernement, pendant les Années 1853-1854, Partie Agricole* (Paris, 1855) p.295; in an earlier report, the French Consul in Jerusalem had spoken about some *Europeans* engaged in silkworm raising: *MAE*, CCC, Jerusalem 2 (Jerusalem, 1.7.1847).
98. Anderlind, 'Die Fruchtbäume', *loc.cit.*, p.83.
99. Cf. *ASA*, Archiv Jaffa, Faszikel 5 (Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa, 27.8.1872); Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.515–16; Victor Guérin, *Description Géographique, Historique et Archéologique de la Palestine*, 7 vols (Amsterdam, 1969) (reprint) vol.i, pp.2–3; G.Schwarz, 'Jafa und Umgebung', *ZDPV*, iii (1880) pp.44–5; Friedrich Bömches, *Bericht über die wichtigsten Hafenplätze der Levante in kommerzieller und maritimer Beziehung* (Leipzig, 1882) pp.42–6; Ebers and Guthe, *op.cit.*, vol.ii, pp.147–9.
100. *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.1 (Jaffa, 30.6.1873); *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.2 (Jaffa, 31.12.1875).
101. Schwarz, *op.cit.*, p.45.
102. Bömches, *op.cit.*, p.44; Loehnis, *op.cit.*, p.240.
103. *PP* 1864/Lxi (Jaffa, May 1864); *PRO*, F.O.78/1834 (Jaffa, 9.11.1864); *Die Warte*, 23.3.1865.
104. *Rapport adressé à S.A. le Premier Ministre par S.Exc. le Ministre des Travaux Publics sur les Travaux Publics à Exécuter dans la Turquie d'Asie* (Constantinople, 1880) p.51; for the context see Alexander Schölch, 'Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung und politische Kontrolle durch die europäischen Mächte im Osmanischen Reich', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 1 (1975) pp.437–8 and 443–4.
105. Cf. *Die Warte*, 8.4.1875 and 21.10.1875; *Das Heilige Land*, xx (1876) p.81; *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.2 (Jaffa, 31.12.1875) and A.xxxix.3 (Jaffa, 31.12.1876); *PP* 1876/Lxxv (Jaffa, February 1876); *PP* 1878/Lxxiv (Jaffa, May 1878).
106. *Archives de la Chambre de Commerce, Marseille*, Dossier Jaffa, An XII-1880 (letter from de Saulcy, 3.9.1880).
107. Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, *Compte-Rendu des Travaux pendant l'Année 1880* (Marseille, 1881) pp.58–61.
108. Cf. *PRO*, F.O.78/1521 (Jerusalem, 5.1.1860); 'Die Eisenbahn nach Jerusalem', *Das Heilige Land*, ix (1865) p.48; Loewe, *op.cit.*, vol.ii, p.110.
109. Cf. *MAE*, CPC, Jerusalem 9 (Jerusalem, 8.10., 22.10. and 22.11. 1867);

- PRO*, F.O.78/1991 (Jerusalem, 28.11.1867); *PP* 1867-8/LXVIII (Jerusalem, January 1868); Wolff, op.cit., pp.5-6.
110. Wolff, op.cit., p.6; see also *PRO*, F.O.78/1449 (Jaffa, 15.9.1859); *Die Warte*, 10.5.1860; *AGCJ*, A.III.4 (Jerusalem, 24.10.1861); *Das Heilige Land*, VIII (1864) p.130.
111. *Sura musawwada wujidat bi-auraq al-marhum al-Shaikh 'Ali al-Laihi bi-khatt Sa'adat Yusuf Basha al-Khalidi yulakhkhisu fiha hadit nash' atih al-awwali mundhu wiladitih fi sanat 1258 ila sanat 1292*. I am most grateful to Mr Haidar al-Khalidi and to his son Kamil for providing me with a copy of this manuscript. This account is confirmed by other sources; see *ASA*, Archiv Jaffa, Faszikel 5 (Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa, 27.8.1872; according to this source, the carriage service even lasted for more than a year); *ASA*, Archiv Jerusalem, 54 (Report on production and communications on the occasion of the Vienna World Exhibition); compare also Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.II, p.164 and *Die Warte*, 18.9. and 18.12.1879 (on Yusuf al-Khalidi's later exertions for a carriage service).
112. Cf *Die Warte*, 5.2., 16.4., 19.5., and 12.11.1874; 3.6., 17.6., and 21.10.1875; 13.1., 13.4., and 25.5.1876; 21.11.1878; 17.4., 18.9., 13.11., and 18.12.1879; 12.2. and 13.5.1880; 21.4., 1.9., and 8.9.1881; *AGCJ*, A.XXXIX.2 (Jaffa, 30.6.1875 and Jerusalem, 3.5.1876); *AGCJ*, A.XXXIX.3 (Jaffa, 31.3.1876); *MAE*, CPC, Jerusalem 14 (Jerusalem, 24.10.1879); *An open letter addressed to Sir Moses Montefiore*, p.65; Christoph Paulus, 'Die Tempelcolonien in Palästina', *ZDPV*, VI (1883) p.40; Wolff, op.cit., p.6; Bauer, *Volksleben*, p.334; Alex Carmel, *Die Siedlungen der württembergischen Templer in Palästina 1868-1918* (Stuttgart, 1973) pp.39-40 and 43-4.
113. *AGCJ*, A.XXXVI.1 (Jaffa, 25.7.1874); on these disputes see also *AGCJ*, A.XXXIX.1 (Jaffa, 29.6.1872) and A.XXXVI.1 (Jaffa, 28.7.1874); Jerusalem, 30.7. and 23.11.1874).
114. Cf Eliahu Elath, 'A British Project for the Construction of a Railway between Jaffa and Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century', in: Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine*, pp.415-22; Francis Rawdon Chesney, *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition Carried on by Order of the British Government during the Years 1835, 1836, and 1837* (London, 1868).
115. According to Elath (op.cit., p.420), Montefiore was president of this society. From Montefiore's diaries it follows, however, that in the prospectus, his name had been listed among those of the directors by mistake; see Loewe, op.cit., vol.II, pp.133-4.
116. About the negative attitude of Palestinian Muslims see *PRO*, F.O.78/1383 (Jerusalem, 9.10.1858); *PRO*, F.O.78/1692 (Jaffa, 25.8.1862); see also *Die Warte*, 15. and 29.10.1857.
117. Quoted in Elath, op.cit., p.421.
118. Cf. 'Die Eisenbahn nach Jerusalem', *Das Heilige Land*, IX (1865); *Die Warte*, 16.3.1865, 1.6.1865, 4.10.1866.
119. 'Die Eisenbahn nach Jerusalem', *Das Heilige Land*, IX (1865) p.56; compare also *PP* 1864/LXI (Jerusalem, May 1864); *Die Warte*, 4.1.1866.
120. *Die Warte*, 6.2., 27.2. and 13.3.1873; 5.2. and 16.4.1874.
121. Cf. *Jaffa-Jérusalem*, Notice (Paris, 1875) (a kind of prospectus); *Das*

- Heilige Land*, xx (1876) p.81; Neil, *Palestine Re-peopled*, pp.174–6 (A Papal Railway in Palestine); ‘Le Chemin de Fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem’, *La Terre Sainte 1875–76–77–78*, pp.36–8, 830–1, 842–4; MAE, CPC, Jerusalem 14 (Jerusalem, 5.11.1878); *Die Warte*, 9.1.1879; PP 1880/LXXIV (Jaffa, February 1880).
122. MAE, CCC, Jerusalem 4 (Jerusalem, 24.10.1879).
123. In 1888, a certain Navon Effendi obtained a new concession which he made over to a French society in 1889. Construction of the Jaffa–Jerusalem railway was then started in 1890, and the line was inaugurated in 1892. Cf. E. Toutain, ‘Notes sur les chemins de fer de la Turquie d’Asie (1900)’, MAE, Mémoires et Documents 134; E. Pech, *Manuel des Sociétés Anonymes Fonctionnant en Turquie* (Constantinople, 1911); Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine* (Paris, 1896–1901) pp.605–9; ‘Arif al-‘Arif, op.cit., p.304.
124. Cf. PRO, F.O.78/1419 (Jaffa, 17.5.1856; answers to queries); *Die Warte*, 16.3.1876; ASA, Archiv Jerusalem, 137 (Jaffa, 20.4.1877); Bömches, op.cit., p.44.
125. PP 1880/LXXIV (Jaffa, February 1880); ASA, Archiv Jaffa, Faszikel 6 (Jaffa, 12.1.1877).
126. ‘Situation économique de la Palestine’, *Bulletin Consulaire Français*, xii (1886); Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p.515; SWP, Samaria, pp.252–3.
127. ASA, Archiv Jaffa, Faszikel 5 (Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa, 27.8.1872).
128. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.531–2.
129. On the urban development of Jaffa see *Das Heilige Land*, viii (1864) p.130; PRO, F.O.78/1834 (Jaffa, 9.11.1864); *An open letter addressed to Sir Moses Montefiore*, p.64; Schwarz, op.cit.; SWP, Samaria, pp.254–8; Guérin, op.cit., vol.i, pp.6–7; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.ii, pp.159–60; *Die Warte*, 23.3.1865, 15.12.1870, 16.7.1874; AGCJ, A.xxxix.1 (Jaffa, 30.3.1872); AGCJ, A.xxxix.2 (Jaffa, 30.6., 30.9 and 31.12.1875); AGCJ, A.xxxix.3 (Jaffa, 31.3.1876 and 31.3.1877) – the quarterly reports of the German consul form a kind of chronicle of Jaffa during those years; PP 1876/LXXV (Jaffa, February 1876); PP 1877/LXXXIII (Jaffa, March 1877); PP 1878/LXXIV (Jaffa, May 1878); ASA, Archiv Jerusalem, 137 (Jaffa, 20.4.1877).
130. See the enthusiastic description in Guérin, op.cit., vol.i, pp.9–11.
131. According to Tolkowsky (op.cit., p.162) this was completed in 1888. Yet this development did not start in 1879, as he says, but ten years earlier.
132. Cf. David Delpuget, *Les Juifs d’Alexandrie, de Jaffa et de Jérusalem en 1865* (Bordeaux, 1866) pp.65–6; *Das Heilige Land*, xi (1867) p.90; ASA, Archiv Jerusalem, 54 (Report on the production in the consular district of Jerusalem on the occasion of the Vienna world exhibition in 1873, 58 pages); Thomson, *Southern Palestine*, p.549; Guérin, op.cit., vol.i, pp.120–8; SWP, Judaea, pp.28–9; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.i, pp.136–50; Ludovic de Vaux, *La Palestine* (Paris, 1883) p.295; P. Palmer, ‘Das jetzige Bethlehem’, ZDPV, xvii (1894); Mustafa Murad al-Dabbag, *Biladuna Filastin*, 10 vols (Beirut, 1965–75) vol.viii/2, pp.425–8.

133. Cf. Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p.304; Palmer, op.cit., p.91.
134. Zschokke, op.cit., p.5.
135. Situation économique de la Palestine, loc.cit.
136. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p.429; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.117–8; Tristram, *Pathways*, vol.ii, p.56. Mansur (op.cit., pp.286–7) reports that according to Ya'qub Farah's chronicle, an exodus of Christian artisans and merchants had taken place because they had been forced to pay land tax without being able to profit from the land. After they had been exempted from these payments through the intermediary of the French Consul in 1855, more than 100 Christian families had returned to Nazareth in the following three years.
137. Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.i, pp.138–40; SWP, Galilee, pp.275–78; Guérin, op.cit., vol.vi, pp.87–92; *Die Warte*, 24.9.1874; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.i, p.302.
138. Dabbag, op.cit., vol.vii/2, p.49.
139. G. Schumacher, 'Das jetzige Nazareth', ZDPV, XIII (1890) p.243.
140. Description and plan in SWP, Galilee, pp.394–6.
141. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.442–3.
142. Luncz, op.cit., p.6; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.i, p.298.
143. Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.117–18.
144. Mary Eliza Rogers, *La Vie Domestique en Palestine* (Paris, 1865) pp.157–8.
145. Schumacher, 'Das jetzige Nazareth', loc.cit., p.245.
146. The paragraphs on Haifa are mainly based on Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*; see also Guérin, op.cit., vol.v, pp.251–2 and vol.vi, pp.403–4; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.ii, pp.106–10.
147. Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, p.65.
148. Cf. Lynch, op.cit., p.61; Sepp, op.cit., vol.ii, p.455; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.92–4.
149. Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, pp.71–2 and 127–8.
150. On the Templar colonies see Carmel, *Die Siedlungen der württembergischen Templer*; Paulus, op.cit.; Hans Brugger, *Die deutschen Siedlungen in Palästina* (Bern, 1908); Karl Imberger, *Die deutschen landwirtschaftlichen Kolonien in Palästina* (Öhringen, 1938).
151. Paulus, op.cit., p.41.
152. See e.g. Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.ii, pp.301–15.
153. Paulus, op.cit., pp.37–41; a similar survey made in 1889 (Carmel, *Die Siedlungen der württembergischen Templer*, pp.52–4) does not show any significant change in this structure.
154. Carmel, *Die Siedlungen der württembergischen Templer*, pp.55 and 244.
155. Fayiz al-Kurdi, 'Akka baina al-madi wa-l-hadir' (Acre, 1972), p.124.
156. Cf. Thomson, *The Land the the Book*, pp.309–10; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.88–9; Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.i, pp.188, 190, 192; SWP, Galilee, pp.145, 164–7; Guérin, op.cit., vol.vi, pp.502–9, 525.
157. Oliphant, op.cit., p.338.
158. Conder *Tent Work*, vol.i, pp.188–9.
159. Oliphant, op.cit., p.338; Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.i, pp.188–9.
160. Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.ii, p.90.
161. Kurdi, op.cit., pp.123–4.

162. See *AGCJ*, A.xxxix.2 (Acre, 24.2.1876) and A.xxxix.3 (Haifa, 25.1.1877); Cuinet, *op.cit.*, pp.98, 105, 108.
163. Cf. *Annuaire Diplomatique de l'Empire Ottoman* (Constantinople, 1872) p.xiii; Zwiedinek, *op.cit.*, pp.78–80; *Information for Passengers by the Austro-Hungarian Lloyd's Steam Navigation Company* (Trieste, 1874) (in *AGCJ*, A.xxxiv.10); Paquebots-Poste Français, Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, *Livret d'Itinéraires et Tarifs des Lignes de la Méditerranée et de la Mer Noire*, 1874 (in *AGCJ*, A.xxxiv.10).
164. Cf. Zwiedinek, *op.cit.*, pp.12–13.
165. This is probably the same person as the Vice-Consul Avicrino mentioned on p.18 above.
166. Scopinich, as his name was spelled properly, was the Austrian consular agent.
167. Zwiedinek, *op.cit.*, pp.25 and 56; compare these lists with the names given on p.24 above.
168. *PRO*, F.O.195/1202 (Acre, 11.7. and 12.9.1878; Aleih, 15.9.1878).
169. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p.310.
170. On Safad cf. Isabel Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land* (London, 1879) p.509; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.272–6; *SWP*, Galilee, pp.199–200 and 248–50; Guérin, *op.cit.*, vol.vii, pp.419–21; Ebers and Guthe, *op.cit.*, vol.i, pp.338–41; Vaux, *op.cit.*, p.372. On Tiberias cf. Lynch, *op.cit.*, pp.88–9 and 93; Sepp, *op.cit.*, vol.ii, pp.142–3 and 146; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.399–400; *SWP*, Galilee, pp.361–2; Guérin, *op.cit.*, vol.vii, pp.250–2; Ebers and Guthe, *op.cit.*, vol.i, pp.318–22; Vaux, *op.cit.*, pp.351 and 354.
171. Thus in *SWP*, Galilee, p.199, the population of Safad is given as 3000 Muslims, 1500 Jews, and 50 Christians. Immediately below, Guérin's figures are quoted without comment: 7000 Jews, 6000 Muslims, 150 Christians!
172. *ASA*, Administrative Registratur, F8/19 (Beirut, 28.2.1858). This post remained in the hands of this Christian family in Safad until 1918; see Arthur Breycha-Vauthier, *Österreich in der Levante* (Wien, 1972) p.125. Like other Austrian consuls, Miklasiewicz was not happy about his protégés. What Montefiore refused to believe (cf. Loewe, *op.cit.*, vol.ii, pp.178–9) can be read in detail in the Austrian archives: Miklasiewicz repeatedly complained about the unworthy conditions among the Jews of Safad, as he saw it, and made grave accusations against them: *ASA*, Administrative Registratur, F8/38 (Safad, 20.12.1864, 23.12.1864, 9.1.1865).
173. *PRO*, F.O.78/1448 (Jerusalem, 19.12.1859); Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p.261; Karmon, 'The Settlement', *loc.cit.*, p.11.
174. *SWP*, Galilee, p.199.
175. Oliphant, *op.cit.*, pp.44–54 and 251–5; *Das Heilige Land*, xxiii (1879), p.18; G.Schumacher, *The Jaulân*, Jerusalem 1976 (reprint) pp.57–9; Eugen Wirth, 'Die Rolle tscherkessischer "Wehrbauern" bei der Wiederbesiedlung von Steppe und Ödland im Osmanischen Reich', *Bustan*, 4/1 (1963).
176. *ASA*, P.A. xxxviii, Karton 228 (Safad, 13.11.1879 and Beirut,

- 6.12.1879); see also the invectives of the Templars against the Circassians ('bloodsuckers', 'band of robbers', 'pest') in *Die Warte*, 25.4., 9.5., 30.5. and 13.6.1878. The attempt to settle Circassians in the Nablus area was also a failure: *AGFO*, 1.A.B.q. (Türkei) 126 (Jerusalem, 4.4.1878); *AGCJ*, A.III.8 (Jaffa, 1.4.1878); *AGCJ*, A.XXXIX.4 (Jaffa, 31.12.1878 and Jerusalem, 28.2.1880); *PRO*, F.O.195/1202 (Acre, 11.7.1878); *Die Warte*, 9.5.1878 and 23.10.1879.
177. Cf. G.Rosen, 'Ueber Nâblus und Umgegend', *ZDMG*, 14 (1860); John Mills, *Three Months' Residence at Nablus, and an Account of the Modern Samaritans* (London, 1864) pp.87–90; Rogers, op.cit., pp.334–7; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p.470; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.137–9 and 400–1; Guérin, op.cit., vol.IV, pp.390–403 and 423; *SWP*, Samaria, pp.166–8 and 203–10; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.I, pp.255–62; Vaux, op.cit., p.311; Nimr, op.cit., vol.II, pp.272–4 and 284–98.
178. Sepp, op.cit., vol.II, p.45.
179. Rosen, 'Ueber Nâblus', loc.cit., p.635.
180. *SWP*, Samaria, p.204.
181. Rogers, op.cit., pp.334–5; also Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.I, p.262; see also the photographs and descriptions in Nimr, op.cit., vol.II, pp.441–62.
182. *SWP*, Samaria, p.204.
183. Tristram, *Pathways*, vol.II, pp.31–2.
184. Mills, op.cit., p.87.
185. Rogers, op.cit., p.336.
186. Unfortunately, Nimr gives us only very general or dateless information (op.cit.). On p.286 he mentions numbers of some workshops, but without specifying which date. On p.292 and p.295 he merely gives some names of owners of soap factories and of merchants the latter again without date.
187. Zwiedinek, op.cit., p.54.
188. Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp.137–8.
189. Rosen, 'Ueber Nâblus', loc.cit., p.638.
190. Guérin, op.cit., vol.IV, p.399.
191. *PP* 1883/LXXII (Jaffa, March 1883).
192. Dabbag, op.cit., vol.II/2, p.199. Cuinet (op.cit., pp.182 and 191) spoke of 15 soap factories, probably on the basis of outdated Ottoman *salnames*.
193. Situation économique de la Palestine, loc.cit.
194. Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.I, p.262.
195. *SWP*, Samaria, p.203.
196. See map in G.Rosen, 'Ueber das Thal und die nächste Umgegend Hebrons', *ZDMG*, 12 (1858).
197. Cf. Robinson, op.cit., vol.II, pp.80, 88, 93–4; Guérin, op.cit., vol.III, pp.218 and 256; Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968) pp.118–23.
198. Rosen, 'Ueber das Thal', loc.cit., p.497.
199. Cf. *Die Warte*, 13.3.1856; Robinson, op.cit., vol.I, p.213 and vol.II, pp.79–81 and 88; Rosen, 'Ueber das Thal', loc.cit., passim; Thomson,

- The Land and the Book*, 583–5 and 596–9; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, p.387; Guérin, op.cit., vol.iii, p.245; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.ii, pp.214–15; Vaux, op.cit., pp.119–20.
200. Quoted in Yehuda Karmon, 'Changes in the Urban Geography of Hebron during the Nineteenth Century', in Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine*, p.81.
 201. Ibid., p.83.
 202. Delpuget, op.cit., p.26.
 203. Zschokke, op.cit., p.5; see also the Austrian report on the production in the consular district of Jerusalem: ASA, Archiv Jerusalem, 54; where the glass ornaments shown at the Constantinople exhibition in 1863 came from, is not known (Dorn, op.cit., p.109).
 204. Situation économique de la Palestine, loc.cit.
 205. Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.ii, p.80; Abbé Morand, *La Terre des Patriarches ou le Sud de la Palestine*, 2 vols (Lyon, 1882–3) vol.ii, pp.66–7.
 206. Karmon, 'Changes in the Urban Geography', loc.cit., pp.71–2.
 207. Situation économique de la Palestine, loc.cit.
 208. *SWP*, Judaea, p.306.
 209. Cf. Sepp, op.cit., vol.ii, p.528; Alexander Wallace, *The Desert and the Holy Land* (Edinburgh, 1868) p.164; Tristram *Pathways*, vol.i, p.5; C.R.Conder, *Palestine* (London, 1891) pp.51–2; Conder, *Tent Work*, vol.ii, pp.169–70; *SWP*, Judaea, pp.234–5; Guérin, op.cit., vol.ii, pp.178–94; Ebers and Guthe, op.cit., vol.ii, pp. 183–4.
 210. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p.556.
 211. *PP* 1874/LXVII, p.925.
 212. Emile Vidal, 'La Palestine', *L'Explorateur*, 1 (1875) p.387.
 213. *Die Karawanenstrasse von Aegypten nach Syrien* (Prag, 1879) p.40.
 214. Dabbag, op.cit., vol.i/2, pp.97–8 and 100.
 215. The main sources on the economic activities of Gaza are the various articles by G.Gatt, especially 'Industrielles aus Gaza', *ZDPV*, VIII (1885) and 'Legende zum Plane von Gaza', *ZDPV*, XI (1888). See also *PP* 1874/LXVII, p.925; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp.547 and 550; *SWP*, Judaea, p.235; Dabbag, op.cit., vol.i/2, pp.99–103.
 216. Gatt, 'Industrielles aus Gaza', loc.cit., p.72.
 217. Ibid., p.75.
 218. Ibid., p.79. Gatt does not make clear if these figures correspond to actual production.
 219. Ibid., p.78–9.
 220. The manufacture of agricultural implements was normally the business of village artisans who also wandered from one place to the other; see Klein, 'Mittheilungen', *ZDPV*, IV (1881) pp.68–9; G.Schumacher, 'Der arabische Pflug', *ZDPV*, XII (1889) pp.165–6.
 221. Cf. Shmuel Avitsur, 'The Influence of Western Technology on the Economy of Palestine during the Nineteenth Century', in Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine*, p.486; Gabriel Baer, 'The Impact of Economic Change on Traditional Society in Nineteenth-century Palestine', in Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine*, p.495.
 222. Cf. *Das Heilige Land*, XI (1867), p.90; Klein, 'Mittheilungen', *ZDPV*, IV (1881), p.68–9.

2 The Political Economy of the Jabal Nablus, 1920–48

SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN

INTRODUCTION

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many areas of what is now described as the Third World experienced a broadly similar process of social and economic transformation as a result of their incorporation into the world capitalist system. Central to an examination of this process – whether it occurred as a result of colonisation or by the more indirect route of economic incorporation as a supplier of raw materials – is the analysis of its impact on local relations of production.

The main features of this transformation at a local level are usefully summed up in a schematic way by G. N. Kitching under the following heads:

1. The conversion of the products of surplus labour into commodities, i.e. the conversion of use values into exchange values.
2. The conversion of means of production into commodities – land, instruments of production, both agricultural and non-agricultural – and the incorporation of money, in the forms of credit/finance capital, as a means of production.
3. The conversion of labour power itself into a commodity.¹

It would clearly be too simplistic to assume that these three forms of integration must necessarily occur in discrete chronological order. They can, however, be used as a means of defining the dominant trends in any specific historical period. In this context it is also worth recalling Trotsky's remarks on the nature of 'uneven and combined' development:

The laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism. Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms.²

In an earlier analysis of the ‘driving forces’ of the Russian revolution, Trotsky points to the differences between the process of historical development in England, ‘the pioneer of capitalism’, and the colonies while emphasising the ‘inner connection’ between the two.

There can be no analogy of historical development between, on the one hand, England, the pioneer of capitalism, which has been creating new social forms for centuries and has also created a powerful bourgeoisie as the expression of these new forms, and, on the other hand, the colonies of today, to which European capital delivers ready-made rails, sleepers, nuts and bolts in ready-made battleships for the use of the colonial administration, and then, with rifle and bayonet, drives the natives from their primitive environment straight into capitalist civilisation: there can be no analogy of historical development, but there does exist a profound inner connection between the two.³

While one may not wish to accept the Eurocentrism and rigidly hierarchical view of cultures expressed in these passages, they do provide the basis for a concept of complexity and unevenness in the analysis of historical change in ‘peripheral’ economies.

The present essay will examine the effects of this historical process of transformation in a particular society – Palestine in the first half of the twentieth century – not by attempting to examine the economy as a whole but by taking a specific region – Jabal Nablus – and tracing its economic history from the 1920s to the 1940s. By focusing on a limited area which has its own particular characteristics and problems within the context of the Palestinian economy and of the world market, it is hoped that some light can be shed on the nature of the

transformation process in general as well as its historically specific features in one region.

These specific features included the domination of the state apparatus by an imperial power – successively the Ottomans and the British – and the transformation of Palestine under the British into a colony in all but name. Just as important was the Zionist drive to establish a national home in Palestine which took little account of existing economic and social structures. All these factors played an important role, both in integrating the economy into the world market and changing certain sectors of it in a capitalist direction.

In this context, to concentrate on a region which became ‘under-developed’ in the course of these transformations, raises particular problems for analysis. The forces of transformation were mediated not only by the colonial state and by the Jewish enclave, but also by the effects of the growing discrepancy between the economic life, both Jewish and Arab, of the coastal plain and the big cities and that of the inland hill area. Jabal Nablus was thus in many respects becoming ‘a periphery within a periphery’. The fact that under these conditions changes were often undramatic makes it more difficult to arrive at clear-cut conclusions as to their socio-economic significance. But this is an analytical problem which is not uncommon, either in the Middle East – for instance when looking at the Bekaa Valley or Jabal Amil in Lebanon – or in other parts of the world. Furthermore, it is a question which continues to be raised – though in a somewhat different form – by the dependent status of the West Bank (of which Jabal Nablus is a part) first under Jordanian and now under Israeli rule.

The analysis will be divided into two main sections in all of which the material will be organised with reference to Kitching’s schema. The first section will deal with the economic and social transformation wrought in Mandatory Palestine under the influence of the colonial state and the Jewish enclave. The second and more extensive section will attempt to analyse in some detail the socio-economic changes in Jabal Nablus both in the light of these ‘exogenous’ factors and of the social relations of production operating within the region. The first form of integration into the world capitalist economy, the conversion of the products of surplus labour into commodities, began in Palestine during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Similar developments took place in other parts of the Middle East, particularly Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, which were increasingly drawn into the orbit of the world market for primary commodities. Palestine’s

involvement, however, occurred somewhat later and on a smaller scale than, for instance, that of Egypt and Lebanon. The extent of specialisation in agricultural export crops in Palestine was limited compared with the development of cotton as the dominant export crop from Egypt or of silk as the major export from Lebanon. The extent and nature of the changes which this integration brought about in Palestine were therefore correspondingly less intense (see Schölch, pp. 12–18).

It may be useful, however, to summarise briefly the changes which took place during the period up to the First World War. The development of a commodity market for agricultural goods centred on the rapid expansion of citrus production for export after the 1870s. Other agricultural commodities found their way on to the international market, but not via the development of plantation production or the establishment of capitalist enterprises. The direct producers – the peasantry – remained distanced from market forces. Those who were affected were the surplus appropriators, the landowners and merchants, who increasingly used rent, debts and other payments collected in kind to engage in trade on the world market.

This process did not lead to drastic changes in the relations of production or in productive methods in agriculture. But certain adjustments and adaptations did take place. The evolution of the legal position concerning landownership – described by Schölch – developed in such a way that by 1913 the Law of the Transfer of Immovable Property gave to holders of *miri* land ‘l’entière et libre disposition de leurs biens avec droit d’exploiter, vouer, vendre, hypothéquer et léguer’.⁴ This was accompanied by increasing interest in land on the part of urban merchants and functionaries and by the slow but noticeable dispossession of peasants. The chronic indebtedness of the latter, which was the rule rather than the exception, made them very vulnerable to the new-found demand for land as an investment.

The incorporation of the products of surplus labour into the world capitalist market, identified as belonging to the first stage of Kitching’s schema was, of course, by no means complete by 1914. At the same time, the second stage of incorporation had only appeared in embryo in one of its aspects – that is, the transformation of land into a commodity.

As Laclau points out in his critique of Gunder Frank, there is a great deal of difference between an economy which is incorporated into the capitalist world market to whatever degree, and one which

itself has a capitalist structure of production.⁵ In Palestine, the crucial economic intervention in the late Ottoman period was the world commodity market and the political and economic pressures exerted by the various European powers which dominated it. It was only during the Mandate that the development of a capitalist sector within Palestine – albeit a relatively small one – combined with the extension of world market forces to cause structural changes and dislocations in the economy at a variety of levels, producing aspects of the second and third forms of integration. Even then, the results of these changes were not always immediately evident; nor were they evenly distributed.

THE ECONOMY OF MANDATE PALESTINE

Before making a detailed examination of economic life in Jabal Nablus, it is necessary first to review the most important external forces which affected its development (or underdevelopment) during the Mandate: the influence of the mandatory authority itself, the establishment of the Jewish national home, and the reactions of the old class of local merchants and landowners to these interventions. All these factors also played a significant part in the further integration of Palestine into the world market and the commoditisation of production at a local level.

The British occupation of Palestine in 1917–18, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 promising the Jews a ‘national home’ in Palestine, and the League of Nations Mandate given to Britain in 1922 led to the creation of a new geo-political entity. Its economy was affected by the establishment of national boundaries throughout the area known as Greater Syria; by the interests of the British state apparatus set up to administer Palestine; and finally, by the development of the Jewish national home under the influence of Zionist ideology.

In some respects the British authorities in Palestine behaved in ways which, particularly in regard to fiscal and budgetary policy, resembled those pursued in their colonial territories. The influence of colonial administrative ideas was increased by the fact that Palestine, in contrast to other mandated territories such as Syria or Iraq, had a British-run administration rather than a local one ‘guided’ by advisers from the mandatory powers.⁶

In certain important respects, however, Palestine’s position did

differ from that of a formal colonial possession. Under the terms of the Mandate Palestine was required not to discriminate in its trading relations against any member of the League of Nations. This precluded the implementation of specific measures against countries unwilling to reciprocate Palestine's enforced 'open door' policy in trading relationships.⁷ In the economic climate of the late 1920s and 1930s when most countries were raising high tariff walls this was a major disadvantage. It also led to the dumping of cheap foreign manufactured goods, particularly from Japan and India, on the Palestine market in the 1930s.⁸ None the less, though for this and other reasons connected with its mandated status Palestine could hardly be considered an 'independent' state, the British Law Officers refused to accept that Palestine was to all intents and purposes a colony and, as such, should be eligible for the preferential treatment in trade increasingly granted to British colonies. Without the acknowledgement that Palestine was a colony, any grant of preferential trading terms by Britain would have clashed legally with her 'most favoured nation' treaties with other countries. This was mainly a result of Britain's declining position as a trading nation and its fear of upsetting established markets. As Barbara Smith has put it:

The case of imperial preference is one of several where Palestine was deprived of a benefit which might have been expected from its 'colonial' link with Britain if it had not had to play second fiddle to the needs of a metropolis whose economic star was rapidly falling. While the demise of Britain as a world trading power prompted the movement towards imperial preference, this same demise ironically prevented the country from offering Palestine a secure market for its produce.⁹

It should also be borne in mind that Britain's interest in Palestine rested primarily on strategic and political rather than directly economic considerations. Palestine was not a major source of raw materials. Nor were the opportunities for investment there particularly attractive, even if British firms did have some chance to trade and to act as contractors – particularly for public works projects sponsored by the Palestine administration. The British government's general attitude was that Palestine should pay for itself and not be a burden on the British taxpayer. Thus public spending policies tended to be cautious. Priority was given to public works (particularly projects such as the building of Haifa harbour which offered tangible

economic and strategic benefits); to defence; and as tensions rose in the 1930s, to internal security. Expenditure on public services and social welfare was fairly low, though not more so than in most colonies (see Table 2.16).

The second and more important factor which modified the 'colonial' aspect of the British administration was the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine which the Mandate undertook to facilitate.¹⁰ Thus the British were obliged, on occasion reluctantly, to take into account the economic and political interests of a settler population which were different from, and increasingly incompatible with, those of the indigenous population.

The establishment of the Jewish national home superimposed on the existing economy (comprised mostly of a non-capitalist agriculture – which as we have seen was progressively developing links with the international commodity market – merchant capital and a small manufacturing sector), a rapidly expanding immigrant community highly organised for the purpose of establishing a Jewish economic and political entity.

Though this community was composed of people from a variety of economic backgrounds, it had, as a whole, access to a substantial volume of capital and skills with which to build up an industrial and agricultural sector that was generally capitalist in its relations of production and geared to selling goods for exchange on both local and international markets. Its agriculture concentrated on citrus production for export and mixed farming. Jewish industry began on a relatively small scale in the 1920s but after 1929 there was a marked growth in terms of investment, size of plant, use of power, and number of workers employed. This represented the transition in the 'implanted' sector from an industrial sector dominated by small workshops to one where larger-scale mechanised plants were increasingly common, though it was not until the 1940s that this change was clearly visible.¹¹

To turn to the particular economic forms assumed by this nexus of pressures and influences on the Mandatory, one of the most basic was the monetary system which took on greater importance as the use of money and exchange values spread through the country. The monetary system was tied to sterling, at first via the Egyptian pound.¹² For a while this arrangement was well suited to Palestine's trading position as Britain and Egypt were her main trading partners. But in 1927, for a variety of economic and political reasons, a separate Palestine pound was created.¹³ It was still tied closely to

sterling and was issued and controlled by a currency board based in London, operating on much the same lines as the East and West African Currency Boards. Apart from facilitating British trade with Palestine, the link with sterling also served to mesh the Palestine economy more closely with international market forces, particularly through the influence of the inflationary and deflationary pressures on sterling during the 1920s and 1930s.

Taxation policy was another, more direct, means through which the Mandatory exercised influence over the Palestine economy. And since the main direct taxes in operation through the 1920s and 1930s were taxes on land and the products of the land, not on income, their effects were of particular significance for the agricultural sector. For the first 15 years of the Mandate, the structure of direct taxation was still based on the general framework of the Ottoman system. Under the Ottomans the main agricultural tax was the *ushr* or tithe which until 1897 amounted officially to 10 per cent of the gross product of the land, after which various supplements were added, increasing the proportion to 12.63 per cent. This tax was levied equally on all the produce of cultivated land, pastures and forests, although there was a small, separate tax on animals (*aghnām*). The tithe was collected either in money or kind – usually the latter, except in the case of honey, grapes and hay for which a money payment was obligatory.¹⁴ Urban merchants and landowners who obtained tax-farms were often able to extract a further surplus from the peasantry, usually by the simple expedient of extorting taxes at levels much higher than 10 per cent of the produce.¹⁵ Their ability to do this rested partly on the use, or threat, of physical force and partly on the fact that some tax collectors or their families were also money-lenders or landowners to the villages they held as tax-farms.¹⁶

The main source of tax revenue under the British remained the *ushr*, along with the *aghnām* or animal tax. The *werko*, a tax on immovable property, was reformed in 1928 to be replaced in urban areas by the Urban Property Tax, though the old tax remained in force in the rural areas until 1935.

In the first few years of the Mandate, various adjustments were made on the operation of the tithe. Tax-farming was abolished and replaced by assessment commissions appointed by the District Governor. The tithe was to be paid in cash only, according to redemption prices determined by local market prices. Field crops were assessed on the threshing floor before threshing or winnowing took place; fruit and vegetables in the fields.¹⁷ In May 1925, the tithe

rate was reduced from 12.63 per cent to 10 per cent. These changes amounted to a 'tidying up' of the Ottoman system, doing away with abuses and trying to make collection procedures more effective. However, they did not diminish the fundamental objection to the tithe as a levy on gross yields, which taxed the costs of production as well as the actual product. As Granovsky pointed out, 'since the costs of production are the same in bad years as in good, the Osher (*ushr*) cut rather sharply into net income'.¹⁸

The next major reform, the Commutation of Tithes Ordinance of 1927, did nothing to solve this problem. Its aim was to give the cultivator a greater degree of security about the amount of tithe he had to pay each year – whatever the variations in the harvest and market prices – by basing it on 'the average aggregate amount of the tithe assessed as payable by a village on ground crops during a period of four and, in a few cases, three, years immediately preceding the application of the commuted tithe. The apportionment of the average amount among reputed owners was carried out by assessment committees according to the respective shares if the land was held in undivided ownership of *mushaa*'.¹⁹ It was unfortunate that in the period immediately after the implementation of this ordinance there was a steep decline in agricultural prices compared with those for the period on which the new tithe rate was based (1924–7) (see Table 2.1 at the end of chapter). This was followed by a succession of bad harvests from 1930 to 1934 which meant that most cultivators found it difficult to pay any taxes at all, forcing the government to remit a large portion of the tithe each year.²⁰ It was estimated that in 1930 and 1931, these remissions amounted to 91.8 per cent and 301 per cent respectively of the tithes actually paid in those years.²¹

Clearly this situation did not promote assured revenues for the state and in 1935, before the land settlement programme had been completed (see p. 123), a new land tax, known as the Rural Property Tax, was instituted. The new tax replaced the tithe and the *werko*, though not the *aghnam*. It was a 'fixed tax assessed on the productivity of the soil as expressed in the net yield of the plot in units of certain crops, such as wheat or oranges'.²² Assessment based on net rather than gross product removed a considerable burden from the cultivator and provided more incentive to bring new land into cultivation and to plant olive and fruit trees by offering reduced tax rates for the first six to ten years of cultivation.

The other major source of government revenue came from indirect taxes – composed of customs duties, excise duties on salt, matches,

tobacco and wine, and stamp duties. Customs duties were initially based on the Turkish *ad valorem* system – standard rate of 11 per cent on imports, later raised to 12 per cent, and then to 15 per cent in 1940. However, changes were gradually made by introducing specific rates for particular commodities, until in 1935/6 specific rates accounted for 80 per cent of the duty collected.²³

One of the main reasons for the introduction of specific rates was that tariffs gradually became an instrument of general economic policy as well as a means of raising government revenue, though these two aims were frequently in conflict. In the mid-1920s, several of the larger Jewish industrial concerns began to demand that the government use tariffs to protect and assist new industries, by lowering duties on the raw materials required for the manufacturing processes and/or raising the duty on imported goods competing with their manufactures. Among those factories were Shemen Oil, Neshet Cement, the Athlit Salt Company (which was already a monopoly and sold inferior quality salt at £E 7–7.5 per ton compared with Egyptian salt which was £E 1.5 per ton), and the Rutenberg Electric Corporation. The lifting of duty on the import of olive oil and sesame seeds had some bearing on the potential development of local (mainly Arab) production. Sawyer, of the Department of Agriculture, complained that these tariff policies were contradicting the policies being pursued by his department to encourage the planting of olive trees and also criticised the import of sesame free of duty which made it difficult for local growers to compete. According to the Hope-Simpson Report, in 1929 3539 tons were exported at an average price of £P 20.436 per ton while at the same time 3470 tons at an average of £P 23.278 per ton were imported. The imports were chiefly from China and said to be inferior to the Palestinian seed.²⁴

The agricultural crisis of 1930, in the wake of the 1929 riots, induced the administration to take some measures to protect Arab agriculturalists, in some cases by reversing concessions previously made to industrialists. Duties were re-established on the import of olive oil and sesame seed and controls were imposed on the quantities which could be imported. Similarly, wheat and flour imports were restricted and tariffs raised in order to prevent further falls in price. In 1932 a flexible scale of duties was introduced to control seasonal price fluctuations.

Trade with Syria, important for the Arab sector of the economy, was the only exception to these fluctuating tariff policies. It was governed by a free trade agreement implemented in 1921 and

renewed in 1929.²⁵ As far as the import of producer goods and manufactured consumer goods were concerned, this agreement probably benefited the Arab sector. But where agricultural products were involved, especially wheat, the reverse seems to have been the case, since it was difficult to prevent Syrian wheat or other crops flooding the Palestinian market and pushing prices down.

The problems and contradictions which are apparent in the taxation structure exemplify some of the larger contradictions of British policy towards the Arab agricultural sector. The 'colonial' policy of maximising revenues and balancing budgets combined with the duty imposed on the Mandatory to allow, if not always actively to promote, the establishment of the Jewish national home militated against concentration on the development of indigenous agriculture.

Most of the changes implemented were in fact cautious and piecemeal. Various protective ordinances were enacted, designed to prevent landlessness caused by land sales.²⁶ The more effective of these measures, in which some of the loopholes in the early legislation were closed, did not come into force until the early 1930s by which time the bulk of the land transfers (at least those to the Jews) had already taken place. Other protective legislation was enacted during the agricultural crisis of the 1930s – notably the Law of Mortgage Amendment Ordinance (1931) which preserved the status of tenants in the case of the sale of land in foreclosure of mortgage²⁷ and also the Imprisonment for Debt Ordinance (1931) which required proof of the means to pay before imprisonment for debt was ordered.²⁸ These, combined with the Usurious Loans Ordinance (1934) lessened, though by no means abolished, the hold of money-lenders on the *fellaheen*.²⁹ However, interest rates remained generally above the statutory maximum of 9 per cent which remained largely a 'dead letter'.³⁰

The chronic indebtedness of the *fellaheen* was clearly the main barrier to the development of production and the stabilising of the peasantry on the land.³¹ The mandatory state was not prepared to break the power of the class of landowners and money-lenders whose exactions were the main cause of this indebtedness, any more than it would give priority to curtailing land sales to the Jews. Hence its attempts to solve this problem were necessarily half-measures. Apart from the remissions of taxation already mentioned, relief was given to the *fellaheen* mainly by means of short-term agricultural loans, especially seed loans after bad harvests and loans to recoup drastic losses due to floods, earthquakes and plagues such as locusts and field

mice. These loans were only given in the periods of particular need – 1919 to 1923, 1928, and from 1930 onwards. Most of these loans did not exceed £P 10 per farmer and were payable in two instalments after the harvest.³² In 1936 arrears amounted to about 20 per cent of the total sum loaned from 1919 to 1935 – £P 780 629.³³

The lack of available capital among the *fellaheen* meant that often attempts to introduce the new methods or crops advocated by the government agricultural stations and experimental farms³⁴ without the assistance of long-term loans merely ended in worse indebtedness.³⁵ Despite repeated calls from all sides for long-term credit facilities for the agricultural sector, little was done until the mid-1930s when the Agricultural Mortgage Company was established to issue agricultural loans for up to 20 years at 8 per cent per annum. However, 'owing to the uncertainty of the law with regard to mortgages on leaseholds, no loans are at present granted on this security',³⁶ and most of the loans were designed for the citrus sector and were for the maintenance of old groves, rather than for the establishment of new ones. All these restrictions limited the applicability of the scheme to the part of the agricultural economy which was already more highly capitalised than average.³⁷ The other major scheme which the government initiated in 1935 was a long-term loan of £P 500 000 for the hill areas. However, the implementation of this scheme was held up and finally suspended in 1938 because of the rebellion.

Another approach which was tried on a limited scale was the establishment of agricultural credit co-operatives in Arab villages. In 1937 there were about 120 with an average of 43 members each. The scale of operations was still small – the total funds owned by all of the co-operatives in 1937 were £P 10 117, added to which were loans mainly from Barclays Bank of £P 62 272.³⁸

There were, however, more general factors which contributed to the limitations of those projects which were implemented. The need to have a stable peasantry was a theme constantly reiterated in the various government-sponsored reports on the problems of Arab agriculture in Palestine from 1929 onwards. This seemed to imply that the mandatory authorities did not want to encourage any basic changes in the mode of Arab agricultural production which would destroy the peasant unit of production or create a situation in which large numbers of peasants became completely separated from their means of production and drifted into the towns where they could not be satisfactorily absorbed as an industrial proletariat.

The foremost need of the agricultural industry is rationalisation. . . The rural population which forms the bulk of the indigenous population, could not easily be industrialised even if there were industries to absorb it. It is therefore essential to secure the rural population in its present occupation at least the minimum of subsistence.³⁹

Likewise it was the opinion of High Commissioner Sir Arthur Wauchope that:

a continued increase in the class of landless Arabs was a social peril against which steps should be taken without delay, in spite of the practical difficulties and political objections and the certainty of resentment on the part of the Jews . . . there was the risk of the landless Arab class producing economic results which would serve as a focus of discontent and might even result in serious disorders.⁴⁰

The view that the Arab agricultural economy should be 'rationalised' was held by most Jewish observers; but for them the main aim of rationalisation was greater intensification in order to free land for Jewish settlement. For the British, however, the question was complicated by their fear of creating some kind of rural lumpenproletariat and furthermore, by their desire to avoid radically upsetting the prevailing social structure and relations of production in Arab society. In fact, their main hope of containing and controlling the Arab population was through the preservation and even ossification of the existing patterns of domination. These would be disturbed by the implementation of major changes in the forces and relations of production by undermining the power of the landowning/merchant class. As John Marlowe points out, 'it all came back to a question of redistributing wealth as a necessary preliminary to increasing the source of wealth and this implied a change of social structure which the Palestine administration was prepared neither to initiate nor even to encourage'.⁴¹

The impact of the mandatory state and Jewish colonisation on this class of landowners and merchants was complex. They still controlled access to land and capital in the rural areas, but one general and immediate result was the removal from their hands of one means of extracting surplus – the control of tax-farms. Access to other forms of state office was also noticeably reduced – only a small proportion of the educated effendis obtained posts in the administration, though

the numbers had increased by the 1930s, particularly as it became policy to appoint Arab district officers wherever possible.⁴² This probably affected the Jerusalem 'notable' class to a greater extent than it did that of provincial centres like Nablus. In the late nineteenth century, the latter had already begun to lose access to these positions to the major Jerusalem families.⁴³

The role of the landowning/merchant class as the main providers of rural credit was also curtailed to a small extent by the legislation mentioned earlier (see pp. 98–9) and by the existence, in the 1930s, of some alternative sources of credit – government loans, Barclays Bank, the Arab Agricultural Bank and credit co-operatives – but it was not until the Second World War and the dramatic rise in agricultural prices that many peasants were able to escape the clutches of the money-lenders.⁴⁴

Even when credit co-operatives were set up to lessen the burden of debt, the co-operatives themselves sometimes ended up owing money to the local landowner. For instance, in Al Yamun village (Jenin sub-district) in 1937, a member of a local landowning family, Haj Muhammad Sayyid Abbushi, had loaned the sum of £P 250 to the Co-operative Society of Al Yamun to meet their obligations due to Barclays Bank in respect of a loan of £P 750, only £P 500 of which had been paid back. In these circumstances Haj Muhammad had agreed to lend them the remainder at 2 per cent interest. But when he himself wanted to collect the sum due to him, the villagers said they had no money and would need to obtain yet another loan in order to enable them to pay him.⁴⁵ Although the interest asked by the landowner in this case was very small, the story does show that the vicious circle of debt continued – although perhaps it had the advantage of being collective rather than individual. The existence of such societies would not necessarily mean that the peasants could escape from the influence and financial control of landowners and money-lenders.

However, whereas it is possible to find a few examples of links between the commercial and agricultural interests of this class, it is relatively difficult to find documentation for the relationship of money-lending to either of these activities, for the simple reason that money-lending, however common a practice, was not a 'respectable' occupation and therefore not acknowledged openly because of the prohibition of interest-taking in Islamic law. Hence it was usually disguised in the census returns as 'agricultural rent',⁴⁶ or as a *sharika* contract (where one party lends the other a major share of the capital

encompassed in the contract). Otherwise it simply involved paying back a larger volume of goods or money than had originally been lent, without acknowledging that this constituted interest. It is therefore necessary to rely mainly on the rather generalised evidence provided by official reports.

Both the Johnson-Crosbie Report and Hope-Simpson Report allude to the fact that money-lenders were often also merchants and Mr French's supplementary report on development asserts that in an (unnamed) sub-district, one money-lender alone employed 26 mounted debt collectors, obviously implying a very large scale of operations.⁴⁷ French claimed that this was not a unique case.⁴⁸ Interest rates apparently remained high. The Johnson-Crosbie Report quoted 30 per cent per annum as a common rate 'but 50 per cent for three months is not unusual'.⁴⁹ Firestone quotes from Nazmi Abd al-Hadi's account books that for other members of his own family, interest rates were usually around 15–17.5 per cent. For tenants and share-croppers, the rate would vary widely with the season and the particular situation, for example he quotes an instance where Nazmi was charging two share-croppers 30 per cent on an old debt.⁵⁰ (Nazmi also operated as a grain merchant.) The links between rural money-lending, trade and agriculture also meant that serious attempts to supersede money-lenders and establish other forms of rural credit represented something of a threat to the prevailing structure of the rural economy.

On the whole, while credit was provided in this way and was given as often in kind as in money, it did not become linked directly with finance capital, even though the new role of the banks in this process obviously did represent the kind of incorporation of credit into the capitalist system mentioned in the schema. It is perhaps possible to speculate that some links may also have existed between local merchant capital (closely connected with usurious capital) and the development of a local banking sector. According to Badran, the creation of the Arab Agricultural Bank in 1934 benefited the owners of large plantations (mostly citrus) rather than the *fellaheen*, and quotes the landowner and notable from Tulkarm, Rashid Haj Ibrahim, as saying that in the first year of its operation the bank was paying 18 per cent interest on capital. He also quotes the director of the National Bank, Ahmad Hilmi, as saying there were 'usurers' included on the board of the bank.⁵¹ If this was the case, then clear, though relatively small-scale connections were emerging between finance capital and usurious/agricultural capital.⁵² Probably the most

accurate description of the role of the money-lender or middleman in the rural economy is that provided by Dominique Chevallier when he describes the money-lender in Syria as the ‘hinge’ between the world market and large-scale commerce and banking on one hand and small-scale peasant and artisan production on the other.⁵³

The expansion of the domestic market for land and agricultural goods, and new outlets for international trade also had some effects on the landowning class, but, again, these were more evident in the sphere of circulation than of production. Thus during the Mandate, the economic status of agricultural land underwent further changes which, in some cases, led to its full conversion into a commodity, while in others, complex forms of partial integration were created. The most significant aspect of the progressive conversion of land into a commodity in Palestine as a whole was the large-scale land purchases by the Jewish community. This had relatively little direct effect on the hill areas since these purchases were mostly concentrated in the coastal plain and the Valley of Esdraelon (Marj Ibn ‘Amir) though they did sometimes affect land owned in the plains by hill villages. At a national level, however, it did create a market which made all land, to one degree or another, a potentially saleable commodity. Many landowners took advantage of this change to accumulate capital from land sales.

As a result, the actual price of agricultural land was pushed very high, though how high it was depended very much on the geographical location and the quality of the land. For instance, citrus land in the mid-1930s sold for up to £P 30 per *dunum* while unirrigated cereal land was up to £P 8–12 per *dunum* (1 metric *dunum* = 1000 sq m = 1 acre).⁵⁴ Cereal land in the Jenin area in 1935 were being sold for prices ranging from £P2.500 per *dunum* (Beit Qad) and £P3.427 (Muqeibila) – to a government resettlement scheme – up to £P 7 per *dunum* in a private sale in the neighbouring village of Silat al-Harithiya.⁵⁵ The market, of course, was somewhat artificial, in that land bought up by the Jewish Agency was permanently taken off the market and was not therefore available for resale according to the mechanisms of supply and demand. Furthermore, since land-buying was viewed as politically as well as economically crucial by the architects of the national home, the demand for land was not wholly conditioned by the price mechanism, hence land was often sold for highly inflated prices.

Although the commoditisation of land had more impact in the maritime plain, the Marj Ibn ‘Amir and certain areas of Galilee in the

hills, there is some evidence to show that in the 1930s a considerable number of land transfers took place in the hill districts among Arabs themselves. According to Lewis French, the Director of Development:

In the hill tracts, there are two directions in which unrestricted transfers of land are proceeding. In some parts, it means the advance of the Jews, without such noticeable progress in development as in the coastal plain, but with similar results in reinforcing the class of landless Arabs. In other parts, it is the absorption, gradual but noticeable, of the Arab peasant proprietor by the Arab effendi or capitalist landlord. . . . In one sub-district in the hilly tracts [unfortunately not identified] it is reported that in a decade no less than 30 of the land has passed from Arab peasants to Arab capitalists.⁵⁶

It is not entirely clear from this description whether the mechanisms whereby land transfers occurred were by and large the same as those which had operated in the nineteenth century or whether the development of land as a commodity and the high prices offered acted as a positive incentive for peasants to sell. Furthermore, some landowners whose power base was in the hill areas also owned land in the plains. Thus Porath gives a list of Arab notables who were said to have either sold land to the Jews or acted as intermediaries for such sales. Among them were the following members of families whose main base was in the Jabal Nablus region: Amin Bey Abd al-Hadi, Awni Bey Abd al-Hadi, Nazmi Bey Abd al-Hadi, Haj Qasim Abd Al-Hadi, Abd al-Rahman Haj Ibrahim and his sons Salama and Salim, and Tawfiq Kanaan.⁵⁷ Profits made by Arab landowners from such sales or from services rendered as middleman were sometimes invested in citrus plantations, sometimes in urban real estate and commercial ventures, but seldom in industrial concerns with the exception of construction, and, especially in the hill districts, equally seldom in large-scale capital investments in new technology on their own agricultural lands.

Agricultural commodities were also in greater demand due both to the high level of population growth through natural increase and immigration and also to changing dietary patterns, particularly among urban immigrants.⁵⁸ In Jabal Nablus, at least, commerce and manufacture seem to have remained heavily dependent on, and interlinked with, agricultural production (see pp. 138ff). The harvest

consisted mostly of the same range of crops grown in the earlier period, though there was some response to the enlarged national demand for vegetables, fruit and meat.⁵⁹

Some intersectoral trade between the Jewish and Arab communities did exist – at least until 1936. Dr Arthur Ruppin claimed that ‘in 1935 Arab farmers sold £P 500,000 worth of agricultural produce to Jews’.⁶⁰ But Nablus and Jenin (though not Tulkarm) were probably too far from the main urban centres to have taken a very large share in this trade. Thus commerce in those towns generally continued to centre around the needs and demands of the Arab population which, though changing, were doing so slowly since the overall rise in affluence and purchasing power was fairly small. Even so, certain cheap consumer products, most of them imported, like cotton goods, kerosene and hardware, did become more widely used, even in the villages.

To recapitulate, in terms of the original schema, the Mandate period saw the intensification of the first form of integration of the products of surplus labour, both as a result of semi-colonial ties which linked Palestine more closely to the international market and also because of the expansion of a domestic commodity market fuelled by Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish economic enclave with capitalist characteristics. These developments also led to the appearance of the second form – the integration of various means of production – though in an uneven and fragmented way. Outside of the Jewish sector of the economy, it was probably land which experienced the most rapid and decisive conversion into a commodity. For most other means of production the evidence is very uneven and difficult to generalise so a detailed analysis of the degree to which raw materials, instruments of production, and credit became commoditised will be made only with specific reference to Jabal Nablus. The third form, the conversion of labour power into a commodity, presents much the same difficulties and will be dealt with separately on pp. 143–54 below.

THE ECONOMY OF JABAL NABLUS

Major Economic Features

The rest of this analysis focuses on a specific part of Palestine in order to trace in more detail the effects of the uneven and combined

development of the forms of integration into capitalism. The area chosen for closer study is the central section of Palestine's hill country, known in Arabic as Jabal Nablus.⁶¹ The main purpose of selecting this region is to examine changes in economic conditions in an area where the direct effects of Jewish colonisation and land-buying were of negligible importance. It is often assumed that in a situation of rapid economic change such 'peripheral' areas will remain essentially 'backward' and economically static, contributing, at the most, a flow of cheap and unskilled labour to the capitalist 'centre'. In the case of Palestine, at least, there is some reason to doubt this view: the evidence presented here lends support to the view put forward by Laclau that 'on the contrary, everything appears to suggest that even the most backward peasant regions are bound by fine threads . . . to the "dynamic" sector of the national economy and, through it, to the world market'.⁶²

Among the areas in which it would be possible to find these conditions, Jabal Nablus had perhaps the clearest claim to being a distinct historical entity, having strenuously resisted the attempts of the Ottoman government to impose centralised rule on it until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Before this time Nablus, the main town of the region, had held a position of some importance as the centre of the soap industry and the surrounding area was a major source of agricultural produce, particularly olives, sesame and wheat (see Schölch, pp. 48–51). From the 1880s onwards, however, the expansion of the seaborne trade with Europe, improved security on the plains the developments in transport began to shift the economic centre of gravity from the hill towns such as Nablus to the coastal ports of Haifa and Jaffa. This trend was accentuated during the Mandate period since the area had no valuable natural resources which might have attracted new investment. As it was, by the late 1930s Nablus itself had experienced a crisis in its previously profitable soap industry⁶³ (to be discussed later, see pp. 139–41), and the agriculture of the region was in considerable difficulties while remaining the predominant source of livelihood.

It is the nexus of economic and social relationships in the agricultural sector that this analysis aims primarily to examine. Although the evidence is fragmentary and not always reliable, and must therefore be treated with considerable caution, there is a sufficient body of material to permit some detailed analysis. Particularly valuable is the work of Ya'kov Firestone on the agricultural economy of northern Jabal Nablus.⁶⁴ However, on questions where

the evidence is too thin to warrant generalisations a more schematic approach will be used. It is also important to bear in mind that much of what is said about Jabal Nablus need not necessarily apply to other parts of Palestine where economic conditions were different. Equally evidence cited for particular villages should not be taken to mean that conditions in every village in the region were inevitably similar – size, geographical position, and the land-population ratio all affected particular local conditions. Finally, it should not be assumed that Jabal Nablus, despite its relatively clear identity as a historical unit, can be taken as an object of study in isolation from the economic, political and geographical context in which it existed. In fact it is the purpose of this study to show the interrelationship of such an ‘isolated’ region with the wider economic environment which played a crucial part in shaping both rural and urban life within it, and their relationship with each other in the control and distribution of surpluses.

Geography and Climate

Geographical and climatic features place the basic limitations on the way in which a predominantly agricultural economy is organised. These factors are of particular importance in areas where agriculture depends mainly on human labour power rather than on sophisticated technology. Without the reinforcement of irrigation, fertilisers or artificial protection of crops, production relies heavily on the quality of the land and is vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather and to numerous pests and plagues.

The limestone hills of Jabal Nablus lie between the higher and more fertile hills of Galilee to the north and the rugged, arid hills and deep gorges of Judea. The Jabal Nablus range is bounded on the north by the Plain of Esdraelon, whose deep alluvial soils made it an important cereal-growing area. On the west, a line of low foothills separate the central range from the maritime plain, providing fairly easy access from the coast. The central range itself is interspersed with open valleys and small plains (such as the plain of ‘Arraba near Jenin) in which cereals and other field crops can be cultivated.

The scarcity of water resources in this area means that agriculturalists have had to rely heavily on rainfall which averages 20–32 inches annually. It must be noted, however, that averages are deceptive as annual rainfall is actually much more variable than this.⁶⁵

Given irregularities in rainfall, along with the often untimely arrival of the hot *khamisin* winds, and periodical plagues of locusts,

field mice, and the wheat disease *scythris temperatella*, for the cultivator, every season was a gamble. As Weulersse points out, in these regions of the Middle East 'une mauvaise année n'est pas, comme dans nos pays modérées de l'Ouest Européen, une question de plus ou de moins dans le récolte, mais de peu ou rien'.⁶⁶

Patterns of settlement and cultivation in this region were determined both by the climatic factors already mentioned and by the historically variable degree of security for the settled population. From the eighteenth to the late nineteenth century the weakness of central state power over the whole of Greater Syria resulted in a shrinkage of the cultivated area and an expansion of the territory dominated by the Bedouin. In the first part of the nineteenth century, for instance, it seems that the Bedouin virtually encircled the Palestine hill regions – controlling the Jordan Valley, the Esdraelon Valley and the coastal plain. It was only after the reassertion of Ottoman power after mid-century that the nomad frontiers were pushed back from the coastal strip and the Esdraelon Valley.

The core of the settled area was thus to be found in the hills themselves and hence hill settlements in Jabal Nablus tended to be much older and more stable than those on the plains.⁶⁷ By the same token, until the latter part of the nineteenth century 'occupation of the coastal plain became largely a branch of mountain settlement. The peasants who moved to the mountains maintained contact with the lands in the plain and – if and when security conditions permitted – they made use of these lands'.⁶⁸ Usually they were occupied at most on a seasonal basis for the cultivation of field crops or for pasturage. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, when conditions on the coastal plain had improved, peasants from the hills began to move to their plain lands and new settlements often became permanent branches (*khirbas*) of the 'parent' villages in the hills.⁶⁹

During the First World War many of these *khirbas* were themselves abandoned and their inhabitants retreated to the 'parent' hill villages as the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and the Turks moved up the coastal plain. Cohen mentions that, in some cases, these peasants became heavily indebted to local landowners and even lost their plain lands through their inability to repay what they owed. In the 1920s the new owners farmed this land with share-croppers, but in the 1930s some of them embarked on the large-scale capitalist farming of cash crops using wage labour.⁷⁰

In the hill areas themselves, land tenure was more likely to take the form of individual ownership, while in the plains *mushaa* tenure was

more common.⁷¹ Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics for the Jabal Nablus region, but for the country as a whole, the Palestine Royal Commission estimated that in 1923, 56 per cent of agricultural land was in *mushaa* tenure, and in 1929, 46 per cent.⁷² Presumably in the hill districts the proportion would have been less than this. The question is further complicated by the fact that many villages had several categories of land: cereal land in the valley or plain, mostly held in *mushaa* tenure; terraced hill land under olive and fruit trees, usually held individually, since the organisation of labour and long-term investments needed for tree cultivation lent themselves less readily to communal cultivation and the rotation of plots; and finally gardens surrounding the built-up area which were usually divided up permanently between the village's families.⁷³ Thus to classify villages simply as *mushaa* or not *mushaa* is not necessarily the most useful indicator of ownership or of access to land, or of the social organisation of labour, since *mushaa* tenure itself was a changing and ambiguous category (see p. 123).

Equally, there is no reliable information on the size and distribution of landholding in various parts of the country at the end of the Ottoman period. Granott quotes official Turkish data for 1909 (of dubious reliability) according to which:

in the three sanjaqs of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, there were 16,910 families occupied in agriculture, tilling between them 785,000 dunums – that is to say, 46 dunums on an average to a family. The great majority of the fellaheen in the sanjaqs of Jerusalem and Nablus – 67 per cent in Jerusalem and 63 per cent in Nablus – were in possession of plots of less than 50 dunums to a family and such an area was reckoned at that time only as a smallholding.⁷⁴

He also gives the following list, showing the concentration of property in the hands of large landowners:

| <i>Kaza</i> | <i>No. of owners</i> | <i>Area in their possession (in dunums)</i> |
|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| Jerusalem and Hebron | 26 | 240 000 |
| Jaffa | 45 | 162 000 |
| Nablus and Tulkarm | 5 | 121 000 |
| Jenin | 6 | 114 000 |
| Nazareth | 8 | 123 000 |
| Haifa | 15 | 141 000 |
| Acre | 5 | 157 000 |
| Tiberias | 6 | 73 000 |

These figures seem to indicate that the Jabal Nablus area (Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm) had a comparatively high concentration of land in the hands of large proprietors.

Population

The Muslim population of the three sub-districts of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm in 1931 was divided as follows:⁷⁵

| | <i>Percentage change since 1922</i> |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Nablus sub-district | +22.6 |
| Jenin sub-district | +24.2 |
| Tulkarm sub-district | +30.6 |

The average increase in the Muslim population of Palestine as a whole was 37.12 per cent for the period 1922–31. There is no way of telling whether the lower increase in the three sub-districts in question represented significant out-migration or either a lower birth-rate or higher death-rate. There were only tiny numbers of Jews and Christians in Nablus and Jenin but more Jews in the Tulkarm sub-district, in settlements to the west of the hills.

It is difficult to compare the Mandate period population figures with those of late nineteenth century. The Ottomans used different administrative boundaries while their census figures tend to be even more unreliable than their commercial ones. However some indication of the trends can be gained from estimates for the population of Nablus itself, the region's largest town. According the figures collected by Ben-Arieh this was as follows:⁷⁶

| | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>1800</i> | <i>1840</i> | <i>1860</i> | <i>1880</i> | <i>1922</i> |
| 7–8000 | 8000 | 9–10 000 | 12–13 000 | 16 000 |

Finally, the population of Nablus in 1931 was 17 189, a growth of about 7.8 per cent since 1922, compared with 44.6 per cent for Jerusalem, 104.6 per cent for Haifa and 203.6 per cent for Tel Aviv. It perhaps can be said with more certainty of the town than of the whole region that its relatively slow rate of population growth reflects its relative economic stagnation compared with other major Palestinian towns.

Transport and Communications

The importance of communications in defining the interactions between 'urban' and 'rural' areas and, by extension between a specified regional 'object of study' and the national and international context is well illustrated in the following comment:

Control over surpluses in a society where they were generated by independent petty commodity producers rather than direct employment of wage labour or slave labour had to be articulated through the medium of circulation and in that communications played a crucial part. Whether one considers the role of the absentee landlords in provincial centres or the incursions of central authority into regional affairs, the urban unit and the communications on which it depended were integral to rural life.⁷⁷

The development of trade in nineteenth century Palestine led to some expansion of communications, the main emphasis being placed on the construction of railways. But as they were either built by Europeans or by the Ottomans in competition with Europeans it is not surprising that they were designed primarily to serve foreign and international trading interests rather than local needs. The first railway built in Palestine was the Jaffa–Jerusalem line which was opened in 1892. It was completed by a French company and aimed mainly to secure the increasing pilgrim traffic to Jerusalem rather than to handle freight.⁷⁸ This railway was originally intended to have branch lines to Gaza and Nablus but these never materialised. The next major development was the branch line from the Hijaz railway (Deraa–Beisan–'Affula–Haifa) which was completed in 1904–6.⁷⁹ As far as Jabal Nablus was concerned, the effect of this development, along with the completion of the Hijaz railway from Deraa to Damascus, was to connect Transjordan (which had previously traded mainly with Nablus and Jerusalem) directly with Haifa and Damascus, and thus probably to cause some loss of trade to the towns of the interior. With the coming of the First World War the Turks hurriedly expanded the railway network in order to have supply lines for the Egyptian front. By 1916, a branch line from 'Affula to Nablus was completed, passing through Jenin and close to 'Arraba.

Against this, the Turks did comparatively little to develop the road system or to maintain existing roads. Consequently, few of them were suitable for wheeled transport.⁸⁰ In particular, the expansion of

settlement and the development of the coastal towns was not fully reflected in the development of roads in the plains during the Ottoman period and by 1914 there was still no north/south road to rival that of the old mountain highroad from Tiberias to Beersheba. Some traverse roads were built, however, notably Jerusalem to Jaffa and Nablus to Jaffa, while a road from Nazareth to Nablus via 'Affula and Jenin was constructed during the First World War as part of an accelerated building programme for military purposes.⁸¹ Thus until the second decade of the twentieth century, the main form of transport in Palestine continued to be the camel for long journeys and on the plains, and the donkey or mule for short journeys and in mountainous terrain.

The most important branch of the inland trade consisted in supplying the cities and villages with grain, legumes, oil-producing plants and livestock and in transporting agricultural goods to the coast. A second branch was the distribution of imported goods. In the first case in particular, the caravan was the main instrument of transport, given security problems, the lack of good roads, and the expense of wheeled traffic and railways.⁸² As Verney and Dambmann pointed out 'les cameliers peuvent soutenir une concurrence acharnée contre le chemin de fer, car leur tarif comporte une réduction de 4 ou 5 francs par tonne sur les prix du chemin de fer'.⁸³ But their method was slow and cumbersome and, in this sense, as Weulersse notes, detrimental to agriculture.⁸⁴ It is true that by the mid-1920s some goods were being carried on the Nablus–Tulkarm railway.⁸⁵ But the 'Affula–Mas'udiya line running through the centre of the agricultural sub-districts of Jenin and Nablus was closed in 1932 as an economy measure. Although the effects of this were not immediately felt – because of the poor harvests in the early 1930s – by 1935 traders were pressing for its reopening and for the reduction of the freight rates previously in force. But in vain: it was not returned to full operation, being placed on a 'care and maintenance basis' and only opened for special purposes.⁸⁶

Lorries were gradually introduced into commercial transport in Palestine, but as far as Jabal Nablus was concerned on only a small-scale, at least until the 1940s. Local road-building under the Mandate was a village responsibility. The Village Roads and Works Ordinance of 1926 and its various amendments required male villagers aged 16–60 to contribute either in taxation or in labour to any road or sanitation works undertaken in the village. Thus the Ottoman legislation concerning compulsory labour on road-making was merely

amended to include the option of a tax in lieu of labour.⁸⁷ In Jabal Nablus itself, the result was that there was little road development until the rebellion, when the British began to build roads to facilitate access for the army.⁸⁸ Thus, in the hill areas in particular, animal transport continued to be of major importance during the Mandate and inevitably exerted considerable influence on the pace of agricultural life, on relationships with the towns and ports, and on the movement of agricultural surpluses.

Developments in Land Tenure and Agricultural Production

Given the complexities of the land tenure system inherited from the Ottomans and the lack of detailed information on ownership, it is on the whole more fruitful to concentrate analysis on the question of access to land for productive purposes and of the changing structure of rent and tenancy arrangements relating to agricultural land.

Control over access to land became increasingly important as Jewish purchases decreased the availability of land on the plains. This was compounded by the fact that, in the hill areas, it was difficult to open up new land without substantial long-term credit because of the extra capital cost of building and maintaining terracing to prevent soil erosion. Another problem was the Islamic law of inheritance which stipulated that a man's land should be divided between all his sons. This meant that, in legal terms, plots tended to become smaller and smaller, usually without any compensating intensification of production by means of irrigation or fertilisers. The alternative was one form or another of co-ownership of plots held by members of a family, something which though productive of friction and disputes, did help to counterbalance the trend towards greater fragmentation.


With a population growing at between 2 and 3 per cent per annum, many families were increasingly less able to live solely off their land. The Johnson-Crosbie Committee (1930) estimated that the average holding of peasant families in a sample of 104 villages (22 of which were in Jenin, Tulkarm and Nablus sub-districts) was only 56 dunums – of which a few dunums would usually have to be left fallow each year.⁸⁹ Of course, this average conceals very large variations. Table 2.4 (at the end of the chapter) gives some idea of the situation in Jenin sub-district in the early 1930s. As the subsistence area for cereal cultivation (with the existing forces of production) for Jenin sub-district was taken to be 120 dunums for a family, it is clear that the vast majority of owners did not possess sufficient land for the

maintenance of the average family. In 1936 an investigation for the Palestine Royal Commission showed that 'about 35 of the holdings in Palestine are under 5 dunums in extent. It is certain that no one can live on that area and that consequently a very large proportion of the rural population of Palestine is actually doing something else besides agriculture'. The question of what this 'something else' was will be dealt with later but this section will first examine some of the mechanisms of access to land which were instrumental in preventing a very large proportion of the Palestinian population from being rapidly converted into either a rural or an urban proletariat. The use of co-ownership or co-cultivation agreements within extended families as an alternative to farming these tiny plots separately has already been mentioned. But similar kinds of agreements were also increasingly used by peasants to gain access to more land in order to make a living from agriculture. This led to the adoption of several previously little-used forms of tenancy, which offered certain kinds of advantage both to landlords and tenants. It also led to changes in the economic status of the land, and, on occasion, in the social relations of production.

In Jabal Nablus there were basically two types of large landowners who would be likely to have tenants. First, there was the absentee landlord who had little or no control over the labour process and, secondly, there were local village 'notables' who usually tried to retain some contact with the process of production but were increasingly being drawn to the new opportunities and status of life in the large towns. In either case, rent as a form of surplus extraction seems to have remained an important source of income during the Mandate period.

The increased opportunities for selling agricultural commodities on the expanding home market as well as abroad were an added incentive to keep land under cultivation and maintain some control over what was produced and how it was disposed of. Ya'akov Firestone made a detailed study of the various rent arrangements operating in the Jenin sub-district at this time.⁹⁰ His two articles form the empirical basis for the rest of this section on the land regime (though most of the speculations as to the significance of these rent contracts are my own). They outline the following options for the landowner who wished to use labour other than that provided by the family unit (see also Figure 2.1):


1. **SHARE-CROPPING** Landlord contributes land, seed, ploughing stock
 Croppers contribute labour
 Croppers receive agreed share of crop, e.g. $\frac{1}{4}$



2. **JOINT FARMING** Landlord contributes land, seed, part of stock
 Joint farmer contributes labour and sometimes part of stock, is also assigned a share of total capital, excluding the land

| e.g. Landlord | ££ | Joint farmer | ££ |
|----------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------|
| 1 horse | 25.0 | 1 ox | 10 |
| 5 oxen | 85.0 | 1 cow | 9 |
| barley feed and seed | 11.0 | 1 donkey | 4 |
| vetch | 1.8 | | <u>23</u> |
| millet seed | 0.5 | | |
| chickpea seed | 0.5 | | |
| sesame seed | 1.5 | | |
| | <u>125.3</u> | Total capital | ££ 148.3 |

Joint farmer assigned $\frac{1}{3}$ total capital = ££ 49.383. Therefore in final share-out at termination of contract, joint farmer debited (££ 49.383 - ££ 23) = ££ 26.383



3. **SHARE-RENT CONTRACT** Landlord contributes land
 Share-rent farmer contributes ploughing stock, seed, labour




FIGURE 2.1 *Types of share contract*

- (a) Share-cropping: the landholder provides the land and the capital/stock, the labour alone being performed by croppers.
- (b) Joint farming: the landowner, who also owns the stock, appoints a villager (who may himself own some stock) to operate the farm, making over a share of the stock to him, debiting him its value and sharing out the product with him according to their initial shares in the capital. The land itself is not included in the contract. The joint farmer could either perform the labour himself with his family or take on share-croppers. This type of contract was mainly used by landowners who wished to maintain some degree of control over the process of production on their land.
- (c) Share-rent farming: the landowner provides only the land, the farmer supplying the whole capital. The farmer could, if he wished, take on joint farmers or croppers or sub-farm out the land. This was a common form of tenancy used by absentee landowners who essentially wanted a reliable manager.
- (d) Tenancy in which cash rent replaced the share rent.

Of these alternatives, the predominant arrangement in the nineteenth century seems to have been share-cropping. This meant that in return for a season's labour, the croppers received a set portion of the crop – usually a quarter or a fifth. From this portion were deducted the cropper's share of crop taxes and other fees and charges incurred during production. Firestone found that, during the Mandate, when share-cropping was still very common, the croppers were in some cases obliged to reimburse the landlord or farmer for one quarter of all wages paid out in the course of the season to non-cropper day labourers such as weeders or harvestmen. A cropper was also frequently expected to provide a woman – usually his wife or a female relative – to do such jobs as feeding and watering livestock, and sifting grain on the threshing floor. Either his crop-share would be conditional on such provision or he was expected to pay a woman's wages for the season. By the late 1920s cropping still provided more security than day labour, but the new market opportunities in the wider economy combined with the increasing difficulty for the peasantry of maintaining access to sufficient land made joint farming and share rent farming increasingly attractive propositions for both landowners and tenants.⁹¹

There were numerous variations on these share contracts which were developed to fit the needs of particular forms of production, most importantly livestock, olives and field crops. The following are

examples of how the contracts were varied to fit different forms of production:

1. *Livestock production*: Livestock had always played an important part in subsistence agriculture, as plough animals, as a source of food and as a means of accumulation, but during the Mandate a trend emerged towards its transformation into a market commodity once the demand for meat increased, especially among the urban population. Much of this new demand was met by imports and by the produce of Jewish farms. Firestone, however, gives examples from Jabal Nablus (particularly from the Yabad area in the west of Jenin sub-district) of stock breeders who took advantage of the new trends. There was a shortage of shepherds due to the fact that many of them had moved off to seek wage labour away from their villages. At the same time the expansion of fruit and field crop-growing had encroached to an increasing degree on pasture land, making the prospects for independent pastoralists increasingly poor. Stock owners sought to remedy these difficulties by the use of share contracts aimed at attracting people to work as shepherds rearing livestock on a commercial basis. The stock owner would supply the sheep or goats (cattle were still comparatively rare), assigning a fixed share to the shepherd (usually a quarter to a third of the assessed worth of the herd). A note would be drawn up to cover this debt which was to be paid off within a specified period, usually three to five years. It should be noted that such a debt incurred in the process of capital-sharing had no direct connection with the shepherd's contract to look after the herd and had to be paid separately, whether or not the enterprise was profitable. The shepherd tended the herd, which he was at least theoretically free to dispose of as he wished and also paid the small *aghnam* (animal tax). The proceeds of any sales of stock made during the period of the contract were divided between the partners according to their agreed shares in the capital. On the termination of the contract, the herd was partitioned, also according to the fixed shares. In this way it was possible for a shepherd who successfully manipulated his contract and managed to pay off all or part of his capital debt during the contract period to end up with some stock of his own. Of course, it involved a risk: if the value of the stock he retained was less than his remaining capital debt, he would be worse off than before. Furthermore, it sometimes happened that the stock owner was also a merchant dealing in meat or cheese. In this case the shepherd would have as the supplier of his means of

production (the herd), the man who was also his creditor (through the capital-sharing arrangement) and the main purchaser of his produce, someone well able to manipulate the prices he paid for the milk, cheese or meat. This overlapping of roles would clearly increase the unevenness of the relationship.

2. *Olive-growing*: In the Jabal Nablus region, the importance of olive cultivation gave special prominence to the *mugharasa*, a planting contract whereby a cultivator developed an olive grove in return for an agreed share in the grove when the trees matured. In some parts of the Levant the cultivator only gained ownership of a portion of the trees through this type of contract, but in Jabal Nablus, it appears that the cultivator often acquired a share of the land itself. According to Firestone, 'it is difficult to overstate . . . the importance of the *mugharasa* as an agent of social change in creating a whole new class of smallholders'.⁹² He adds, however, that this type of contract was also employed by large landowners to increase their power and influence while maintaining close ties with their peasantry, citing in particular the Abbushi landowning family of Jenin as having used such arrangements to their advantage.

This contract differed from the standard joint farming and share-rent contracts in important ways. The cultivator only brought his labour to add to the landlord's capital and seedlings, but the moment the trees matured (if this operation was successful – again the element of risk to the cultivator was always present) he actually acquired a portion of the original capital in the form of land. He did not, however, incur the debt which was shouldered by the shepherd or joint farmer when they agreed to participate in the landlord's capital and were then debited with his share.

3. *Joint farming*: usually of field crops, provided access to land and capital only for the period of the contract. The cultivator might possibly gain from the operation by making profits from the sale of his share of the product but he did not finally acquire land or capital from the contract. In terms of labour, he might work the land himself with his family or take on croppers or, in the case of a share-rent compact, he might engage a joint farmer. From the point of view of any cropper or joint farmer he engaged, he himself was in the position of the landlord, becoming simultaneously both exploiter and exploited.

Such a superimposition of joint farming or share-rent compacts on

share-cropping arrangements often led to considerable ambiguity in the relationships between the various parties. The portion received by the croppers depended on the precise way in which the landlord and joint farmer divided up the product and on the relative sizes of each of the two shares in the capital. Firestone gives some detailed examples from the account books of Nazmi Abd al-Hadi, who entered into a series of joint farming relationships involving the partition of the crop, first, in proportion to the shares of the landowner and the joint farmer in the capital and, secondly, according to their respective obligations to each of their share-croppers. In fact, some of the land involved belonged to a relative of Nazmi's and some to his joint farmer, but all the plots were farmed together with Nazmi's own land to permit certain economies of scale. On land belonging to the joint farmer or the relative the owner got a rent share of a quarter of the whole crop *before* a division was made between Nazmi and the joint farmer on the basis of their capital inputs, whereas on Nazmi's land the joint farmer only paid a quarter of his own divided share of the product as rent to Nazmi. Firestone then shows that this discrepancy in rent shares according to who owned the land meant that the share-croppers received a larger share from their work on Nazmi's land than on the land of the joint farmer or relative.⁹³

It appears that in the mid-1930s the croppers of 'Arraba and Zir'in were successful in persuading Nazmi to equalise these shares, but at his own expense rather than that of the joint farmer. This was probably a rare example of cropper bargaining power due to specific conditions prevailing in these villages, but it exemplifies the dependence of a landlord wishing to maintain economic and political control in his villages on maintaining the joint farmer as a local agent and thus as someone he could not afford to penalise in a dispute with the croppers.

The following analysis by Marx of a form of rent remarkably similar to the joint farming contract shows how it might of itself be seen as a transitional form of relationship which changes the role of the tenant *vis à vis* the landlord.

As a transitory form from the original form of rent to capitalist rent, we may consider the metayer system, or share-cropping, under which the manager (farmer) furnishes labour (his own or another's) and also a portion of the working capital (e.g. cattle) and the product is divided between tenant and landlord in definite

proportions which vary from country to country. On the one hand, the share here appropriated by the landlord does not bear the pure form of rent. It may actually include interest on the capital advanced by him and excess rent. It may absorb practically the entire surplus labour of the farmer, or leave him a greater or smaller portion of this surplus labour. But, essentially, rent no longer appears here as the normal form of surplus value in general. On the one hand, the share-cropper, whether he employs his own or another's labour is to lay claim to a portion of the product not in his capacity as a labourer, but as a possessor of a part of the instruments of labour, as his own capitalist. On the other hand, the landlord claims his share not exclusively on the basis of landownership but also as a lender of capital.⁹⁴

It follows that the land itself was not completely transformed into a commodity under these contracts. It is true that land as rent – a form of appropriation of surplus labour – ceased to be the sole determining factor in the relationship between tenant and landlord. However, the point had yet to be reached where the tenant was an independent capitalist farmer who had direct relations with the market for agricultural commodities. In the joint farming arrangement the land itself was not usually part of the share contract and carried the normal rent-share, but the fact that the capital was divided in notional proportions between the two partners meant that, as Marx pointed out, the tenant partner actually controlled a share of the capital for the duration of the contract which might run for anything from one year to a decade. In the share-rent situation, the tenant's position approximated more closely to that of a farm manager: he provided and controlled all the capital and labour on behalf of the landlord who only received his rent share of the product. From this situation it was obviously only a short step to money rents which became increasingly prevalent in the late 1930s. And yet even this does not of itself turn the tenant into a capitalist farmer; such a transformation would depend on a nexus of factors including the size of the farmer's surplus, the availability of markets, the extent of monetarisation in the economy as a whole and the prevalence of wage labour. Idriss, examining the three kinds of pre-capitalist rent in Morocco (labour rent, rent in kind, and money rent) says:

Cette rent en nature peut se transformer en rente en argent sans pour autant se transformer en rent capitaliste, elle continuera en

effet à être confondue avec la plus-value, le producteur direct payant tout simplement le montant de cette rente en argent au lieu que ça soit en produit. Cette transformation de la rente en nature en rente en argent correspond à un développement important du commerce, de l'industrie urbaine et de la circulation monétaire. Avec l'apparition du mode de production capitaliste, le profit apparaît mais c'est toujours la rente qui limite le profit et non pas l'inverse. Ce n'est qu'avec le développement du capitalisme en agriculture et son triomphe que l'inverse se produit.⁹⁵

The share forms of rent, while not necessarily leading directly to capitalist farming, as Marx envisaged, none the less did create conditions in which a part of the peasantry moved away from the position of being solely suppliers of surplus labour in the form of pre-capitalist rent. From the landlord's point of view these tenancy arrangements had the advantage of securing his labour force at a time when the opportunities for wage labour, though not extensive, were sufficient to constitute a threat to the stability of the peasant workforce in some areas. The co-farming compacts gave the peasant more incentive to remain on the land with at least some prospect of advancement, while the landlord gained a more dedicated farmer, and also a local client who would look after his interests, political as well as economic, in the village. This aspect was important since it allowed an increasingly absentee landlord class to retain its position of patronage as well as its control of the production process. It appears that in practice landlords were sometimes prepared to accept short-term economic disadvantages (e.g. in the course of a season be willing to support a farmer with interest-free advances to their own detriment) in order to maintain their position of control in the longer term. The maintenance of a political as well as an economic base in the rural areas was of considerable importance for a landowning class which also represented a substantial portion of merchant capital and showed few signs of shifting its activities towards industrial enterprise.

It does seem, however, that one additional advantage may have accrued to landlords in the form of surplus labour. The family was still the main unit of labour on the land and, in share-farming and share-cropping agreements, the labour of at least part of the share-farmer's family would normally be employed in the joint enterprise. This would embody more labour time at a cheaper rate than the landlord could obtain by hiring wage labourers to whom full

subsistence would have to be paid. It does not necessarily mean, however, that family labour was totally without cost to the landlord as it was quite common for the joint farmer and his family to receive assistance of various kinds from the landlord to tide them over difficult periods. But such assistance would still be generally cheaper than employing wage labour. Equally, if the joint farmer himself took on share-croppers he would also, as was customary, have the use of the labour power not only of the cropper himself, but also of at least one of his womenfolk. Commenting on the *khammes* (share-cropping) system in Algeria during the colonial period Benachnou makes this same point:

L'exploitation économique [du khammes] est plus accentué dans la mesure où elle inclut celle du travail de tous les membres de la famille de propriétaire se procure, grâce à une faible fraction du produit de la force de travail à très bon marché.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the fundamental asymmetry of the respective economic positions of landowner and tenant were not wholly reflected in the share contracts described earlier. While they often entailed some risk on the part of the peasant as the subordinate partner, they none the less provided one form of opportunity for the improvement of his economic position, or at least of increased security for the period of the contract. This could make a significant difference to his prospects for survival during, for instance, the lean years of the early 1930s when even comparatively well-off peasants found themselves in difficulties.

The conditions upon which access to land was obtained by tenancy therefore varied considerably in scope: at one end of the scale there was the marginal position of the cropper, and at the other, the cultivator who virtually became a small landowner and exploited others as his croppers or labourers. The access to capital resources which the more advantageous of these arrangements allowed was important in the expansion of certain branches of production in response to changing conditions and together with a slow development of wage labour, led to gradual increases in differentiation among the peasantry. In other words, those who managed to acquire some kind of capital asset were able to profit from the use of their initial advantage, in contrast to those peasants whose only expandable input was their labour.

The changing economic status of land also had important effects on

the older patterns of communal tenure practised in villages cultivating field crops. It seems unlikely that *mushaa* tenure, even as a form appropriate to a subsistence economy, ever had a wholly fixed or stable character, but the impact of the market and increasing shortages of land brought about a number of adaptations which in the longer run caused the form itself to disappear. During the Mandate years, however, it continued to function in modified ways in some areas of Palestine. This was despite the fact that the authorities were very keen to abolish communal tenure, first, because, like the Ottomans, they considered that personalised property facilitated tax collection; secondly, because land sales were far more difficult to effect on land under communal tenure; and lastly because they claimed that its subdivided plots made for 'inefficient' farming and discouraged investment in the land. The importance of the second point is underlined by the fact that their country-wide settlement and survey operation, designed to break up *mushaa* tenure and settle title on individuals, concentrated mainly on the areas in which there was most Jewish land-buying and also the greatest concentration of land in *mushaa* tenure. In fact, by the Second World War they still had not tackled most of the Jabal Nablus area and much of the hill country remained unsettled until the end of the Mandate. Table 2.5, at the end of the chapter, compiled from the Annual Report of 1935, indicates the degree to which the coastal districts had been given priority in settlement work. Nablus sub-district is not included since no settlement operations had taken place there by that time.

Even where *mushaa* tenure formally remained, however, the impact of market and other forces upon it meant that the apparent equality of access to land within the village which it presupposed often served to disguise marked differentiations and inequalities. One of these inequalities lay in the fact that in some villages large landowners had bought into the *mushaa* lands without actually abolishing the system entirely (even though the periodic redistribution of plots became less and less common during the Mandate period). Firestone gives an example of such an arrangement from the *mushaa* village of Zir'in (13 miles north-east of 'Arraba in the northern part of Jabal Nablus):

Where the *mushaa* land jointly owned by the cultivators was bought out or taken over progressively from individual owners, as each non-resident owner acquired a share in the lands of the village he was concurrently understood to have taken over the right to the

periodic reassignment of locations that went along with that share: any such reapportionment was henceforth among the new owners (and these cultivators who had not lost their land) . . .⁹⁷

Inequalities had also developed within villages between the various families or individuals among whom the land was divided. For example, in villages where apportionment of land was based on the ownership of draught animals to pull ploughs, the better-off peasant who could muster more draught animals had a permanent and possibly cumulative advantage over his poorer neighbours and relatives.⁹⁸ Equally, any individual or family who succeeded in mustering some capital would be at an advantage in utilising his land even where assignment was not based on command of a capital input, especially if the periodic reallocations had been discontinued.

A great deal of emphasis was placed by the mandatory authorities and by Jewish commentators on the subdivision or co-ownership of plots under the inheritance system which meant that not only were plots scattered according to the value of the land, etc. (see pp. 127, 130) but were divided among more and more families. Some evidence about this comes from the 1944–5 survey of five villages where the land had been held in *mushaa* tenure up to the 1930s but then largely broke up into individual parcels (see Table 2.6).⁹⁹ It was pointed out, however, that not all of these parcel shares were cultivated on an individual basis, either before or after settlement, but were sometimes rented out to the owner of the neighbouring plot, perhaps in exchange for a more convenient one. The owners might also enter into one of the joint cultivation contracts (outlined above) to facilitate cultivation. The miniscule size of most parcels may have been an added incentive to make such arrangements. It must also be borne in mind that the clan (*hamula*) as well as the extended family unit played a part in economic life and the organisation of labour, so that it was not only landowners who co-operated with brothers and cousins and even relations-in-law in cultivating a family's lands. Hence the formal subdivision of plots, though it clearly did lead to many diseconomies in terms of time and effort, was probably not as great a disadvantage as it would first appear. It did, however, lead to a very dense and complex meshing of contractual and family relations, both to maintain some access to land for the poorer members of the community and to allow the more prosperous to take advantage of new opportunities offered by the widening market mechanisms. Equally, those who left the village for long or short

periods of time might be able to maintain their access to local land by arranging for a relative to look after their plots.

To some extent then, common ownership, though in the long run by no means an appropriate response to the world and national markets, probably acted for a time as a kind of safety net which temporarily retarded the effects of market mechanisms for those peasants still living near the margins of subsistence and unable to respond positively to the market. For many peasants, who had no capital to invest anyway, the disincentives to invest in land and capital stock as commodities, which seemed to many people inherent in the *mushaa* system, were largely academic. It is not, however, the purpose of this study to enter into the debate as to the value of *mushaa* tenure but, rather, simply to point out the effects of market forces upon it. Although the historical context is different in many respects, the following comment by Marx on Russian agricultural land tenure in 1881 highlights the question of differentiation and the increasing difficulty of sustaining co-operative labour under market conditions:

Common ownership, divided petty cultivation: this combination which was useful in remoter periods, becomes dangerous in ours. On one hand, mobile property, an element which plays an increasing part even in agriculture, gradually leads to differentiation of wealth among members of the community, and therefore makes it possible for a conflict of interest to arise, particularly under the fiscal pressure of the state. On the other hand, the economic superiority of communal ownership, as the base of cooperative and combined labour, is lost.¹⁰⁰

World Market, National Economy and the Peasant Farm

Few comprehensive studies were made during the Mandate of the economics of the peasant farm but the summarised results of the two most detailed – those by the Committee on the Economic Condition of Agriculturalists (Johnson-Crosbie) and by Wilkansky – are cited below (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8 at the end of the chapter). These will provide the basis for a discussion on the response of the unit of production to market forces and an examination of the pressures exerted both by external demands and the pervasive shortage of capital and the land. Information from the Five Village Survey published in 1945 will also be used, though this survey focused

primarily on land tenure and social relations and did not deal in detail with the process of production.

We have seen that the pattern of land accumulation usually took the form of the agglomeration of numerous small plots on which petty commodity production still prevailed. It is the interaction of these (micro) units of production with the wider (macro) forces of the national economy and the world market which will concern us here. David Lehman remarks that:

By introducing – and ‘problematizing’ – units of production, as a less general concept than that of ‘mode of production’, we are able to separate out relations of production from the analysis of the general operation and conditions of survival of a mode of production. We are able to give an account of the variety and heterogeneity one encounters in history and in the field without getting into terminological log jams when talking, for example, about peasants who have one foot in each of two (or more?) modes of production. The concept of mode of production is far more general than such formulations would permit.¹⁰¹

The question arises, however, as to how best to define this unit of production. The Johnson-Crosbie Committee’s Report makes certain explicit assumptions about the parameters of the ‘family farm’ which will be examined in detail to discover to what extent they applied to Jabal Nablus. But before taking the discussion any further it is necessary to make a number of preliminary points about the figures contained in this report. First, the studies were drawn up by agricultural economists whose prime concern was to decide how much land constituted the ‘lot viable’ – the amount of land, given existing productive forces and patterns of husbandry, that a peasant family required in order to subsist. The Johnson-Crosbie Committee figures in particular were a contribution to the largely political argument over the ‘cultivable area’ of Palestine and the amount of land which could be taken over by the Jews while still maintaining a ‘stable peasantry’.

Secondly, the calculations are made with some of the assumptions of ‘cost accounting’, input/output models in mind – including the assumption that all items are directly quantifiable in money terms. This was to some extent justified by the increased importance of money in the rural economy, but to estimate all costs in strictly monetary terms and to treat all less measurable items as ‘non-costs’,

as the Johnson-Crosbie Report does on occasion may well distort or oversimplify the peasant's relationship to exchange and the market. In the circumstances, however, this was the only way to arrive at some answers to the 'cultivable land' question and to provide some statistical proof for the various arguments surrounding it. It is none the less useful to bear in mind when studying these figures a comment by Theodore Shanin on the 'logic' of 'peasant economies':

The differences between peasant economy and the 'normal' economic behaviour of a Weber-wise rational capitalist entrepreneur cannot be explained merely by peasant traditionalism or sheer stupidity. Traditionalism itself must also be explained. Investigation of the rationale underlying peasant beliefs and choices in terms of the specific economic conditions has constituted, therefore, a fruitful and important stage in the analysis of the peasantry.¹⁰²

Thus, there is little point, even if the evidence were available, in trying to produce a 'better' set of figures. My aim is rather to examine, through the medium of these figures, which parts of the process of production, exchange and the appropriation of surplus, were tending to fall within the sphere of the market, or at least the way in which the existence of a commodity market affected the choices open to a peasantry operating on its margins. This also raises the question of how far even the poorest members of such a community could be described as 'subsistence' farmers unaffected by these external changes. Finally, though the specific evidence on this point is rather thin, some attempt will be made to look at the way in which the intensification of Form I – the commoditisation of the products of surplus labour – affected family income and life-style.

One question arising from these estimates is that of the amount of land available to each family and under what terms. It has been shown that many peasants did not have access to 80 to 100 dunums of land; in many cases they had less than half this amount. The picture is further complicated by two other factors. The first is the differential fertility of the land so that the actual area of land held is not alone a sufficient indicator of what the output might be. Thus 20 dunums of good fertile plain land might produce an income similar to that of 40 to 50 dunums of poor stony hill land.¹⁰³ In Jabal Nablus it is reasonable to assume that no irrigation was available outside the *hawakir* (garden) areas. Second, we have seen that access to land was

often through a complex series of contractual relations for share-cropping or co-cultivation which might provide a peasant family with access to more land than they actually had title to. In assessing the figures, the differences in outgoings must be borne in mind between (1) those who held title to all their land and paid no rent, (2) those who held some land themselves and who paid rent on an extra portion, (3) those who paid rent on all their lands, and (4) those who received rent on part of their land. For any cultivator who was obliged to pay rent on all or part of his land this represented a considerable drain on his resources.

The Johnson-Crosbie Committee estimated rent at 30 per cent of income from cultivation, though Wilkansky makes no allowance for it. The Hope-Simpson Report pointed out that at the beginning of the 1930s:

Rents are rising; those who wish to rent land find it difficult to obtain it, and offer rents which frequently cannot be paid and yet leave a surplus for the maintenance of the family in a standard of reasonable comfort. Cases were reported in which fellahin who desired to obtain land offered 50 per cent of the produce, the landlord paying the tithe. The Committee reports that the commonest rent is 30 per cent of the produce, the tenant paying the tithe, or 40 per cent, the tithe falling on the landlord. Money rents are now beginning to appear in some parts of the country, as was to be expected as a consequence of the commutation of the tithe. These rents vary from about 50 mils to 250 mils the dunam. The most common is 100–150 mils.¹⁰⁴

Another factor which could make a certain difference to the costs of production was the size of the farm. If the amount of land held was substantially smaller than 100 dunums, the amount of seed sown would be less as would, probably, be the costs, if any, for hired labour or croppers. However, it would make little difference to the other costs. The unit of 100 dunums was roughly based on the 'common but variable unit, the feddan'.¹⁰⁵ This was usually taken to be the amount of land which could be ploughed by one yoke of plough animals the required number of times during the ploughing season.¹⁰⁶ A smaller plot would still require one team and hence the cost of the animals and their forage would be unlikely to diminish unless the fellah had only a part share in a team.

A less quantifiable aspect of the conditions of access to land was

the question of scattered plots. Even where land was not held in *mushaa* tenure, it was not unusual for villagers to have widely dispersed parcels of land, particularly in hill villages with detached areas of land in the plains. Again, on occasions, land shortage in the surrounding area might drive the peasant further afield.

It is true that there are villages at present in Palestine where cultivation sometimes takes place a day's journey from the fellah's house. This refers to rain, or dry farming. The fellah of Tubas (Nablus sub-district) for instance may decide to cultivate an area near the Jordan, by himself, in place of, or in association with, a local Bedu. A number of his friends of like mind and he depart bag and baggage to the area at sowing time. After sowing is over they return, leaving a watchman whose upkeep is shared among them. The crop is left alone and lives or dies according to circumstances. They return at harvesting time which, if the land is in the Jordan Valley or equally on the coastal plain, would be earlier than in the hills. Their crops are wheat or millet (*dura*), perhaps (very perhaps) an oil crop but certainly no crop that can be easily and productively stolen.¹⁰⁷

Hence it follows, as Firestone also points out, that the location of land to which a peasant had access in relation to the village area would determine to some extent the kind of crops which it was feasible to grow, unless he was prepared to hire someone to keep an eye on more valuable and vulnerable crops like olives and fruit trees, which represented in themselves a long-term investment.

The vulnerability and instability of a peasant family's income, whether from subsistence or cash crops, thus came from two sources: first, price mechanisms over which it had no control; and second, the vagaries of the weather. The latter problem was accentuated because capital was seldom available to improve production or protect crops by means of irrigation, fertilisers or other new forms of technology. It is noticeable that neither survey quoted includes these inputs in their list of costs. It was only large landowners who could afford them and relatively few in the area under discussion seemed to have been willing to lay out capital on their land to develop irrigation or import fertilisers and machinery. In fact, of all the inputs into production, the actual instruments of production were least affected by market forces. They mostly continued to be made of wood and other locally available materials. For instance, ploughs were normally made and

repaired locally with the iron parts being made by a blacksmith.¹⁰⁸ It seems that the type of technology used was generally appropriate to the small-scale nature of production and was unlikely to change radically without corresponding changes in the form of ownership and control of the land.¹⁰⁹

Most land was therefore of relatively low productivity and there might also be considerable variation in yields. In the case of wheat, the most important field crop, the Johnson–Crosbie Committee found that the average yield per dunum in 104 Arab villages studied was 48 kilos, while Wilkansky's estimate is 50 kilos per dunum. There were obviously considerable annual fluctuations, however, and there were great differences in yields between good plain lands and hill slopes. Nazmi Abd al-Hadi estimated the average yield on his good plain lands as six-fold (approximately 93 to 94 kilos per dunum) but on hill lands only 1.5–3 fold (24–48 kilos per dunum).¹¹⁰ One of Nazmi's more prosperous peasant joint farmers owned 30 dunums of land under olives and 52 dunums of field-crop land of which 44 dunums were considered poor. This implies that the area of land to which a peasant family had access cannot be treated as the sole criterion of their ability to make a living from agriculture.

Turning to the specific figures given for costs of production, neither estimate takes into account the costs of producing olive or fruit trees, or livestock which made up a significant proportion of production in Jabal Nablus. In the hill areas where there was a higher proportion of land under fruit trees and particularly olive trees than average, it would be unrealistic not to take into account inputs into orchards as well as the cost of having the olives pressed. Olive-growing expanded after the First World War though much of the new planting was replacement of trees which had been cut down by the Turks during the war to provide fuel for the railways.¹¹¹

In the late 1930s there was another large expansion in olive cultivation in response to the rising price of olive oil (see Table 2.9).¹¹² Thus an unusual amount of capital and labour time was employed in establishing groves during these periods. The capital input in a grove could be greater or smaller depending on the source of the plants (suckers) used. These could be acquired free from forests under state licence or, later in the period, from government nurseries, though the figures show the latter was not very common. However, the free suckers were not always of good quality and better quality ones had to be paid for. This was one reason why the *mugharasa* contracts described earlier represented one way of gaining

access not only to land but also to better quality inputs.

Another cost of production relating specifically to hill areas, whether under olives or other crops was terracing. Judging by evidence collected from the Jabal Nablus area in the early 1940s, this was something that had been neglected – perhaps especially in the early 1930s. It may also have been neglected when new land was brought into production in the Mandate period. According to Strickland's report, the cultivation of new plots, particularly those for olive and fruit growing in response to new market opportunities, was often carried out without sufficient attention to terracing and the planting of soil-binding plants.¹¹³ The expansion of field crops restricted grazing, causing the remaining grazing areas to be progressively denuded. Erosion was also increased by tree-cutting and the cutting of brushwood and soil-binding plants for lime burning which became a common supplementary occupation of agriculturalists with the expansion of the building industry.¹¹⁴ By the 1940s 'a total of 16,191 dunums or 44 per cent on the steep slopes [were] estimated to show erosion' in the catchment areas of the main wadi running between Nablus and Tulkarm.¹¹⁵

For all these reasons, expansion of the cultivated area and short-term responses to new economic opportunities without sufficient resources could have detrimental effects in the longer term on the productivity and availability of agricultural land.

The maintenance of animals except those used for ploughing is another cost ignored by both surveys. By and large this would be reasonable since it was not customary to feed animals; except when they were allowed to graze in the fields after the harvest, they had to survive on whatever grazing was available. However, in very bad years, such as 1932, when almost no grazing was available particularly in the eastern parts of Nablus sub-district, peasants had the option of selling their animals off at low prices or buying in forage for which the price was 'higher than it had been for many years'.¹¹⁶ If plough animals died or had to be sold in these conditions, they would have to be replaced before the next sowing season in order to continue cultivation. Certainly within the 25 or so years covered there were at least four or five seasons in which such droughts occurred and which might therefore have entailed extra capital expenditure. Firestone's study on the expansion of commercial stock-raising mainly among landowners and merchants employing 'professional' shepherds has already been mentioned. Even among peasants for whom stock was an adjunct to subsistence, providing meat, milk, skins, transport and

power for their own consumption, the fact that there was now a demand for meat on a commercial scale meant that the replacement of animals that had died, or the building up of a herd, could only be done at the going market prices.

The costs of production given in both surveys are estimated on the basis of 80 to 100 dunums of field crops only. The cost of seed does not seem to cause any disagreement with both estimates around £P6–6.5. However, this figure conceals the significance of grain as both an input into production, a product itself, and a means of subsistence. Taking the theoretical model of a self-sufficient family farm as an example, the amount of wheat produced should have been sufficient to provide subsistence for the family as well as seed for the next year. However, we have seen that this was seldom the case in Palestine, because the harvest was rarely good enough, yields were low and land was in short supply. In addition, peasants were increasingly compelled to put part of their crop on the market in order to pay taxes in cash and to buy other goods and services which were increasingly considered as part of subsistence. Hence there would often be a choice between consuming what grain was left to the peasant and keeping it as seed for the next season. The more likely choice would probably have been to use it for subsistence since it was sometimes possible (in the early 1920s and the early 1930s) to get short-term seed loans from the government or, alternatively, to obtain a more expensive loan from a money-lender.

Of course the picture just given has to be modified by taking into account the fact that most farms grew a wider variety of crops which allowed more leeway for coping with this tension between subsistence needs, external demands on income, and the next year's seed requirements. In Jabal Nablus both sesame and olives, as well as vegetables, peas and lentils, were commonly grown at least in part as commercial crops which might provide the cash to pay taxes, etc., while the wheat crop would be retained for consumption and seed. None the less both sesame and olives were subject to large fluctuations in production levels and prices, and both were unprotected against foreign imports from 1926 until 1932 when controls were reimposed (see p. 97).

Equally, there were crops like barley and millet (*dura*) which could be substituted for wheat for subsistence purposes if the latter crop failed. Nimr notes that *dura* became the main ingredient in bread during the First World War when wheat was unavailable.¹¹⁷ However, if wheat or any other grains had to be purchased midway

between harvests their price was always much higher than at harvest time. According to Nazmi Abd al-Hadi's account books, quoted by Firestone, the price of wheat seed purchased between harvests in 1934 was 50 per cent more than the prices paid on the farm at harvest time.¹¹⁸

Apart from these seasonal price fluctuations, wheat prices rose dramatically in 1925 because of a temporary shortage in Syria and then collapsed, as did all agricultural prices at the beginning of the 1930s, causing the government to impose import controls and to fix an average price inside the country at £P9.5 to 10 in 1932. The Johnson-Crosbie Report itself gives a clear account of the effects of this collapse in world market prices on Palestine's rural population:

A fall in the prices of agricultural produce then began, which has continued ever since and has become rapid during the past three or four months. The price of wheat in June, 1929, was about £P12 a ton; it is now (in June, 1930) £P6–7. For similar dates, the price of barley has fallen from over £P60 to £P30; that of olive oil from £P77 to £P40. Other prices have followed suit, and it may be said that the value of agricultural produce is now roughly half of what it was a year ago. The fall in prices appears to be mainly due to world over-production and the dumping of foreign produce which has resulted. The market is glutted, and the farmer is unable to sell his surplus produce. He is particularly affected by the lack of demand for wheat and for olive oil, as these commodities are his principal means of barter, of transactions with money-lenders and of realising cash to pay tithes and taxes. Similarly the money-lender holds as security more wheat and oil than he can dispose of, and is therefore unwilling to increase his commitments by further advances. As has been pointed out earlier, the supply of local wheat available for the market is very limited, and consequently market prices are easily affected by imports. It may be argued that, as the farmer is unable to sell his wheat, he will be better supplied with seed for the next season and will be able to raise his standard of living by eating a better quality of bread. But this enforced improvement of his standard of living will really be at the expense of his creditors, and will render his position, which is already difficult, little short of desperate.¹¹⁹

Neither survey explicitly counted the cost of family labour in the costs of production. It must be pointed out, however, that although

family labour is often viewed as 'self-exploitation' and therefore without identifiable cost, it is still necessary to count the cost of reproducing its labour power. Where this is not expressed in the form of wages it can only be assessed by looking at the cost of living (i.e. historically defined subsistence) of the family labour unit and its dependants.¹²⁰ Both surveys give estimates for yearly expenses covering food, fuel, clothing, village communal expenses (e.g. paying watchmen or entertaining village guests) and social expenses such as weddings, funerals, etc. In the Johnson-Crosbie estimate this totalled £P25; the villagers themselves put it at £P38. The major discrepancies were for clothing and items obtained outside the village. The Committee pointed out that these needs were more elastic and could be cut back in difficult times.¹²¹ In the first place, this assumption seems dubious in the case of items such as fuel. Furthermore, it bears out the view that purchases of goods from outside the village were increasingly part of what was defined as subsistence:

At the present day, there are few, if any villages in which the populations provide entirely for themselves by means of their own labour. The importation of machine made cloth, paraffin oil and other western commodities have, on the whole, made the lives of village artisans and craftsmen unprofitable.¹²²

A 1929 report made the same point: it noted a substantial decline in the purchase of imported cotton goods by the rural population as agricultural conditions worsened, giving the impression that during the easier years of the 1920s peasants had become accustomed to make purchases of this kind. Wilkansky's higher estimate of yearly expenses of £E49.5 may partly reflect this expanded consumption but is due mostly to the higher price levels prevailing at the time of his survey.

It also appears that the use of hired labour – either share-croppers or day-labour – was becoming increasingly common during the Mandate period. This also indicated the redeployment of family labour. Firestone found that 'Fathers tended to direct their sons into business or other off-farm occupations and only one or two remained to attend to managing and overseeing', and they took on croppers or day-labourers to make up the labour force.¹²³ In this light it is interesting to consider the discrepancy between the two estimates for hired labour. The Johnson-Crosbie Committee seemed to be assuming that so long as there was sufficient labour power in the family to

do the work, outside labour would not be used. The villagers' declarations may, as the Committee implies, simply be an exaggeration, but they might also reflect a change of strategy in regard to the use of hired labour. Wilkansky, on the other hand, does not include hired labour as an expense, although he does give a sum of £E12 as income from outside labour.

It is thus becoming clear that subsistence, if it is taken to be 'the production of historically and socially defined use values for consumption within the family unit', was not the sole aim or need of the peasant family.¹²⁴ The 'self-contained and autonomous nature and behaviour of the peasant farmer' assumed by neo-populist theorists, did not exist even in nineteenth-century Palestine when demands from the state and from landowners forced the production of a surplus, or led to indebtedness if no surplus was forthcoming.¹²⁵

Estimates of the size of the rural surplus sold directly on the market are somewhat vague but the most common figure is around 20 per cent.¹²⁶ This however was the national average and there must have been marked local variations according to general economic conditions and proximity to markets. It seems likely that in Jabal Nablus during the early 1930s the peasants' disposable surplus after rent, taxes, interest, etc. was often considerably less than the national average. It must also be remembered that, in the early part of the Mandate period at least, Palestine had no integrated national market structure and prices varied considerably from town to village and area to area. Thus agricultural products and by-products were generally cheaper at their source – for instance, soap in Nablus, olives in Nablus and Acre, charcoal in Jenin, bread and wheat in Gaza. Elsewhere transport costs could increase the prices substantially.¹²⁷ It is also possible that the spate of disastrous harvests, which particularly affected Jabal Nablus in the early 1930s, may have led to local shortages which pushed prices higher than the averages given. For peasants whose crops had failed this simply meant that they had to pay more for the extra food.

Prices also affected the payments of tax and interest in ways which are not reflected in the two surveys. If the annual cost of the tithe was £P4.5, as the Johnson-Crosbie survey calculates, the quantity of grain or other produce which would have to be sold in order to raise that amount would vary considerably with the price. For example, taking the figures of wheat prices in the northern district for 1925 and July 1930 (see Table 2.1 at the end of the chapter), these were respectively 13.5 mils per kilo and 5.9 mils per kilo. This would mean that in 1925

the number of kilos of wheat required to pay the tax was 333 kilos and at harvest time in 1930, 762 kilos.

It was initially assumed by the British authorities that any such increase in the burden of taxation on the peasantry would be shifted to the consumer also through the price structure. But in fact, for a peasantry which had only one foot in the market economy and retained a substantial part of the crop for its own consumption, this was not true. Moreover, due to indebtedness it might have to dispose of its crop below the going market rate and thus fail to regain the income lost on taxation.¹²⁸ Even where payments were still made in kind, the price mechanism often intervened in calculations. It is notable that in the Abd al-Hadi account books examined by Firestone most of the calculations were made in terms of money rather than quantities even where these applied to crop shares. Where the payment of interest on credit was concerned Latron points out:

Les avances consenties en nature sont souvent, au moment de leur réalisation effective, comptées en numéraire au cours du jour; lors du remboursement qui a lieu à la moisson suivante, elles sont réconverties en nature, également au cours du jour, pour être prélevées sur l'aire avant l'enlèvement de la part de récoltes qui revient au métayer emprunteur. Les prix des produits étant très bas au moment des récoltes et bénéficiant ensuite de fortes plus-values, cette double conversion oblige en fait le paysan à rembourser en nature une quantité intrinsèque de produits supérieure à celle qu'il a reçue.¹²⁹

To conclude, it is very difficult to estimate the precise cost of living of peasants existing partly in a market and partly in a subsistence economy. The British produced a cost of living index based on 1922=100 which showed a continual decline through the 1920s and levelled out in the 1930s at between 50 and 60. However, this index was admitted to be defective, particularly as it only included food and fuel, not clothing or rent.¹³⁰ Thus it is impossible to make any very useful calculations on this basis, the more so as detailed evidence of changes in rural consumption patterns are not available. Another problem is posed by the role of indirect taxes, notably customs dues which amounted to 40.3 per cent of government revenue in 1931/2 and 43.9 per cent in 1937/8.¹³¹ Hinden and Horowitz point to the regressive nature of these taxes, a large proportion of which they said

‘fell with severity on the poorest section of the community’. Referring to 1936/7, £P550700 (27.3 per cent) was raised on foodstuffs and tobacco alone, with articles of general consumption such as sugar, rice and wheat-flour accounting for as much as £P251300 (12.4 per cent). The duty on Kerosene, the most commonly used fuel for domestic purposes in Palestine, amounted to £P106000 (5.3 per cent).¹³² Clearly this must have affected the rural Arab population to some extent, although some sources point out that a high proportion of goods consumed in this sector were imported duty free from Syria and thus that the burden of indirect taxation fell more heavily on the urban than on the rural population.¹³³

Finally, the Johnson-Crosbie Committee gives a figure of £P1 per year for communal expenditure which may be taken to include the cost of weddings, funerals, etc.¹³⁴ As an average this might well be correct, but in practice such costs would tend to occur more sporadically, in particular the provision of the bride-price. This, according to Granqvist and Jaussen, usually amounted to about £P50, which, in the context of the annual earnings reviewed here, was clearly a large sum and might entail indebtedness.¹³⁵ Of course, for most families which had both sons and daughters this was a two-way process and a bride-price received for a daughter would not only compensate for the loss to the family of her labour power but might also enable her family to pay off debts or even gain access to land which could be given as part of the bride-price.¹³⁶ The average thus conceals the impact of these payments and receipts on a single year’s income.

Looking at the overall picture it is clear that most peasants could only reproduce themselves economically from season to season with some difficulty, unless that is they obtained access to more land on reasonably favourable terms, or found off-farm work to supplement agricultural income. A small number of more fortunate peasants, whether landholders or tenants, were able to take advantage of the existence of a commodity market which already affected agricultural production in a variety of (mostly indirect) ways. This phenomenon could not, however, be said to presage a rapid growth of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture. Such changes in the organisation of production and concomitant developments of socio-economic stratification are probably better seen, at least until the 1940s, rather as adaptations within an existing productive regime to cope with new conditions created by the world market and the embryonic capitalist enclave.

Developments in Industry and Commerce

A survey of commerce and manufacturing in Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm in the 1930s certainly bears out the impression that these towns relied heavily on the sale and processing of agricultural products along with the import of cheap consumer items and foodstuffs, and a very limited quantity of luxury goods.¹³⁷ In Nablus itself trade was dominated by a small number of families. The composition of the Executive Council of the Nablus Chamber of Commerce in the mid-1930s is more or less a summary of the most important merchant families in the town.¹³⁸ Several members of the Nabulsi family owned soap factories and another exported soap as well as cereals, flour and colonial goods. Yet others had tailoring and textile businesses, a commission agency and a furniture factory in Jaffa. The Tuqans also had a soap factory and a textile business. This family, along with the Abd al-Hadis and the Nimrs owned and rented out most of the shops in the bazaars of Nablus. Increasingly they also rented out the houses above the shops as more and more of them moved out to newly built homes on the slopes of Mount Ebal.

There appears to have been little change up to the mid-1930s in the kind of goods Nablus merchants sold. The only exception seems to have been the Tamini family who branched out into new types of consumer goods. One family partnership which sold building materials also had an agency for motor cars and accessories as well as benzine, paraffin and lubricating oils. Another sold HMV gramophones and records and yet another manufactured cardboard boxes. But this more adventurous approach seems to have been limited in its appeal.

Most of the expansion of trade and industry in the region appears to have come not from embarking on new kinds of enterprise but more from the expansion and diversification of established trades. One of the most important expansions was in the building industry and the related trade in construction materials as well as in stone-quarrying and lime-burning. Most of Palestine's building activity centred on the coastal area and Jerusalem but this inevitably created a general increase in the demand for such products. There was also some building in Nablus itself, particularly new houses for the well-to-do and the rebuilding of others after the 1927 earthquake.¹³⁹ As larger quantities of grain had to be imported over the years to satisfy local needs, the import/export business in cereals and flour was also a source of considerable profit. Millers, too, benefited from the

expansion of business. In Nablus in the early 1920s four millers set up a price-ring to control the price of local flour to their own profit and to the detriment of consumers.¹⁴⁰ Though most flour mills in the three districts were worked by motor power, they were on a small scale and mainly processed local wheat for the Arab market, leaving large-scale enterprises like the Grands Moulins in Jaffa to handle the imported wheat which they converted into white flour more suited to urban Jewish tastes.¹⁴¹

Generally speaking, techniques of production in manufacturing altered little during the Mandate, though the 1927 industrial census showed that there were a number of factories in the three districts – including flour mills, a confectionery and a tobacco factory – which used machine-powered equipment, the overall picture suggests that these were very much the exception.¹⁴² Himadeh quotes the same census as showing that the country-wide average of horsepower used per industry was 3.63HP and, per person, 0.71HP.¹⁴³ But this was in the early stages of the ‘take-off’ in the Jewish industrial sector.

Perhaps the best illustration of the effects of the changing structure within which the agriculturally based industries had to operate and of the inability or reluctance of their owners to adapt to it is the Nablus soap industry. Soap was still produced in Nablus during the Mandate by ‘the elementary saponification of olive oil by means of caustic soda in open vats’.¹⁴⁴ The only technical change from the Ottoman period was the substitution of caustic soda imported from Egypt, Britain and Belgium for the alkali previously derived from a desert plant known as *killi*, which, until the establishment of an international border between Transjordan and Palestine, had been obtained from the area around Tadmur and Salt. Only very simple equipment was used. As late as 1923 the *Commercial Bulletin* reported that ‘the first hand machine for soap cutting has been installed by Haj Nimr Nabulsi . . . signs of competition are already apparent as other manufacturers are taking steps to install similar machines’.¹⁴⁵

No animal or motor power was used and the establishments were on a small scale with only five to six employees per factory. The average total capital used up per month by Nablus’s 24 factories, discounting fixed capital in tools, buildings, etc. was:

| | |
|---|-------------------------|
| Raw materials | £P2 569.5 |
| Wages (clerks, technicians and contract labour) | £P 102.3 ¹⁴⁶ |

The main raw material input, olive oil, was generally obtained

from local production, although it might also be imported in poor years, mainly from Syria and Greece.¹⁴⁷ Thus the fortunes of the soap industry and that of olive culture were closely connected, since about a third of the olive oil produced was used for soap-making. According to Jaussen's information, soap factories usually purchased the olive crop from producers before the harvest to ensure supplies for the year.¹⁴⁸

The general conservatism of the long-established soap manufacturers of Nablus is clearly exemplified by a member of the Tuqan family engaged in the soap industry who told Jaussen in the 1920s that 'la méthode [de fabriquer le savon] est très perfectionnée et je ne vois pas la nécessité de changer de procédé'.¹⁴⁹ The wider economic environment, however, did not favour the continued prosperity or expansion of this type of production.¹⁵⁰ Since it relied on a market which valued its purity as olive oil soap without other additives, its sale was limited mainly to Arabs in Palestine and, even more importantly, in Egypt, which took about 50 per cent of annual production. For those who did not particularly value its purity, it was too expensive (since olive oil cost more than other vegetable oils) to compete with other cheap soaps which were being imported into Palestine by the mid-1930s.¹⁵¹ To make matters more difficult, there was increasing competition from Jewish mechanised industry, particularly the Shemen oil and soap factory, founded in 1922 near Haifa with a capital of about £E250 000, i.e. almost the same amount as the 24 soap factories in Nablus combined.¹⁵² As it produced refined olive oil and sesame oil, perfumes and cattle cake as well as soap, it did not therefore depend entirely on the production of one line of goods.¹⁵³ Furthermore, in the late 1920s, it was one of the Jewish firms most successful in persuading the British authorities to lift the import duties on olive and sesame oil (see p. 119). This advantage, combined with the economies of scale resulting from the size of the enterprise, allowed it to produce cheap lines of soap which were able to undersell Nablus soap in the late 1930s as soon as the price of olive oil began to rise again after the Depression (see Table 2.10, at the end of the chapter).

Finally, the inability of the Nablus industry to expand its domestic market was made worse by the fact that it had lost a good part of its export trade with Egypt from 1931 when the Egyptians imposed a high tariff on imported soap in order to protect their own soap industry (see Table 2.11 at the end of the chapter).

The particular difficulties facing the soap industry as a result of

international and domestic competition lead to the more general question as to why more Arab merchants, landowners and manufacturers did not attempt to engage in larger-scale capitalist industrial production, whether in Jabal Nablus or elsewhere in Palestine. It is true that quite a number of new Arab enterprises – 529 according to Horowitz and Hinden's estimate for the years 1931–7 – were established, particularly in Haifa and other coastal towns.¹⁵⁴ But with the exception of a few large factories (notably a metal works, a match factory, and a rice mill) most of these enterprises were on a small scale and most often in the service or commercial sector. Generally speaking, local capital could not be mobilised on a scale which could hope to compete with the larger Jewish enterprises. And when even capital was available, it appears that the existence of other, less risky, options usually acted as a deterrent. It is worth pointing out, however, that this lack of interest in industrialisation and the emphasis of the landowning and merchant class on trade, banking, real estate and service industries was a common enough pattern in the Middle East. By and large, the colonial or semi-colonial governments of the time did little to encourage industrial development.

Class Formation: The Surplus Appropriators

The Palestine Royal Commission report remarked that, apart from the loss of state offices, 'it is difficult to detect any deterioration in the economic position of the Arab upper class'. At the level of immediate economic advantage this seems to have been substantially true, despite constant complaints. It could be argued that the very nature of the section of this rentier class whose interests still centred around agricultural land enabled it to take relatively easy advantage of opportunities arising from the demand for land and agricultural goods. This is not to say that there were not different responses within this class and that, generally speaking, the landowners and merchants of Jabal Nablus, especially the rural ones, did not respond in a more than averagely cautious and conservative way to the new economic situation. Nevertheless, at a structural level, the productive relations on which the whole class depended were being gradually, but fundamentally, transformed by the development of market relations both locally and internationally.

When examining the relations of landowners in the Jabal Nablus region to their land and their peasantry one special feature should be noted. The continuity of settlement and cultivation in these hill areas

(in contrast to the plains) and their relative independence both from the Ottoman authorities and from the surrounding areas, had given rise to a landowning class which, though it had expanded in the late nineteenth century to include the type of 'rentier' landlords described earlier, also contained a core of influential families whose power base was actually in the villages rather than the towns. The relations of these families – for instance, the Abd al-Hadis (Jenin and Nablus sub-districts), the Jarrars (Jenin), Hanuns (Tulkarm), Abbushis (Jenin), Abu Hantash (Qaqun) – to the peasants who worked on their lands had, until the Ottomans reimposed central control in the 1860s, been rather closer to those of 'classic' feudalism than most other areas of Palestine, in that peasants were obliged to fight for their lords in feuds with other families or outsiders as well as pay rent on their land.¹⁵⁵ But equally, there seems to have been an element of 'noblesse oblige' on the part of these families which was noticeably lacking in the case of the absentee rentier class. The fact that they lived in or near the villages established closer relations of patronage than those of absentee landowners and meant that the families' political as well as economic power and status depended very much on the maintenance of these relationships. By the 1920s some of these families had branched out economically and physically, expanding their holdings and engaging in trade, particularly in agricultural produce,¹⁵⁶ as well as acting as creditors to their peasants. They thus became less clearly distinguished from merchants and urban notables who had acquired land in the previous decades, the more so as some of them moved into the towns and abandoned any direct connection with agriculture even though the bulk of the family income might still come from that source.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, it seems that since these families continued to need their rural base for both economic and political reasons, they did not always behave in exactly the same way as a strictly absentee landowner would have done in his relations with his tenants and share-croppers (see p. 121).

Another question which arises is how far the family unit (generally taken to mean the clan or *hamula*) is a useful category with which to view the economic status of this class. There is some evidence to suggest that, as economic collectivities, families no longer held their wealth in common or operated strictly as economic units. According to Granott, by the Mandate period 'there is no longer any property belonging strictly to the family as such. For the most part it has long since been divided up among the members of the family or its various branches'.¹⁵⁸ Firestone also mentions that in Jabal Nablus families

were splitting up into smaller groupings with different economic interests.¹⁵⁹

While economic and, in some cases, political divergences certainly did exist within family groups, in the context of new economic opportunities, family connections undoubtedly facilitated co-operative ventures and, perhaps more importantly, reinforced the inter-relationships between trade, agricultural production and usurious capital. In some cases, one and the same person would engage in two or more of these activities but, in others, different members of one family or clan would hold positions complementary to each other. Another relatively new aspect of this class's deployment of its wealth was investment in skills, especially in the education of their sons.¹⁶⁰ However, as the chosen professions of the younger generation tended to be those of doctor, lawyer, teacher or administrator, their connections with the reproduction of their families' wealth became less direct. Sometimes, a few family members who had an interest in developing the family lands, would run farms belonging to relatives who had moved into towns and who had no connections with trade or agriculture, thus keeping ownership and control of land within the family and maintaining it as a basis for their wealth and influence.¹⁶¹ Family linkages thus undoubtedly facilitated responses to new economic opportunities but, at the same time, probably helped to retard changes in the *form* of their wealth by reinforcing existing relations of production, especially on the land itself.

Class Formation Wage Labour

The third form of integration – the development of wage labour – was the least developed of the three in the Arab sector of the economy during the Mandate period, and, from the point of view of assessing its impact on particular districts, the hardest to trace. Although the British authorities began to compile regular unemployment returns by district in the 1930s, their value as evidence is much reduced by the admission of the Statistics Department itself that there was no uniform practice in their compilation. The figures could therefore only give 'a general description of the labour situation but not a figure on which numerical estimates can properly be based'.¹⁶² Equally, they give little indication of the total number of people from any one area entering the labour market. This problem of enumeration reflects the nature of Arab wage labour at this time. It was mostly short-term or seasonal day-labour undertaken by peasants seeking to

supplement static or shrinking agricultural incomes without losing their base on the land. In these conditions, the categories 'employed' and 'unemployed', as they would apply to an urban proletariat, are scarcely applicable.

In regard to wages, somewhat more evidence is available over the whole period as the British began to produce real wage statistics in the late 1930s. These give a rather better picture of the value of earnings, particularly in the inflationary conditions of the 1940s. None the less, it is difficult to assess their significance for seasonal workers still based in agriculture because the cost of living index used in the compilation of the real wage figures was probably inaccurate (see p. 136) and, even more importantly, based exclusively on an estimate of the subsistence needs of workers detached from the land.

Arab labour outside agriculture did not develop to the point where a significant urban proletariat could be identified. There were two major reasons for this. First, in contrast to South Africa for example, where the rapid development of mining industries created a demand for a large volume of cheap unskilled labour, the development of the Palestine economy was on a smaller scale and did not include a major sector, such as mining, which depended for its viability on cheap labour. Plantation agriculture for the export of citrus was probably the nearest approximation to this. The other important deterrent to the rapid expansion of Arab wage labour was the pressure from the Zionist movement to expand Jewish immigration into Palestine (particularly in the 1930s as the political situation in Europe worsened) and the consequent concern to provide employment for these immigrants. Thus in public works and other enterprises in which they had an interest, the British authorities were under constant pressure to employ a guaranteed quota of Jews. But this frequently conflicted with the colonial authorities' desire to keep costs down and led to conflicts with the well-organised Jewish trade union movement (the Histadrut) which was often able to defend its members' living standards in a way which the mostly non-unionised Arab labour force was unable to do.¹⁶³ Not only was this a reflection of the predominance of small-scale enterprises in the Arab sector but also of the fragmented nature of a seasonal, unskilled, migrant labour force.

In the 1920s the flow of Arab labour to the towns was very limited and thus the first slump in the urban sector (1926–8) had little effect on the Arab population. However, the general boom in industry in the early 1930s, at the same time as the crisis in Arab agriculture, drove an increasing number of peasants to seek work in the towns or

in both Arab and Jewish-owned plantation agriculture. The Palestine Royal Commission report also ascribed the drift from the rural areas to the towns to the exacerbation of the land shortage by the rapid increase in population.¹⁶⁴

Such an influx into the urban work-force soon created competition for jobs with the swelling number of new Jewish immigrants, some of whom could not get, or were not qualified for the skilled work in which Jews predominated. This led to a hardening of the Histadrut's attitude over the question of the exclusive employment of Jewish labour in Jewish enterprises. As the boom ended in 1935 and employment opportunities diminished, particularly in construction and in the citrus groves, the Histadrut launched a campaign to exclude Arab workers from all Jewish enterprises. The Arab general strike of 1936 and the rebellion of 1936–9 further diminished the opportunities for employment outside agriculture, especially since it led to a slowing down of public works projects on which most Arabs were employed. The integration of the peasantry into the wage labour market had not, however, gone far enough by this stage to preclude a retreat into agriculture, even though this could mean some hardship and considerable underemployment.

It cannot be assumed, however, that the spread of wage labour was distributed evenly over the whole country. One obvious factor affecting the number of people employed in this way in any village or district was the proximity to towns, to settlements with plantation agriculture or to army bases. In this respect, it seems likely that Jabal Nablus was relatively disadvantaged compared with villages closer to the coast or nearer to Jerusalem. Variations in response to the labour market would also have reflected conditions in particular villages – the ratio of population to the land, the attitude of the villagers to travelling away from home, and the existence of family members or other connections in a big town or in a work place where wage labour might be obtained. It does, however, seem possible that the economic difficulties of the early 1930s may have induced peasants to take options which they would not previously have been willing to consider.

Given the lack of specific data concerning Jabal Nablus's contribution to the migrant labour market, it seems best to consider the possibilities for work outside the family in a schematic rather than empirical way. Such possibilities can be set out as follows:

1. Agricultural labour – on a share basis or for wages – for a large landowner or another peasant.

2. Off-farm work connected with agriculture and still based in the village or immediate locality – either for wages or on a share basis.
3. Crafts and trades based in the village or town – either for wages or self-employed.
4. Day-labour or short-term contract labour for wages (mostly unskilled).
5. Regular wage or salaried employment.

Categories 1 to 3 clearly have no necessary connection with capitalist relations of production, though in some cases they represent indirect responses to the expansion of the national market. Apart from the fact that Jabal Nablus did not experience an influx of Jews during the 1920s and 1930s, the following description by Henry Rosenfeld of the status of these occupations in a village in Lower Galilee is applicable:

In the early 1920s, nearly all economic activity remained centred in the village. Subsistence was based on agriculture and in no case was any individual cut off from some role in agriculture or isolated from its effects. With the influx of Jews in these years, some villagers began to work for Jews outside the village as agricultural labourers or construction workers. Within the village, others turned – at least in part – to the extraction of lime and charcoal burning, spurred mainly – though not entirely – by Jewish building needs. But occupational categories often remained fluid. This was true forty years ago when village artisans were also part-time farmers, while many farmers and cameleers worked in lime extraction in their free time, or a man might work as a sharecropper one year and as a hired shepherd the next. The same phenomenon continued to characterise the 1920s, both due to [the seasonal nature of] the type of agriculture practised and due to the transitional character of the larger economy.¹⁶⁵

This occupational fluidity was clearly not a new phenomenon in the Mandate period, nor did it necessarily cause changes in the existing social relations of production, either within the family labour unit, or between landowners and peasants. The character of such work, fitting into the interstices of seasonal agricultural production, entailed rather the adjustment and adaptation of these relations.

Work as a ploughman, watchman, harvester or fruit-picker differed from the concept of the wage labourer – separated from his/her means of production and receiving money wages – in several ways.

First, working for a large landowner might entail relations of patronage, a certain obligation of loyalty and duty compensated by advances on wages and help in times of sickness. Second, there is evidence for the early 1920s from the nearby hill district of Ramallah that agricultural workers often got food as a supplement to their wages as a matter of course. Seasonal olive-picking paid PT 15 per 12-hour day to men and PT 10 per day to women, plus food. Shepherds also received food and clothing along with their wages. Furthermore, ploughmen in particular could still provide their own means of production. For example, a ploughman would get PT 15 per 8-hour day with food or £E 20 per annum with food and clothes. Where he provided his own instruments of production, he would get PT 50 per day with a mule and plough and PT 80 per day with two oxen and a plough.¹⁶⁶ Wages for these types of work, in some cases continuing to include food and/or lodging, do not appear to have risen substantially until the 1940s, although it may be that the 1922 figures used in this comparison are rather high, reflecting as they do the tail-end of the post-First World War inflation after which both wages and prices dropped quite sharply.

Apart from long established types of village-based work such as that of plough-mender, blacksmith, small trader or pedlar, the most rapidly expanding opportunities were those connected with the building trade. For work of this kind, the self-employed Arab master builder and stonemason continued to command a good living (varying from £E 1 per day in 1922 to 500–600 mils per day at the end of the 1920s for the former and 500–600 mils per day in the late 1920s for the latter, depending on the level of demand and prices.¹⁶⁷

Taken together, these developments also contributed to expansion of commercial transport. Both animal and motor transport were used, though the latter was not very common in the hill districts until the 1940s. Camel transport was widely used in the building industry and road-making, and in the 1920s large imports of camels for this purpose were reported. In addition, camels still remained an important means for transporting agricultural goods. Traders and landowners thus found it useful to own large strings of camels, both to reduce their own transport costs and also to provide greater flexibility in seeking profitable markets for their goods. When these strings were not in use by their owner they could be hired out as commercial transport. Sometimes these camel strings would be operated by hired drivers who got a set wage when working for the owner himself or a quarter of the total takings when the camels were

rented to customers.¹⁶⁸ One way of increasing the driver's stake in the success of the enterprise and the well-being of the stock, as well as adding to the attractiveness of the job, was to draw up a contract between the owner and the driver, whereby the former bought into the capital (at between one-eighth and one-quarter depending on how much he could afford) on the same lines as the share-farming contracts in agriculture. The driver would then get a quarter of the proceeds in the share-out, plus an amount proportionate to his share in the capital. Another possibility was for a 'sleeping partner' to provide money under a similar type of contract to an owner-driver who did not have sufficient capital to expand his business alone. Such partnerships were apparently quite common, particularly within families, since they facilitated the establishment or the expansion of an enterprise by a person lacking large reserves of capital without resorting to a straightforward loan. In the 1940s similar kinds of contracts were operated with lorries.

The third category of labour was in crafts and small-scale manufacturing. The number of people employed in this sector was fairly small since most production was on a workshop basis. The proportion of the population employed in such enterprises also varied from one sub-district to another. According to the data produced by the 1931 census there were 1673 persons employed in industry in Nablus sub-district out of a total of 16 715 earners in all occupations, i.e. about 10 per cent of the total, as against the national average of 14 per cent.¹⁶⁹ In Jenin sub-district only 470 were thus engaged out of a total of 10912 earners, or 4.3 per cent.¹⁷⁰ The differences in percentage between the two sub-districts is explained by the fact that Jenin was essentially a rural district market town whereas Nablus was a town of substantial size with a long-standing tradition of trades and crafts.

There were 24 soap factories in Nablus in 1927, employing in all 198 persons, of whom 35 were classified as owners and relatives, 32 as clerks and technicians. The rest of the labour force thus amounted to 131, an average of only 5–6 wage workers per factory.¹⁷¹ At least until the end of the 1920s, labour was employed on a contract basis by a *rais*, who was the technical expert in charge of production. He hired assistants to help him in each process of production for a daily wage which was negotiated between him and the workers (in 1930 between 50 and 200 mils per day). This was apparently quite a common method of organising labour in manufacturing industries in the Levant, as it avoided the necessity of paying wages during slack periods and allowed more flexibility in the numbers hired at different

periods.¹⁷² It was particularly important for the soap industry, in which the level of activity depended to some extent on the size of annual olive crop, and for the oil presses.

It is unlikely, however, that these or the other larger enterprises in this region – for example, flour mills and a tobacco factory in Nablus – provided much scope for the expansion of wage labour, even on a part-time basis. The 1931 census registered the subsidiary occupations of agriculturalists but gives no indication that many of those working in manufacture and crafts had other occupations as well. In fact, even if allowance is made for the inaccuracy of the figures, unemployment seems to have been particularly high in Nablus and Tulkarm sub-districts during the mid-1930s. The run of bad agricultural seasons probably accounted for most of this, but the problems in the soap industry during this period may have also been a contributing factor in the Nablus area.¹⁷³ Wage labour in the cities, particularly Haifa, became more important in the 1930s though there is little reliable data to hand to assess the number of workers coming from any particular district. The most common openings were in public works, the private building trade, citrus groves and, from about 1933, portorage in Haifa harbour. There is evidence to show that a substantial number of workers from the interior came down to the coast to work on the construction of the harbour and, after its completion, as porters. Rachelle Taqqu notes that the registers of the harbour authority, which kept a record of the number of workers who were discharged between 1932 when construction work began to slow down and 1934 when the project was completed, accounted for 1800 Arab workers and some 400 Jews at the harbour and the nearby Atlit quarries. Of the Arab workers, the majority came from the Haifa region – more than 400 from Tira, 150 from Ijzim, and about 300 from Haifa itself. None the less, quite a number came from distant areas – including about 200 from Jenin and 150 from Nablus. Taqqu also points out that ‘the willingness of Nablus residents to travel to the coast for work was further attested by the torrent of 1200 workers who streamed from Nablus into Haifa after the government expelled Haurani portworkers in 1936. Officials had sought to recruit only 200 labourers and had to send the overflow back home’.¹⁷⁴

The Palestine government was the largest employer of Arab labour mainly in the Public Works Department – for road-building and other public works. Like other employers, they paid daily rates on a scale which reflected the difference in organisation and bargaining power between different sections of the population. Although they looked

with disfavour on unionised (Jewish) labour, they still paid it at the highest rates, paying Arab rural labour the lower rates. There were four main wage levels for unskilled labour, according to the 1928 Report of the Wages Commission:

Arab rural 120–150 mils a day

Arab urban 140–170 mils a day

Jewish non-union 150–300 mils a day

Jewish union 250–300 mils a day

(see also Table 2.12, at the end of the chapter, for government rates).

Problems concerning the scales of wages were particularly clear during the building of Haifa harbour, where the contractor's desire to minimise costs conflicted with the Jewish unions' demand for a quota of jobs, including unskilled ones in the stone quarries, but at higher rates than were paid to Arab labour.¹⁷⁵ A compromise was finally agreed by putting the Jewish workers in the quarries on piece-work which effectively gave them higher wages. However, in the course of this debate, another issue emerged: that of the subsistence requirements of different sections of the population. It was assumed that the Arab population had a lower standard of living and therefore needed less to subsist. However, the fact that in the scale quoted above, Arab rural labour was paid even less than Arab urban labour seems to reflect not only minimal bargaining power but also the notion that it was not necessary to provide rural migrant labour with the full subsistence required by an urban worker who had no access to agricultural means of production.

The same discrepancies appear to have existed in the citrus groves. Arab owners employing all-Arab labour seem to have paid low wages in order to remain competitive with the more organised and highly capitalised Jewish plantations, and the Jewish owners paid on different scales for Jewish and Arab workers. Here, as in Public Works Department jobs, Arabs also tended to work longer hours which further reduced their hourly earnings. At wage levels like these it would, in fact, have been very difficult for a migrant labourer to detach himself entirely from the means of production available to him in his own village. The Palestine citrus trade was hit by a crisis of overproduction in the mid-1930s which lowered prices and was an added incentive to make use of the cheapest available labour in order to maintain profits.¹⁷⁶ This swelled the number of migrant Arabs who worked seasonally in Jewish groves for a few years, until the 1936

General Strike and the subsequent rebellion limited the movement of labour and further hardened Jewish attitudes towards the employment of Arabs.

The opening of Haifa harbour in 1933 provided a new option for wage labour. According to a report in January 1935, portage for all goods except imported coal and citrus for export was under the control of a contractor named Muhammad Kamil Namura, appointed by the Director of Customs, who had in his regular employ 80 Arabs as well as 600–700 casual day labourers, also Arabs.¹⁷⁷ Fruit, on the other hand, was loaded by labourers hired directly by the exporters.¹⁷⁸

Unskilled work on a more permanent basis in the larger factories was not often available to Arabs. Among the relatively few large-scale enterprises, some like the Shemen Oil Company, did not employ Arabs; other Jewish-owned factories – for example, Nur Match Company, Neshet Cement and the Rutenberg Enterprises – employed only a few. There were also a small number of regular jobs on the railways but these generally required some skills.¹⁷⁹

Wage levels for unskilled workers seem to have held fairly steady from the late 1920s until the mid-1930s. But after 1935 there was a general decline which continued until the early 1940s. Arab real wages appear to have declined more rapidly than those of the Jews. In addition, the Arab rebellion (1936–9), in which Jabal Nablus was one of the focal points, probably led to a reduction in the flow of migrant labour from this region. The Second World War, however, saw a very marked expansion in the opportunities for wage labour outside agriculture, particularly servicing the British Army in Palestine. The figures in Table 2.13 (at the end of the chapter) give some indication of the scale of wage labour for villages in the Nablus/Tulkarm area in the early 1940s. Unfortunately it is impossible to tell how many of those recorded as employed outside the village had been involved in any kind of wage labour prior to the war.

Another question which arises in this context is how far the option of wage labour, where it existed, affected the peasant family's budget and the deployment of its labour time. It has already been mentioned that I have no evidence as to the proportion of rural families in Jabal Nablus which entered into the wage labour market, but the following account by a young peasant from Nablus sub-district is probably some indication of the role which wage labour might commonly have played in a family's activities:

I remained in the village (his own village of Silat edh-Dhahr) for about 15 days when a person from Kalkilia, Husein Abu Aba, a contractor, came and engaged 20 persons and me among them to work in stone cutting near Kalkilia. I worked there for 20 days. On finishing the work I returned to my village. I stayed 3 days in the village when Amin Umrad of my family received a letter from a contractor from Tyre who lived in Haifa asking him (Umrad) to come with 2 workmen to work in Haifa. I proceeded to Haifa where I worked for the said contractor in the drainage [*sic*] for about a month. I left then in order to return to my village and buy corn for the family.¹⁸⁰

Thus the short-term nature of most wage employment reinforced the continuance of ties with the home village and only in rare cases where secure employment was obtained in industry or government service would the worker have been likely to leave his village for more than a few months at a time.

For the present purposes perhaps the most crucial determinant of wage labour's significance was the proportion of family income derived from it. A peasant such as Abu Diyyak, probably earning wages for 100–150 days a year at most and on the 'Arab Rural' scale of 100–150 mils a day (see p. 150), would contribute between £P10 and £P22.5 to a family income. Allowing that some small part of this might be necessary for the wage labourer's subsistence while he was working, the remainder could well contribute, as in this example, to the purchase of seed or to the repayment of debts or other short-term needs. Given the narrow margins within which most families lived, these earnings would make an important contribution to its reproduction but not to expanded reproduction. Even wage labour would thus be unlikely to lead to any accumulation of capital. Only those who migrated for longer periods of time were sometimes able to return to their villages with sufficient capital saved to invest in land or stock.¹⁸¹

The organisation of labour within the family would inevitably have been affected when one or more of its members went away to work, although what the effects would be would depend both on the length of absence and the ratio of active family members to non-working dependants. The seasonal nature of agricultural work meant that there were periods of unemployment or underemployment for those without subsidiary occupations. Thus it might be possible for a son to go away during the slack months with little disruption to normal patterns of labour. If, however, migrant labourers remained away for

a larger part of the season, then substitute labour on the farm would have to be found. Several possibilities existed: either the family could continue to cope alone by reorganising its work-load; or day-labour could be hired for short periods; or share-croppers could be taken on for a whole season. Presumably the decision would depend on the family's economic position and the availability of agricultural labour in the locality at a rate lower than that earned by the absent migrant.

There is little detailed research available at present which would enable us to determine how far, if at all, the sexual division of labour within the family was changed statistically by these developments. Women were not normally counted as 'earners' when their role was mainly in the domestic sphere of production in agriculture and reproduction, although the 1931 census acknowledges the existence of 'working dependants'. It also includes data on women declaring themselves as 'earners' (presumably principal earners in the family) as shown in Table 2.14.

It seems that women in Jabal Nablus were generally more involved in agricultural work outside the home than their sisters in other rural areas and therefore might have extended their role in production to substitute for absent male family members without causing any major social disruption. However, it is doubtful if, for the most part, women took much part in decision-making about production or deployment of the labour force.

Marx commented that peasants, living under these so-called 'transitional' conditions tended to get the worst of all worlds.

The disadvantages of the capitalist mode of production, with its dependence of the producer upon the money price of his product, coincide here . . . with disadvantages occasioned by the imperfect development of the capitalist mode of production. The peasant turns merchant and industrialist without the conditions enabling him to produce his products as commodities.¹⁸²

Although this was certainly true for most peasants in Jabal Nablus in the 1930s, the particular conditions of the Second World War turned the price mechanism momentarily in their favour. Frank has pointed out that the war often resulted in a form of artificial protection against world market forces, behind which it was possible for a 'national' economy to expand. Such was the case in Palestine, which was not only cut off from regular trade with Europe by the Mediterranean blockade but also played host to the British Army

which opened up new wage labour opportunities and expanded the domestic market. The agricultural sector benefited in several ways. In 1941 the government imposed import controls on a wide range of agricultural commodities including wheat, olives, sesame, oil seeds, dura, kirsinna, peas, beans, lentils, potatoes and onions.¹⁸³ All agricultural prices soared, something which made life very hard for the poorer townspeople but brought substantial profit to the countryside. Wages also rose fast – in some cases by 300–400 per cent – although for the urban population this was only just enough to cope with inflation. For peasants, however, with one foot in subsistence and one foot in the market, the situation was very beneficial. They were not wholly dependent on the consumer market, were able to get high prices for their products, and could supplement their income more readily with wage labour. According to the *Survey of Palestine*, many peasants succeeded during this period in paying off their debts for the first time in many years. At the end of the war, however, the ‘protection’ was lifted, and Palestine, like other countries in the Middle East, was once again subject to the pressures of the world market.

CONCLUSION

The adaptation of tenure relations, productive processes and labour power to the development of market forces at various economic levels could logically have been expected to produce changes in the social structure of the rural areas and greater socio-economic differentiation at the village level. This process was, however, a slow and equivocal one, due partly to the uneven way in which the economic changes took place and partly to the result of the series of political disruptions which the Jabal Nablus region experienced from the 1940s onwards. In these circumstances a straightforward progression towards social formations appropriate to capitalism could hardly be expected. During the Mandate, the Arab landowning class, though marginalised economically and politically at the national level, still maintained much of its control over the lives of the peasantry, meeting only a brief and somewhat anarchic challenge during the rebellion of 1936–9. On the other hand, the formation of an urban Arab proletariat was curtailed by the desire of the Zionists to develop a Jewish proletariat. At the same time, the fragmentary and unorganised nature of the Arab migrant labour force prevented

the development of a separate political and economic force on a scale large enough to challenge effectively either the power of the landowning class in the countryside or the forces of Jewish industry and organised Jewish labour in the towns.¹⁸⁴ The only form of resistance the Arab rural populations was able to offer was military opposition to the colonial power of Britain, but this lacked a corresponding political and economic programme with any kind of class basis.

In the rural areas differentiation did begin to emerge with the breaking up of communal tenure and the increasing importance of money at all economic levels. It is difficult to say whether, if there had been a continuity of socio-economic and political conditions beyond 1948, this might have led to any permanent divisions into say, a *kulak* class and a poor peasantry. Discussing the analysis of class and social change in West African societies, Ken Post points out that ‘many of the social phenomena with which we are concerned represent techniques for meeting new demands, rather than crystallisations of new class structures’.¹⁸⁵ Some commentators also assume that even if one generation of a peasant family acquires more land or wealth, this advantage will be dissipated by the enlargement of family size in the next. However, in the changing economic and political circumstances of Jabal Nablus from the 1940s onwards, such a conclusion does not seem inevitable.

One form of differentiation can be discerned even during the Mandate period and that is in actual relations of production where the peasant becomes, in certain circumstances, both exploiter and exploited. This has been observed in two situations. First, in the joint-farming contract, where the joint farmer both extracts surplus labour from his labourers or croppers and, at the same time, provides his own and his family’s surplus labour to the landowner with whom he has the contract. Second, in the case of the peasant who also works as a wage labourer providing his employer with surplus labour – the more perhaps because the employer does not pay him the full cost of his subsistence – and, at the same time, perhaps forcing his family to hire labour on the farm to replace him, thus extracting surplus labour themselves. Such a situation does not appear to be an unusual feature in ‘peripheral’ economies. Kitching, discussing the Kenyan economy, indicates that:

the categories ‘source of surplus labour’ and ‘appropriator of surplus labour’ are not mutually exclusive in Kenya . . . On the one

hand the worker on the capitalist farm or in the factory or mine is a source of surplus labour for the owners of these means of production, but on the other hand, as the . . . owner of the home farm he is the 'appropriator' of the surplus labour of others (usually landless or almost landless peasants). Moreover, insofar as part of the (migrant) worker's subsistence . . . is supplied by the home farm, the total cost of his labour power, as well of course as the cost of the reproduction of labour power, i.e. of his children, is not met by the wage bill, but is supplied in part by the product of the direct labour of his wife/wives, and by the labour of those whom he hires.¹⁸⁶

There seems to be no reason why this kind of situation should not persist for some time without leading to the full conversion of labour power into a commodity. It is sometimes the case that the maintenance of a labour pool in the rural areas, still partly attached to the land, is beneficial to both national and international capitalist interests in the area. In the Palestine case, however, further political factors must be mentioned. The redrawing of boundaries after 1948 left Jabal Nablus as a part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. From 1948–67 the West Bank, as the whole area was named, essentially played the role of agricultural hinterland to the 'East Bank' into which a certain amount of foreign aid was pumped. The West Bank saw few of the benefits in terms of investment or other forms of development, and had the additional burden of refugees from inside Israeli territory (see Plascov, p. 212). Meanwhile, certain changes seem to have taken place in the pattern of landholding – e.g. the diminution of both very large and medium-size holdings and the further proliferation of very small holdings.¹⁸⁷ which may indicate a decline in the importance of land as a source of power. One new form of investment, however, did become significant in the investment in skills. Education was a passport to job opportunities, but these were mostly available abroad. As a result, the West Bank began to develop a professional middle class, the majority of which lived and worked abroad, making the area dependent on the inflow of funds from skilled migrant labour in other parts of the Middle East and Europe.¹⁸⁸ The migration of professionals has continued under Israeli rule and has been joined by another form of dependence; some 30 per cent of the work-force – mostly unskilled – now works in Israel as daily migrant labour. This has diminished rural unemployment and underemployment but has also made the West Bank a dormitory for

a part of Israel's work-force, rather similar to the role of villages within Israel itself.¹⁸⁹ Thus, in many cases, wage labour is now the predominant form of income, even for families which still hold some land, in contrast to the situation during the Mandate. The monetarisation of the economy is also all but complete. But in spite of this neither the full proletarianisation of labour nor the complete conversion of agriculture to capitalist relations of production has occurred.

TABLE 2.1 *The redemption prices of six major Palestinian crops on which the tithe was commuted, 1924–7 and their market price in July 1930*

| Commodity | District | Tithe redemption prices per kg | | | | | Market price July 1930 | Fall from the average redemption price |
|-----------|-----------|--------------------------------|------|------|------|---------|------------------------|--|
| | | 1924 | 1925 | 1926 | 1927 | Average | | |
| | | mils | mils | mils | mils | mils | mils | per cent |
| Wheat | Northern | 11 | 13.5 | 11 | 10.2 | 11.4 | 5.9 | 48 |
| | Southern | 10 | 15 | 11 | 10 | 11.5 | 5.7 | 50 |
| | Jerusalem | 10 | 15 | 11 | 10 | 11.5 | 6 | 48 |
| Barley | Northern | 8.1 | 8.2 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 3.2 | 56 |
| | Southern | 7.5 | 10 | 6 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 2.4 | 68 |
| | Jerusalem | 7.5 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 7.6 | 2.5 | 67 |
| Qatani | Northern | 9.8 | 10.6 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 9.3 | 4.5 | 52 |
| | Southern | 8 | 13 | 8 | 7.5 | 9.1 | 3.3 | 64 |
| | Jerusalem | 8 | 12 | 8 | 7.5 | 8.9 | 2.5 | 72 |
| Sesame | Northern | 24.7 | 26.5 | 24.6 | 23.9 | 24.9 | 13.3 | 46 |
| | Southern | 23 | 27 | 25 | 23 | 24.5 | 15.1 | 38 |
| | Jerusalem | 24 | 28 | 25 | 23 | 25 | 20 | 20 |
| Dura | Northern | 8.5 | 7.6 | 6 | 6.5 | 7.1 | 3.4 | 52 |
| | Southern | 9 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 7.5 | 2.8 | 62 |
| | Jerusalem | 9 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 7.8 | 3 | 61 |
| Olive oil | Northern | 53.7 | 53.5 | 54.6 | 58.1 | 54.9 | 30.5 | 44 |
| | Jerusalem | 53 | 55 | 52 | 57 | 54.2 | 30 | 44 |

SOURCE Hope-Simpson, *Report*, p. 174.

TABLE 2.2 *Share of Jews, Arabs and others in Palestine's foreign assets, 1946*

| | £P millions | £P millions |
|---|----------------|----------------|
| Net currency reserves: | | |
| Arab owned | 29.2 | |
| Jewish owned | 7.3 | |
| Other (incl. government, military, etc.) | 6.4 | 42.9 |
| Net banking reserves: | | |
| Arab owned | 9.3 | |
| Jewish owned | 50.2 | |
| Other (incl. government, military, etc.) | 3.7 | 63.2 |

SOURCE Palestine Government, *A Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1946) p. 565.

TABLE 2.3 *Percentage of population of the sub-districts of Nablus, Tulkarm and Jenin dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, 1931*

| | Nablus | Tulkarm | Jenin |
|---|--------|---------|--------|
| Total number in all classes of earners and dependants | 68 490 | 46 326 | 41 411 |
| Number of earners and dependants in agriculture and pastoralism | 48 125 | 36 760 | 33 991 |
| Percentage of total earners and dependants in agriculture and pastoralism | 70.27% | 79.35% | 82.08% |

SOURCE *Census of Palestine 1931*, 11, pt. 2, Table xvi, p. 315.

TABLE 2.4 *The relationship of peasant population to agricultural land in the Jenin sub-district*

| Number of holders | Total cultivated area (dunums) | Average holding/owner (dunums) |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 4 793 | 260 161 | |
| of which | | |
| 499 (above subsistence area) | 161 593 | 323.8 |
| 4294 (below subsistence area) | 104 337 | 24.3 |

SOURCE Report to High Commissioner by Director of Development, 1933/4, PRO/CO 733/252.

TABLE 2.5 *Stages of settlement work reached in the 167 villages brought under settlement at the end of 1935*

| | Settlement area | | | | | | | | Total | |
|---|-----------------|-------|------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-----------|-------|---------|
| | Jaffa | Ramle | Gaza | Haifa | Tulkarm | Jenin | Safad | Jerusalem | | Jericho |
| Villages in which settlement work has been entirely completed | 39 | 35 | 19 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 1 | | | 107 |
| Villages in which land disputes are being heard prior to completion of settlement | 2 | 9 | 12 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 1 | | | 38 |
| Villages in which final stage of investigation is in progress | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | | | | | 13 |
| Villages in which preliminary field investigations are in progress | | | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| Total | 42 | 46 | 36 | 14 | 23 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 167 |

SOURCE Palestine, *Annual Report* (1935) p. 3. The total at the end of December 1936 is 171 settlement areas, see *Annual Report* (1936) pp. 80 ff.

TABLE 2.6 *Number of privately-owned parcels of land in five villages, distributed according to the number of owners of each parcel, 1944*

| Villages | Number of parcels owned by the following number of persons | | | | | | | | | | | Total number of parcels | Total number of shares | Total number of owners |
|---------------------------------|--|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11+ | | | |
| Absolute figures | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A | 116 | 83 | 57 | 45 | 23 | 10 | 14 | 24 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 384 | 1284 | 149 |
| B | 394 | 162 | 68 | 64 | 40 | 36 | 25 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 21 | 828 | 2439 | 127 |
| C | 401 | 118 | 43 | 14 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 3 | — | 1 | 613 | 1064 | 222 |
| D | 187 | 58 | 28 | 23 | 43 | 26 | 41 | 2 | — | 5 | 19 | 432 | 1491 | 140 |
| Total four villages (A—D) | 1098 | 421 | 196 | 146 | 119 | 78 | 89 | 38 | 12 | 11 | 49 | 2257 | 6278 | 638 |
| E | 150 | 40 | 26 | 24 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | — | 4 | 265 | 593 | 143 |
| Grand total five villages (A—E) | 1248 | 461 | 222 | 170 | 130 | 81 | 93 | 40 | 13 | 11 | 53 | 2522 | 6871 | 781 |
| Percentages | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A | 30.2 | 21.6 | 14.8 | 11.7 | 6.0 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 100.0 | | |
| B | 47.6 | 19.6 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 2.5 | 100.0 | | |
| C | 65.4 | 19.2 | 7.0 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 0.5 | — | 0.2 | 100.0 | | |
| D | 43.3 | 13.4 | 6.5 | 5.3 | 9.9 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 0.5 | — | 1.2 | 4.4 | 100.0 | | |
| Total four villages (A—D) | 48.6 | 18.7 | 8.7 | 6.5 | 5.3 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 1.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.2 | 100.0 | | |
| E | 56.6 | 15.1 | 9.8 | 9.1 | 4.1 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 0.4 | — | 1.5 | 100.0 | | |
| Grand total five villages (A—E) | 49.5 | 18.3 | 8.8 | 6.7 | 5.2 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 100.0 | | |

SOURCE 'Five Village Survey' in *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics* (Dec. 1945) p. 758.

TABLE 2.7 *Estimates of the average cost of agricultural production of income and profit, 1930*

| | Committee's est. £P m. | Villager's est. £P m. |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Cost of production of 100 dunums field crops | | |
| Annual share of cost of plough animals | 2.000 | 6.000 |
| Implements | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Forage for plough animals | 7.000 | 7.000 |
| Seed | 6.500 | 6.000 |
| Hired labour | 3.500 | 12.000 |
| Transport to village/threshing floor | <u>2.000</u> | <u>2.000</u> |
| Total | 22.000 | 34.000 |
| <i>Cost of living of a family of six</i> | | |
| Wheat and dura | 10.000 | 12.000 |
| Olives and olive oil | 3.000 | 3.000 |
| Other village produce | 4.000 | 4.000 |
| Other necessities not of village origin | 3.000 | 5.000 |
| Clothing | 5.000 | 14.000 |
| Communal expenditure | <u>1.000</u> | — |
| Total | 26.000 | 38.000 |
| Average net return from 100 dunums of all kinds of land | | |
| <i>Gross income</i> | | |
| Field crops | 39.000 | |
| <i>Fruit trees</i> | | |
| Olive | 9.000 | |
| Other | <u>9.000</u> | |
| Total for cultivation | 57.000 | |
| Stock, dairy produce, poultry, etc. | <u>7.000</u> | |
| Total | 64.000 | |
| <i>Cost of production</i> | £P 22.000 | |
| <i>Taxes</i> | | |
| Tithe | 4.500 | |
| Werko (House & land tax) | 1.800 | |
| Animal tax | <u>500</u> | <u>28.800</u> |
| <i>Net return to owner-cultivator</i> | | 35.200 |
| Rent at 30% of income from cultivation, viz., £P 17, less £P 1.8 Werko paid to landlord | | <u>15.200</u> |
| Net return to tenant | £P. | <u><u>20.000*</u></u> |

*Note: This does not represent a true net profit as it takes no account of the labour of the farmer or his family. The cost of producing olives and livestock is also ignored as is the cost of feeding and watering animals.

SOURCE Estimates to be found in the Johnson-Crosbie *Report*, most of which are summarised at the end of the Hope-Simpson *Report*.

TABLE 2.8 *Income and expenditure of an 'ordinary fellah', according to Wilkansky (area 80-100 dunums)*

| | | |
|---|--|------------------------|
| 1. <i>Expenditure</i> | | £E |
| (a) <i>Expenses</i> | | |
| Food for 2 oxen, 2 kantars sesame cake or beans | | 7.00 |
| Seeds | | 6.50 |
| Communal charges | | 1.60 |
| Various, repairs, etc. | | 0.30 |
| Osher (<i>ushr</i>) and Verko (<i>werko</i>) (tithe and land tax) | | <u>4.50</u> |
| | | 19.90 |
| (b) <i>Household expenditure</i> | | 16.00 |
| 4 kantars* of wheat at £E 4 | | 7.50 |
| 3 kantars* dura at £E 2.50 | | 9.00 |
| 600 litres of milk at Pt 1.5 | | 2.00 |
| 400 eggs | | 5.00 |
| Olive oil, 7 jars | | 4.00 |
| Clothing | | <u>6.00</u> |
| Vegetables, rice, lamp-oil, sugar, etc. | | 49.50 |
| Total expenditure | | £E <u><u>69.50</u></u> |
| 2. <i>Income</i> | | |
| 30 dunums of wheat at 50 kg/dunum | | 20.00 |
| 10 dunums barley at 60 kg/dunum | | 6.00 |
| 10 dunums kirsinna | | 6.00 |
| 30 dunums dura | | 6.50 |
| 10 dunums sesame | | 3.00 |
| 800 litres milk | | 12.00 |
| 1000 eggs | | 5.00 |
| Outside labour | | <u>12.00</u> |
| Total income | | £E <u><u>70.50</u></u> |

*The weight of the kantar varied from 256 kg in the north to 288 kg in the south.

SOURCE Hope-Simpson *Report*, pp. 177-8. Wilkansky is I. Elazari Volcani author of *The Fellah's Farm* (Jewish Agency for Palestine, Institute of Agricultural and Natural History, Tel Aviv, 1930), Hebrew. The fact that the figures are given in Egyptian pounds implies that the data was probably collected in or before 1927, when the currency was changed to Palestine pounds.

TABLE 2.9 Olive propagation: olive trees planted by the government according to source, 1924/5-1936/7

| | Sub-districts | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-------|
| | Jenin | | | | Nablus | | | | Tulkarm | | | |
| | Pr ¹ | For ² | Govt ³ | Total | Pr ¹ | For ² | Govt ³ | Total | Pr ¹ | For ² | Govt ³ | Total |
| 1924/5 | 22770 | 6690 | — | 34460 | 5490 | 2505 | — | 7995 | 21128 | 1240 | — | 22368 |
| 1925/6 | 1900 | 6000 | — | 7900 | 13325 | 875 | 3 | 14203 | 43916 | 6700 | — | 50616 |
| 1931/2 | 24920 | 2400 | — | 27320 | 33625 | 150 | — | 33775 | 16040 | 1300 | — | 17340 |
| 1933/4 | 25000 | — | — | 25000 | 42800 | 500 | — | 43300 | 20166 | 600 | — | 20766 |
| 1934/5 | 35533 | 3550 | — | 39083 | 40739 | 450 | — | 41189 | 25995 | 625 | — | 26620 |
| 1935/6 | 20043 | 1100 | — | 21143 | 34182 | 100 | — | 34282 | 25633 | — | — | 25663 |

¹Pr - suckers obtained from private groves

²For - suckers obtained under licence from public forests

³Govt - suckers obtained from government nurseries

SOURCE Derived from Annual Agricultural Reports.

TABLE 2.10 *Wholesale prices of Nablusi soap compared with that of the Shemen Factory, 1929–40 (£P per 100 kilos)*

| | 1929 | 1931 | 1933 | 1937 | 1938 | 1940 |
|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Nablus | 4.910 | 3.180 | 3.560 | 5.787 | 4.251 | 5.664 |
| Shemen | | | | 3.463 | 3.325 | 3.967 |

SOURCE Palestine, *Annual Report* (1933) p. 206; *Statistical Abstract of Palestine* (1943) p. 26.

TABLE 2.11 *Exports of soap from Palestine, 1928–40**

| Year | Tons | £P |
|------|------|---------|
| 1928 | 6187 | 224 496 |
| 1932 | 3640 | 108 101 |
| 1934 | 2713 | 71 532 |
| 1936 | 1841 | 53 798 |
| 1938 | 2502 | 68 532 |
| 1940 | 1332 | 53 593 |

*Includes exports by other soap factories, especially Shemen, to Britain and other European countries

SOURCE Naval Intelligence Division, *Palestine and Transjordan* (London, 1943) p. 264.

TABLE 2.12 *Average wages paid to labour per 9-hour day in 1929 (skilled and semi-skilled work)*

| | Non-Jews (mils) | Jews (mils) |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Asphalt workers | 160 | 220 |
| Road labourers | 130 | 160 |
| Stone breakers | 130 | 180 |
| Stone dressers | 460 | 530 |
| Masons | 475 | 500 |
| Concretors | 200 | 350 |
| Builders' labourers | 150 | 180 |
| Plasterers | 410 | 425 |
| Painters | 350 | 400 |
| Carpenters | 445 | 485 |
| Blacksmiths | 360 | 460 |
| Mechanics | 425 | 475 |

SOURCE PRO/CO 733/165/7757.

TABLE 2.13 *Estimates of wage labour employed outside the village in two Palestinian sub-districts during World War II*

| Village | Population | Total land area (in dunums) | No. in employment outside the village |
|-----------------------------|------------|---|--|
| <i>Nablus Sub-district</i> | | | |
| Bazzariya | 170–320 | 4278 | 8 |
| Beit Iba | 630–650 | 5063 | 60 |
| Beit Umrin | 850–860 | 12094 | 35 |
| Burqa | 2590–3000 | 18486 | 400–500 |
| Deir Sharaf | 800–850 | 7190 | 40–50 |
| Ijnisiynya | 200–210 | 6547 | 20 |
| En Naqura | 350–500 | 5507 | 50 |
| Nisf Jubeil | 150–260 | 5054 | 10 |
| Rafidiya | 430–500 | 2004 | 200 |
| Zawata | 330–350 | 3558 | 10–15 |
| <i>Tulkarm Sub-district</i> | | | |
| Anabta | 3000–3120 | 15445 (excluding detached areas) | 400 |
| Bal'a | 2220–2300 | 21151 | 100 |
| Kafr el Labad | 900–940 | 14757 | 60 |
| Shuweika | 2370–2800 | 6328 (excluding detached area of 11500 dunums in the plains) | 12 |

SOURCES H. Kendall and K. H. Baruth, *Village Development in Palestine during the British Mandate* (London, 1949) pp. 49–52; and *Village Statistics 1945; A Classification of Land and Area Ownership in Palestine* (Beirut, 1970).

Note: Where there are discrepancies in population figures between these two sources, both figures are given.

TABLE 2.14 *Source of income for wage-earners in three Palestinian sub-districts (1931)*

| | Income from agriculture, women (men) | Ordinary cultivation, women (men) | For servants, field servants and labourers, women (men) |
|---------|---|---|--|
| Tulkarm | 153 (370) | 320 (4586) | 326 (2323) |
| Nablus | 121 (349) | 622 (7258) | 398 (1711) |
| Jenin | 117 (305) | 481 (3524) | 379 (2349) |

SOURCE *Census of Palestine 1931*, I, Pt. 1, p. 323.

TABLE 2.15 *Estimated production of Palestinian crops for the years 1927-42 (in metric tons)*

| | 1927 | 1928 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| <i>Winter crops</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wheat | 99406 | 65288 | 87873 | 87339 | 79650 | 51073 | 44447 | 82855 | 104353 | 76059 | 127420 | 44435 | 89190 | 136082 | 90366 | 104392 |
| Barley | 44524 | 46697 | 46240 | 60071 | 41200 | 24300 | 33926 | 68714 | 68905 | 55169 | 75417 | 66736 | 86230 | 102541 | 68845 | 114518 |
| Lentils | 3155 | 1397 | 3840 | 3800 | 3758 | 1606 | 1547 | 2251 | 2698 | 2379 | 3830 | 3278 | 2649 | 5184 | 3085 | 4022 |
| Kersenneh | 6414 | 4108 | 7751 | 7612 | 8030 | 2077 | 1892 | 3922 | 8849 | 7378 | 6004 | 5374 | 5500 | 11011 | 5726 | 7850 |
| Beans | 1859 | 1022 | 3977 | 3384 | 3670 | 768 | 655 | 808 | 1489 | 961 | 1529 | 1325 | 1363 | 3253 | 2161 | 2497 |
| Chick-peas | 948 | 466 | 1181 | 1288 | 1064 | 1411 | 3373 | 125 | 225 | 871 | 2037 | 2153 | 1601 | 2007 | 1432 | 1395 |
| <i>Summer crops</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dura | 37441 | 32732 | 31439 | 37058 | 16862 | 15452 | 8860 | 42423 | 46135 | 22122 | 61023 | 63253 | 42896 | 58301 | 65494 | 57965 |
| Sesame | 5831 | 1978 | 4169 | 2365 | 2024 | 449 | 214 | 2633 | 6914 | 1847 | 9317 | 6441 | 3754 | 6624 | 7467 | 6214 |
| Olives | 20551 | 2635 | 15500 | 2993 | 33906 | 6559 | 3599 | 6647 | 45092 | 15755 | 47247 | 38572 | 35282 | 45767 | 13472 | 62708 |
| Melons | 37926 | 15576 | 16298 | 14840 | 22059 | 32125 | 20434 | 40510 | 68799 | 81335 | 102859 | 114805 | 86892 | 107829 | 77906 | 64717 |
| Grapes | 7190 | 4117 | 5345 | 5936 | 17196 | 25995 | 18504 | 29764 | 28818 | 49359 | 45673 | 46784 | 45433 | 47988 | 47417 | 52771 |
| Figs | 8302 | 7060 | 7481 | 7544 | 6727 | 9895 | 4585 | 7580 | 10945 | 16421 | 18107 | 22753 | 26048 | 25220 | 26827 | 22828 |
| Almonds | 411 | 298 | 342 | 359 | 488 | 810 | 442 | 1490 | 4099 | 3910 | 4184 | 1650 | 4006 | 4190 | 2628 | 3129 |
| Fruits other | 4138 | 6187 | 7163 | 7520 | 2271 | 5241 | 3909 | 4640 | 5231 | 19709 | 11964 | 24009 | 20537 | 18956 | 20023 | 23894 |
| Vegetables | 19148 | 13305 | 15913 | 12865 | 15068 | 24371 | 21305 | 36465 | 67847 | 70321 | 120395 | 109088 | 129373 | 198273 | 189794 | 194226 |

SOURCE *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, II* (1943) p. 70.

Note: This table is based on tithe returns for the years 1925 to 1928 and on estimates of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for the years 1929 to 1942.

TABLE 2.16 *Domestic expenditures of various colonial governments in the interwar period by purpose (per cent)*

| | India 1921–30 | Cyprus 1923–38 | Iraq 1921–30 | Trans-Jordan 1924–31 | Syria 1923–30 | Average | Palestine 1920/21– 1939/40 |
|--|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|------------------|---------|----------------------------------|
| General administration | 19.7 | 32.0 | 34.6 | 20.8 | 35.4 | 28.5 | 29.4 |
| Defence and public safety | 33.8 | 17.5 | 34.4 | 45.8 | 28.1 | 31.9 | 28.6 |
| Economic and environmental services | 20.1 | 16.5 | 14.5 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 13.2 | 18.7 |
| Public works (development) | | 13.9 | 7.0 | 8.6 | 15.1 | 11.2 | 12.1 |
| Social welfare services | 7.2 | 20.1 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 8.9 | 11.2 | 11.3 |
| Domestic debt service and unspecified expenditure | 19.2 | — | — | 6.8 | 5.4 | 10.5 | — |
| Total domestic expenditure | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | | 100.0 |
| Administration and safety | 53.5 | 49.5 | 69.0 | 66.6 | 63.5 | 60.4 | 58.0 |
| Economic, environmental, and development | 20.1 | 30.4 | 21.5 | 16.3 | 22.3 | 24.4 | 30.8 |

SOURCE N. T. Gross and J. Metzger, *Public Finance in the Jewish Economy in Interwar Palestine* (Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, Discussion Paper No. 776, Jerusalem, July 1977) Tables 17 and 18.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

List of Abbreviations

Bull. PES *Bulletin of the Palestine Exploration Society*

CO Colonial Office (UK)

FO Foreign Office (UK)

IEJ *Israel Exploration Journal*

IJMES *International Journal of Middle East Studies*

ISS Institute of Social Studies (The Hague)

JQ *Jerusalem Quarterly*

MES *Middle Eastern Studies*

PEFQS *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement*

PRO Public Record Office, London

RCAJ Royal Central Asian Journal

1. G.N.Kitching, 'Modes of Production and Kenyan Dependency', *Review of African Political Economy*, 8 (Jan–April 1977) p.56.
2. L.Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. (London, 1977) p.27.
3. L.Trotsky, *1905*, trans. (Harmondsworth, 1973) p.67.
4. J.Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et de Proche Orient* (Paris, 1946) p.92.

5. E.Laclau, 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America', *New Left Review*, 67 (May/June 1971) pp.24–8 passim.
6. Mandate for Palestine, Article 1. A copy of the Mandate can be found, *inter alia*, in D.Ingrams, *Palestine Papers 1917–1922* (London, 1972).
7. Mandate for Palestine, Article 18; H.Sawwaf, 'Foreign Trade', in S.B.Himadeh (ed), *The Economic Organisation of Palestine* (Beirut, 1938) pp.440–1.
8. Palestine Royal Commission, *Report* (London, 1937) p.159.
9. B.J.Smith, 'British Economic Policy in Palestine towards the development of the Jewish National Home, 1920–1929', D.Phil. (Oxford, 1978) pp.15–16.
10. Mandate for Palestine, particularly Articles 2 and 4.
11. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the complex interrelations between the British Mandatory authorities and the Jewish community in Palestine except in so far as these led to policies which affected Arab agriculture and trade. The following works deal in detail with the economic aspects of this relationship: R.R.Nathan, O.Gass and D.Cramer, *Palestine: Problem and Promise* (Washington, 1946); D. Horowitz and R.Hinden, *Economic Survey of Palestine* (Tel Aviv, 1938); ESCO Foundation, *Palestine, a Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies* (New Haven, 1947).
12. R.D.Ottensooer, *The Palestine Pound and the Israeli Pound: Transition of a Colonial to an Independent Currency* (Geneva, 1955) p.14. One Palestinian pound (£P) = 1 pound sterling = 1 000 mils. One Egyptian pound (£E) = £P 1.026.
13. *Ibid.*, pp.33–7; Smith, 'British Economic Policy', pp.26–40.
14. A.Granovsky, *The Fiscal System of Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1935) p.145–51.
15. For instance, in the Jabal Nablus area it was said that Hafiz Tuqan, who built up the Tuqan family's fortunes in the Nablus soap industry, obtained the money to establish this enterprise from his position as a tax collector in the village of Tubas, J.-A.Jaussen, *Coutumes Palestiniennes*, 1, *Naplouse et son District* (Paris, 1927) p.135.
16. For example, *ibid.*, pp.140–1; G.Post, 'Essays on the Sects and Nationalities of Syria and Palestine'. *PEFQS* (April 1891) pp.106–7; S.Bergheim, 'Land Tenure in Palestine', *PEFQS* (July 1894) p.198; Rev F.A.Klein, 'Life, Habits and Customs of the Fellahin of Palestine', *PEFQS* (Jan 1883) p.45.
17. Granovsky, *Fiscal System*, pp.146–51.
18. *Ibid.*, p.153.
19. M.F.Abcarius. 'Fiscal System' in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation*, pp.518–19.
20. A sum of £P719 701 between 1930 and 1933, Palestine Royal Commission, *Report*, p.123.
21. Granovsky, *Fiscal System*, p.163.
22. *Ibid.*, p.181.
23. *Ibid.*, pp.30ff.
24. Sir J.Hope-Simpson, *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (London, 1930).

25. For details see N.Burns, *The Tariff of Syria, 1919–1932* (Beirut, 1933). For a general survey of British tariff policy in Palestine see Smith, 'British Economic Policy', pp.59–78.
26. For example, K.W.Stein, 'Legal protection and circumvention of Rights of Cultivators in Mandatory Palestine' in J.S.Migdal (ed), *Palestine Society and Politics* (Princeton, 1980) pp.233–60.
27. Palestine, *Annual Report* (1931) pp.6–7.
28. *Ibid.*, p.7.
29. Palestine, *Annual Report* (1935) p.25.
30. Hope-Simpson, *Report*, p.68.
31. In the early 1930s debts were estimated at £P27 per peasant family, *Report of a Committee on the Economic Condition of Agriculturalists in Palestine and the Fiscal Measures of the Government Thereto* (Jerusalem, 1930) p.20. (Hereafter cited as Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*).
32. Interest rates seem to have been around 6 per cent in the 1920s and 5 per cent in the 1930s – at least until 1935/6 when they rose to 9 per cent. Palestine, *Annual Report* (1925) p.14; G.Hakim and M.Y.El-Husayni, 'Monetary and Banking System' in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation*, p.498.
33. Palestine, *Annual Report* (1937) pp.194–6.
34. See Palestine, *Annual Reports* (1925–38), for details of the activities of these farms.
35. Palestine Royal Commission, *Report*, p.198.
36. Palestine, *Annual Report* (1936) p.55.
37. For details see Hakim and El-Husayni, 'Monetary and Banking System' p.501.
38. *Ibid.*, pp.496–501.
39. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, pp.41–2.
40. Extract from discussion in Secretary of State for Colonies' room, 7 Nov.1932, PRO/CO 733/217/97072.
41. J.Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine* (London, 1946) p.103.
42. Palestine Royal Commission, *Report*, p.91; Y.Miller, 'From Village to Nation: Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–48', Ph.D. (University of California at Berkeley, n.d.) pp.155–62.
43. Y.Porath, 'The Palestinian awakening: the Palestinian Arabs and their Leadership towards the End of the Ottoman Period' in M.Ma'oz (ed), *Studies in Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975) p.368.
44. *A Survey of Palestine*, 1 (Jerusalem, 1946) pp.364–7.
45. Statement by Diyyab ibn Abdul Hamid Fahum, Field Organiser in the Co-operative Societies Dept. in Nazareth, 19 Oct 1938, *Tegart Papers* (St Antony's Middle East Centre, Oxford), Box 1, file 3(a).
46. *Census of Palestine 1931* (Alexandria, 1933) vol.1, pt.1, p.292.
47. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, p.24; Hope-Simpson, *Report*, p.68. See also the High Commissioner's advocacy of seed loans in 1933 when he reported:

The failure of the winter harvest means that farmers will find it almost impossible themselves to provide seed for the next winter sowing. Moreover, in the majority of cases, owing to present heavy indebted-

ness and the absence of further security, farmers will have to resort next year to the money lenders for the purpose of seed; but even if the money lender, who is usually a grain merchant, is willing to issue seed loans in kind, such loans will be at very exorbitant rates of interest (14 Aug. 1933, PRO/CO 733/245/17493).

48. PRO/CO 733/217/4, p.48 (n.d.).
49. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, p.42.
50. Y.Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics in Mandatory Palestine', 1, *MES*, xi, 1 (1975) p.21, note 34 and 2, *MES* xi, 2 (1975) p.188, note 9.
51. N.A.Badran, *al-Ta 'lim wal-Tahdith fi al-Mujtama 'al-Arabiya al-Filistiniya* (Beirut, 1969) pp.273-4.
52. However, in overall terms, the involvement of Arabs in the banking sector remained relatively small in the period of the Mandate as the figures in Table 2.2 indicate.
53. D.Chevalier, 'De la production lente à l'économie dynamique en Syrie', *Annales*, xxi, 1 (1966) p.67.
54. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions* Colonial No.134 (London, 1937) pp.42, 102.
55. Report on the Jenin Scheme, 1, Settlement of Displaced Arabs, 31 March 1935, PRO/CO 733/270.
56. L.French, 'First Report on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine', Dec.1931, p.19.
57. Y.Porath, 'The Land Problem in Mandatory Palestine', *JQ* 1 (1976) pp.23-4.
58. For a study of comparative Arab/Jewish and urban/rural dietary patterns see I.J.Kligler, A.Geiger, S.Bromberg and D.Gurevitch, 'An Inquiry into the Diets of Various Sections of the Urban and Rural Population of Palestine', *Bull.PES*, v, 3 (1931) passim.
59. Unfortunately, although figures in the annual Agricultural Reports indicate substantial increases in the production of these crops, vegetables in particular, there was no breakdown for regions and districts, so that it is impossible to tell how evenly spread this development was. For estimates of crop production for the years 1927-42 see Table 2.15, at the end of the chapter.
60. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence* p.107.
61. Under the administrative divisions of the Mandate Jabal Nablus is taken to include the sub-districts of Nablus and Jenin and the eastern portion of the Tulkarm sub-district up to the line of the Haifa-Tulkarm-Lyddah railway. This means that in interpreting figures for the whole of the Tulkarm sub-district it must be borne in mind that they also refer to an area which contained a substantial Jewish population in the coastal area.
62. Laclau, 'Feudalism and Capitalism', p.23.
63. For example, S.B.Himadeh, 'Industry', in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation*, pp.266-7.
64. Y.Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1 and 2 and 'Production and Trade in an Islamic Context: Sharika Contracts in the Transitional Economic of Northern Samaria, 1853-1943', 1 and 2, *IJMES*, vi (1975).

65. For a general geographical survey of the area see, Naval Intelligence Division, *Palestine and Transjordan* (London, 1943) passim.
66. Weulersse, *Paysans*, p.27.
67. D.H.K.Amiran, 'The Pattern of Settlement in Palestine', *IEJ*, III (1953) pp.193–203 passim.
68. *Ibid.*, p.199.
69. A.Cohen, *Arab Border Villages in Israel* (Manchester, 1965), p.10.
70. *Ibid.*, pp.43–4.
71. Firestone gives the contrasting examples of 'Arraba, north of Jenin and one of the centres of power of the Abd al-Hadi family – 'a hill village with a long tradition of smallholder independence' – and Zir 'in, on the borders of the hills facing the Esdraelon valley – a lowland settlement of the *mushaa* type whose villagers were largely migrants from the hill country and perhaps sedentarised semi-nomads. From the beginning of the Mandate period, the Abd al-Hadi family had taken over the bulk of the lands in the latter village, though formally, it remained in *mushaa* tenure. 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1, p.4.
72. Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions, p.26, col.2.
73. 'Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in Arab Villages, 1944', *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics* (Dec.1945) p.749. (Hereafter, *Five Village Survey*).
74. A.Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London, 1952) pp.38–40.
75. *Census of Palestine 1931*, II, pt.2 (Alexandria, 1933) Table III, 10.
76. Y.Ben-Arieh, 'Population of the Large towns in Palestine during the First 80 years of the Nineteenth Century according to Western Sources' in M.Ma'oz (ed.) *Studies*, p.64. Ben-Arieh also points out (*ibid.*) that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Nablus was one of the four biggest towns in Palestine but that, by the end of the century it had lost this position – surpassed by Jaffa and even Hebron. It is worth noting that other sources give considerably higher figures for the period 1880–1920 for examples N.Verney and G.Dambmann *Les Puissances étrangères dans le Levant en Syrie et en Palestine* (Paris and Lyon, 1900), p.283) give 20 000 for 1892 and 24 830 for 1897 while Naval Intelligence Division (*Palestine and Transjordan*, p.190) cites a consular estimate of 25000 for 1913. Lastly, Ruppin (*Syria*, p.7) gives an Ottoman source of 30 000 for 1915. Such figures may point to rapid growth at the end of the century followed by a sharp loss of population during the war but, given the unreliability of the figures, it is impossible to be certain.
77. J.de Groot, 'Kerman in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Regional Study of Society and Social Change', D.Phil. (Oxford, 1977) p.21.
78. Verney and Dambmann, *Les Puissances étrangères*, p.253.
79. Naval Intelligence Division, *Palestine and Transjordan*, p.341; A. Ruppin, *Syria: an Economic Survey*, trans. (New York, 1918) p.75.
80. Verney and Dambmann, *Les Puissances étrangères*, p.398.
81. Ruppin, *Syria*, pp.74–5.
82. In 1887, the tolls levied on the Jaffa–Jerusalem road were: 2s 8d for a carriage or cart, 3½d for a camel, 2½d for a pack-horse or mule and 1½d for a donkey, GB *Parl.Papers*, 1888, vol.xxxix, p.2.
83. *Les Puissances étrangères*, pp.258–9.

84. *Paysans*, p.137.
85. Jaussen, *Coutumes*, 1, pp.293–4.
86. Naval Intelligence Division, *Palestine and Transjordan*, p.371; Palestine, 'Report on Traffic Organisation, Facilities and Rates of the Palestine Railways' (1935) p.43.
87. Palestine Royal Commission, Memoranda by the Palestine Government, Memo.No.21, 'Municipal and Local Councils', p.73. For complaints by the Arabs about compulsory road-making and the system of 'voluntary' labour for fighting locusts see 'Memorandum of the Congress of Arab Villagers', pp.3–4, Microfilms of US State Dept. Documents, Reel 6, St Antony's College, Oxford.
88. Marlowe, *Rebellion*, p.200.
89. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, p.22.
90. See his 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1 and 2 and his 'Production and Trade in an Islamic Context', 1 and 2.
91. It is hard to tell just how widespread was the use of these contracts. Firestone says that they were quite widely used in the Jenin area in the 1930s. A Memorandum to the High Commissioner from J.D.Shepherd in Jan.1934, commenting on the arrangements made by the government to purchase land for displaced Arabs in the village of Muqeibila (Jenin sub-district), reports that 4 500 dunums of land had been purchased from a large owner who had cultivated part of this holding on a share basis with smaller proprietors in the village. PRO/CO 733/251/37249.
92. 'Production and Trade in an Islamic Context', 2, p.316.
93. 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1, pp.14–17.
94. K.Marx, *Capital*, trans., vol.III (London, 1959) p.803.
95. H.S.Idrissi, 'La rent foncière au Maroc', *Bull.econ.et sociale du Maroc*, 131–2 (1976) p.46.
96. M.A.Benachnou, 'Accumulation du capital et évolution du matériel de paysannerie en Algérie de 1880 à 1962', *Rev.Algérienne*, 13 (1976) p.373.
97. 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1, p.19.
98. Bergheim, 'Land Tenure', p.192.
99. *Five Village Survey*, p.758. The same survey discovered that, taking all five villages together, a quarter of the parcels were smaller than 2.5 dunums, half smaller than 5.5 dunums and about three quarters smaller than 10.5 dunums. Parcels of 51 dunums or more constituted only 3 per cent of the total number. *Ibid.*, p.756.
100. K.Marx, *Pre-capitalist Economic Formations*, ed. E.Hobsbawm (London, 1964) p.143.
101. D.Lehman, 'Agrarian Structure: Typology and Paths of Transformation in Latin America', mimeo (Centre of Latin American Studies, Cambridge, n.d.).
102. T.Shanin, 'The Nature and Logic of the Peasant Economy', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1, 1 (Oct.1973) p.72.
103. *Five Village Survey*, p.750.
104. Hope-Simpson, *Report*, pp.69–70.
105. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, p.14.
106. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1, p.8.

107. Memo by J.D.Shepherd, enclosure 4 in High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 26 Jan.1934, PRO/CO 733/251/37249.
108. *Commercial Bulletin*, Jan–June 1922, p.177.
109. For comments on the importance of the relations between technology and land tenure see R.Cresswell, 'Techniques traditionnelles dans un village de la montagne Libanaise', *Objets et mondes*, 16 (1976) pp.149–54.
110. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 2, p.192, note 33.
111. Firestone, 'Production and Trade', 2, p.310; Jaussen, *Coutumes*, I, p.11.
112. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 2, p.310.
113. C.F.Strickland, 'Report on the possibility of introducing a System of Agricultural Cooperation in Palestine' (1930) p.3.
114. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 2, p.202. 'Offences of this nature were usually in proportion to the poverty of the district and the badness of the season', Palestine, *Annual Report* (1925) p.8.
115. H.Kendall and K.H.Baruth, *Village Development in Palestine during the British Mandate* (London, 1949) p.15.
116. *Commercial Bulletin* (April 1932) p.126.
117. I.Nimr, *Ta 'rikh Jabal Nabalus w-al Balqa'*, Pt.2 (Nablus, 1951) p.137.
118. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 2, p.188, note 5.
119. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, pp.43–4.
120. The *Five Village Survey* (p.439) found that average family size was five to six persons and estimated that in the village surveyed every wage earner had to support three dependants. This included part-time work but excluded the work of women.
121. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, pp.18–20.
122. *Census of Palestine 1931*, I, 1, p.284.
123. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1, p.7.
124. For a discussion of the various concepts of subsistence and surplus see C.Keydar, 'Surplus', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, II, 2 (1975) pp.221–4 and S.Gudeman, *The Demise of a Rural Economy: From Subsistence to Capitalism in a Latin American Village* (London, 1978) pp.33–60.
125. R.M.Harrison, 'Theories of Peasant Economy', D.Phil. (Oxford, 1974) *passim*.
126. Johnson-Crosbie, *Report*, pp.8, 23; B.Veicmanes, 'Internal Trade' in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation*, p.346.
127. For example, *Commercial Bulletin* (July 1923) p.17.
128. Smith, 'British Economic Policy', p.63.
129. A.Latron, *La vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, 1936) p.94.
130. Palestine, *Annual Report* (1938) p.131.
131. Horowitz and Hinden, *Economic Survey* p.155.
132. *Ibid.*, p.157.
133. According to a Jewish estimate, the Arab rural population substituted 'to the extent of a third wood and charcoal for kerosene' while being the main consumer of duty-free imports of wearing apparel and cotton piece-goods from Syria. The same source added that imported wheat and flour were mainly consumed by the urban population and in Jewish settlements; not by the Arab rural population. 'Memorandum to the

- Treasurer on the Jewish contribution to public revenue' enclosed in High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 Nov.1932, PRO/CO 733/220/7.
134. Wilkansky puts these same 'communal charges' under expenses of production, by which he probably means charges for watchmen, etc.
 135. H.Granqvist, *Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village* (Helsingfors, 1931) passim; Jaussen, *Coutumes* I, p.57.
 136. Granqvist, *Marriage Conditions*, pp.27, 119, 133, 135.
 137. Information comes mainly from Arab Chambers of Commerce, *Directory of Arab Trade, Industry, Crafts and Professions* (Jerusalem, 1938) and Jaussen, *Coutumes*, I, passim.
 138. Its President was Abd al-Rahim Effendi Nabulsi; its members were Abd al-Rahim Effendi Tamini, Taha Effendi al-Masri and Taufiq Effendi Ahmad Arafat.
 139. For the annual volume and value of building activity in Nablus, Tulkarm and Jenin for 1924-8 see the special articles on Palestinian building in the *Commercial Bulletin* and for 1934-9 the *Statistical Abstract of Palestine* (1943) p.91.
 140. *Commercial Bulletin*, no.44 (1923) p.258.
 141. Palestine, *First Census of Industries* (Jerusalem, 1928) p.98.
 142. The only comprehensive survey of industry, taken in 1927, probably underestimates the number of Arab manufacturing enterprises due to the owners' reluctance to submit returns.
 143. S.B.Himadeh, 'Industry' in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation*, p.237.
 144. *Census of Palestine 1931*, I, 1, p.196.
 145. *Commercial Bulletin* (July 1923) p.24.
 146. *Census of Industries* (1928) p.106.
 147. Himadeh, 'Industry', p.266.
 148. Jaussen, *Coutumes*, I, p.289.
 149. *Ibid.*, p.291.
 150. At the same period, Syrian soap was suffering a severe decline, Burns, *Tariff of Syria*, pp.77-8.
 151. In 1937, soap imports were worth a total of £P12 039, Palestine, Dept of Customs, Excise and Trade, *Statistics of Imports, Exports and Shipping* (1937) p.207.
 152. *Census of Industries* (1929) p.106.
 153. Hope-Simpson, *Report*, p.109.
 154. Horowitz and Hinden, *Economic Survey*, pp.81, 208.
 155. Y.Porath, *The Emergence of the Arab Nationalist Movement, 1918-29* (London, 1974) pp.217ff. For descriptions of these relationships in general see M.Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968); I.Nimr, *Ta 'rikh Jabal Nabalus w-al Balqa'*, pt.1 (*Damascus*, 1938); J.Finn, *Stirring Times*, 2 vols (London, 1878); Mrs Finn, *Palestine Peasantry: Notes on their Clans, Warfare, Religion and Laws* (London, n.d.); Post, 'Essays', pp.99-125.
 156. For instance, one of the most important non-absentee landowners in the Jenin sub-district, Nazmi Taufiq Abd al-Hadi, also operated as a grain merchant while members of the landowning families of Hanun and Samara in the Tulkarm sub-district had businesses in Tulkarm for the

- export of watermelons and sweet melons, the district's most important cash crops. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 2, p.188, note 5; Granott, *Land System*, p.82; Arab Chambers of Commerce, *Directory*, section on exporters.
157. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 1, p.11.
 158. Granott, *Land System*, p.82.
 159. Firestone, 'Crop-sharing Economics', 2, pp.181ff. Writing of the 1920s Jaussen still quotes figures for the sum which each 'family' or clan within a 'family' was 'worth'. For instance, he says that the Abd al-Hadis of 'Arraba held 200 000 dunums of arable land which yielded an annual income of £E14 000–15 000. He also estimated that the three branches of the Nablusi family in Nablus possessed fortunes of £E50 000, £E25 000 and £E30 000 respectively while the Tuqan fortune was said to amount to £E25 000 in cash and £E15 000 in gardens and shops. *Coutumes*, I, pp.131–8.
 160. For a detailed examination of the development of education for this class since the end of the nineteenth century see Badran, *al-Ta'lim*, passim.
 161. For examples of such men see the 'Arab Who's Who' compiled by C.Eastwood (1933), PRO/CO 733/248/17693.
 162. Enclosure 4 in High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Colonies, 30 Oct.1935, PRO/CO 733/269.
 163. With the exception of the Union of Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Workers with its 300 Jewish and 209 Arab members, the few Arab unions tended to be more like trade associations or unions of self-employed craftsmen.
 164. Palestine Royal Commission, *Report*, p.92.
 165. H.Rosenfeld, 'From Peasantry to Wage Labour and Residual Peasantry: the Transformation of an Arab Village' in L.E.Sweet (ed.), *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East*, vol.II (Garden City, NY, 1970) p.152. For detailed information about the subsidiary occupations of agriculturalists and the agricultural activities of other workers by district see *Census of Palestine 1931*, II, Pt.2, Tables xviii and xix. Unfortunately there are no earlier or later figures with which to compare them.
 166. 'Life in an Agricultural District in Palestine', *Commercial Bulletin*, I (Jan.–June 1922) pp.172–8.
 167. *Ibid.*, and source in Table 2.12.
 168. Firestone, 'Production and trade in an Islamic context', 2, pp.317ff.
 169. The 1931 census defined 'industry' as the processing of raw materials in workshops or factories, whatever their size. In fact, the actual enumeration depended more on a person's description of his occupational category than on any *a priori* definition.
 170. *Census of Palestine 1931*, I, Pt.1, p.294.
 171. *Census of Industry* (1928) p.106.
 172. *Commercial Bulletin* (Dec.1930) p.248; J.Asfour, 'Arab Labour in Palestine', *RCAJ*, 32, Pt.2, p.202.
 173. Himadeh, 'Industry' in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation* pp.266–7.
 174. R.L.Taqqu, 'Arab Labour in Mandatory Palestine 1920–1948', Ph.D. (Columbia University, 1977) pp.64–5.

175. This was a period (1926–8) when there was a recession in the Jewish sector of the economy with Jewish unemployment high and when the British were under pressure to provide relief works for the unemployed.
176. For an analysis of the problems facing citriculture see Horowitz and Hinden, *Economic Survey*, pp.66–79.
177. Apparently many Jewish labourers gradually left the port as they found better-paid jobs elsewhere.
178. PRO/CO 733/277, p.13.
179. The total numbers of people employed by the Palestine Railways was 1 769 men and 30 women, of whom only 141 men and 2 women were recorded as coming from the districts of Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, *Census of Palestine 1931*.
180. Statement of Abd al-Rahim Abd al-Karim Dahud Abu Diyyak, 2 May 1938, *Tegart Papers*, Box 1, file 3(c).
181. For example, Firestone, 'Production and Trade in an Islamic context', 2, p.311.
182. Marx, *Capital*, III, p.812.
183. *Survey of Palestine*, vol.II, pp.997–8.
184. For example, Tamari, in this volume.
185. K.Post, 'On "Peasantisation" and Rural Class Differentiation in Western Africa', *ISS Occasional Papers* (The Hague, Sept.1970).
186. Kitching, 'Modes of Production', pp.66–7.
187. J.Hilal, *Al-Diffa al-Gharbiya: al-Tarikh al-Ijtima wa'l-Iqtisadi (1948–1974)* (Beirut, 1975) p.156.
188. B.Van Arkadie, *Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967* (New York, 1977) pp.24–5.
189. Rosenfeld, 'From Peasantry to Wage Labour', pp.164–5.

3 Factionalism and Class Formation in Recent Palestinian History

SALIM TAMARI

'Faction' and 'class' are often used as exclusive or polarised categories in explaining the progression of national politics in agrarian-based societies from fragmented sectional alignments to movements based on class solidarity. This political transformation is invariably linked to the penetration of capitalist relations of production and wage labour into the village community, but then only as a precondition for the fulfilment of the process. In discussing primordial loyalties among peasants, Alavi posits this relationship in the following fashion:

Political cleavages in peasant societies are often vertical cleavages, which run across class lines, rather than horizontal cleavages of class conflict. Faction leaders are conceived either as power-holders or as manipulating political entrepreneurs, who organise political groups with their retinues of labourers, sharecroppers and other economic dependants – if they have them – and alliances with other influential individuals or groups.¹

Furthermore, these 'vertical cleavages' are seen as having a *conserving* and *conservative* function, in that conflict between factions 'does not have an ideological expression, because rival factions, or faction leaders, fight for control over resources, power and status which are available within the existing framework of society rather than for changes in the social structure'.² It is this latter aspect of factionalism and its function in the preservation of the social structure against

external disruption and internal conflict that is our primary concern here. We should, however, avoid an implicit formal opposition of 'faction' – which is a political category – to that of 'class' – which is a socio-economic category.

In the following analysis, I propose to examine the usefulness of the categories 'faction' and 'class' in understanding the inner dynamic of Palestinian social structure before 1948. 'Factionalism' will be examined as a key theme of explanation in post-Ottoman Palestine, a predominantly rural society where class politics were obscured by a variety of intervening localised and 'vertical' identifications, such as clan, religious and regional interests. My aim here is to examine how factional politics 'deflected' class politics, even when the factional elements were diffused under the single leadership of a united organisation, the Arab Higher Committee. We will also discuss the embryonic forms of class organisation among Palestinians with special reference to the formation of a bourgeois class and its relationship to the nationalist leadership. The persistence of factionalism in the dismembered Palestinian community after the war of 1948 will not be discussed here.

THE HETEROGENEOUS CHARACTER OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY

One problem which obscures our understanding of nationalist politics in the Middle East is the manner in which conflicts and ideological expressions at the national level articulate localised (rural and urban) factional alignments and interests of a completely different character from those which emerge at the top. The problem becomes more complex when the subject is national (or ethnic) consciousness in as much as the phenomenon implies a homogeneous outlook for a population characterised by regional, religious and ethnic diversity – and, in our case, by physical dismemberment.

We are confronted with two kinds of discontinuities in modern Palestinian society, each expressing itself in ideological terms and itself subject to ideological manipulation by Zionism and pan-Arab nationalism. The first is the cultural heterogeneity of Palestinian society which has been successfully unified by the ideology of Palestinian Arab nationalism. There is no doubt that both Jewish nationalism and British colonialism contributed significantly to the emergence of this (unifying) ideology although they were not its sole

determinants. It was already a vigorous force in the later stage of Ottoman dominance. Yet Israeli writers continue to refer to the Arab people of Palestine as being composed of sects, confessions and even nationalities. In his first address to the Knesset as Prime Minister, for example, Begin referred to the non-Jewish citizens of Israel as constituting *three* nationalities: Arabs, Druze and Circassians.³ From a different perspective, pan-Arab nationalists (like Sati al-Husri and the Ba'athists) regard Palestinians as merely a geographical extension of a homogeneous Arab nation – a view shared by many Zionists. We will attempt here to transcend these ideological mystifications of what constitutes the Palestinian people, without negating their heterogeneous character.

The second kind of discontinuity refers to the rupture which occurred in Palestinian social organisation and the dispersal of the population. In a recent article Nakhleh rightly warns against the conception of traditional Arab social structure having an 'immutable nature [which] is the major factor impeding the process of substantial social change', and the view 'that the Ottoman and mandatory past can explain the Arab–Israeli present'.⁴ Here he was referring to the preoccupation of social scientists with units of analysis (e.g. *hamula*) and value-systems ('honour and shame') which no longer have their former explanatory value for understanding the present moment, and the ideological character of such a preoccupation. Nevertheless, in examining the persistence of a nationalist ideology in the Palestinian context we are concerned with both continuities and discontinuities with the past. A significant feature in the rupture which occurred in Palestinian society in the war of 1948 is that it took place in a society where class formation was continuously thwarted by inhibiting factors, both internal (related to its weak bourgeoisie) and external (related to Jewish colonialism).

In retrospect, what is most striking about factionalism in Palestine prior to 1948 was its political consequences. These were, primarily, the incapacity of the organised Arab community in Palestine to counter successfully the challenges posed by Jewish settlement to its independent survival. The Zionist movement, having organised Jewish immigrants into parallel social and economic institutions to those of the pre-capitalist Palestinian Arab society, was met by resistance organised along factional lines based on clan and patronage. To the extent that Palestinian political forces expressed class interests of groups that were threatened by Jewish colonisation, these forces were either incorporated into the factional structure (e.g. al-

Istiqlal party, of which more will be said later), or were marginalised because of their inability to overcome the factionalism of the national movement (e.g. the Communist Party and the League of National Liberation).

The consequences of factionalism became evident when the frontal assault was finally made by the Zionist forces on Arab society in 1948. In a study of stratification in Palestinian society Peretz refers to 'the pattern of vertical and horizontal stratification among the Palestinian Arabs during the mandate as a major institutional factor in the community's disintegration' during the 1948 war.⁵ He notes that, during the initial period of communal clashes (between Jews and Arabs) which extended over the latter part of 1947 and early 1948, a substantial section of the Palestinian élite (landlords, businessmen and professionals) constituted the bulk of the 30 000 who fled the country in this period. Given the absence of an extra-governmental body in Palestinian society (equivalent, for example, to the Jewish Agency) which could co-ordinate the Palestinian resistance and provide basic services to a community steadily being deserted by its bourgeoisie and landlords, the impending break-up of its political will was unavoidable. More than the effects of military assaults and massacres, concludes Peretz, 'the collapse of communal institutions probably caused more disruption leading to the exodus of some 80 per cent of the Arabs living in Israeli-controlled territory.'⁶

Peretz's account, whose main features I find convincing, raises important questions about the nature of what he calls the 'Palestinian élite'. Was this a cohesive and integrated class? Was it a class at all or a group of diverse, regional, landed and mercantile notables? What was the relationship between the landed and bourgeois interests in each region and the country as a whole? And, finally, what was their relationship to the colonial Mandate state?

With the major dislocation which has taken place in Palestinian society since then, and the disappearance of relations of patronage upon which factional politics rested, we are compelled to look to different categories of analysis to understand these changes. Although most Palestinians remaining in Palestine still dwelt in rural districts (in the Galilee, the Triangle, and the West Bank – but not Gaza), they can no longer be characterised as a peasant society – that is, a society subsisting mainly on agriculture. The Arab rural sector in Israel was progressively incorporated into the Jewish economy and its peasants began to relate to it mainly as wage-workers. To the extent that factional politics persisted in the Arab village, it was due to the

external manipulation by Israeli political parties of a traditional clan structure that was losing its viability and inner dynamic.

I will now examine the historical character of factionalism in Palestine by focusing on three forms of social relationships upon which it rested: fictive alignments, religious–communal relationships, and clan patronage.

FICTIVE ALIGNMENTS

The most distinctive divisions of Palestinian society which struck the foreign observer writing at the end of the last century were those of town, country and nomadic (Bedouin) settlement.⁷ However these were not necessarily the divisions that Palestinians themselves identified with. Although the city/village dichotomy permeated the consciousness of Palestinians when they reflected on groups outside their local community (as evidenced in the folkloric literature), it was nevertheless a consciousness mediated through other identifications which they believed to be primary. These included regional loyalties, religious affiliations, and clan affiliations. One of the most enigmatic and confusing of these identifications, however, was the partisan affiliations with the factions known as Qais and Yemen. Although common to many regions of greater Syria under the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was unique in that these divisions persisted as forms of political affiliation a long time after they lost their (seeming) function.

In Syria and Lebanon, Qaisi and Yemeni factions seem to have always been expressed through clan alignments.⁸ In the main, all the members of a clan would belong to a single faction, but there were exceptions.⁹ Nominally these factions traced the origin of the clan to its fictitious roots in northern or southern (Yemeni) Arabia during the Arab migrations to greater Syria after the Islamic conquest. In practice, however, they had the primary function of establishing the basis for loose alliances in the event of interclan conflicts. Such alliances cut across the village/city dichotomies and often united Christian and Muslim families. Haddad, a Palestinian ethnographer writing after the First World War notes:

In Jerusalem the headship of the Qaisi is in the hands of the Haldi family, of the Yemeni with the Husseini. There are still (in 1920) traces of the old party rivalry; when the peasants get into trouble

with the government, or find themselves in pecuniary difficulty, they resort for help to the patrons of their respective parties. In nearly every village there are members of both parties. In some districts most of the inhabitants belong to one faction, as for example in the district of Hebron, where the majority is Qaisi. In Beit Jala most are Qaisi; in Bethlehem, on the other hand, most are Yemeni, etc.¹⁰

If Haddad's description is accurate then what we obtain here, except for the big cities, is a pattern of fictive alignments on a regional basis or, at least, one in which interregional or intervillage conflicts would not disrupt the internal solidarity of the village. But we should not overlook the fact that many towns and villages did include a minority clan which occasionally would act as a potential disruptor of village solidarity. In my own town of Ramallah, for example, all the indigenous clans were Qaisi with the exception of one, al-Shaqara, who were Yemeni. Whenever a dispute arose with the neighbouring village of Beitunya – which is both Yemeni and Muslim – this one Yemeni clan (which, like the rest of the indigenous Ramallah clans, is Christian) would ally itself with the Beitunians against the other Ramallah (Qaisi) clans. On the other hand, we have instances of regional conflicts which involved exclusively Yemeni clans, for example, the Lahham clan of Bethlehem against the Abu Ghosh clans, near Jerusalem.¹¹

Fictive affiliations, however, do not seem to have taken the same form throughout Palestine. In a comprehensive study of Qaisi–Yemeni divisions in nineteenth-century Palestine, Miriam Hoexter distinguishes two main regional patterns of clan alliances; those prevailing in the Nablus mountains and those in the Judean hills.¹² In Nablus indigenous notables and landlords ruled the countryside, while in Jerusalem the local *majlis* was governed by an Ottoman Pasha. Hoexter argues convincingly that while the terms 'Qais' and 'Yemen' were used more frequently in identifying the contending factions in the Judean hills, the participation of town landlords (in Jerusalem) in their struggles was marginal and secondary. In Nablus, by contrast, town notables were the actual leaders of factional disputes.¹³ The reasons for this lie in the different character of Nablus and Jerusalem as regional centres; the former was a 'ruralised city', the abode of successive waves of wealthy landlords (Jarrar, Abd al-Hadi, Nimr) who moved there throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from their local villages and continued to rule

the peasantry from Nablus on behalf of the High Porte. Jerusalem, on the other hand, was a city with its own economic foundations (mainly based on its religious institutions and related crafts) – see Schölch – and its notables were relatively isolated from their rural hinterland.¹⁴ In factional disputes the Jerusalem notables were the arbitrators rather than the contenders among the Qaisi–Yemeni parties.¹⁵

The use of the term ‘party’ (i.e. *hizb*) in most references to Qaisi and Yemeni factions should not obscure the tribal character of these affiliations. The divisions acted as symbols of permanent identification around which members of a clan could be mobilised to secure various (and variable) objectives of their clan heads and tribal leaders. Owen, in dismissing the picture of a perennial ‘tribal’ conflict in which this factionalism has traditionally been portrayed, suggests a framework in which Qaisi–Yemeni divisions can be seen as ‘part of a process designed both to augment the resources of a particular family (or clan) leader as well as, in the Jabal Nablus and Jabal al-Khalil, to persuade the Ottoman authorities to award them a lucrative public office or the right to collect taxes’.¹⁶ Furthermore, it provides a mechanism for redirecting ‘internal dissent against an external enemy’.¹⁷

The decreasing isolation of the Palestinian village (as a result of such factors as the spread of cash-crops, the Jerusalem–Jaffa railroad and the centralisation of government) and the decline of the patronage system associated with share-cropping during the Mandate period, affected these alignments negatively. Qaisi–Yemeni affiliations lost their effectiveness as foci of clan identification when a new, more complex system of alliances was needed to meet the transformed relations between the peasantry and the urban sector on the one hand, and the Jewish social structure on the other. Nevertheless, they continued to surface throughout the Mandate period and villagers took account of them in public festivities lest the crowds amassed in one place should allow latent conflicts to explode along Qaisi–Yemeni lines. Granqvist, writing in 1933, provides a striking example of these fears from the village of Artas, in the Bethlehem district:

Although now, in the days of Zionism and the strong central government of our days in Palestine, the fights between Qais and Yemen do not occur – or only rarely – the memory of them continues in this custom ... When Muhammad Yusef in the

autumn of 1926 fetched his bride Sa'da Derwis from al-Khadr, this wedding was preceded by rumours that disturbances would take place and when the bride was brought out in her white dress there were mutterings and grumblings of Qais and Yemen among the crowd of people, although a policeman had been sent by the local authorities, they did not come to blows. 'It was the first time a policeman was present at a wedding in order to keep order in this part of the country', 'Aliya remarked.¹⁸

Weddings, it should be recalled, are the cementing bonds of clan alliances and, as such, act as occasions in which clan solidarity and expressions of rivalry are displayed. Even today, in marriage ceremonials and other public festivities, a token recognition of the family's past affiliation to one of the two factions is occasionally observed through the gowns worn by womenfolk; white for Yemen, and red for the Qaisi party. However, as rallying instruments for clan alliances and mobilisation, these factions had lost their influence by the third decade of this century.

Qaisi-Yemeni factionalism thus disappeared because it was no longer an appropriate channel of organised politics in the changed patronage and class relations in Palestinian society. Its limitations can be located in its relatively fixed character (label) and its emptiness of any ideological content. As a result, it is seldom that we encounter cases where a clan had changed its factional affiliation (a rare exception was the behaviour of the Jarrar clan in the nineteenth-century power conflicts in the Nablus district.)¹⁹ But such flexibility was certainly necessary for a clan striving to secure its interests in the network of shifting alliances between patrons and their dependants when the pattern of land tenure began to change in Palestine under the Mandate. Again, Qaisi-Yemeni factionalism did not present an alternative ideological affiliation for peasants in the struggle against their landlords or the central authority. In Spain, to provide a contrasting example, peasant factions, affiliated with either Carlists or Liberals, provided opposing positions on questions of land reform and state decentralisation.²⁰ In Palestine we observe occasional and isolated cases where peasant factionalism had a class content. The best example is perhaps the struggle between the Baraghteh clans and the *fellaheen* in the Beni Zeid areas, towards the end of the nineteenth century.²¹ But both these rival groups, and their important Qaisi-Yemeni affiliations, belonged to a different era. With Zionist land purchases increasingly encroaching on the stability of

Palestinian land tenures, a new framework of alliances was called for.

CONFESSIONALISM AND SECULAR NATIONALISM

Fictive alignments were not the only, or even the main, forms of 'vertical' factionalism in Palestine. One of the chief obstacles to the emergence of secular (and therefore *national*) politics during the British Mandate period was the residual institutions of the Ottoman *millet* (confessional) system. The structure of dependence in this system was such that each religious community in Palestine communicated its grievances to the regime (either via the local governor, or sometimes – in cases of religious oppression – to the High Porte in Istanbul) through its confessional head: the imam, the chief rabbi or the patriarch. Muslims, of course, being both the majority and members of *the* community of believers related to the central authority in this capacity and through their access to the various administrative organs of the regime. Nevertheless, the *millet* system reinforced the vertical segmentation of society and consolidated the power of the traditional leadership within its religious confines. Christians were perhaps less subject to these confines by virtue of being primarily urban communities and because of their early dependence, material and political, on foreign interests. Nevertheless, their cultural identity was defined within this framework.

Moreover, it is important to note that the erosion of the confessional system as a principle of social organisation pre-dated the economic changes introduced by British colonialism (the proliferation of wage labour and the further incorporation of Palestine into the world market) which are commonly thought to be decisive factors in the destruction of the *millet* principle.

In the years before 1914 a crucial factor in the development of a secular nationalism was a combination of reaction to the rise of Turkish nationalism (i.e. the defeat of the attempt to create a multinational Ottoman federation) and the inability of the communal (*millet*) system to continue operating as the basis of political organisation, given the changes in the structure of the urban population as a result of such factors as the increased importance of the trading community and changes in occupational patterns.

To assess the extent of the variety of fluidity in the forms of potential national consciousness that were possible in greater Syria

during this early period of Arab (and regional Palestinian) nationalism one must appreciate the political climate which prevailed then. According to Zeine:

All the Arab leaders wanted at first – the masses were still indifferent – was that the Arab provinces *within the Ottoman Empire* should have an independent Arab government. They believed that the best form of government for the multi-national, multi-racial Ottoman Empire was a decentralized government . . . As to *complete separation* from the Ottoman Empire, the idea was only in the minds of few extremists among the Muslims, before the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Its exponents and real supporters were primarily the Christians of Lebanon.²²

While pre-existing cultural differences between Turks and Arabs lent themselves to the development of an Arab anti-Turkish nationalism, such a nationalism could conceivably have accommodated itself within an Ottoman context (along federal lines, for instance). But the emergence both of Turkish nationalism and, in Palestine, of Zionism provided an extra external stimulus towards the emergence of a separate Arab national consciousness.

Gellner associates two social categories with the growth of a nationalist ideology: the proletariat and an intelligentsia.²³ The proletariat is seen as necessary as a class of people who are uprooted from local loyalties and who facilitate the process of ‘unmediated mass socialisation’. The nationalist intelligentsia is the necessary catalyst which decides the direction and content of the nationalist ideology. One can argue on the basis of recent experiences of nationalist movements in Asia and Africa that while alternatives to the proletariat in this process can be found (for example, the state), there is nothing which can take the place of the intelligentsia.

In post-Ottoman greater Syria, communal solidarity continued to be manipulated by the French and British along sectarian lines. Different provinces, however, exhibited different adaptations towards communalism. Lebanon and Palestine, for example, parted ways. While in the former confessionalism was institutionalised into the political system, in the latter (Palestine) Islam gradually lost its edge as a central component of the nationalist ideology. This may have been due to a tendency in British colonialism to draw less on sectarian politics in furthering their political objectives than the French. But, more likely, it is rooted in the different weights of the

denominational distribution in each province. While the Maronites constituted a majority in Mount Lebanon, Palestinian Christians were less than a fifth of the population.

In both cases the *millet* system, at its best, provided a protective and respected position for Christians as a minority in a culture in which they did not properly belong *as citizens*. For them, Arab separatism became the cultural-linguistic mould in which they expressed their striving for a new homogeneous (i.e. secular) order. Ever since the literary renaissance of the 1870s and 1880s Christian Arab intellectuals educated in the liberal missions of Beirut, Damascus and Nazareth gave the movement of Ottoman decentralisation a nationalist (pan-Arab) direction. By the 1930s nationalism and secularism (with the complex exception of Lebanon) had become inseparable.

In Palestine itself Christians constituted a very substantial number of the urban population throughout the Mandate period. In 1935, 78.8 per cent of Arab Christians lived in the urban areas, compared to 73 per cent of the Jews and 26.6 per cent of the Muslim population,²⁴ and, in all likelihood, they constituted a majority of the literate public. The Muslim-Christian Associations of the 1920s, among the first anti-Zionist groups in the country, were only the beginning of an irreversible trend towards secular politics. In this movement Palestine, together with Syria, was the pioneer among the Arab states. Here, one need mention only in passing the works of al-Yaziji and the Bustani brothers in adapting the Arabic language to modern usage; Shibli Shumayyil's introduction of materialist doctrines to popular audiences in the 1880s; Jouzi's rewriting of Islamic history from a critical perspective; Zaidan's liberal monthly journals (*al-Hilal*, etc.) and the daily newspaper *Filasteen*, established in 1909 by al-Issa brothers in Jaffa.

The point should not be overstated, however. Christian intellectuals had neither a monopoly of, nor sole access to, secular education, which was first introduced to Palestine by the Ottoman authorities (a case of belated 'reactive' modernisation), followed by the Protestant and Russian Orthodox missionary educational establishments. Again, despite the emergence of a secular intelligentsia, the essential atomisation of Palestinian society continued to be based on loyalties rooted in clan alliances and clan organisation, rather than in Christian-Muslim communal divisions or urban-rural dichotomies. It was that vertical segmentation of society, which the nationalist movement and its intelligentsia tried unsuccessfully to overcome, to which I will now turn my attention.

PATRONAGE, CLAN FACTIONALISM AND REGIONAL ALIGNMENTS

Neither during the Mandate nor during the late Ottoman period was Palestine quite a 'patronage society', in the sense suggested by Gellner, that is a system characterised by an 'incompletely centralized state, [with a] defective market or defective bureaucracy' and where a dominant syndrome or long-term unsymmetrical relations and inequality of power prevails.²⁵ Nevertheless, patronage relations, in the general sense of bonds of reciprocal dependence where one party exercises dominance over the other subordinate party, permeated relations of agricultural production (share-cropping, *taljia*, etc.) as well as access to seats of administrative authority and allocation of posts to public office.

One of the main features of the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman period was that it marked the transition from a tribute-exacting mode of production (based on *iltizam* tax-farming) to a more complex system of surplus appropriation in agriculture. This change was dictated by the pressure exercised by the European powers on the Ottoman state to repay its debts and interests on massive loans following the incorporation of the Ottoman social formation into the world capitalist economy. The Ottoman state sought to increase its revenues from land by a process of eliminating the *multazims* (tax-farmers) (although not always successfully) and thus creating a more direct access to the immediate producers. It also encouraged the formation of large landed estates in the hope of developing agricultural capitalism. Hence the significance of land registration.

An immediate result of the reforms in Palestine was the decline in rural autonomy.²⁶ This was a consequence of a series of administrative decrees (beginning with the Land Code of 1858) aimed at the regulation of landownership, which facilitated the dissolution of the communal (*mushaa*) ownership of village lands by the peasants and the rise of absentee landlordism.²⁷ But as the reforms also aimed at increasing agricultural productivity they produced other, more stabilising, results. Those included the establishment of security in the countryside, a substantial growth in the urban population, and the integration of the region in a network of transportation routes and a railroad system (see Schölch and Graham-Brown).

Rauf, a Palestinian writer, describes two responses of the peasant to the mounting pressures he was facing from increased taxation and indebtedness as the cash economy penetrated his world. One was to

surrender his share in the *mushaa* system to the landlord who relieved him from his debts and taxes. The other was the same act, but done collectively. This is a system of patronage *par excellence*, known as *taljia* ('refuge'):

A single peasant or a whole village crushed relentlessly under despotic taxes and debts placed themselves, together with their lands, under the protection of the town notable, who then interposed himself between his dependants and the tax collectors or creditors, and he looked after their taxes and court cases.²⁸

Both these processes were accelerated by the Tanzimat and contributed to the dissolution of the patriarchal mode of landownership and encouraged absentee landlordism and share-cropping. But the process of the disintegration of the *mushaa* system was prolonged and uneven and was not carried out fully except in the latter period of British rule.

What is also significant about the Ottoman reforms as far as factionalism is concerned was the administrative separation of the Jerusalem *sanjak* (which included, at that period, around three-quarters of the population of Palestine) from the northern *sanjaks* of Acre and Balqa' (which included the best agricultural lands).²⁹ Jerusalem, it should be remembered, differed from the main urban centres of Palestine in that it was detached from its rural hinterland. Its élite, in the main, were not absentee landlords, nor was there any organised form of interaction between the city and the surrounding rural population.³⁰

Two consequences of the administrative separation of Jerusalem on factional politics can be cited here. One was the relative independence of, and the privilege accorded to, the Jerusalemite notables by virtue of their direct relationship to the High Porte. Their independence was doubtless influenced by the interests accorded to the Holy City (with undisguised imperialist ambitions) by the European powers. Porath suggests, however, that this relative autonomy had a marked negative consequence on general political life in southern Palestine; namely, the weakness of local voluntary associations for the advancement of education and social welfare, in contrast to the northern districts and Damascus where such associations were vigorous. This weakness flowed from the strong dependence of Jerusalem on the central government.³¹ In class terms this can be explained by Jerusalem's 'parasitic' social structure: its

dependence on religious endowments, international charities, and weak organic links with the rural base. The city may have been the Mecca of Palestine, but it lacked a Quraishi ruling class.

The other consequence of administrative separatism was the intensification of factional rivalry between Jerusalem-based clans and Nablus-based clans. The roots of these conflicts go beyond the administrative reform. Northern notables traditionally complained about the way their fate was tied to 'the whims of the Jerusalem effendis' – as expressed by the Nablus historian Ihsan al-Nimr.³² This hostility persisted even after the unification of Palestine under the British Mandate. Several decades later, when al-Istiqlal, the only mass-based pan-Arabist party, began to mobilise Palestinian Arabs around an anti-Zionist and anti-Imperialist programme, it invariably encountered factional opposition from the Jerusalem clan-based parties of the Hussainis and Nashashibis. Those difficulties were due to no small degree to the fact that the leader of al-Istiqlal, Awni Abd al-Hadi, belonged to a family of big landowners in the Jenin (Nablus) area.³³

What was the social basis for clan power? It seems to have been associated with two related variables. One was the number of men that clan notables could mobilise on their side in factional struggles, a factor which was dependent, as far as peasants were concerned, on the amount of land under control by the clan head and the intricate system of patronage he concluded with his share-croppers and semi-autonomous peasants, including his ability to act as their creditor in an increasingly monetised economy. The second variable was the accessibility of the clan head and his relatives/aides to public office, hence his ability to extend services to his clients in return for their support in factional conflicts (including municipal elections which became a major focus of rivalry under British rule).

Power over the peasantry, expressed in this system of patronage, and the reinforcement of that power by the possessors of public office mutually reinforced each other. Influential village patriarchs who succeeded in consolidating large estates for themselves after the dissolution of the *mushaa* system would soon send a few of their capable sons or relatives to establish themselves in the regional centre, or, alternatively, they would acquire a public post themselves. It has been suggested that the power of those potentates can be measured in terms of the degree to which they transferred residence from their rural base to the district centre.³⁴

Landownership under semi-feudal conditions (characterised, for

example, by the leasing of land to share-croppers through a *wakil* – the landlord’s local agent) was not always necessary as a basis for factional power. There were cases in Palestine where a clan’s power was rooted almost exclusively in the holding of public administrative office, that is, on its ability to organise its members’ skills in the service of the state, with landownership and mercantile activities playing a marginal role. This seems to have been the case with the Nashashibi clan, which became the main contender for the leadership of the nationalist movement after the Hussainis, despite the small size of their landholdings.³⁵

The challenges posed by the Zionist movement and its success in creating modern and independent Jewish institutions, as well as the inability of the colonial government to accommodate Palestinian nationalist aspirations, all compelled the machinery of factional politics to perform a role to which it was thoroughly unsuited. While the Arab leadership was capable of the effective mobilisation of the masses against the British colonial presence, in pursuit of independence, to dislodge the Zionist colonies would have required a radically different strategy. Such a strategy would have projected the nationalist movement into a protracted struggle and into class alignments which, in all likelihood, would have eroded the system of patronage on which its leaders’ power was based. But who were the groups and social strata in Arab Palestine that were capable of transcending factionalism, and of giving the appropriate political leadership? The social structure of factional alliances seemed to permeate the whole fabric of urban and rural society:

The pyramidal family and clan network which built on relationships of support and protection from the village level through local potentates to leading families at the distant level, offered the means of rapid articulation of opinion and mobilization of all levels of society. The main political parties were based on this structure, the parties of the particularly influential Husayni and Nashashibi families having ties throughout the country. However, this structure made it difficult to unify the national movement. *Since each leading family had a political power base in client villages or town quarters, it felt itself the equal of the others and bargained vigorously before forming alliances.* Even then the alliances shifted rapidly, on the basis of personal and family differences rather than policy.³⁶ (emphasis added)

It would be a mistake, however, to think of Palestinian national politics during the Mandate as based entirely on factionalism. Both the Istiqlal party and the Communists had social bases (especially among urban professionals and sections of the working class) which were secular and devoid of patronage. But both were unsuccessful in challenging the factional leadership of Haj Amin al-Hussaini and the Arab Higher Committee, and remained only marginal movements.

On the other hand, factional alliances in Palestine were remarkable in that, following the intensification of Jewish settlement, they transcended both regional divisions (especially the endemic rivalries referred to above between the Jerusalem and Nablus clans), and religious-ethnic divisions. I have suggested, furthermore, that the urban-rural dichotomy has little explanatory value in Palestinian factional politics since faction leaders were mainly urban-based 'representatives' of hierarchical system of rural 'clients' and kinsmen reaching all the way to the small peasant debtor and landless labourer.

Paradoxically, the extended role of the colonial state apparatus after the First World War strengthened the role of the 'leading families' of Palestine since alternative institutional mechanisms of 'intermediate' power were absent. They became the mediators between the state and the rural masses and urban poor as well as the representatives (or rather, the *clemencers*) of the latter towards the central authorities.³⁷ Both the limitations and strengths of the factional system were demonstrated in the response of the traditional leadership to the 1936 revolt.

The spontaneous peasant uprisings which marked the initial period of the revolt compelled the two main nationalist parties – the Arab Palestinian Party representing the Hussaini faction, and the National Defence Party representing the Nashashibis – to merge in the framework of the Arab Higher Committee. Both clans represented the same class (if the term can be used here), and both stood to lose their privileges if independent peasant politics were to prevail, even temporarily. However, the Hussaini's stronger links to the land, Haj Amin's role as the *mufti* of Jerusalem, and the Defence Party's past record of collaboration with the British authorities, all ensured that the Nashashibis would play a secondary role in the Committee. In that merger we observe the appearance of factional politics defactionalised. What happened, however, was simply the temporary suspension of factional politics at the level of national leadership, with the institutional linkages to the hierarchical pattern of vertical alliances remaining intact.

CLASS FORMATION AND FACTIONALISM

The foregoing analysis implicitly raises several questions about the difficulties (and perhaps inadequacy) of applying class analysis to precapitalist social formations. We have set ourselves the task of demonstrating how factional alignments 'deflect' class solidarity. But the notion of 'deflection' here is itself problematic, because it presumes the presence in objective terms of actual class formations, and of class interests (not to speak of consciousnesses) corresponding to those formations, against which factionalism could operate. 'Deflection' also raises problems of conceptualisation at a different level. Like the notions of 'vertical' and 'horizontal' stratification, it is a term borrowed from the natural sciences (in this case from optics) and suffers from the strain of having to explain a complex reality with an oversimplified allegorical instrument.

Specifically, we are face to face with the problem of demonstrating how a combination of sectional alignments, based on fictive, confessional and clan-patronage relations, channelled the political consciousness of Palestinians into forms of identification which obstructed their class consciousness. These 'diversions' took various forms as we have already suggested: whole villages siding with one clan leader against another set of villages (as in the civil wars in Jabal Nablus, 1841-58), members of a socially differentiated urban clan acting in solidarity against members of another clan (Tuqan v. Nimr, Hussainis v. Nashashibis - especially during the revolt of 1936) and village potentates recruiting poorer peasants to act as cannon fodder in factional politics. But it is not sufficient just to say that factionalism diverted the masses from potential forms of class solidarities; that would be a teleological escape. Rather we must show, with historical examples, that it could have been otherwise, that is, that class politics belonged to the realm of the 'thinkable' and 'do-able' - to borrow an idea from M. Godelier. For the term 'deflection' to have any substantive meaning in this context it is necessary to show that alternative bonds of class solidarity - among poor peasants, middle farmers, professionals and urban wage-earners - were a feasible proposition sufficient to ensure their livelihood in case they broke away from their factional loyalties.

I will tackle this problem on two levels. First I will refer to concrete examples - some of them already introduced - which indicate the challenge to factional politics provided by groups mobilised along non-factional and, in some cases, class, lines. Second, I will suggest

the limitations imposed on class politics in a situation where the structural conditions for the growth of a hegemonic class, and, in particular, a bourgeois class, were not obtainable.

Class politics in pre-1948 Palestine manifested itself mainly in several small groups, and in trade union federations, but, on occasion, it also appeared within the framework of the factional parties themselves. The Hussaini–Nashashibi factions, in particular, could not have rested exclusively on relations of patronage since, at crucial periods, they had to mobilise masses of urban inhabitants with whom they had no direct or indirect relations of reciprocity. In practice, therefore, the thousands of Palestinians who followed the lead of the Defence Party (DP) (Nashashibi) or the Arab Palestinian Party (APP) (Hussaini) included many who can by no means be considered clients of either clan-based factions. They were attracted, for instance, by the determined stance taken by the APP against the Jewish national home and the mandatory authority. In the case of the DP, they may have been influenced by the ‘moderation’ of the Nashashibis and their strategy of alliance with the colonial authorities against the Zionist movement. Each position, of course, implied a different perspective of class alignment for those of their supporters who were not involved in patronage relationship. These class ‘intrusions’ into factionalism became more disruptive as clashes with the colonial authorities and the Zionist movement became more intense (1936, 1938, 1945–8), thus challenging the capacity of the hegemonic stratum of landlords to maintain its political leadership.

In its turn, the factional leadership had to make concessions to followers who were not tied to it by patronage relationship, as well as to conclude alliances with other parties in the context of a united front (for example, the formation of the Arab Higher Committee). Thus class politics and factional politics had periodic fusions, especially in periods of crisis, although these always ended with the dominance of clan sectional interests over class solidarities. Moreover, these ‘fusions’ were always characterised by strains on the political system as a whole. That strain reached its height in the 1936–8 period when landless peasants entered the nationalist movement *en masse* and compelled the factional leadership to take increasingly militant positions, which threatened its organisational foundation. It was at this point that the hegemonic class of landlords and urban notables chose to intervene directly and diffuse the revolt. In the case of the Nashashibi’s Defence Party, they went to extremes and organised ‘Peace Units’ to crush the rebels.³⁸ For the factional

leadership, this confrontation was a costly process: disgruntled elements in the nationalist movement began to desert them and to establish their own political base outside the factional system. I will refer to three such groups here, each reflecting a different class (or potential class) position.

Case One is the Qassamites. This was a movement of peasant warriors who fought against the British in 1935 under the leadership of a minor religious shaikh, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, and then as an amorphous contingent within the revolt of 1936–8. Evidence shows that they were recruited by al-Qassam from among the landless peasants in the Jenin area and from the destitute labourers of the shanties on the outskirts of Haifa.³⁹ The class character of the Qassamites put them clearly beyond the reach of the factional system. More importantly, al-Qassam himself came into open conflict with the leadership of the Arab Committee on several occasions.⁴⁰ Altogether, al-Qassam had no more than 200 armed followers in his lifetime,⁴¹ but the exemplary conduct of the Qassamites after their leader's death at the hands of the British exposed the vacillations of the factional leaders and temporarily took the initiative from their hands.

Case Two is the Palestine Communist Party and the League for National Liberation. Together they constituted the Arab and Jewish sections of Palestinian Communism. Here it was the national conflict rather than factionalism which prevented them from making inroads into the Arab working class. Palestinian Communists, however, succeeded in forging an alliance with the left wing of the nationalist movement under the leadership of Hamdi al-Hussaini, of the Istiqlal party.⁴² When the Arab Higher Committee collapsed after the defeat of the revolt in 1939, the PCP became the only organised party in the Arab community, until 1946 when factional politics re-emerged.⁴³

As a general rule, it may be said that when the Communists of Palestine organised along class lines (which in practice meant along bi-national lines, such as in the 1920s and 1940s) they were marginalised by the nationalist movement. When, on the other hand, they became an active contingent within the nationalist movement (1935, and 1936 when the party joined the co-ordinating military committee of the revolt) they were submerged by the factional leadership. Nevertheless, the Palestinian working class succeeded in retaining a certain degree of autonomy from factional politics. The two main Palestinian trade unions – the Palestine Arab Workers' Society (under social-democratic leadership) and the Federation of

Arab Trade Unions (under Communist leadership) – remained free from the control of the Hussaini and Nashashibi parties. In 1948 it is generally acknowledged that Sami Taha, general secretary of PAWS, was assassinated on orders of Haj Amin al-Hussaini because of his active opposition to the Mufti's leadership.

Case Three is the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. Led by Awni Abd al-Hadi, a member of one of the largest landowning families in Palestine, al-Istiqlal was founded in 1932 and became the most militant of the nationalist parties. The social composition of al-Istiqlal's membership reflected a high concentration of intellectuals and members of the nascent bourgeois class. Tuma describes it as 'the nearest party [in Palestine] which expressed the ambitions of the Arab nationalist movement led by the bourgeoisie, and reflecting, to some extent, mass sentiments'.⁴⁴ The significance of the Istiqlal lies, however, in its conscious attempts to create an alternative political movement to the factional leadership of Jerusalem. In order to do this it was willing to co-operate even with the Communists (see above, p. 192), but the party's real assets were the important contacts which its leader, Awni Abd al-Hadi, had established with King Faisal of Iraq and the Saudi ruling dynasty and his ability to use these contacts as a leverage in the Arab Higher Committee.⁴⁵

Naji Allush, who refers to al-Istiqlal as a party composed of semi-bourgeois, semi-feudal elements concludes that it was the vacillations of the party away from its class basis (presumably the bourgeoisie) in the direction of links with the mass movement which brought about its downfall. 'By raising slogans such as "The English are the roots of the disease", "resistance until victory", and calling for total boycott and abstaining from payment of direct taxes, at a time when the national leadership was following the path of compromise and concessions, [al-Istiqlal] was bound to expose and embarrass the traditional leadership. It is not surprising therefore that the "bosses and notables" took a hostile attitude towards the party'.⁴⁶ But Allush also describes how, later, the leaders of al-Istiqlal, 'due to their class instincts, returned to the bosom of the traditional leadership, while the peasants and workers took up arms to resist British colonialism, under the leadership of organizations founded independently'.⁴⁷

But al-Istiqlal was not the party of the Palestinian bourgeoisie for the simple reason that the bourgeoisie had no party during this period. This point must now be clear from the tortured attempts of Allush, Tuma and many other writers to characterise its class content, either in terms of membership or of political programmes – which did

not differ in substance from the programmes of the factional parties.⁴⁸

The amorphous character of the Palestinian bourgeoisie brings us to the second problem of class formation mentioned above (p. 194); that is, the limitations imposed on class politics in a situation where the structural conditions for the growth of a hegemonic class did not obtain.

Can we speak of a Palestinian bourgeoisie as having existed prior to 1948? We have referred earlier to a 'hegemonic class of landlords and urban notables'. This intentionally ambiguous formulation – which will have to remain ambiguous until more rigorous research is undertaken on the subject – rests on the observation that only the landlords and associated urban functionaries behaved politically as a class. They were 'hegemonic' because they had a certain degree of access (through municipalities, judgeships, etc.) but no control over the colonial state apparatus, and because, as landlords and patrons, they appropriated the largest portion of the agricultural surplus. The factional political system was, to them, the most appropriate system for the preservation of their privileges and the reproduction of the social order in which they prevailed. It is true that within that order, class conflict, social conflict and potential class conflict persisted: between landlords and share-croppers, between landlords and peasant proprietors (through unfavourable market relations) and between urban capitalists and wage labourers, between the colonial state and the dispossessed peasants and urban casual workers, between the village patriarchs and their poorer kin, and finally, perhaps the most insoluble of all, between the Jewish *Yishuv* and the Arab community as a whole. But all these contradictions were diffused, 'deflected', and even fostered within the context of the factional system. The strain they produced, while occasionally disrupting the functioning of the system, never succeeded in breaking it.

But what about the bourgeoisie? To determine the existence of a capitalist class in Palestine a brief sketch of its terrain is necessary. While the old regional divisions in Palestine, based on administrative zones under Ottoman and British rule, began to lose their original significance, new divisions began to emerge reflecting the integration of the region's economy into the European capitalist market. Colonial penetration also contributed to the development of a modern infrastructure, to a large extent for reasons of military strategy. By the First World War, Palestine had the greatest ratio of railroad tracks per capita in the Middle East, although the economic

impact of modern transportation was not as dramatic as in Egypt.⁴⁹ The building of the Jaffa–Haifa railroad line (later Jerusalem–Haifa, and linked to the Hijaz railway), the growth of citriculture with a European market, and the proliferation of wage labour related to the British war efforts and the employment of Palestinians in the government bureaucracy – all led to the decline of the subsistence character of agriculture and the semi-feudal relations hinged on it.

Many absentee landlords who resided in the main cities, and a few state functionaries whose wealth did not rest on land, began to reinvest their agricultural surplus in export/import trade and in light industries. A Royal Commission Report prepared during the 1936 Revolt challenges the predominant picture of a vigorous modern Jewish industrial economy dwarfing an Arab sector based presumably on craft production. ‘Arab industry’, the report states, ‘is also diversified [as Jewish industry] and consists of some large undertakings and numerous small ones which, in the aggregate, form an appreciable contribution to the industry of Palestine.’⁵⁰ The main urban industries in the Arab sector included soap manufacturing, flour mills, textiles and construction material.⁵¹ Agrarian capitalism also flourished during the Mandate and was based on citrus plantations in Jaffa, Gaza and the Ramle–Lydda regions. Olive oil extraction was the main form of manufacture in the rural sector in which wealthy peasants and landlords invested their capital, although it tended to remain primitive in its technology.

For all these reasons, a new class of merchants and manufacturers was growing in the coastal cities of Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre, all constituting the Mediterranean outlets of Palestine to Europe. This growth of a coastal bourgeoisie was accompanied by important demographic changes: the population of the towns in general, and the coastal cities in particular, increased substantially. The city of Jaffa had the fastest rate of growth, quadrupling in size between 1880 and 1922 alone to become the economic and cultural nerve-centre of Arab Palestine.⁵² The 1930s also saw the beginning of large-scale rural–urban migration, which reflected the increase both in the employment potential of the cities and in the amount of surplus agricultural labour.⁵³

A new regional dichotomy was emerging between the main coastal cities – centres of trade, newspapers and literary magazines, and of urban Jewish migration – and the inner mountain cities (Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron) – seats of conservatism and the traditional leadership. But this was not a dichotomy between the abode of the

bourgeoisie and the abode of the landed classes. Unlike the landed élites, the Palestinian bourgeoisie did not behave as an integrated class during this period. The reasons for that, I propose, lie in the composition of the mercantile and manufacturing bourgeoisie in Palestine. As in the neighbouring Arab countries, the Palestinian bourgeoisie was a stratum organically linked to the landed classes. Those entrepreneurs who were not themselves landlords either had patronage relationships with them, or were related to them by marriage. Furthermore, most landlords found it convenient to invest their agricultural surplus either in real-estate transactions, construction, or in 'buying' posts for their sons (for example, through marriage bonds); in all cases, non-productive activities.

I am not suggesting a closed circle here. The fact that capitalists and merchants belonged to the same families, and were often the same people, as the landed élite does not necessarily negate the possibility that there were indeed two, functionally separate, classes: entrepreneurs and landlords. After all, capitalists have to come from somewhere, and in Palestine, as elsewhere in the Middle East, there was a process of differentiation taking place within the landed classes. But this process did not generate the growth of a bourgeoisie proper. Because the Palestinian hegemonic class, the class of landlords and urban notables, did not have control over the colonial state apparatus, and because of the heavy competition from the autonomous Jewish sector (which, except for the period of the boycott, had unhindered access to the Arab consumer market) the external condition for the growth of the Arab bourgeoisie did not exist.

Nor did it have its own internal dynamic. A very small portion of the agricultural surplus was invested in manufacturing enterprises. Those 'landed businessmen' who did invest in manufacture (such as the al-Masri family of the Nablus soap industries) were few in number and could not generate enough employment for the masses of dispossessed peasants, peasant-workers, and urban labourers who were looking for jobs. Such entrepreneurs were too closely linked to the landed élite to develop their own distinct consciousness and separate ideology. Most of them belonged to, and even helped to build, the very factional parties which presumably blocked their own 'potential class interests'; and on such grounds they never transcended factionalism.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. H. Alavi, 'Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, i, 1 (1973) p.44.
2. *Ibid.*, p.44.
3. M. Begin, Speech to the Knesset presenting the Likud Government and its policy, 1977.
4. K. Nakhleh, 'Anthropological and Sociological Studies of the Arabs in Israel: A. Critique', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vi, 4 (1977), p.65.
5. D. Peretz, 'Palestinian Social Stratification: The Political Implications', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vii, 1 (1977) p.55.
6. *Ibid.*, p.55.
7. For example, E. Grant, *The People of Palestine* (London, 1921); C.R. Lees, *The People of Palestine* (London, 1905); C.T. Wilson, *Peasant Life in the Holy Land* (London, 1906).
8. E. Haddad, 'Political Parties in Syria and Palestine', *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*, i, 1 (1920) p.212.
9. M. Hoexter, 'The Role of the Qays and Yemen Factions in Local Political Divisions: Jabal Nablus Compared with the Judean Hills in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', *African and Asian Affairs*, ix, 3 (1973) p.269.
10. Haddad, 'Political Parties', p.213.
11. A.M. Lesch, 'The Palestine Arab National Movement under the Mandate' in W.B. Quandt, F. Jabber and A.M. Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York, 1973) p.278.
12. Hoexter, 'Qais and Yemen', *passim*.
13. *Ibid.*, pp.300-3, 310-11.
14. *Ibid.*, p.301.
15. *Ibid.*, p.304.
16. R. Owen, 'The Economic History of 19th-century Palestine: Some Points and Some Problems', mimeo, p.2.
17. *Ibid.*, p.2.
18. H. Granquist, *Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village*, vol. II (Helsingfors, 1935) p.88.
19. M. Abir, 'Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine, 1800-1834' in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975) pp.288-9.
20. I. Terriades, 'The Making of a Catalan Home Industry', Ph.D. (Manchester, 1978), *passim*.
21. Information from Dr Abd al-Latif Barghuti. The conflict between the Barghuti clans and the fellaheen factions took on a violent character in the 1935 Revolt with the Barghutis (descendants of the big tax-farming clan in the Banu Zeid region) siding with the Nashashibi party and most of the *fellaheen* clans joining the rebels. Dr Barghuti informs me that after the rebellion was crushed in 1938, numerous acts of revenge were exacted from the peasants who supported the revolt, he himself having witnessed several cases. This was true in the villages of Deir Ghassana, Beit Rima and Kafr 'Ein. It should be added that all the Barghuti families of the Banu Zaid district were Qaisi while most of the *fellaheen*

- were Yemeni.
22. Z.Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut, 1958) p.124. Emphasis in original.
 23. E.Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London, 1970) p.170.
 24. Hopkins, 'Population' in S.B.Himadeh (ed.), *The Economic Organisation of Palestine* (Beirut, 1938) p.13.
 25. In E.Gellner and J.Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients* (London, 1977) pp.4-5.
 26. For this subject in general see, P.Stirling, 'Structural Changes in Middle Eastern Society', in A.Lutfiyya and Churchill (eds.), *Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures* (The Hague, 1970) p.156.
 27. J.Ruedy, 'Dynamics of Land Alienation' in I.Abu-Lughod (ed.), *The Transformation of Palestine* (Evanston, 1971) pp.123-4.
 28. F.Rauf, 'Introduction à une étude de la revolution palestinienne', mimeo (Paris, 1973).
 29. A.M.Lesch, 'The Origins of Palestinian Arab Nationalism', in W.Haddad and W.Oschsenwald (eds.), *Nationalism in a non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire* (Ohio, 1977) p.280.
 30. Abir, 'Local Leadership', p.291.
 31. Porath, 'Political Organisation', pp.3-4.
 32. I.al-Nimr, *Ta'rikh Nabulus w-al-Balqa'*, III (Nablus, 1973) p.17.
 33. In his history of the Palestinian national movement, E.Tuma attributes the downfall of the Istiqlal party to other causes, *Judhur al-qadiya al-filastiniya* (Haifa, n.d.) p.199.
 34. Y.Shim'oni, *The Arabs of Palestine*, trans. (New Haven, 1956) p.331.
 35. Loc.cit. Tuma, however, describes the Nashashibis as 'one of the two great feudal families in the country', *Judhur*, p.203. Compare also, Gh.Kanafani, *Thaura 1936-39 fi Filastin* (Beirut, 1972) pp.75-6.
 36. Lesch, 'Palestinian Arab National Movement', p.17.
 37. E.Z.Sabella, 'The Leading Palestinian Hamayil (Families) and Socio-Economic and Political Organization in Palestine, 1971-1948', mimeo, Bethlehem University 1971, p.38.
 38. Kanafani, *Thaura*, p.105.
 39. N.Allush, *Al-muqawama al-arabiya fi Filastin, 1918-1948* (Beirut, 1967) p.103.
 40. Ibid., Tuma, *Judhur*, p.103.
 41. Allush, *Al-muqawama al-arabiya*, p.103.
 42. Ibid., p.84; J.Beinen, 'The Palestine Communist Party, 1919-1949', MERIP, (Washington) 55 (1977) p.9.
 43. Ibid., p.13.
 44. Tuma, *Judhur*, p.197.
 45. Lesch, 'Palestine Arab National Movement', p.23.
 46. Allush, *Al-muqawama al-arabiya*, p.46.
 47. Ibid., p.86.
 48. Compare the texts in *ibid.*, pp.191-6.
 49. G.Baer, 'The Impact of Economic Change on Traditional Society in Nineteenth-Century Palestine' in Ma'oz, *Studies* p.497.
 50. S.B.Himadeh, 'Industry' in Himadeh, *Economic Organisation* p.245.
 51. Ibid., *passim*.

52. Y. Ben-Arieh, 'The Population of the Large Towns of Palestine during the first Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century according to Western Sources' in Ma'oz, *Studies*, p.68.
53. For figures, see Hopkins, 'Population', pp.12-15.

4 The Palestinians of Jordan's Border

AVI PLASCOV

With the outcome of the 1948 war between the Arab states and Israel, what had once been a unified area under the British Mandate was divided by a new border. The actual location of this border, which was modified slightly by the 1949 Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement,¹ became a crucial factor in the lives of those who lived along it in that part of Palestine annexed by Jordan – known as the West Bank of the enlarged Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The changes that were made to the 1949 Demarcation Line pushing it east towards the hilly regions, were carried out solely because of Israeli security considerations. Thus Israel gained Arab territory it did not formerly hold, but which it considered strategically important for its defence. This development resulted from the fact that the Jordanian regime aspired to control most of the area designated as Arab Palestine by the unimplemented 1947 UN Partition Plan and, to that end, was willing to sacrifice some of its territorial gains in order to secure Israel's acquiescence. Consequently, the land lying west of the Demarcation Line passed into Israel's control. The resulting dislocation and deprivation was tremendous: Arab villages were cut in two, families were split and the landholders compelled to surrender a large part of their fertile soil which was now on the Israeli side. The villagers along the new border were thus left with stonier, more arid lands.

These frontier villages were ancient settlements situated on the top of rocky hills which, in earlier days, had acted both as a natural protection for the village and its source of water as a means of utilising all cultivable land. Some villages, especially in the southern area of eastern Palestine, built extensions to the west called *khirbas*.

These consisted of poor shacks which later developed as seasonal dwellings. They were often situated near water sources and inhabited by shepherds and peasants who left their mountain village homes to plough and sow the land or to live there during the harvest season. Some parts of these *khirbas* were gradually turned into permanent homes in the form of 'daughter villages'. This process took place mainly at the end of the nineteenth century when law and order was maintained on a more regular basis and there was less to fear from living in isolation. A later, more powerful incentive for living in the *khirbas*, was that they were often closer to both British sources of employment and especially the rapidly expanding Jewish enterprises established in the coastal plain. The waves of Jewish immigration which saturated the plains of Palestine brought with them also skilled labour necessary for the process of industrialisation and modernisation which followed, with western Palestine proving a magnet to Arabs from neighbouring regions.

Under the British Mandate most of the Arab villages in eastern Palestine were economically backward and could not satisfy the needs of their growing populations. This was especially so in the southern region where, although the villagers owned large plots of land, much of it consisted either of rocky or sandy soil, which limited cultivation and encouraged migration westward towards the plains. Such migration was especially prevalent among the landless villagers, driven to search for employment. The latter joined the proletariat in the coastal towns, supplying the bulk of the cheap manpower. Consequently, local citrus groves grew in size, roads were paved, trade between the villages and towns developed and, on the whole, the interaction between the eastern Arab villages and western British and Jewish-dominated economy intensified.

But these developments were brought to an end by the 1948 war which shattered the economy of those Arab villages now situated along the newly established border. They were at once cut off from most of their agricultural lands to the west and from all the benefits which derived from having links with the economy of the plain area. As a rule this new situation resulted in poverty and economic stagnation, which in turn provoked migration among the young and the skilled workers – now eastward – although this picture differed in detail from town to town and village to village. Such were the fundamental and, until 1967, the virtually insoluble problems of the frontier villages.

Altogether along the Demarcation Line there were some 111

towns, villages and hamlets.² In the Jenin area, 18 out of the 55 villages fell into this category; in Tulkarm, 22 out of 42 villages; in Nablus, 8 out of 35; in Ramallah, 18 out of 77; in Jerusalem, 19 out of 29; in Bethlehem, 9 out of 15; and in Hebron, 12 out of 23. Estimates varied as to the size of the total population in the frontier area. According to a Chatham House survey of 1953, there were 119 150 villagers (excluding refugees). But in the light of unpublished reports by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for the Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) these figures seem to be somewhat high.

Estimates of the total amount of land lost by the new border villages were made throughout the 1950s by the Jordanian government and international agencies. One Jordanian minister claimed that of the 800 000 dunum owned by these villages prior to the 1948 war, only 471 000 dunum of cultivable land and plantations were left on the Jordanian side, amounting to an average of some 25 dunum per family of five, as opposed to the 95 dunum considered to be necessary for sustaining such a family.³ Naturally, some villages lost a relatively larger proportion of their cultivable land than others, producing different effects in different places.⁴ In addition, some of the land belonging to a number of villages in the Jerusalem area came to be categorised as 'No Man's Land' by the Armistice Agreement. Even though such lands were not under Israeli control the villagers were not permitted to cultivate them. Owing to this arrangement, the residents of Sur Bahir (south of Jerusalem), who had left their village in 1948 to seek shelter nearby, returned later to find that they had lost more than 75 per cent of their cultivable lands. Against this, a number of Arab villages on the Israeli side had to surrender that part of their land which remained behind the Jordanian line⁵ This land, and former Jewish-owned land,⁶ also on the Jordanian side, was in many cases taken over by border villagers. But such minor adjustments could not alter the acuteness of the situation.

For these reasons, the circumstances prevailing along the border caused great concern and discontent among many of its inhabitants. Immediately after the 1948 war many protests were made by its community leaders and representatives who disapproved of the new political arrangements made by King Abdullah. They criticised 'their' new government vehemently for the hasty manner in which the Demarcation Line had been established.⁷ Subsequently, those whose vast lands were trapped behind the newly established border in the Tulkarm and Jenin areas set up a committee with the aim of challenging the King's decision. Other committees were formed in

Jerusalem and Nablus, but there was no coordination between them as they represented different interests. In the event, they could do nothing more effective than to send carefully phrased petitions to the UN and the press, for they had to take into account the policy of the new regime and its sensitivity to any open anti-government criticism.

JORDANIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS

As a rule, the Jordanian regime was able to withstand internal threats by tempering harshness with flexibility when protecting what it considered its vital interests. Moreover, the Palestinian opposition was fragmented and disorganised, with the factions often competing among themselves, something which seriously blunted their force and effectiveness. However, the regime did not succeed in solving the problem of its own legitimacy in the eyes of its adopted subjects, even if it managed to obtain some measure of acceptance and respectability. The monarchs did enjoy the support of many Palestinians, who were of inestimable value in coping with the opposition of their fellows. Such men were given posts of varying importance, and they became part of a tightly-knit network composed of those loyal to the regime, all enjoying security, salaries and other perquisites. Nevertheless, a polarisation within the population developed, with many Palestinians seeing themselves as the underdog and claiming to be discriminated against as a group. Even the fact that large numbers of Palestinians were easily absorbed into the constantly expanding administration – by virtue of their high qualifications – did not alleviate this feeling as they soon realised the purpose they served. Moreover, constituting a majority within the kingdom with enormous potential, they felt that they deserved far more than merely a secondary role, while the decisive higher levels of administration remained the prerogative of the Trans-Jordanians of the East Bank. Conversely, many East Bankers felt that they were deprived of their status and rights as masters of their country by ‘upstart’ Palestinians. The basic social differences were thus difficult to bridge. While economic and political competition, stemming from conflicting interests, characterised the process of coexistence, some mutual adaptation took place through the modernisation of the backward kingdom. The Trans-Jordanians probably benefited most from this process. The Palestinians remained inferior partners who also felt dissatisfied with the lack of any industrial schemes for the West Bank. This, they

claimed, was due not to negligence but to the determination of the regime to 'balance' the small, dense and relatively progressive West Bank with the vast, poor, backward and sparsely populated East Bank. Whilst the Palestinians believed that their skills acquired during the British Mandate should be used to develop the West Bank,⁸ the government wished to direct its efforts toward the economic improvement of the area where, it was claimed, the main potential lay, namely the East Bank with its phosphate deposits and other natural resources.

In the long run, and from a purely economic viewpoint, much Palestinian criticism of the economic considerations which shaped government policy seems somewhat unjustified. Yet it goes without saying that the logic behind this policy was far from being exclusively economic.⁹ And many West Bankers considered their charges warranted when, in later years, the potash contained in the Dead Sea remained unused, and when the King refused to allow even the establishment of a West Bank university. In many interviews, businessmen said that they were pressured to invest in the East Bank, a practice in which they acquiesced the more readily as the West Bank became increasingly insecure because of the border tension with Israel. Moreover, any large industry on the West Bank would have demanded large quantities of water which were simply unavailable. West Bank politicians understood this, but wanted the development of some light industry at least, even though this could not have provided much employment. Thus, the protest is best seen as an expression of helplessness and anger against a regime which restricted industrial development as well as the provision of extra urban services through town councils as a result of its failure to supplement their budgets in the same proportion as those on the East Bank.¹⁰ Yet any *ad hoc* West Bank organisation set up to express this sense of bitterness was bound to fail as the Palestinians themselves had conflicting views of their own priorities, with each town seeing itself as most entitled to be the site for any development scheme. An equally serious handicap was governmental intolerance of any attempt to set up an organisation which would embrace the whole West Bank.

In the meantime, the economic development of the East Bank was carried out mainly by Palestinians who agreed eagerly to put their knowledge, skill and talents at the disposal of the regime. In this way, the formerly backward capital of Amman grew into a flourishing city, thus shifting the centre of economic gravity away from the West

Bank.¹¹ In addition, the movement of many refugees to the East Bank was used by the government to press UNRWA into committing more resources for that part of Jordan. The constant eastward migration was thus an expression of an official policy seeking one-sided development under the guise of integration. Nevertheless, it was economically beneficial to most Jordanians, whether Palestinians or former Trans-Jordanians.

With the scarcity of arable land – most of it concentrated in the hands of a small number of inhabitants – and with a population surplus of largely destitute people, many of the young, capable and skilled West Bank Palestinians emigrated abroad.¹² This had its economic advantages inasmuch as it benefited those local families who received large sums in monthly remittances from their sons now working in the Arab oil producing states in the Gulf. Such payments helped to raise the Palestinian standard of living and, indeed, became an important input into the economy of the country as a whole. The regime was also to gain politically from emigration. The weakening of the West Bank's economic potential affected the political sphere, somewhat strengthening the influence of the conservative tendencies among the older people who remained behind. Thus, radical opposition groups could not rely on their elders, who were generally loyal to the monarchs. For these reasons the regime entertained mixed support from Palestinians in the two parts of the Kingdom, in spite of its policy of strengthening and developing the East at the expense of the West. Whereas it afforded rights to Palestinians as individuals, it refused to consider extending them collective rights as a group, and, indeed, did its utmost to thwart any separatist notions. Hence the regime's policy towards the frontier villagers and the refugees must be understood in the context of its overall attitude to the West Bank and to the Palestinians in general. In this regard, an examination of its attitude towards Jerusalem is particularly instructive because of the city's tremendous religious and symbolic importance, and also because the city, as the obvious rival to Amman, embodied in itself the whole conflict between the regime and the Palestinians. The city thus served as a microcosm of the many problems afflicting the West Bank and the frontiers in particular.

Jerusalem was the only large city situated on the border with Israel. Until 1948 it had been an important trading centre. But its natural development was abruptly halted by the tensions which developed between Arabs and Jews. Its commercial lifelines had been severed when the roads to Jaffa and Haifa became too dangerous and many of

its Arab residents had fled the strife-torn city which, following the 1948 war, was divided by the new border. Only in 1950 did these inhabitants begin to return in significant numbers. Under Hashemite rule, which aimed at establishing Amman as its capital, Jerusalem lost its economic supremacy in the West Bank to Nablus. Nevertheless, it continued to provide some key public services and to serve as an administrative, legal, and religious centre. But it was the extent and status of these functions that became a political issue, both internally and internationally. In this respect the Hashemite attitude toward the city was a reflection of its overall Palestinian policy.

The thrust of the regime's policy can be seen clearly in the gradual transfer of key administrative offices from Jerusalem to Amman. The significance of these moves was highlighted by the Mayor of Jerusalem in his correspondence with the Minister of the Interior, in which he reminded the Minister that 'Jerusalem is the first town in the West Bank and the centre of all religious sects, the next in importance to Amman'.¹³ Palestinian appeals 'to turn the city into the Kingdom's second capital' were expressed a number of times up to the mid-1950s. However, such calls excited little attention among the bulk of the Palestinians and the regime refused to grant the city such a status.

The term *in 'ash*, which in essence meant the revival and restoration of Jerusalem, was prominent in all these demands. Jerusalemites nevertheless wanted the government to regard the city as a front line settlement and to do its utmost to strengthen it. Instead, they faced a consistent policy aimed at exactly the opposite. Vehement protests were made by West Bankers in general, and Jerusalemites in particular, against the actions of the Jordanian government seeking to weaken the city's administrative and economic position. The transfer of all important offices to Amman was a source of grievance to the West Bank's population which constantly protested against the government's refusal to allow even UNRWA's Jordanian headquarters to be situated in Jerusalem, the centre of the West Bank – where 75 per cent of the refugees were living. The Palestinians believed that the UN activities would offer vast employment opportunities for refugees and non-refugees alike. Its presence could also have helped to develop Jerusalem and the West Bank and to retard both migration to the East Bank and emigration abroad. The government's refusal to be moved on this question is further evidence of its attempt to undermine the status of Jerusalem and this led to a spate of protests.¹⁴ The government's purpose in all this was two-fold: first,

it wanted tight control of all UNRWA affairs,¹⁵ and, second, it sought to develop the centre of the Kingdom. In economic terms, UNRWA's offices in Amman meant a substantial contribution to a country intent on improving its poorer areas. As a result of this policy and of the absence of a prominent and united local leadership, Jerusalem lost its seniority. In order to weaken the city's position further, the authorities even considered moving part of the Muslim law courts to Amman, once again over the futile protests of the City Council.¹⁶ Such treatment was a great insult to the Palestinians and served as further proof of their lowly status. Even so, protests against the regime's discriminatory policy, as expressed by West Bankers throughout the 1950s, never went so far as to call for the separation of the West Bank but only for a change in government policy.

In spite of the severe handicap of being downgraded politically and administratively, Jerusalem's commercial position improved with the passage of time. This was mainly due to the tourist industry, which began to flourish during the 1960s. Trade, commerce and small businesses all benefited from the tourist boom.¹⁷ Damaged houses were repaired and new buildings, commercial premises, and hotels erected, leading to a further expansion of the districts outside the old city walls. Landlords enjoyed higher incomes from the rents paid by the staff of the various UN and UNRWA agencies and from the diplomatic corps. The growth of the souvenir industry produced wider employment opportunities even though the primitive character of industry in general did not change.

The economic prosperity of Jerusalem in the 1960s reduced its emigration loss to the lowest in the West Bank. In fact, its population increased during the twelve years after the 1948 war. Not only did it absorb Christian and Muslim refugees from West Jerusalem and other towns and villages now in Israel but the city attracted people from neighbouring Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Ramallah, and especially Hebron. Migration from the Hebron area was constant and this led to an increase in the influence of the Hebronites there. New shops and workshops were opened, and trade expanded, mostly inside the city walls.¹⁸ With this new-found prosperity the strip of land between Jerusalem and Ramallah, the traditional route to Nablus, began to develop. In the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, well-to-do refugees, who had lost all hope of returning to their former homes, purchased relatively cheap land adjoining the main road. They were later joined by others returning from the Arab oil countries with money to invest. There was also a tendency for some Jerusalemites

and Hebronites to settle in this northern area.

But while Jerusalem enjoyed some prosperity, particularly since the end of the 1950s, for most other border settlements the trend was largely in the opposite direction.

CHANGES IN THE FRONTIER AREAS

The demarcation of the border led to profound changes, both economic and social, in the life of the frontier villages. Since many of these places had been cut off from their western sources of livelihood, they had to turn eastward. But here they encountered severe problems: employment was scarce, and gained mostly by the numerous, hungry refugees, ready to work for any wage, who saturated the West Bank towns. It was now also much more difficult and less profitable to market the goods produced in the frontier villages as they faced very heavy competition in the eastern centres.¹⁹ This new enforced economic reorientation had an important influence on the villages' development.

The larger, more densely-populated villages suffered more than the smaller ones.²⁰ The situation in the Hebron area was particularly acute. Although the heavy loss of land and population borne by the frontier villages there did little to change their social composition, the economic implications were far-reaching. The townlets of Dura and edh-Dhahiriya lost economic, and hence political, status in relation to Hebron itself. This also applied to a number of Dura's remaining *khirbas* which now became more dependent on their own 'capital'.²¹ In many instances there were additional shifts in the power and status of individuals and groups, usually as a result of the loss of land and wealth. These new developments were reflected in changes in the old patterns of influence and political representation.

Tulkarm is an example of a small town whose social composition was changed as a consequence of the 1949 borders.²² As most of its cultivable land was on the Israeli side, it, like Qalqilya, was left with the less cultivable, rocky lands to the east which partly belonged to the *fellaheen* and which up to 1949 had been without assessed value. Throughout the Ottoman and British periods, Tulkarm had developed rapidly. Situated between Nathanya, Nablus, Qalqilya and Jenin, and with a railway passing through it, Tulkarm established strong economic ties with the plains and with Ramle and Lydda. This encouraged the migration to Tulkarm of some families from Nablus

and neighbouring villages; meanwhile, a counter-movement of Tulkarm inhabitants to the coastal strip also took place. But then the war and its aftermath caused a real economic setback. The limited assistance provided by the Jordanian authorities did nothing to reverse the situation. Tulkarm's new reliance on Nablus, something it shared with all the border townlets and villages of the northern West Bank, reduced both its economic and political position. Only the fact that some of Tulkarm's families were of Nablus origin gave it a slight economic advantage over Jenin and Qalqilya.

There was now a need to absorb many refugees and to cope with the economic effect of the return of many of Tulkarm's own migrants from Jaffa and other places. One refugee camp was built in the centre of the town and another established later near its boundaries. The refugees who arrived in 1948 were mostly poor, unskilled labourers whose chances of work in a small local market were extremely low. Thus, like many other places in 1949, Tulkarm was transformed into a fragmented, polyglot community composed of Tulkarm clans proper, villagers and townsmen who were either there or returned in 1948 as refugees, refugees from other places who had relatives among the town's population, and other groups of refugees (including Bedouin). In political terms, however, these refugees were not a major factor in the shifts in parliamentary and municipal representation.²³ Such political changes which took place were due to the loss of land. Thus, some traditional and wealthy families had to yield power to now more fortunate local landowners.

In most places the presence of the refugees was regarded as a nuisance by the local inhabitants. In the early years after the 1949 war tensions arose because the refugees occupied public buildings (mosques, schools etc.), encroached on farm land, picked local crops, used scarce local water, and so on. Those refugees who had originally come from their new place of settlement or who had families there were treated slightly better, but even they were too numerous to be absorbed under the new conditions. The local inhabitants could not cope with these tremendous pressures, and soon became exasperated with the endless demands of the refugees. They abused them and reminded them forcefully that a guest was not forever welcome. Profiteering through abuse of the relief system further aggravated the relationship. The refugees accused the local authorities of not distributing all the assistance sent by the Red Cross, and UN, and Western charitable organisations. Moreover, they complained bit-

terly about rising rents, about their low wages and, above all, about exploitation by their fellow Palestinians. Not surprisingly, with this new reservoir of cheap labour, the agricultural development of the area accelerated greatly.

For all this, the presence of the refugees in the border areas was regarded by the locals as a burden rather than an asset. For example, Idna village in the Hebron region lost some 14 000 of its 34 000 dunum of land, to its great detriment. To make matters worse it was then saturated with refugees including many Bedouin. During the first few years they all settled in two refugee camps within the village boundaries. In addition, the village had to absorb some of its former inhabitants who had now returned after some 50 years away from their place of origin.²⁴ In neighbouring Beit Aula the situation was only slightly better. The village lost only 2000 of its 24 000 dunum and none of its *khirbas* but was forced to give up some of its land to a Red Cross refugee camp which was established there.²⁵ This camp, like all other camps situated in the border near the Hebron district, was later moved eastward. Similarly, the village of Rummana in the Jenin area, which lost half of its land (10 000 dunum), was overcrowded with refugees, mostly Bedouin, until the government, troubled by border incidents, ordered them to move eastward to join others who had left voluntarily some time before.

For the Bedouin whose pastures remained on the Israeli side, prospects of acquiring land for grazing and cultivation on the West Bank were limited. The majority of them were unemployed and during the first years after the 1948 war made little effort to improve their lot. Those who lived along the border continued to maintain close connections with their families in Israel, making a relatively good income from smuggling. Others, especially those from southern Palestine, found themselves having to work more intensively in agriculture, a job they detested. Generally, they lacked the motivation, experience or skill for this kind of work. Many became tenants, tilling poor soil under harsh conditions. Life for these Bedouin became increasingly difficult. Often, they were forced to encroach on other people's lands, or the *dira* (a particular area over which a certain tribe, or tribes, has traditional seasonal grazing rights) of local tribes, using their limited water supply and exacerbating the existing tension. The West Bank soon became overcrowded and employment prospects for those Bedouin limited, the more so since thousands of better trained, eager village refugees competed for any available work.

Most of the Bedouin who came to the West Bank from southern Palestine were from the Azazmah, Jahalin, Tayyaha, and Trabin federations, units which could not survive in their new environment. In the past the *qabilah* the federation of Bedouin tribes was a prestigious unit and a unifying force. But, after the 1948 war, the lack of economic viability and the impossibility of living together in large numbers broke up this framework and members of the tribes dispersed over a wide area. The increased migration of Bedouin youngsters in search of employment further loosened the clan (*hamulah*); and larger groups were forced to choose between splitting up and moving eastwards into southern Jordan. Faced with grim economic conditions on the West Bank, many Bedouin were tempted to move there, with or without government assistance. By the mid-1950s, most Bedouin refugees had moved from the southern part of the West Bank to the East Bank, so that only a few fragmented sub-tribes remained. One example was the Shalalin of the Tayyaha federation, a weak tribe which was constantly pushed around by the local *fellaheen*. Another example was the Bili, a tribe which managed to reestablish itself for a while in the Hebron area, settling down around a school built by UNRWA. The Ramadin (Tayyaha) was the only tribe which remained for long in that area. This tribe, one of the richest on the West Bank, actually retained part of its land, some 9500 dunum.²⁶ In 1953, at its request, UNRWA built it a stone school, in the hope that this would encourage the tribesmen to settle on one site. The Ramadin built houses around the school and later rejected UNRWA's proposals to transfer the school elsewhere. Although it had more economic potential than other tribes, in the early 1950s some of its members also began to look elsewhere for employment.²⁷ Nevertheless, the Ramadin rejected the government's attempt to transfer it to Azraq on the East Bank,²⁸ preferring to remain and live as a 'Frontier Village' within sight of its former lands now being cultivated by the Israelis.

The situation in the northern part of the border region was different. Unlike the southern Bedouin, the northern semi-nomads generally moved to refugee camps in Tulkarm, Balata, Askar, Fara and Jenin, or nearby villages. But those who had managed to flee with their cattle were forced to move on to the Jordan Valley near the Damiya bridge where empty grazing land was available. Others, like the Arab Abu Kishk people, who came from the fertile region near the Yarqon River settled down in Qalqilya. There they joined the Quran Bedouin, who managed to bring their herds with them and

who, in a relatively short time, had established themselves economically by dint of hard work as suppliers of the town's dairy products. The Qalqilya residents, who had little respect for the Quran, were nevertheless forced to sell them land in the early 1950s when the town was suffering a serious economic setback as a result of the war. The Quran have since produced an educated and highly skilled generation, most of whom emigrated in the 1960s. But those who remained built makeshift shanties and huts in the town and some have continued this mode of living to the present day.

Qalqilya was also forced to take in other groups of refugees. The four local clans, which suffered equally from the outcome of the 1948 war, 'adopted' the refugees according to their place of origin,²⁹ and were relatively more helpful and more organised in dealing with the refugees than in other places. Utilising the refugees' farming experience, Qalqilya tried to make the most of what remained of its own fertile lands. These unique efforts contributed greatly to making it a flourishing town by the 1960s.³⁰ Uncultivable land was tilled and new citrus trees planted to compensate for the tremendous loss of the groves left on the other side of the new border. Melons were grown and some 40 artesian wells dug to ensure a water supply, thus supplementing the relative high average of rainfall the Nablus region enjoyed in comparison with the Hebron region. Within a few years, Qalqilya had managed to export oranges to the Gulf countries and, according to its inhabitants, their hard work resulted in the production of a bumper crop in the mid-1960s.

BORDER TENSION

Qalqilya is certainly an exception, both in terms of its economic growth and of the relationship between the refugees and the local residents. Elsewhere, tension between the locals and the refugees stemmed from the attempt by some of the latter to cross back into Israel.³¹ The frontier villagers were understandably troubled by the Israeli retaliation which followed, with Israel claiming that the infiltrators had not only entered its territory from the border villages but had also received aid from their inhabitants. The border crossings or 'infiltrations' took a number of forms. In the first few years, it involved refugees attempting to return to their homes and relatives. Such infiltration reached its peak during the harvest season, when the peasants were tempted to pick their crops, fruit or olives now on the

other side. Starvation, attachment to their land, and a burning sense of injustice spurred the refugees and local *fellaheen* to take the risks involved. The border was also crossed to retrieve assets which had been hidden or abandoned. In addition, infiltrators engaged in thieving and smuggling, though this was usually carried out by professional groups. Many members of the local population, especially the frontier villages, also engaged in infiltration. But as a rule the main 'infiltrators' were Bedouin – some of whom were refugees – who proved indispensable to the smuggling operation as a result of their familiarity with the area and their far-flung family connections.

But from the early 1950s, the predominant type of infiltration consisted of acts of terror against Israel. These included the sabotage of telephone and railway lines and water-pipes, the bombing of houses, the laying of mines, and the killing of people, all of which provoked clashes between the Israeli army and the various armed Palestine groups – referred to as 'terrorists' by the Israelis – and as *fidaiyun* by the Arabs (literally, those who sacrificed themselves for the cause). With the rise of Egyptian arms smuggling into Jordan, using some of the tribes who constantly crossed the Israeli Negev, the Israelis became more sensitive to such movements as they feared that the new armed groups would succeed in implementing at least part of their plans. Israel also feared that the arms consignments would be used against the Jordanian monarch and might result in the overthrow of his regime, a situation which Israel believed would not serve its interests.

The shooting of smugglers by Israelis incited blood feuds and vendettas, causing chain reactions which culminated in further killings. Many such incidents occurred in the Negev and could be explained as Bedouin actions of blood revenge rather than as the more politically motivated *fidaiyun* activities. Under the pretext of 'live and let live', the Bedouin infiltrators tried to deter the Israelis from taking further action against them. In response, Israel sometimes opted to hit Jordan where it was vulnerable. Israel also acted against tribes living in southeast Jordan, and expelled some Bedouin living in Israel who were suspected of assisting their relatives on the other side of the border.

The infiltrations and skirmishes along the border elicited different responses from the inhabitants who lived there; but some found the tension too great and decided to move out. One example was the case of Wadi Fukin, a village which had lost two-thirds of its 10 000 dunum in 1948. The tension caused by this loss was further aggravated by the

bitter conflict between Jordan and Israel concerning the exact location of the agreed Demarcation Line. The dispute evolved around three different maps, thus making a quick settlement of the issue difficult. The people of Wadi Fukin left their homes in 1948 but later returned. Throughout the 1950s many border incidents occurred in the area and the village became unsafe for habitation and cultivation.³² Though not refugees by definition, many of them moved to the Dahaysha refugee camp near Bethlehem from where they commuted daily to their village, at great risk, to plough their fields. Others who abandoned their village houses lived temporarily in neighbouring Nahhalin, Husan, or Beit Jala. However, when the first two of these villages were attacked by Israel's army more of them moved elsewhere.

Appeals to Israel to allow minor changes of the Demarcation Line so as to enable the frontier villagers to cultivate part of their lost lands or to use their wells were rejected. Israel demanded that before any such concessions be made the Jordanian Government should fulfil certain provisions of the Armistice Agreement, such as free passage to the Western (Wailing) Wall and the Jewish cemetery on Mount Olives and use of the Latrun road. Political observers believed that such measures would probably have removed some of the major causes of friction. But the Jordanians never acceded to these demands.

Only in Battir village, where both sides had a common interest, was agreement reached. Situated south of Jerusalem, Battir's leaders concluded an agreement with the Israelis, whereby the village's lands remaining on the Israeli side could be cultivated by its former owners who were allowed daily passage through a special gate. The success of this kind of arrangement depended on the fulfilment of all the conditions of agreement by both sides. Any change in the situation which would have been harmful to one of Israel's most important routes in and out of its capital – namely the railway passing through Battir and through neighbouring partitioned Beit Safafa village – would have resulted in the villagers being denied access to their land on the other side of the border.

While Israel claimed that the easing of border tension depended on the strict implementation of the Armistice Agreement, Jordan argued that Israel used the infiltrations as a pretext to demonstrate power. Both sides complained to the UN of so-called 'atrocities' and 'aggressions' committed by the other. Mutual condemnation and accusation only aggravated the delicate relationship between the two states. As tension mounted, both governments came under severe

internal pressure. As far as the Israeli Government was concerned, pressures from army officers and citizens were critical factors in deciding in favour of retaliatory activities following the killing of Israeli citizens as a result of Arab acts of terror.³³

As it did not trust the effectiveness or the impartiality of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), Israel decided to protect its own borders, declaring that a government which did not prevent 'hit and run' attacks from its territory secretly favoured such action. Israel clearly wished to have a moderate and stable neighbour on its eastern border. But so-called 'retaliation' actions, far from always achieving their aim – namely the prevention of actions against Israel and the tightening of border control by the Jordanian Arab Legion – sometimes proved counter-productive by harming the Jordanian regime which itself had a direct interest in maintaining a quiet border. Israel's retaliatory operations, especially at Qibya and after, in which Palestinian villagers were killed, faced the Jordanian Government with violent demonstrations and loud protests against ties with the West. The intensity and frequency of the Israeli action against Jordan not only undermined the Arab Legion's position, as well as that of Britain, but also, ironically, helped the Jordanian opposition groups and augmented the growing influence of Egypt's President Gamal Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) in the country. King Hussein was bitterly criticised for his unwillingness to enlarge his army, a move which would have forced him to recruit a growing number of Palestinians, whom he generally feared. The Palestinians also attacked both the Jordanian Chief of Staff, the Briton John Glubb, and the King for deliberately neglecting West Bank security and for not training its inhabitants properly or providing them with modern equipment for self defence.³⁴

But the dismissal of Glubb in 1956 along with all the other British officers stationed in Jordan altered little. The newly 'purged' army continued to follow basically the same principles up to 1967. Opponents of this policy soon realised, if and when they became decision-makers, that the Jordanian military would be no match for the Israeli army.

JORDAN'S SECURITY POLICIES

Throughout his service as the Jordanian Arab Legion's commander, General Glubb believed that each and every border incident could

trigger off a clash between the two states. Unlike the politicians who demanded Jordanian military action, he calculated that in open battle Jordan stood to lose more than just its army and, therefore, that border clashes had to be prevented at all costs. Thus it was not concern for the plight of the border villagers and the refugees that motivated Jordan to pay attention to their situation. Rather, it was fear that their infiltration across the border might endanger the stability of the regime.

Seeking to remedy this unstable situation, the Jordanian Government employed a variety of measures. One was to reach agreements or compromises between Israel and Jordan on either a national or a local level and to set up liaison bodies.³⁵ A second was direct confrontation using the armed forces and the security services. Third, there was the 'thinning out' of the border population in order to reduce the frequency of violations.

The National Guard

In mid-1949 General Glubb sought to establish a defensive force which would give the West Bankers some sense of security and of participation in the Kingdom, while at the same time relieving the predominantly Trans-Jordanian Arab Legion (later known as the Arab Army) from border duty. The Arab Legion, a capable force trained and armed by the British, was too small to maintain a constant observation along all borders. It was not equipped for such a task. Its main role was that of defending the monarch in Amman, not the borders. But the army's presence in the West Bank was seen both as a deterrent to Israel and as a reminder to the Palestinians of the new Jordanian authority. Despite their constant criticism, the Palestinians were well aware that their situation in 1948 would have been quite different but for the Arab Legion. Glubb sought to keep small numbers of the Arab legion behind the frontier at points where there were reasonable lines of communication to the frontier villages, while using the poorly armed villagers, aided by the Legion's NCO's, on the actual border.

The predominantly Palestinian National Guard (*al-Haras al-Watani*), appealed especially to those living in virtually undefended frontier areas. It was to function as a separate but disciplined force which, it was hoped, would warn off, delay and perhaps even repel Israeli attacks, while above all preventing any local incidents which might bring Israeli retaliation. However, until its amalgamation with

the Arab Army in 1965, the National Guard operated with only limited ammunition and little mobility, as a result of regime fears. It comprised groups of villagers garrisoned in their own frontier villages – the assumption being that the villagers would vigorously defend their own homes. Organised in such loose local units, the National Guard served as Jordan's 'regional defence system'. Although seen as a valuable addition to the regular forces in case of attack,³⁶ with limited ammunition allocated to each soldier,³⁷ little training, and hardly any coordination, not much could be done to counter an Israeli attack. In response to the demand of a number of Members of Parliament that the Army, and not the National Guard, should handle the defence of the border lines,³⁸ the government ordered additional budget allocations for the Guard.³⁹ It also gave wide publicity to the programme of training refugee students in secondary schools⁴⁰ and to a new law which enabled wounded National Guardsmen to receive compensation similar to that paid to the Arab Legion.⁴¹ It was by such virtually meaningless measures, or by conciliatory statements, that the regime dealt with each wave of criticism or demands for greater involvement. This technique was used even more frequently in the aftermath of any Israeli retaliatory action.

By 1954, training had already been received by those residing in the east of the West Bank and by the town dwellers. Like everyone else, these people urged the expansion of the National Guard to cover the whole of the West Bank even if they were personally not interested in serving in it.⁴² But for the frontier villagers, the National Guard proved to be their only defence. Hence their eagerness and sensitivity about its composition, living as they did under constant threat and fear of Israeli retaliation. Since they could do very little to prevent the Israeli strikes, and since the regime made them unwilling masters of their own fate, from 1952 onward some villages became more efficient about checking border infiltration. They watched keenly for suspicious activity coming from their villages and eastward. But soon Palestinian enthusiasm gave way to growing awareness of the National Guard's real position and role. Training took valuable time, especially for the young men in employment, and so it was not long before the National Guard was manned mostly by the old. Although compulsory training was introduced, prompted by the fierce protests which followed Israeli retaliations, people began to evade it or to bribe their way out. This happened in particular when it became too expensive for those who worked elsewhere to remain

members of the National Guard, as it meant either living in the village itself or returning there daily.

Faced with the growing bitterness and the inevitable apathy of the frontier villagers which resulted from the National Guard's inadequate equipment, low salaries, and the heavy burden of feeding its troops, the Jordanian authorities decided in the mid-1950s to make a number of changes. However, these required a substantial increase in funds. Britain, on whom Jordan was financially dependent, was reluctant to allow any dramatic change in the country's military power.⁴³ The British could not believe that a more capable National Guard would enable it to prevent infiltration, but feared that a strong National Guard would bring about more military clashes with Israel. Meanwhile, the Arab League, requested by Jordan and the Palestinians to make large financial contributions of its own, would only do so if it was given some control over the National Guard, as it considered the Palestinian question a common Arab issue – an approach the Jordanian regime felt it necessary to reject. As for the Monarch, he too wanted a weak National Guard so that its members would be forced to realise its limitations. Moreover, when they saw the fate of those frontier villages which were hit by Israeli action, the regime hoped that the members of the National Guard would be reluctant, even if able, to start the chain reaction it feared.⁴⁴

Confronting Infiltration

One of the first measures taken by the Jordanian authorities was to publicise widely a warning against crossing the border.⁴⁵ With many outlaws in the area, and with arms being held by those who, in the 1940s, used to belong to one Arab force or another, the authorities also ordered the confiscation of all weapons. Among other things, this was to prevent attempts by pro-Hussaini elements to murder officials out of a general bitterness towards the Trans-Jordanians and to stop any Palestinian vigilantes from threatening the delicate agreement between Israel and Jordan. With smuggling on the increase, the Jordanian Government stepped up its coercion. The Jordanian files detail the various actions taken by the state against infiltration from the West Bank.⁴⁶ Many of those attempting to take part in such activities were severely punished even before they had been able to commit any crime. Against this, in other cases where bribes were made, similar activities were ignored by the authorities. Jordanian officers themselves were sometimes directly involved. At

other times they deliberately overlooked such activities when they served to profit the loyal Bedouin.⁴⁷

Apart from announcing the punishments meted out,⁴⁸ in order to serve as a deterrent to others, prominence was also given in the press to prohibition against infiltration and arms transactions,⁴⁹ and to the fact that some infiltrators were killed or gaoled by the Israelis after trying to cross the lines.⁵⁰ *Mukhtars* who, through complicity or simple incompetence, failed to supply names and to report such activities were fired. New *mukhtars*, whom the authorities trusted, were appointed in their place, but they proved to be no more reliable.

Those who infiltrated Jordan from the Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip generally requested to be transferred to Zarqa in the East Bank. Before granting permission, however, the Jordanian authorities, naturally suspicious of the Palestinians' loyalty, would put them under surveillance.⁵¹ All these new arrivals, who had expected better treatment than in impoverished Gaza,⁵² were questioned closely by army officers. In 1954, the Jordanian Government, having consolidated itself on the West Bank, approached the Egyptian Government to seek a halt to this constant flow of illegal refugees. It was also announced that, as a deterrent, any refugee leaving the Gaza Strip and arriving in Jordan without a permit would not have the right to receive UNRWA assistance and would be subject to expulsion.⁵³

Additional measures were directed against those who might start a chain reaction of violation and retaliation. Trigger-happy soldiers or guards in the border area who failed to comply with orders were punished or sent elsewhere. At the same time, the Jordanian High Command ordered the armed forces not to shoot at any Jewish civilians unless special permission had been granted.⁵⁴ The press also called for action against infiltration into Israel, claiming that it gave a pretext for Israeli retaliation. Even stricter measures were taken after a series of violations and retaliations; for example, following the Israeli raid on Qalqilya in 1954 the Jordanians imposed a curfew on the region up to six miles east of the border. Again, fearing that the arms distributed to the inhabitants of the frontier villages would touch off a new wave of border incidents, the government ordered the registration of all weapons and ammunition, as a prelude to confiscating them. Finally, the government managed to seize arms⁵⁵ and to arrest those who had been supplied weapons by the Egyptian and Syrian agents operating within the Kingdom.⁵⁶

On the whole, however, there is little evidence to suggest that

either the measures taken by the Jordanian Government, or the growing risk of casualties, or the fierce Israeli reaction, deterred those who, for one reason or another, were determined to infiltrate. For its part, the Jordanian regime was constrained by both internal and inter-Arab pressures as well as its fear of the consequences of Israel's retaliation. The regime knew that the policy of repressing marauders was unpopular and could have led to dangerous internal threats to its existence. This was especially true in the mid-1950s with the growing sympathy for Nasser and the *fidaiyun*. The arrest of hundreds of infiltrators by the Jordanian forces was naturally considered by the Palestinians as an act of collaboration with Israel. But the Jordanian Government had somehow to accommodate this criticism within the restricted framework of its policies.

Relocation

As early as 1949 the Jordanian regime adopted the policy of 'thinning out' the border areas as an additional method of reducing the possibility of conflict between the Jordanian and Israeli armies. For the most part, this was done by relocating large sections of the border refugee population to camps farther east. At the same time, it was decided that no large-scale development programme, from which the frontier villages could have benefited, would be established near the border as the government feared that such programmes would prompt the refugees to stay put. The authorities also used the harsh winters of the first few years to encourage many of the refugees to move to the warmer, eastern Jordan Valley. (However, this mass movement was reversed during the summers when the Valley became unbearably hot, and the refugees flocked back to the cooler, western hills where they again created trouble for the government.) In June 1950, the Jordanian Defence Minister ordered the removal of all refugees to camps at least 20 kilometres east of the border lines;⁵⁷ and by 1951 the bulk of them had already been transferred either to existing camps or to new ones established for that purpose. This move fitted in with UNRWA's policies because the previous border camps had been almost impossible to reach without proper access roads and because large, central camps were easier to maintain and administer than small, dispersed ones. After this, apart from the camp in Tulkarm, no official border camps were left. Nevertheless, there were still two large concentrations of refugees in the border areas, one in an unofficial camp in Beit Aula, which was dismantled

only in 1954, and the other at Qalqilya⁵⁸ which managed to achieve some recognition by UNRWA as late as 1965.

Following the removal of the camps, the main weight of the regime's 'thinning out' policy was directed against the Bedouin whose frequent crossing of the border was a constant source of tension. Glubb sought to transfer them to remote areas where they could re-establish themselves. He warned the shaikh of each sub-tribe against 'collaborating with the Jews against the Jordanian interests',⁵⁹ and he made tempting offers to those who would move with their tribes to the East Bank.⁶⁰ As mentioned previously, largely because of the unfavourable economic and social conditions on the West Bank,⁶¹ many tribes were willing to make the move across the river⁶² and in time, very little remained of the old tribal arrangements.

The refugees of village origin also had mixed feelings about the transfer.⁶³ Some were pleased to move, and even requested that they be transferred to the East Bank,⁶⁴ anticipating employment opportunities there. Others viewed the move with suspicion,⁶⁵ wishing to remain within sight of their former homes in the hope that they would be able to return. To them, a transfer to another camp in the East meant that their presence outside their own country was more than temporary. They felt betrayed by the government and became suspicious of its actions after they were told that they had to choose between joining other camps or staying where they were and getting a minimum of help from the relief agencies.

One of the few instances of indigenous frontier villagers requesting to be transferred to the East Bank was that of the inhabitants of Surif, many of whom had sold their land at a low price.⁶⁶ This angered the surrounding villagers because it tended to lower the value of their own land.

There was also a small movement along the border rather than away from it. One interesting but exceptional case was the creation of a new frontier village by refugees on land belonging to their original village just over the border. These refugees came from Umm el-Fahm and the village they built, and which later flourished, was called al-Taiyiba. A different kind of resettlement in the form of new, small hamlets took place in the south. Old, unoccupied shacks, either deserted or used for keeping animals, were renovated and taken over by refugees.⁶⁷ However, such settlements, which involved only a small segment of the population, were not encouraged by the regime.

The government's relocation policy contradicted the rumours that the government intended to sent up 'model villages' along the border

with Israel, to be populated by refugees until 'the day of return'. This was said by some to be the best means of safeguarding the rights of the refugees by settling them close to their place of origin. *Al-Urdunn* newspaper, which reported favourably on this scheme in December 1952, reflected the views of the prominent politician Anwar al-Khatib⁶⁸ and of the then Defence Minister, Anwar Nusaiba.⁶⁹ The latter was also the head of a short-lived Jerusalem-based association which advocated – as did the Muslim Brotherhood – the fortification and development of the border villages in an attempt to slow down the desertion of the young in search of employment. In addition, the transfer of refugees eastward was not in line with the views and opinions of Arabs outside Jordan. Prominent Arab writers called for the fortification of the border area and for the settlement of all refugees only 'in the remaining part of Palestine' i.e. the West Bank. They also felt that the refugees along the borders with Israel should be housed in special temporary camps which would serve as army bases and not as refugee settlements.⁷⁰ Some even went further to urge that such camps should be run by the refugees themselves and should serve as military training bases rather than places for promoting the stability which the West envisaged.⁷¹ Accordingly, the Arab League called for the establishment of tightly-knit refugee settlements along the borders, which could play an active military role until the 'next round' between the Arab states and Israel. But all these appeals were ignored by the Jordanian regime, regardless of its statements to the contrary.

With the passage of time, however, an official transfer policy became unnecessary, since the eastern part of the Kingdom had become an economic magnet for many Palestinians. And yet this growing migration to Amman, especially of refugees, began to trouble the government in turn as it not only caused social and economic problems but also posed a direct political threat to the vulnerable regime in the unstable days of the mid-1950s and afterwards. The capital was already crowded with bitter, hungry refugees.⁷² Nevertheless, thousands of youngsters continued to stream into Amman and other East Bank towns. The government calculated that efforts to stop this migration would provoke fierce resistance from those who depended on these urban centres for their living. It also feared that it would be charged with pursuing a deliberate policy of discrimination against the Palestinians whom it wanted to integrate.

The authorities became extremely troubled also by the growing

size of the migration of non-refugees from the frontier areas, and ordered it to cease. It was argued that the frontier villages had become more exposed to the enemy's threats because the youngsters sought employment elsewhere, leaving the old and the very young with little protection. Hence, the regime decided to take certain measures to stop this migration. The government ordered UNRWA not to allow the transfer of ration cards from the frontier villages.⁷⁶ This coincided with UNRWA's own policy that the inhabitants of the frontier villages could 'draw half rations only as long as they reside in their village', i.e. on the frontier.⁷⁷ However, the promise of half rations was not particularly attractive when potential earnings were much higher in Amman. There was little the Agency could do about this and its warnings to frontier villagers to desist from moving were useless. In an effort to meet this situation, the government exerted still more pressure on the Agency to concern itself with these villagers' misery.⁷⁸ In this way it hoped to relieve itself of the burden of this sector of the population and to saddle UNRWA with additional tasks outside its original terms of reference.⁷⁹

THE FRONTIER INHABITANTS – WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?

The various Red Cross and UNRWA definitions of a 'refugee' were vague and did not include the indigenous poor whom they officially considered to be outside their mandate and, therefore, a governmental responsibility. However, the Red Cross agreed to assist the many Jerusalemites who belonged in this category whose livelihood had been terminated by the war, leaving them destitute. But, as a rule, it found it difficult to distinguish between *bona fide* refugees⁸⁰ and the indigenous poor from whom it faced such tremendous pressure as to threaten the whole relief operation. Thus, the Red Cross's Jerusalem Commissariat was forced to assist some 40 000 people,⁸¹ approximately half of whom were totally impoverished inhabitants of the old city – traditionally known as 'the Poor of Jerusalem'. Among them were members of the Algerian, Indian, Bukharan and Afghani communities who, like some non-refugees from neighbouring areas, succeeded in attaining refugee status.⁸² The aid provided eased the burden of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Muslim Council, both of which urged the Red Cross to enlarge its indirect subsidy to the city's budget.⁸³ In the light of this situation, the

Town Councils of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahur also insisted that the Red Cross should attend to the plight of their poor as well.⁸⁴ Before the Red Cross discontinued its operations in the area, it requested that the UN waive the rule which classified the Jerusalem Poor as non-refugees and treat them as refugees in the wider sense. The arrangement then arrived at brought some 3000 poor under the protection of the World Lutheran Federation and another 8000 under UNRWA's care, placing them in the same category as the frontier villagers.

The latter also raised problems of their own since they were not refugees according to UNRWA's working definition. According to the Agency a 'refugee' was a person who, as a result of the 1948 war, had lost both his home and his means of livelihood, and who was in economic need. The frontier villagers, cut off from their property, were not refugees in the strict sense of the word, as they remained in their own houses. But it was claimed that they did qualify, as a result of the conflict, to receive certain aid under that part of the definition which stressed 'means of livelihood'. In other words, they were refugees in the economic sense and indeed they later came to be called 'Economic Refugees'.

When UNRWA took over the relief operation in 1950, some 17 000 frontier villagers were already receiving support from the ICRC which functioned as part of the United Nations Relief for the Palestine Refugees operation (UNRPR). During this chaotic period just after the war the Red Cross had been forced to give assistance to the frontier villages under pressure from both the Jordanian Government and the villagers themselves, who demanded that they be regarded as refugees in the full sense and to be cared for like their neighbours and brothers. Many of those who received aid had originally fled the border villages during the war. Immediately registered as refugees, often in camps, most of them eventually returned to their homes still in possession of their ration cards.⁸⁵ Others were assisted under a change in ICRC policy which classified them as 'second-class refugees'.

UNRWA inherited the inflated refugee ration lists of the Red Cross and soon attempted to update them. This resulted in the deletion of the names of many frontier villagers, creating much discontent among these needy people. They set up their own committee⁸⁶ which sought to involve the political parties, Parliament and prominent figures on their behalf,⁸⁷ in the hope that this would give further weight to their endless stream of petitions and demands.

The Jordanian Parliament, moved by the frontier villages' misery, called upon the government to assist them and to regard them as refugees, with no differentiation between those who were expelled from their land and those who remained in their homes. It further urged the authorities to assist the 17 frontier villages in the Hebron area and to provide them with seeds donated by the American Point IV scheme. By now, not only those whose ration cards had been confiscated, but also those who felt entitled to receive aid from the West, joined in the demands. In political terms, they continued to stress the need for a return of their former lands as the only solution of their problem. Until such time, they argued, they should be considered as genuine refugees. For its part, the government, fearing the possibility that it would have to come to the assistance of the frontier villages, was reluctant to create any such precedent. While it wanted UNRWA to assist most Palestinians, regardless of their origin, the agency itself felt that it had to concentrate its resources and to give priority to those who were most needy amongst those who had lost their homes.

Although UNRWA was aware that in some cases it was giving aid based on false registration, it accepted this in practice as it coincided with the UN's original purpose of developing the country as a whole. Nevertheless, economic considerations aside, the agency faced difficult political problems concerning the question of eligibility for relief, which threatened both its own position and the smooth running of its operations in Jordan. At an early stage it abandoned its policy of setting up projects only in places that housed many refugees, on the condition that their economic integration into an area was accepted and assisted by the indigenous population. Instead, it began to set up schools and other facilities in the frontier villages in the hope that this would make it easier for the refugees to settle in their new place of residence, as well as help the frontier villages themselves. But it was only in 1955, when UNRWA set out to investigate the magnitude of the problem,⁸⁸ that it decided to provide more inhabitants with half rations. Even then the bulk of the aid came not from the agency itself but from UNESCO, UNICEF, the Near East Council of Churches and many other Christian agencies which were called upon to share responsibility for the frontier villages.⁸⁹ Among the various programmes of these international voluntary agencies were health and self-help schemes,⁹⁰ rehabilitation loans, material aid such as rations, feeding centres, clothing, fixed and mobile clinics, vocational training, educational summer

schemes for children, mother and child centres, care for epileptic and retarded children, community development projects, the building of new homes and assistance in creating new fields in the waterless, stony land. In economic terms, and in comparison with neighbouring villages that did not lose their fertile land on the other side of the demarcation line, the importance of this aid cannot be underestimated. As a result, many frontier villages managed to make some modest, but perceptible, changes in their mode of life.

Since there was little land to cultivate, the relief agencies tended to expand educational and vocational training schemes, concentrating on the younger generation. This pattern was followed everywhere, resulting in the creation of a white-collar second generation.⁹¹ Peasant fathers thus became dependent on the skills of their children – who generally either migrated or emigrated. Through education schemes, the operations of these agencies actually enabled more young people to settle abroad. With the young moving away, the rehabilitation projects, which were intended to make the frontier villages self-supporting, could make few inroads into the problems facing the people living there. And they certainly could not remove the existing psychological strain. As a result, the agencies became an integral part of the economic life of these villages which in turn were completely dependent upon them.

EPILOGUE

The 1967 Middle East war inaugurated a new era for the West Bank with its occupation by the Israelis.⁹² Though damaged in the fighting, Qalqilya, like Jenin and Tulkarm, soon took advantage of the Israeli policy which re-linked them with their former natural markets from which they had been cut off in 1948. This served the interests of both Israel and the border towns. Israel wanted to erase any sign of a so-called 'Green Line' (i.e. the demarcation line) and to create new economic patterns between the East and West Banks. It also aimed at reducing the economic, and thus political, dependence of these border towns on Nablus. The border towns for their part, were offered an opportunity of re-establishing their old prosperity. By 1970 their dependence on the Israeli economy needed no further encouragement from the Israeli government which, until then, had subsidised a relatively larger share of these towns' budgets as compared with those further to the East. Jerusalem was once again a

unique case. The economic boom experienced by the city following its annexation by Israel after the 1967 war turned it into a centre of trade between Israel, the West Bank and Jordan.

In the new circumstances, many refugees who had originally come either from West Jerusalem or from the coastal towns, provided an indispensable link between Israel and the West Bank as a result of their family ties with those who had remained in Israel, their old contacts with Israelis, and their knowledge of Hebrew. All these factors helped to create and to maintain new business relationships with Israeli merchants and markets.

The frontier villagers, for their part, especially in the southwestern part of the West Bank, were not allowed to recover any of their lost lands or even to till them once again. Nevertheless, Israel extended aid to some of these villages as well as to others on the West Bank. By so doing, Israel played an important role in the tremendous development of the West Bank's agriculture, now employing mainly men of the older generation, as their sons could obtain high salaries in Israel itself where they provided a cheap, unskilled or semi-skilled labour force. One result was that the process of emigration slowed down and some Palestinians even returned from abroad. Another feature of this development was the rising standard of living and the accelerated building boom which developed in most West Bank villages.

Yet, for many, economic prosperity was dependent on fluctuations within the Israeli economy. The high rate of inflation acted to slow down economic growth in the West Bank just as the Palestinians were determined to capitalise on their new opportunities as long as they lasted. But one way or another, the new reality which made the West Bank once again dependent on its pre-1948 markets, created a symbiotic relationship which, it seemed, any new political arrangements would have to take into account.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

This paper relies chiefly on Jordanian, Red Cross and UNRWA unpublished records (found mostly in Israel's State Archives in Jerusalem) as well as on extensive field research carried out in the West Bank. Parts of the chapter are based on the author's more detailed study, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-57* (Frank Cass: London and New York, 1981).

1. See maps in UN Security Council Official Recorder, 4th Year special supplement No. 1, New York. S/1302/Rev., Annex 1. Map 1. part 1 and 2. 20.6.49.
2. The sources used for this evaluation are: an unpublished UNRWA map entitled 'Villages and Towns in Jordan Along the Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line' (covered by UNRWA survey 1955) obtained through courtesy of Antranig Bakarjyan, UNRWA's Ramallah Area Officer) – see Appendix No.1; an UNRWA unpublished study entitled 'Explanatory notes of Frontier Villages in the UNRWA area, Hebron, Bethlehem' written by the late Henry Knezevitz (who worked with the Agency); a Jordanian map entitled *Key to Villages*; and a report of the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture entitled *Territory Tables of Village Lands* (Dec. 1968) 19pp. (Hebrew). Some sources put the number at 104 villages and *khirbas*. A further source for comparison is the table indicating the loss of land classified as non-cultivable and cultivable according to sub-districts. See 'Jordan's Frontier Villages' in *The World Today* (Chatham House Review, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), vol.9.
3. Later another report on the economic hardships, prepared by Muhammad Adib al-Am'ari, Director of the Jordanian Ministry of Development and Reconstruction (published in *al-Urdunn* daily, 27.8.54), claimed that as opposed to 1948, when every inhabitant had an average of 17 dunum, the villagers now only had six dunum. Similarly, each possessed one-third head of cattle as opposed to three in the past. The report put the number of people in the frontier villages as 132 000. (Also *Beirut Radio* transmission of 27.8.54, 1700 hrs.)
4. Zububa village (Jenin) lost about 12 000 dunums and retained 2000, whilst Ya'bad Village lost only 200 dunums. For a report on the frontier villages' agricultural situation see *Filastin* daily, Jerusalem 3.8.52. On other aspects, see Lutheran Churches Report published in *ibid.*, 15.2.53.
5. For example: El-Walaja (2000 dunums); El-Maliha; Lifta; Qaluniya (523 dunums); Majdal Yaba; Kafar Qasim; al-Taiyiba (2500 dunums); Baqa el Gharbiya (531 dunums); Qaqun (600 dunums); Umm el Fahm (4000 dunums, part of which was resettled and developed by the village's refugees); Muqaybila (1000 dunums); Sandala; El-Mazar (104 dunums). Whilst the Israeli source mentioned above claimed that a part of the former Bir Saba' lands which were left on the Jordanian side came within this category, the detailed Jordanian map does not support such evidence. For further reading on Arab border villages on the Israeli side of the border see Abner Cohen, *Arab Border Villages in Israel: A Study of Continuity and Change* (New York, 1956).
6. The Hubayla Project, which was one of UNRWA's refugee resettlement schemes (set up on one of the former Jewish settlements of Gush 'Etzyon) as well as Qalandya and Dahaysha refugee camps were partly built on such land. According to an unpublished map entitled 'Palestine, Index to Villages and Settlements, Land in Jewish Possession' (31.12.44), The Jewish National Fund and private Jewish landowners had land parcels of varying sizes in the following places: Beit Ummar,

- Surif, Nahhalin, Battir, Bethlehem, Sur Bahir, Beit Safafa, Sharafat (east of the railway line) on the village borders of Abu Dis and Silwan, Anata, Hizma, Neve Ya'aqov, Beit Hanina, Beit Iksha, Lifta, Shufat, En-Nabi Samwil, Biddu, Beit Ijza, El-Jib, Bir Nabala, Er-Ram, Judeira, Qalandya, 'Atarot, Kafar 'Aqab – all in the Jerusalem area, and an area in Habla (south of Qalqilya). It could be assumed that additional land was acquired up to the 1948 war. Although insignificant when compared with the total area of the land lost by the frontier villages, as far as the individual villagers were concerned in the Jerusalem area, cultivating such additional lands would have contributed to the easing of the hard conditions that faced them.
7. Findings from field research carried out in 24 frontier villages: Muhammad, Hijji, the *mukhtar* of al-Burj, who described the way the *khirba* was divided by the armistice line which moved the border eastwards, said that the Jordanian Chief of Staff, Lt Gen John Glubb answered their protests by saying 'It is enough for you'. A similar story was told by 'Abd al-Rahman Swaytah (a refugee from Umm Hashram) on Beit 'Awwa's border (interview there 13.3.74).
 8. This was reflected in the words of the organisers of the first economic congress co-organised by the Palestine Chamber of Commerce and the Palestine Trade Committee which was held in Ramallah in April 1949 – see *al-Jazirah*, daily, Amman, dated 28.3./10.4.49. The West Bankers continually hoped to receive the promised government assistance – see *al-Nashrah al-Iqtisadiyyah* (Economic and Social News) Weekly, Arabic and English, 'Amman, 27.6.50 edition, p.1. The minutes of the Congress of the Association of Chambers of Commerce held in Ramallah on 11.1.51 repeated the demand for an immediate change in the government's West Bank economic policy. Calls for paving roads, industrialisation allocating money for developing projects which could offer vast employment opportunities, transfer of government departments to the West Bank, support to the municipalities, and the opening of a special office for the West Bank's economic developments, are all contained in the speakers' words and the 14 resolutions presented to the authorities. (From the Jerusalem Municipality Historic Archives; unpublished records of the Arab Jerusalem Town Council (hereafter JMHA) file B/Z/42/1. Text 20 pp. signed on 30.1.51.)
 9. Dr Richard Ward, the Head of the US Agency for International Development (AID), suggested that the economic potential for the development of Jordan was in the East and not in the West Bank. (Interview Washington, DC, 2.9.73.) Dr John Davis, the former head of UNRWA, recalled that the USA rejected any idea of developing the West Bank. Most Palestinians interviewed by the author refused to accept Dr Ward's economic assessment, suggesting that AID deliberately ignored the West Bank's economic potential.
 10. To prove this discrimination, *Filastin* of 16.9.58, published a table of the amounts loaned and granted by the government to the various areas in the West and East Banks. The table showed that small places in the East Bank received relatively more than heavily populated towns in the West Bank.

11. See Ishaq Duzdar's bitter words in the 1962 election campaign in Qalandya camp: 'Look at the palaces which are being built in 'Amman and not in Jerusalem, erected after 1948 on Palestinian shoulders. They had to be built in Jerusalem but were removed from there so it would stay like a village.' (2.11.62). Israel's State Archives, Jordanian Unpublished Records (hereafter cited as SA JUPR) CF. 406-9. See Eliezer Be'eri's *The Palestinians Under Jordanian Rule: Three Issues* (The H.S.Truman Research Institute Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978) pp.61-2.
12. According to an unpublished UNRWA map, the percentage of the West Bank emigrants and migrants amongst the refugees equalled the natural rate of increase. For statistical details concerning the rate of migration and emigration from the West Bank as a whole, see U.Schmeltz's article, 'Demographic Development of the Arab Countries in *Hamizrah Hehadash* (the New East quarterly) vol.xxiii, no.1 (89) (1973) pp.29-45.
13. SA JUPR File ML/274/50 titled UNWRA Affairs. Letters B/B/39/1/4 dated 2.2.50 from the Jerusalem mayor.
14. A memorandum signed by 14 Palestinian MPs demanded that Jerusalem become an administrative centre for all the West Bank with branches of all government offices. (See *al-Hayat* 2.8.52.) For further reading see: *al-Difa'*, 4.2.54; *Filastin*, 4/19/21/24.2.55; *Bilad*, 7.2.55; *al-Jihad*, 25.6., 14.8.56; *al-Difa'*, 31.5., 4/15.6.56, 29/30.7.56, all of which reflected similar demands.
15. An example of this was the transfer of UNRWA's Education Department to Amman. The government wanted to control all matters connected with the appointment of teachers, their transfer and dismissal in the face of their increasing political activities amongst their pupils.
16. JMHA Contr. 101. File ML/274/50. Letter to Governor of Jerusalem signed by the Mayor, 'Umar al-Wa'ri, dated 15.8.55, containing resolution No.1480 of the Council.
17. For example, the number of taxis in 1965 was 600 while there were only two in 1949. Many of those belonged to refugees. (From a lecture delivered by Rawhi al-Khatib in a seminar in Beirut entitled: 'Development in Jerusalem from 15th May, 1948 to 15th March, 1965', found in JMHA.)
18. For further reading, including a detailed map on Hebronite business in the Old City, see Norman Gosenfeld's article 'Changes in Business Community of East Jerusalem' in *Hamizrah Hehadash*, vol.xxiv (1974) no.4 (96) pp.261-79 and Michael Roman's work entitled 'The Economic Development of Jerusalem' in *Jerusalem Atlas*.
19. The fact that many of these places were not supplied with proper arteries of communication connecting them with one another was pointed out by West Bankers also as further proof that the Hashemites never intended properly to defend these places. Later, road access to the FVs was developed. This facilitated travel for the local villagers to their markets in the eastern areas, as well as for the army defence and control. (See articles in *Filastin* 24/25.1.52.)
20. For further reading see the relevant articles in A.Shmueli, D.Gross-

- man, and R.Ze'evy (eds), *Judea and Samaria. Studies in Settlement Geography* (Geography Departments of the Bar-Ilan and Tel Aviv Universities (Hebrew), Cnaan Publishing House, Jerusalem, 1977) vol.1.11, 373pp.
21. Prior to 1948, Dura served as the centre of some 90 villages and *khirbas* whose inhabitants were all related to the four clans of Dura and carried their names. As a result of the 1948 war, Dura lost some 30 of its *khirbas*. A report in 1955 on Dura notes that there were about 12 000 inhabitants and 2000–3000 refugees (mostly from the occupied *khirbas*) all living in 60 *khirbas*. These were separated into two groups: those on the mountain around the townlet, and those in the 15 *khirbas* along the border. The report sheds some light on the conflicts between the two factions within Dura and points out that the western *khirbas* were not represented by any of the *mukhtars* living in the village. (SA JUPR. Contr. 2865/1.) The Jordanian 1961 census put the number of Dura inhabitants at 3852. See the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Dept of Statistics, First Census of Population & Housing 18.11.61. vol.1. *Final tables. General characteristics of population: geographic location; personal & cultural characteristics* (Amman, April 1964) p.13.
 22. Salah Hanun, a non-refugee from Tulkarm, today a teacher in Nur-Shams camp, claimed his family used to be one of the most wealthy in the area, but as a result of the war lost all its property. 'Though I still own my old house, I see myself as a refugee', he said. (Interview in Nur Shams camp on 14.2.1974.)
 23. It is suggested that apart from Ramallah, where many urban refugees ended up, the refugees, notwithstanding their image, were relatively passive and disunited politically. Ramallah was eventually to be 'taken over' economically by the refugees of Jaffa, Ramle and Lydda. The sons of Ramallah's eight clans were later scattered throughout the USA, becoming well-to-do American citizens who contributed generously, annually, to the maintenance of Ramallah and its development. (In the course of the field research by the author of this paper in August 1973, carried out in the USA, some thirty figures from Ramallah, Al-Bira, Jerusalem and Bethlehem were interviewed.) The Ramallah community was the only one found to be organised in a confederation. It had a newspaper named *Hadhihi Ramallah* (This is Ramallah), published in Detroit. Owing to the high rate of assimilation of the new generation an English edition was brought out simultaneously with the Arabic one. The number of Ramallah's sons in the USA is roughly estimated at 8000 to 10 000.
 24. 'Abd al-Majid Muhammad Tamyizi, Idna's school headmaster in an interview in Idna on 3.4.74.
 25. Shakir Nimr Shakir al-'Amlah and Isma'il Muhammad 'Abd al-Hadi (the village council secretary). Interviews in Beit Aula on 27.3.74.
 26. Shaykh Muhammad Khalil Frayjat and Shaykh Sirhan Sulayman Ibn Ghayad (interviews held on the Ramadin's lands in Khirbat Sana' al-Jabiri, 20.2.1974). They originated from the *khirba* named Khwaylfah, which belonged to Dura village, and was populated partly by the Ramadin. (Interview held with Hamzah Muhammad Khalil Abu 'Alan

- in Zahiriyyah on 10.4.74.) Moshe Sharon suggested further that a few members of the tribe were also living near 'Azzun village (Tulkarm area) (interview in Jerusalem, December, 1974). See also his unpublished work 'Shivtay ha-Beduum ha-Nodedim be-Nafot Hevron u-Bayt-Lehem' (Hebrew) (The nomadic Bedouin tribes in the Bethlehem, Hebron regions) (August 1970) pp.71-2.
27. Details from Musa Sulayman Ibn Ghayad (Interview held in Sana' al-Jabiri on 20.2.74).
 28. The Jordanian government's policy with regard to the Bedouin refugees is discussed later in this paper.
 29. Jamil Mustafa Walwil (Kafar Saba's *mukhtar*) (interview held in Qalqilya on 12.3.74) and Hajj Husayn Sabri, the former mayor of the town (interview held there on 28.2.74). Some 200 Kafar Saba people are found also in Jalazun, 'Aqbat Jabr, Tulkarm, Balata, Far'a and Amman camps. About 900 of them live in Qalqilya, mostly in a new refugee camp set up as late as 1965 and named after their own village. A small number are found in frontier villages in this area.
 30. As opposed to the refugees from all other nearby places, a few Kafar Saba people had marriage ties with the local Qalqilya folk, dating back to the nineteenth century. Although this did not help these refugees economically, it had some bearing on their attempts to reestablish themselves in Qalqilya.
 31. One of Battir's teachers interviewed put it as follows: 'We wanted to live with the refugees peacefully, but that was impossible because the refugees were anxious to infiltrate back to their lands, and that was against the local wish because attacks from Israel would be on us. In addition, there were many refugees who resented the fact that some local villages were able to continue to benefit from the use of their lands on the other side of the border while they could not.'
 32. 'Awni Manasrah (interview in Wadi Fukin on 29.3.74).
 33. An interesting source, although only partially published, is the memoirs of the late Moshe Sharett, the former Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, which appeared in the Israeli daily, *Maariv*. His notes on 18.1.55 concerning the pressures to respond to the murder at 'Ajjur, described his fear of authorising such an operation. 'From the security point of view, the retaliation would serve no ends. On the contrary, it would serve as an opening link to a new outbreak of bloodshed on the frontier' (*Maariv*, 17-21,6,74).
 34. As one of the interviewed former senior British officials put it: 'They did not get the rifles and ammunition they felt they deserved, as you can never know in which direction the gun is going to shoot...'. The interviewee asked to remain nameless.
 35. The Arabs rejected Israel's suggestion of erecting fences on the demarcation line as a measure against infiltration, on the grounds that it 'might imply recognition of either Israel or the existing borders'. See Fred J.Khoury, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (Syracuse University Press, 1969) p.185.
 36. See P.J.Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan. A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1952* (New York, 1967) p.81.

37. Ahmad Khalil Muhammad 'Amir – the former head of the National Guard in al-Majd (interviewed on 13.3.74). Glubb said, 'We were too poor, we could give them no more'. (First interview held in Mayfield, England, on 21.12.73.)
38. See review on a meeting of Nablus area MPs in *Filastin*, 11.2.53, and a presentation by the Jerusalemite Ba'thist 'Abdallah Na'was in *ibid.*, 17.2.53.
39. *Ibid.*, 12.2.53.
40. In Rummana village the National Guard did not include any refugees from the hundreds living on the village lands, as it was directed against those among them who were constantly infiltrating. In the frontier villages the 'Returnees' were considered as natives. (Muhammad 'Abd al-Fattah Abu 'Ummayir: interview, *op.cit.*)
41. *Filastin*, 30.3.53.
42. Glubb added that the town folk were reluctant to guard the borders even though the frontier was only a few kilometres west. 'For them the frontier villages were the buffer they wanted reinforced, without too much effort on their own behalf'. (Second interview held in Mayfield on 7.2.77.)
43. See *al-Jihad*, dated 15.2.54. Poor economic possibilities are emphasised in all official publications as a reason for the small army and the limitations imposed. Another was the fact that Great Britain did not support the National Guard. See *'Ishrun 'Aman min al-Jihad wa al-bina'*, 1952–1972 (Twenty years of Struggle and Construction) (Amman, 1972), p.56.
44. Interviewed villagers who complained of the government's neglect of the FVs said that the government officials seldom toured the FVs and that most such visits dealt with security problems, infiltration and smuggling. This, they claimed, reflected the government's attitude to their problems. See *Filastin*, 17.8.58, which described such an event where the Area Commander visited the Hebron FVs and ordered the villagers to be loyal to the King. *Al-Jihad* daily of 18.8.58 tells of a similar meeting in the Qalqilya area where the local inhabitants also condemned Communism and smuggling activities.
45. SA JUPR. Letter to Minister of Interior in response to Nablus DG Recommendation No. 1/297/5/11633 and 4/8/6225 dated 17.8.50. The Nablus Area Commander suggested passing a new defence law which would have prohibited any Arab from moving in the enemy's territory as he felt that the law, based on No.55 of 18.6.48, was not effective enough. (*Ibid.*, to Chief of Staff (COS) 1/297/5/11633 dated 5.8.50.)
46. For example SA JUPR MNM/5N. Confd. Headquarters Arab Legion ALG/1/9/2998, Subject Allocation of Interrogation Duties to Amman Police and all Osc. Dists. Signed by Glubb, COS on 1.8.51.
47. The Bedouin shaikhs became rich and influential by expanding their smuggling network. One example of this was found in the Bani Sakhr Bedouin, whose smuggling activities were supported by their leaders, whether politicians or senior army personnel. Another example was the Huitat tribes. According to unpublished Egyptian reports, their smuggling activities were run by al-Sharif Nasir Bin Jamil, King Husain's uncle,

who was one of the most influential figures in the kingdom. He received assistance in these operations from one of the most influential notables in the Hebron area. (Egyptian Unpublished Records (found in Israel's State Archives), Report No. SWY/T/3/2 (220) dated 21.7.58.)

48. See *Filastin*, 1.8.49. The case of three refugees caught smuggling into Israel, jailed in Nablus.
49. For full text signed by the Army COS, see *ibid.*, 14.6.49. The Jerusalem police also warned the local inhabitants against infiltrating into the Jewish areas (*ibid.*, 4.8.49). An item on 6.9.49 referred to the sentences of those caught in smuggling relief items to Israel. For further details on those punished for infiltration, espionage and thefts on the other side, see *ibid.*, 18.11.49; 4.1.50; 23.11.50 and 25.10.52.
50. *Ibid.*, 1.8.49.
51. *Ibid.*, Amman Police Commander to Hebron AC A/18/1/1884 dated 23.5.52 and 13.1.44369 dated 23.12.52.
52. *Ibid.* Report from Hebron AC to the Chief of Staff MKH/1/38/3586 dated 14.10.50.
53. *Ibid.* Order No.28 signed by the Minister of the Interior 2/49/2429 dated 23.2.54.
54. Order by Ahmad Sidqi al-Jundi who recalled certain incidents of shooting on inhabitants inside Israel. MQM/7/18900 dated 7.8.54.
55. Report from Hebron AC to the Army COS on two refugees from Aqbat Jabr Camp caught with automatic weapons and sentenced. Letter MKH/21/50/717/58/4968 dated 9.7.58.
56. The Egyptians operated mainly through their Consulate in Jerusalem until it was closed in 1957. A secret Jordanian report gave details of 12 people from the Hebron area who were paid by the Consulate for infiltrating into the Gaza Strip, and bringing arms supplied by the Army there back to the West Bank (SA JUPR File entitled 'The Activities of the Egyptian Consulate in Jerusalem', Letter AS/2/24/974 dated 4.9.57). The price paid for each arms smuggling operation was 59 Jordanian Dinars.
57. SA JUPR. Letter from Defence Minister to Minister of Interior. No. 5/1/k/6635 dated 31.8.50 and file titled 'The Refugee Camps'. Letter from DG to Assistant Military Governor. KH/29/1/2387 dated 5.6.50.
58. The DG asked the AC to look into the possibility of transferring the refugees in Qalqilya to Marj Na'jah, but the answer was that there was no need for the move as most refugees were renting dwellings (SA JUPR. File T/20/1/2 letter dated 13.1.52). Later, a request for a camp to be established there, or for the refugees to be transferred to Nablus was presented by refugees living there (*ibid.*; a request to be transferred to Balata and Nur Shams Camps was presented in 1955).
59. Shaik 'Atiyah 'Id Ibn Rabi-a of the Zarabah tribe ('Azazmah), explained Glubb's policy: 'He wanted to transfer the Negev Bedouin to the East Bank and amalgamate them with all other Trans-Jordanian Bedouin as against the rest of the Palestinians. Later, Glubb warned the local East Bank Bedouin about the Negev Bedouin whom, he claimed, dealt in smuggling and spying for the Jews against Jordanian interests. This warning followed Glubb's realisation that the 'Azazmah were not

- obedient like his Trans-Jordanian Bedouin'. (Interview in Edh-Dhahiriya on 24.6.74).
60. Shaikh Ibn Rabia went on to say: 'Glubb approached me in 1955 and offered me personally money, land and a tractor if I would convince the tribe to go to Azraq. . . He [Glubb] exerted direct pressure on me and instructed the army commanders here to neglect the Bedouin refugee demands, making them thereby accept the plan'. This was his explanation for the departure of the Sawannah who, he claimed, were threatened by Glubb and left for the East Bank (interview 24.6.74). The shaikhs of Ramadin supported this version (interview, op.cit.).
 61. The Flock Pasture Prohibition Law, enacted by the Parliament in 1956, which aimed at protecting some 35 villages on both sides of the Jordan River, hurt the landless Bedouin refugees and threatened to dispossess them. See *al-Manar* newspaper, 4.8.56. Furthermore, the question of water proved to be crucial, especially in the dry years, for those Bedouin who raised flocks or cultivated land. UNRWA provided them with water depending on the availability of the water tanks.
 62. The Bili tribe requested to be transferred to a place where it could engage in agriculture. (SA Contr. 2870-9. File KH/2/99, p.8. Petition signed by Shaikh Muhammad Ma'sad al-Harafi.)
 63. In May 1952 the Tulkarm DG added his recommendation, on the same grounds mentioned above, to a request of the camp's notables who asked for the transfer of the whole camp from Nur Shams (*ibid.*, p.56). Fearing their transfer eastwards, many Qalqilya refugees ordered to register at the local police station did not do so (*ibid.*, p.19).
 64. As was the case in Fawar Camp, upon Jean Chapiro's, UNRWA's Deputy Representative in Jordan, visit there, although others indicated their adamant refusal. SA JUPR. Letter from Hebron AC to the Political Dept Army Headquarters. MKHM/1/33/B35. 28.2.58.
 65. Hasan Qasim Muhammad al-Najjar recalled on his transfer from Idna, that the refugees protested as 'There, we were near our homes and here we are locked between two valleys' (interview in Fawar Camp, 20.2.74).
 66. See *Filastin*, 6.4.52.
 67. For further reading about the geographic developments which took place in the West Bank under the Hashemite rule, see Elish'a Efrat's article 'Changes in the Pattern of Settlements in Judea and Samaria, 1947-1967', *Hamizrah Hehadash*, No.91 (1973) pp.283-95 (including maps) and 'The Distribution of Settlement in Judea and Samaria', vol.xx, No.3 (79) (1970) pp.257-65, Noshe Brawer's articles, 'Village Sprawl and Village Pattern in Judea and Samaria'; and 'Frontier Villages in Western Samaria' in *Judea and Samaria Studies in Settlement Geography*, ed. A.Shmueli, D.Grossman and R.Ze'evy (Jerusalem, 1977) pp.367-83, 411-22.
 68. In an interview (Jerusalem on 28.1.75) al-Khatib said, 'I was in favour of establishing villages on the border like [the Israeli] "Nahal", but got no encouragement. We wanted to fortify the border and thicken it and build villages and camps there, but Glubb was against it and both kings supported Glubb's view'. See also al-Khatib's interview in *al-Hayat*, 15.6.53. The government did not accept UNRWA's proposition to set

- up two refugee camps for the refugees living in al-Tur, a suburb of Jerusalem. This project was part of the proposed resettlement schemes whereby every refugee would receive 20 dunums near the Abu Dis village. However, later a modest project was established further east near neighbouring al-'Izariyah by the Voluntary Agencies.
69. On 11 March 1953, as Minister of Development and Reconstruction (MDR) Anwar Nusayba announced the intention of building 12 model villages of 350 housing units for the refugees in the frontier areas of the West Bank. He said the refugees there would be given land and equipment. The press further maintained that work had begun in the first village and that this was part of a large agricultural and industrial programme. A more detailed announcement was published by the MDR on 9 August of that year, specifying the cost of \$1 000 000 – which UNRWA allocated for this project.
 70. For example, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, *Inkadh Filastin* (Salvation of Palestine) (Damascus, 1950) pp.182–3.
 71. See Muhammad al-Qadi *Masra' al-'Adalah* (The Fall of Justice) (Beirut, 1954) pp.104–5.
 72. SA JUPR file entitled 'Refugee Affairs, Bethlehem area', Order No. 145 of Minister of Interior. No.29/9/13136, dated 29.11.54, ruled against any transfer of ration cards to Amman as the refugees there were 'a risk to public security'.
 73. *Ibid.* Letter from MDR to Minister of Defence, No.1/11/20/3663 dated 18.8.57.
 74. *Ibid.* Letter from UNRWA's Hebron Area Officer, Ishaq Duzdar to the government's Hebron DO 5/SC/9-A-L (57 dated 6.1.60 which discusses the case of the Wadi Fukin people residing in Dahaysha Camp whose evacuation the Agency Area Officer demanded, but which never took place. As mentioned previously UNRWA had to cope with their presence in that camp as of the mid-1950s. The government constantly intervened on their behalf and demanded that UNRWA should regard them as refugees in the full sense and provide them with tents. On 15.8.60, the government's Bethlehem Area Officer notified the Governor of Jerusalem that these villagers requested asbestos shelters in Dahaysha Camp, like every true refugee there, and that he is of the opinion that they deserve it. Letter B/50/34/2/1039).
 75. As of 1949, the Jordanian records indicate numerous attempts on behalf of the government to represent the case of the frontier villages to the Agency. In January 1951 a 'final' agreement between the two parties was reached according to which 68 villages would be regarded as frontier villages and thereby receive the Agency's aid. (File KH/29/3 Letter from MDR to the Agency's Director 1.10.213, dated 24.1.51). But a few days later the Minister urged the inclusion of the towns of Tulkarm and Jenin plus another ten villages in the northern area.
 76. A booklet entitled *Shu'un al-Laji'in fi al'Urdunn* (Refugees Affairs in Jordan) published in 1953 by the Minister of Development and Reconstruction, summarised the government's attempts to arrange for those people to receive all the necessary help.
 77. The difficulties arising from this subject are discussed in an article by

- the author of this paper entitled 'Who Is a Palestinian Refugee? The attempts to define the refugee status and the problems that evolved around this in Jordan after the 1948 War' (to be published shortly).
78. See *Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge. Bulletin International des Societes de la Croix Rouge* (Supplement June 1949) vol.11, No.6, p.200.
 79. Those people were not, of course, native to the country, but they had nearly all resided in Palestine for a great length of time. It was reasonable, therefore, to admit their claims since, having stayed in Jerusalem, they could be placed in the same category as the 'poor inhabitants'. See *ibid.*, pp.201–2.
 80. For further reading see the International Committee of the Red Cross (CRC) *Relief Scheme For the Poor of Jerusalem* (Geneva, 1950) and ICRC Reports of 1950 (p.75) and 1951 (p.63).
 81. *Filastin*, 26.11.49. In response to UNRWA's decision to attend to some FVs, the council of Beit Jala approached the Agency in the hope the townlet would be included in this category as well.
 82. SA JUPR. ICRC's Hebron delegate protested to the DO about the disorder in Dura village, and stopped the relief operation there until the government agreed to look into the situation and update the inflated lists of relief recipients. (Signed by M.Perrott.) Letters No.1759 dated 1.11.49.
 83. The frontier villages in the Hebron area were organised under the umbrella organisation of 'The Front Line Villages Congress', headed by Yusuf 'Abbas 'Amru and Muhammad al-Qadi. The FVs demanded they be considered refugees and receive assistance accordingly: employment, tax exemption, grants and loans for agricultural development, and the establishment of development projects by the government. In 1954, the Jenin area FVs, after organising themselves, made similar demands.
 84. The demands of the frontier villagers to have themselves regarded as refugees were supported by a few politicians who bothered to attend to their plight. Kemil 'Ariqat, who concentrated on the east Jerusalem frontier villages, and 'Abdallah N'was from the Ba'th party, were both very active in this area after the 1950 elections. The former continued to represent their case through the 1950s as 'The Refugee Spokesman'.
 85. A report on al-Burj village's losses in the war, which included recommendations that the government should attend to the poor village, was answered by the Hebron Area Commander on 24.5.53, who said such help should come from UNRWA (SA JUPR Contr 148/25 report by DG). The files contain many requests from FVs for economic assistance, and also protests from them that no aid was given even after the Israeli attacks on the villages. (The case of al-Jab'ah. File KH/3/38 dated 19.4.50.) The village inhabitants also claimed that a large portion of the meagre assistance they had received was taken by their *mukhtars*.
 86. SA JUPR. Letter from Eric Evans, UNRWA's District Works Officer to the Hebron DG Subject: Integration of Refugees. Ref.WO/4/10D (716) dated 29.1.51. The letter detailed in length the various items stipulated in the UNRWA–Government agreement to that effect.
 87. Battir's influential leader – Hasan Mustafa (who was an UNRWA

senior worker and was, therefore, able to arrange for his village to be cared for by the Agency which established various work and self-help schemes) – set up a school and clinic and built a road to the village, although no real refugees had lived there since 1949 (interviews with Jean Chapiro (UNRWA) held in Jerusalem 10.9.74, and in Battir on the 29.3.74). This case, however, was an exception.

88. Following the visit of UNRWA's Director to the FV. See *UNRWA Special Report of the Director Concerning other Claimants for Relief* (pursuant to paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 818 (ix). General Assembly Official Records: Tenth Session Supplement No.15A (A/2978/Add.1. New York, 1955) p.1.
89. The combined efforts of the following organisations:

| | |
|------|---|
| CARE | Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere |
| SOIR | Swedish Organisation for Individual Relief |
| LWF | Lutheran World Federation |
| CRS | Catholic Relief Services |
| NECC | Near East Council of Churches |
| SSCF | Swedish Save the Children Federation |
| CDF | Community Development Foundation |
| SIRA | Swedish International Relief Association |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| SFCA | Swedish Free Church Aid |
| MCC | Mennonite Central Committee |
| CS | Community Services |

With the allocations received from the American 'Point Four Plan', some improvement in the life of the villages took place. In al-Burj, for example, the remaining water source was roofed in 1953.

90. The size of these projects was examined through reviewing unpublished Voluntary Agency papers, reports and annual reports of the International Christian Committee, Jerusalem (for example, its *Annual Report 1975*, prepared by Elias Khoury, Executive Secretary of the West Bank Area of the Middle East Council of Churches' Services Department) or the Near East Ecumenical Committee for Palestine Refugees *Annual Report 1973*, p.19.
91. For example, today Qalqilya has over 30 doctors most of whom are working abroad (interview with Dr Fysal 'Abd al-Rahim Sab' held in Qalqilya on 28.2.74).
92. For further reading see Avi Plascov, 'A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives', *Adelphi Papers*, No.163 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

Index

- Abbushi family, 118, 142
Abbushi, Haj Muhammad Sayyid, 101
Abd al-Hadi family, 23, 104, 138, 142, 171 n.71, 182; landed property, 175 n.159
Abd al-Hadi, Awni Bey, 104, 190, 196
Abd al-Hadi, Mahmud, Nablus palace, 48–9
Abd al-Hadi, Nazmi Bey, 104, 130, 174 n.156; quoted by Firestone, 102, 119, 133, 136, 171 n.71
Abd al-Qadir, 48
Abd al-Rahman, Haj Ibrahim, 104
Abd al-Rahman, Effendi Nabulsi, 174 n.138
Abd al-Rahman, Effendi Tamini, 174 n.138
Abdullah, King of Jordan, 205, 207
Abu Dis, 229 n.6
Abu Diyyak, 152
Abu Ghosh clan, 182
Abu Hantash family, 142
Abu Kishk, 214
Abu Nabbut, 39
Abu Shaban, 54
Abu Shusha, 25, 26
Acre, 24, 26, 41, 49, 109, 189; port facilities, 11, 13, 19–20, 46, 55; economic, 13–15, 18–20, 27, 43–7, 55, 60, 65; industry, 14–15, 46, 135; population, 23, 27, 43–5, 57; Egyptian occupation, 43; Ottoman garrison, 45, 46; tax-farming, 46–7; Acre to Damascus railway, 25
'Affula, 112; – to Nablus railway, 111
'Affula–Mas'udiya railway, 112
Agricultural Mortgage Company, 99
agriculture, agricultural production, 2, 11, 91; marketing the surplus, 12–13, 19; north and south Palestine diversification, 16, 59; capitalist penetration, 22, 55–6, 99, 157; implements, 55, 87 n.220, 129–30; taxation under the Mandate, 95–6; price fluctuations, 96, 97, 101, 133; 1930 crisis, 97, 98; village credit co-operatives, 99, 101, 198; need for stable peasantry, 99–100; socio/economic causes of increased demand, 104–5, 114, 131, 166; unit of production, 126; costs of, 126–36, 161; plantation, 144, 145; crop production, 1927–42, 166; and class solidarity, 177; spread of cash-crops, 188; *see also* land tenancy agreements *and* peasantry agriculture, subsistence, 113–14, 117–19; joint farming, 118–19; and surplus labour (the 'family farm'), 121–3, 124, 126, 132–4, 135; role of the clan (*hamula*), 124, 142, 175 n.159; concept of subsistence, 135
agricultural products, 112, 130, 138; citrus fruits, 2, 6, 13, 16, 91, 103, 104, 130, 144, 145, 150, 198, 215;

- grain, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 33, 53, 106, 130, 132; olives (oil), 10, 13, 16, 17, 33, 38, 106, 130–1, 135, 139–40, 163, 198; sesame, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 33, 38, 97, 106, 132, 140
- Alavi, H., 177
- Aleppo, 31
- Alexandria, 20, 31
- Algeria, share-cropping, 122;
Algerians in Palestine, 38
- Allush, Naji, on composition of al-Istiqlal, 196; urban notables, 197
- Al-Am'ari, Muhammad Adib, and Arab land-holdings, 231 n.3
- America, 20, 40
- American Civil War, 14, 15, 50
- American point iv Plan, 228, 241 n.89
- 'Amman, 8, 219, 231 nn.1, 15, 235 n.29; economic development, 207–8; Jordanian policy, 209, 210, 225; influx of refugees and migrants, 225, 226
- 'Amru, Yusuf 'Abbas, 240 n.83
- Arab Agricultural Bank, 101, 102
- Arab Higher Command, union of factional elements, 178, 192, 194, 195, 196
- Arab–Israeli War, 1948, 179, 180, 203, 204, 205, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214; behaviour of refugees, 212; War of 1967, 1, 229
- Arab League, 225
- Arab Palestinian Party, Hussaini faction, 192, 194
- Arab Revolt, 1936–9, 5, 113, 145, 151, 154, 192, 195
- Arabia, 20, 40; Arabic language, 187
- Arafat, Taufiq Effendi Ahmad, 174 n.138
- al-Arif, Arif, 30, 32, 33
- 'Ariqat, Kamil, 240 n.84
- Armenians in Palestine, 28
- 'Arraba, 23, 107, 111, 171 n.71; Abd al-Hadis, 175 n.159
- Artas, wedding disturbance, 183–4
- al-Asali, Musa, 32
- al-Asali, Sulaiman, 32, 80 n.86
- Ashkenazim, 30–1
- Asia Minor, 13, 17, 19, 20
- 'Askar, refugee camp, 214
- Athlit Salt Company, 97
- Atlit quarries, 149
- Austria, 17, 20, 21, 46; wages, 29, 68; shipping, 46; Jews from, 48; Austrian Consul, 11, 35–6; Austrians in Palestine, 37
- Avicrino, vice-Consul, 46, 85 n.165
- Azraq, 214
- Badran, N. A., 102
- Baghdad, 31
- bakshish*, and land registration, 26
- baladis*, 17
- Balata, refugee camp, 214, 235 n.29, 237 n.58
- Baldensperger diary, 32
- Balfour Declaration (and a Jewish national home), and the British Mandate, 4–5, 92
- Balkans, 20, 48
- Balqa', *sanjak*, 189
- Banu Zeid, Barghuti/*fellaheen* conflict, 184, 200 n.21
- Barclay's Bank, loans by, 99, 101
- Barghuti clan, conflict with *fellaheen*, 184, 200 n.21
- Barghuti, Dr Abd al-Latif, 200 n.21
- Basala (Austrian Consular Agent), 54
- Ba'thists, 179, 240 n.84
- Battir, 217, 231 n.6, 235 n.31, 240–1 n.87
- Bedouin, 15, 52, 214; economic, 17, 19; industry, 53, 54; incursions by, 17, 108, 213, 216, 224; the *quabilah*, 214; West Bank refugees, 213, 214; of Hauran, 19; of Negev, 53, 237 n.59; Qur'an Bedouin, 214–15; Taomira, 39; of Bani Sakhr, 236 n.47; of Sinai, 53; smuggling operations, 213, 216, 222, 236 n.47
- Begin, Menachim, and non-Jewish citizens, 179
- Beirut, 2, 19, 31, 33; economic, 24, 36, 46; Templars, 44; domination of Acre, 46–7; missions, 187

- Beit Aula, refugee camp, 213, 223–4
 Beit Jala, 210, 217, 227, 240 n.81;
 agriculture, 29, 32, 52, 80 n.86;
 Qaisi faction, 182
 Beit Qad, 103
 Beit Safafa, 217, 231 n.6
 Beit Sahur, 227
 Beitunya, Yemeni/Muslim village,
 182
 Bekaa Valley, 90
 Belgium, 139
 Ben Arie, statistical tables, 26, 57,
 110, 171 n.76
 Benachnou, M. A., share-cropping
 (*khammes*) in Algeria, 122
 Beni Zeid, Baraghteh/*fellaheen*
 conflict, 184
 Bergheim, Melville, 25, 83
 Bergheim, Peter, murder of, 26
 Bergheim family, 25–6
 Bethlehem, 31, 39, 205, 210, 229 n.6;
 devotional articles, 33, 40, 55;
 industry, 10, 40; occupational
 structure, 29, 39, 40, 55, 72; urban
 development, 26, 39–40; Lahham
 clan, 182
 Bili, Bedouin tribe, 214, 238 n.62
 Bohemia, glassware from, 50, 51
bourgeoisie, acquisition of land, 23,
 56, 197; in Acre, 46; amorphous
 character, 196–7; hegemonic class
 of urban notables, 197; regional
 dichotomy, 198–9; link with
 landed class, 199; Arab, 199
 Britain, 13, 14, 20, 21, 89, 93; British
 Consul, 11, 15, 17–18, 19, 20, 32,
 38; British Mandate, 2, 90, 92, 93,
 94, 95, 116, 203, 204; British in
 Palestine, 1917 invasion, 1; socio/
 economic analysis, 3, 92ff; 144,
 155; colonial features, 4, 92–3, 98,
 105, 144, 180, 185, 191, 192, 194,
 196, 197; capitalist sector, 92, 105;
 army of occupation, 1917–18, 92,
 108, 153–4; ‘open door’ trading
 relations, 93; expenditure on
 public services and welfare, 94,
 167; monetary system, 94–5;
 taxation, 95–7, 98; customs duties,
 tariffs, 96–8; policy towards Arab
 agriculturalists, 97, 98, 99, 100;
 economic status of land, 103–4,
 114; Arab landowners, 154
 Bukovina, Jews from, 48
 al-Burj, *mukhtar* of, 232 n.7; war
 losses, 240 n.85
 Bustani Brothers, 187
 Bustros, Habib, 24
 Caboga, Count (Austrian Consul in
 Jerusalem), 36
 capitalism, capitalists; Jewish/Arab
 (capitalist/pre-capitalist)
 interaction, 4, 6, 7; and rural
 change, 6; and religious
 penetration of Palestine, 11; and
 profit from trade, 18; and
 agricultural production, 22;
 penetration into land tenure, 23,
 56, 118, 119–21; incorporation of
 rural credit, 102; integration into,
 105–6, 154; Palestine terrain, 197–
 9
 Chatham House Survey, 1953,
 frontier villages, 205
 Chesney, General F. R., 37
 Chevallier, Dominique, the money-
 lender and rural economy, 103
 China, 97
 Christ Church, Jerusalem, 28, 29
 Christians in Palestine, 3, 10, 110,
 182; demographic, 23, 24, 42, 43,
 52, 84 n.136, 187; holy places, 26,
 27–8, 32, 40–1; occupational
 structure, 30, 54; location, 42, 43,
 52, 84 n.136; cultural identity, 185;
millet system, 187
 Circassians in Palestine, 48, 86
 n.176, 179
 clan affiliation, 181, 214; Qaisi and
 Yemeni factions, 181–2, 184; and
 patronage, 181, 183, 184, 193
 clan alliances and organisations, 187;
 Jerusalem based/Nablus based
 factionalism, 190, 192; socially
 based power, 190, 191
 class formation, inhibiting factors,
 174, 179; and factionalism, 193–9;

- politics of, 193, 194, 197;
 solidarity, 193–4
 Cohen, A., peasant indebtedness, 108
 colonialism, Jewish, 179; *see also*
under British in Palestine
 colonisation, European, 3, 4, 7, 11,
 27; Jewish colonists, 23, 179;
 source of future conflict, 26, 56;
 and Jerusalem, 27; role of
 Templars, 43–5
 Commutation of Tithes, 1927
 Ordnance, 96, 157
 Comptoir d'Escompte, 38
 Conder, C.R., 23, 24–5; on Acre, 45
 confessionalism, and secular
 nationalism, 185–92, 193
 cost of living, Jerusalem, 1858, 1880,
 18; consumer prices, 66; peasant
 families, 134, 136; index, 136, 144
 cotton-growing, 13, 38, 55;
 influences on production and
 export, 14–16, 60, 61; boom years,
 14, 18, 19, 50; trade in
 manufactured goods, 31, 49;
 Egyptian involvement, 91
 Cotton Supply Association of
 Manchester, 15
 Crimean War, and Palestine
 economy, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, 27,
 33, 51, 55; building booms, 28–9,
 41, 55
 currency, Palestine pound, 4, 94–5
 customs duties, 96–8; lifted on olive
 oil and sesame seeds, 97, 140; per
 cent of government revenue, 136;
 regressive character, 136–7
 Cyprus, 20

 Dahaysha refugee camp, 217, 231
 n.6, 239 n.74
 al-Dabbag, Mustafa Murad, 50;
Biladuna Filastin, 12
 Damascus, 25, 31, 33, 49, 56, 111;
 cotton-growing, 14; missions, 187,
 189
 Dambmann, G., use of camels, 112
 Damiya Bridge, 214
Das Heilige Land, 38

 Dead Sea, 32; 'Stone of Moses'
 (*hajar musa*), 40; mineral
 resources, 31, 55, 207
 Deraa, Hijaz railway, 111
 De Sauley, President Comité
 Fondateur, Jaffa harbour project,
 35
 Dufferin, Lord, Jaffa–Jerusalem
 Railway company, 37
 Dura, 240 n.82; loss of politico/
 economic status, 211; *khirbas*,
 211, 234 n. 21, 234–5 n.26
 Duzdar, Ishaq, in Qalandya camp,
 233 n.11

 East Bank, 156, 214, 222, 232 n.10,
 237 n.59; Transjordanians, 206;
 relations with West Bank, 206,
 207, 208
 edh-Dhahiriya, 211
 education, 143, 233 n.15; and job
 opportunities, 156; mission
 schools, 187; secular, 187;
 Protestant and Russian Orthodox,
 187; voluntary associations, 189;
 228–9
Effendis, 190; land appropriations,
 23; and administrative posts, 100–
 1, 138 n.174
 Egypt, 6, 12, 31, 43, 53, 97, 198;
 British occupation, 11; Palestine
 exports, 13, 17, 19, 20, 50, 54, 139,
 140; cotton-growing, 15, 91;
 Jewish emigration, 31; occupation
 of Acre, 43; trade with Europe,
 51, 56; integration into world
 capitalist economy, 90, 91; soap
 industry, 140, 164; arms trade,
 216; illegal refugees in Jordan and
 Gaza, 222, 237 n.56; Egyptian
 Cattle Plague, 17; Egyptian
 Pound, 94
 Esdraelon, Valley of (Marj 'Ibn
 'Amir), 23, 24–5, 103; Bedouin in
 Valley, 108; Plain of, 107
 Europeans in Palestine, 2, 3, 10, 11,
 12, 26; socio/economic needs, 19,
 21, 45; denominational pilgrims,
 27–8; influence on agrarian sector,

- 55; and railways, 111; *see also* individual countries' exports, 2, 12, 20, 57; port facilities, 13, 57; changes in importance, 13–14, 15–16, 58–60; long-term structural change, 17, 62; causes of overall increases, 17–19, 62; market conditions and prices, 18, 63, 64; destination of profits, 18–19; and value of imports, 20; *see also* agricultural products
- factionalism, concept of, 177;
faction/class opposition, 177, 178;
political consequence, 178–80,
189, 191, 192; historical character,
181–4; fictive alliances (Qaisi–
Yemenu), 181–5; permeation of
urban and rural society, 191, 192;
leadership, 192, 194–5; and class
formation, 193–9; 'deflection' of
class solidarity, 193
- Fahmi, Hasan, 34–5
- Faisal, King of Iraq, 196
- family income and life-style,
peasant, effect of commoditisation
of products of surplus labour, 88,
127; vulnerability and instability,
128, 129–30; bride price, 137; role
of the clan (*hamula*), 142, 175
n.159; the family as economic
collectivists, 142–3; and socio/
economic inter-relationships, 143
- Far'a, refugee camp, 214, 235 n.29
- Farah family, 24
- Farah, Ya'q'ub, 84 n.136
- Federation of Arab Trade Unions,
195–6
- fida'iyun*, 223
- Finn, James, 15, 18–19, 80 n.87
- Finn, Mrs, olive yield of Beit Jala,
32, 80 n.86
- Firestone, Ya'kov, 3, 106; Jabal
Nablus agricultural economy, 106;
landlords' rent arrangements, 116,
172 n.91; livestock production,
117, 131; planting contracts (the
mugharasa), 118; purchase of
musha land by landowners, 123;
location of accessible land, 129;
redeployment of family labour,
134; quoting Nazmi Abd al-Hadi,
102, 119, 133, 136, 171 n.71
- First World War, 25, 91, 111, 112,
130, 132, 197; British occupation
of Palestine, 92, 108, 192
- 'Five Village Survey', 125–6, 240
nn.81 and 83, 240 n.85; private
land ownership, 124, 160, 172
n.99; cost of living, 134, 173 n.120;
government neglect, 236 n.44
- Flock Pasture Prohibition Law, and
Bedouin, 238 n.61
- France, 40–1, 186; trade with
Palestine, 13, 14, 15, 17; French
Consul, 11, 50, 84 n.136; French in
Palestine, 20, 28, 34–7 *passim*, 52,
111; French shipping, 35, 43, 46
- Frank, Gunder, and wage labour,
153–4
- French, Lewis, and money-lenders,
102; peasant/capitalists land
transfers, 104
- Front Line Village Congress, 240
n.83
- Fuad Pasha, (quoted by Zimpel), 37
- Galicia, Jews from, 48
- Galilee, 23–4, 103–4, 107, 146, 180
- Gatt, G., on soap production, 32,
53–4
- Gaza, 27, 111; agriculture, 2, 52,
198; economic, 32, 52–4, 135;
industry, 53–5; border infiltrations
in Gaza Strip, 222, 237 n.56
- Gellner, E., 186; 'patronage
society', 188
- Germany, 17, 20, 21; German
Consul, 11, 15, 23, 25, 37, 39;
Germans in Palestine, 20, 23, 25,
28, 36, 44; Templars, 3, 36–7, 43–4
- Glubb, Sir John, Jordanian Chief of
Staff, 218, 232 n.7; and border
control, 218–19, 236 n.42, 237
n.59; Bedouin relocation, 224, 238
n.60, 238–9 n.68
- Godelier, M., 193
- Gouin et Cie, 38

- Graham, Cyril, 37
 Grandqvist, H., bride price, 137;
 (with Jaussen), 183–4
 Grands Moulins, in Jaffa, 139
 Granott, A. (quoting official Turkish
 data), 109
 Granovsky, A., 96
 Greece, 13, 21, 140; Greek shipping,
 17, 43; Greeks in Palestine, 20, 23,
 24, 28, 39
 Guérin, V., 83 n.130; Nablus soap
 export, 50
 Gush'Etzyon, Jewish settlement,
 231–2 n.6
- Haddad, E., on Qaisi/Yemeni
 factions, 181–2
 Haifa, 8, 20, 28, 49, 109, 111; port
 facilities, 11, 13, 19, 26, 43, 46,
 106; export trade, 13–16, 18, 55,
 60, 65; urban development, 43;
 demographic, 43, 110, 195;
 harbour project, 93, 149, 151;
 Templar colony, 42, 43–5; Haifa
 to Acre carriageway service, 45;
 Haifa to Nazareth road, 25, 41, 45
 Hanun family, 142, 174 n.156
 al-Haras al-Watani, *see* Palestine
 National Guard
 al-Harithiya, Silat, 103
 Hauran, Bedouin (in quote), 11;
 Hauran Grain, 13, 16, 19, 27, 41,
 45–6; Hauran Portworkers,
 expulsion, 149
 Hebrew language, 230
 Hebron, 10, 31, 109, 205; glassware
 and waterbag industries, 33, 51–2,
 55, 87 n.203; Jewish holy city, 47;
 period of disasters, 51; viticulture,
 51, 52, 55; migration to Jerusalem,
 210–11; frontier land losses, 211
 Hijaz railway, 111, 198
 Hilmi, Ahmad, 102
 Himadeh, S.B., industrial census,
 139
 Hinden (with Horowitz), 136–7, 141
 Histadrut (Jewish trade union), 144,
 150; closed shop to non-Jewish
 workers, 145; power of, 155
- Hoexter, Miriam, Qaisi–Yemeni
 division, 182
 Hoffman (Templar Chairman), 36–7
 Hope-Simpson Report (socio/
 economic), 97; and money-
 lenders, 102; estimates of rent,
 128; costs of production, 132; cost
 of living estimates, 134
 Horowitz, D. (with Hinden), 136–7,
 141
 Hubayala Project, 231–2 n.6
 al-Khuri, Salim, 24
 al-Husri, Sati, 179
 Hussain, King of Jordan, 218, 236–7
 n.47
 al-Hussaini, Haj Amin, *mufti* of
 Jerusalem, 192, 196
 al-Hussaini, Hamdi, 195
 al-Hussaini, Umar Effendi, 26
 al-Hussaini family, 181, 190; v.
 Nashashibi family, 190, 193, 194
- Ibrahim, 39, Egyptian troops, 51
 Ibrahim, Rashid Haj, 102
 Idriss, H.S., rent in Morocco, 120–1
 Idna, land losses and refugee camps,
 213, 238 n.65
 Ijzim, 149
 immigration, 3, 5; Jewish, 29, 47,
 103, 145
 imports, 16, 31; value of, 20;
 countries of origin, 20–1, 56, 132,
 134; customs permits (*refdiyye*),
 20; re-imposition of controls, 132;
 and cost of living, 134, 136–7;
 government controls on
 agricultural commodities, 154;
 commodities, 20–1, 29, 56, 134,
 137, 138, 154, 173 n.133
 Imprisonment for Debt Ordinance,
 1931, 98
 India, 20, 93
 industry, 6, 140, 175 n.69, 198;
 manufacturing technique, 139;
 industries, building, 26–30, 131,
 138–9, 146, 147, 149; flour milling,
 138–9, 149; matches, 141; mining,
 144; textiles, 56; soap, 12, 13, 16,
 17, 53, 54, 87 n.218; areas of

- manufacture, 32, 38, 53, 54, 135, 138, (Nablus), 49, 50, 138, 139–40, 148–9; production method, 139–40; source of competition, 140–1, 164, 174 n.151
- intellectuals, intelligentsia, 186, 187, 196
- Islam, 186; Law of Inheritance, 113; prohibition on usury, 101
- Israel, creation as a State, 1, 7–8; and West Bank, 156, 203; link with West Bank through refugees, 230; and West Bank agriculture, 230; migration of professionals, 156; day migrant labour, 156–7; incorporation of Arab rural sector, 180; manipulation of Arab clan structure, 181; land acquisition, 203; and control of Arab Palestine, 203; and refugee ‘infiltration’ (by *fellaheen*), 215–216, 222; acts of terrorism against, 216; the army and, 216, 217, 218, 222; reprisals, 216, 218, 219, 223; rejects changes to Demarcation Line, 217
- Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement, 1949, 203, 217; creation of ‘No Man’s Land’, 205
- Israel–Jordan Demarcation Line, 8; socio/economic effects on frontier villages, 203–5, 210, 211, 231 nn.3 and 4; frontier changes, 211–15; border tension, 215–19, 223; crossings and infiltrations, 215–16, 217, 221–3; dispute over exact location, 217–19, 235 n.35; relocation of refugees, 223–6; plight of inhabitants, 226–7, 240 n.79; refugee/indigenous poor distinction, 226, 227; demands of frontier villages, 240 nn.83 and 84
- Istanbul, 31
- al-Istiqlal party, 179–80, 190, 192, 195–6, 201 n.33
- Italy, 13, 20, 21; Italians in Palestine, 20
- Jabal Amil, 90
- Jabal al-Khalil, 51, 52, 54, 183
- Jabal Nablus, 183; agriculture, 14, 104, 106, 108, 117–18, 130–2, 135; demographic, 107, 108, 110, 142–3, 145, 153; economic, 13, 89–90, 95, 105–7; geography and physical features, 7, 90, 103, 106–10, 123, 131, 141–2; identification, 106, 107, 156, 170 n.61; land ownership (*khirbas*), 108–9, 113–14, 123, 126, 127, 141; taxation (*ushr* and *aghnam*), 95–6; tithes, 96; customs duties, 96–7; transport and communication, 111–13; wage labour, 151–2; Civil Wars, 193
- Jabal al-Quds, Samhan clan, 80 n.87
- jabals*, 17, 23
- Jaffa, 19, 25, 28, 32, 109, 138, 198; port facilities, 11, 12–13, 19, 26, 33–4, 37–8, 106; Consulate, 11, 15; export trade and commodities, 13, 14, 16, 18, 38, 53, 55, 58, 59, 62; agriculture (cotton and oranges), 15–18, 33, 38, 198; price trends, 18, 62, 63, 64, 65; main imports, 1874–7, 1879–82, 20–1, 29, 67; Europeans in, 33–9; urban development, 38–9; Templar colony, 36–7, 44; Jaffa to Jerusalem railway, 37, 111; Jaffa to Jerusalem road, 22, 29, 33, 35–6, 83 n.123, 112; carriage service, 36, 45; traffic carried, 38, 71; income from, 38, 71; tolls, 171 n.82
- Jarrah family, 142, 182, 184
- Jaussen, 137 (with Grandqvist), 140, 183–4, 174 n.137, 175 n.159
- Jenin, 23, 106, 111, 112, 205, 211, 229; al-Yamun village co-operative, 101; land prices and ownership, 103, 109–10, 113, 118, 142, 158, 174 n.156; employment, 138, 148, 149; landless peasantry, 195; refugee camp, 214; Abd al-Hadis, Jarrars, Abbushis of, 142
- Jerusalem, 2, 11, 22, 189, 205; the holy city, 10, 26, 27–8, 31, 33, 47, 183, 189, 209; demographic, 23, 28–30, 55, 209, 210; economic, 18,

- 19, 30, 32, 101, 110, 189–90, 209–10, 226, 227, 229–30; industry and commerce, 10, 26, 28–9, 31–2, 33, 138, 210; pilgrims, tourists, and colonists, 27–8, 31, 33, 43, 52, 111, 183, 210; political, 181, 182, 183, 189, 190, 208–11; ‘poor’, 226, 227; Muslim Council, 226; post 1967 war, 229–30; Templar colony, 43–4; Jerusalem to Haifa railway, 198
- Jewish Agency, 5, 103, 180, 239 n.75, 240 n.81; definition of a refugee, 227; and eligibility for relief, 228; socio/economic facilities for refugees, 228–9
- Jewish National Fund, 231–2 n.6
- Jewish National Home, 103, 194; Balfour Declaration, 4, 92, 98; socio/economic incompatibility between settlers and hostile host, 194
- Jews in Palestine, 3, 7, 10, 43, 45; First Aliya, 3, 11; land purchases and acquisitions, 4, 5, 23, 24, 25, 100, 103, 106, 113, 115, 123, 128; and Jerusalem, 27, (‘taking possession’), 28, 30; industrial activity, 29, 94, 97, 139, 140, 141, 149; socio/economic classes, 31, 36, 47, 52; and a national home, 45, 90, 94; colonisation, 106; population figures, 110; pressure for immigration, 144, 204; influx into villages, 146; nationalism, 178
- Johnson-Crosbie Committee/ Report, and the economic conditions of agriculturalists, 1930, 125, 161; (quoted), 100; money lenders/merchants combination, 102; peasant landownership, 113; and the ‘family farm’, 126; and the ‘lot viable’, 126; and ‘cultivable area’ of Palestine, 126, 127; use of ‘cost accounting’, 126–7; per cent estimation of rent, 128; influences on productivity, 130; costs of production, 132; and collapse in world prices (1930s), 133; use of hired labour, 134–5; prices/tax payments relations, 135; communal expenditure, 137
- Jordan, 208; Palestine area of control, 8, 90; Hashemite Kingdom, 156, 203, 233 n.19; annexation of West Bank, 203; border Palestinians, 204–5, 206–9, 211; West Bank/East Bank disproportion, 206–7, 208; frontier problems and tensions, 208, 213, 215–18; refugees, 212–18, 228; Egyptian arms smuggling, 216, 222, 237 n.56; security policies, 218–19; dependence on Britain, 221; and border infiltration, 221–3, 236 n.45; resettlement of refugees, 223–6
- Jordanian Arab Legion (Arab Army), 218–20
- Jordanian High Command, 222
- Jouzi, 187
- Judea, 107; peasant land ownership (in dunums), 23–4; hill clan alliances, 182
- Kafar Saba, 235 nn.29 and 30
- Kamil Pasha, Mutasarrif, 36, 47
- Kanaan, Tawfiq, 104
- Karmon, Yehude, 51–2; quotes Seetzen, 51, 87 n.100
- Kayat, Consul, 15, 19
- Kerak, 8
- al-Khalidi, Abdallah, 32
- al-Khalidi, Yusuf Effendi, 36
- Khan al-Tujjar (Suq al-Khan), 40–2
- al-Khatib, Anwar, and resettlement villages, 225, 238–9 n.68
- kibbutz, the, slow evolution, 3
- Kitching, G.N., three forms of integration into capitalist system, 88, 90ff; on Kenya economy, 155–6
- labour power, conversion into a commodity, 88, 156; in Palestine, 90–1; cost of family labour, 133–4; delayed proletarianisation, 157

- Laclau, E., 91–2, 106
- Lahham clan of Bethlehem, 182
- Lake Hula, 14, 48
- land, purchase of, 2–5; individual ownership, 3, 21, 160; right of inheritance, 21, 113, 124, 126; price variations, 23, 103–4, 124; as an investment, 91, 123; commoditisation, 91, 103–4, 120, 127; peasant dispossession, 91, 104; transfers between Arabs, 104; village categories, 109; size and distribution of holdings, 109, 113, 156, 231 n.3; changes in economic status, 114, 122–3; inequality of access to, 123–4; pattern of accumulation, 126; constitution of ‘lot variable’, 126; ‘feddan’ unit, 128; and productivity, 130; soil erosion, 131; as a source of power, 156
- Land Code, 1858, 188
- Land Law of 1858 and Law of 1867, 21
- land registration, 2–3, 188; for *mulk* and *waaf* property, 2, 22–3; acquisition of title deeds, 25; *bakshish* demands, 26
- land settlement programmes, 96, 123, 159 n.5, 192, 231–2 n.6; *see also* ‘Five Village Survey’
- land tenancy systems, 6, 98, 102, 113, 114, 116, 122, 127–8; doctrine of patronage system, 183, 138; cash-rent, 116; joint-farming, 115, 116, 118–19, 120, 124, 148; the *mushaa* (peasant ownership), 2, 3, 11, 21, 22, 25, 56, 96, 108–9, 123–5, 171 n.71, 188, 189, 190; plantation contracts (the *mugharasa*), 118, 130–1; share-cropping, 102, 108, 115–19 *passim*, 128, 146, 183, 189, 191; share-rent contracts, 115, 116–17, 172 n.91
- landowners and merchants (grain), 24, 73, 118, 129, 131, 146, 141; new legal framework, 21, 91; right of inheritance, 21; creation of large areas, 22, 56, 109; land purchases, 24, 25, 103, 123, 124; absentee landlords, 121, 142, 188, 189, 198; rentier class, 141, 142; control of peasantry, 154–5; and factional power, 190–1; diffuse Arab Revolt, 194
- Latron, A., payment of interest on credit, 136
- Law of Mortgage Amendment Ordinance, 1931, 98
- League for National Liberation, 180, 195
- League of Nations Mandate, 1922, 92, 93
- Lebanon, 3, 90; imports from Palestine, 12, 13, 19, 23; and world capitalist economy, 90, 91; silk trade, 91; confessionalism, 186; Lebanese in Palestine, 2, 28, 33
- Lehman, David, concept of ‘units of production’, 126
- locust plagues, 15, 16, 107, 172 n.87
- Loehnis, H., 23
- Luncz, occupational structure of Jerusalem, 1877, 30, 31, 70
- Lydda, 198, 211; soap factories, 32, 38, 50
- Madbak, former Prussian Consular Agent, 54
- Malta, 13, 29
- al-Mamluk, Yusuf, tax-farmer, 46
- Marj Ibn ‘Amir, 23, 24–5, 103
- Marlowe, John, 100
- Maronites, in Palestine, 23, 187
- Marseilles, pilgrims from, 27
- Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, 35
- Marx, Karl, analysis of rent, 119–20, 121; on agricultural land tenure, 125; on capitalist production, 153
- al-Masri family, 199
- al-Masri, Taha Effendi, 174 n.138
- Mas ‘udiya to ‘Affula railway line, 135
- al-Mazar, 231 n.5
- Middle East, 141, 154, 156, 178

- Miklasiewicz (Austrian Consular Agent), 48, 85 n.172
- Mikveh Israel Agricultural School, 26
- money; 120; use of, and rural change, 6; as a means of production, 88; in Mandatory Palestine, 94–5; link with finance capital, 102; increasing economic importance, 155, 190
- money-lenders, 31; peasantry and, 22, 24, 95, 101; hold on *fellaheen* indebtedness, 98; interest rates, 98, 102; disreputable occupation, 101; disguised in census reports, 101–2; link with trade and agriculture, 101–2; role in rural economy, 103, 126, 132
- Montefiore, Sir Moses Haim, 22, 36, 82 n.115, 85 n.172
- Morocco, pre-capitalist rent, 120–1
- Mount Ebal, 138
- Mount Lebanon, Maronites, 187
- Mount Olives, Jewish cemetery, 217
- Mount Tabor, 41
- Muqaybila, 231 n.5
- Muqeibila, 103; land for displaced Arabs, 172 n.91
- The Muslim Brotherhood, 225
- Muslim-Christian Association, anti-Zionist, 187
- Muslims in Palestine, 10, 30, 32, 43, 48, 52; occupational structure, 30, 33, 54, 68; population increase, 110; access to central authority, 185
- Mustafa, Hasan, 240–1 n.87
- Nablus, 8, 24, 32, 39, 86 n.176, 205, 211; cotton-growing, 15, 41, 49, 50, 55; urban development, 27, 49, 50–1, 138–9; soap production, 38, 49, 50, 55, 58, 86 n.186, 135, 138, 139, 148–9, 199; physical and architectural beauty, 48–9; commercial prosperity, 49–50, 51, 138, 209; social structure, 101, 138, 142, 174 n.138, 182; population increase, 1800/1922/1931, 110, 171 n.76; economic stagnation, 110, 171 n.76; Nablus Chamber of Commerce Executive Council, 138; Nablus–Tulkarm railway, 112
- Nabulsi family, 138; fortunes, 175 n.159
- Nabulsi, Abd al-Rahim Effendi, 174 n.138
- Nabulsi, Haj Nimr, 139
- Nahhalin, 217
- Nahr al-Naamin, Acre, 46
- Nakhleh, K., and Arab social structure, 179
- Namura, Muhammad Kamil, and Haifa portorage, 151
- Nashashibi family, 190, 194, 200 n.21, 201 n.35; v. Hussaini, 190, 193, 194
- Nasir Bin Jamil, al-Sharif, 236 n.47
- Nasser (President Gamal Abd al-Nasir), 218, 223
- Nathanya, 211
- National Defence Party (Nashashibi), 192; ‘Peace Units’, 194
- nationalism, national/local level articulation, 178; pan-Arab, 178–80; secular, 185–6, 187, 191, 195; entry of landless peasants, 194; and non-factional groups, 195, 196
- Navon Effendi, 83 n.123
- Nazareth, 13, 43, 49, 109; urban development, 26, 40–3; ‘protected’ by Christian Europe, 40–1; occupational structure, 42, 73; Templars, 44; agricultural implements, 55, 87 n.220; Christians and land tax, 84 n.136; mission schools, 187; Nazareth to Nablus road, 112
- Near East, pilgrims from, 52
- Near East Council of Churches, 241 n.89, 228
- Nesher Cement Company, 97, 151
- Neumann, B., 32; foreign settlers in Jerusalem, 28, 33
- The Negev, Bedouin of, 53; terrorism, 216, 237–8 n.59

- Nimr family, 138, 182; v. Tuqan, 193
 al-Nimr, Ihsan, 86, n.186, 132, 190
 Nur Match Company, Arab employment, 151
 Nusaiba, Anwar, and border villages, 225
 N'was, Abdallah, 240 n.84
- Octroi, 41
 oil-producing States, 208, 210–11
 Oliphant, L., 45
 Ottoman Empire/government, 2, 12, 15, 25, 28, 178, 179, 181; Europe and, 10, 38; and land, 21–2, 24, 123; position of Jaffa, 34–6, 37; shipping, 43, 53; Acre garrison, 45; provincial administration, 48, 54, 106, 187; domination of Palestine, 90, 92; agricultural taxation (the *ushr* and *aghnam*), 95; legislation on road-making, 112–13; residual institutions, 185; Tanzimat reforms, 188; and world capitalist economy, 188
 Owen, R., 183
- Palestine Arab Workers' Society (PAWS), 195–6
 Palestine Chamber of Commerce, economic congress, 229 n.8
 Palestine Communist Party (PCP), 180, 192, 195
 Palestine Exploration Fund, 24
 Palestine government, 4, 5; and land tenure, 21–2; seed loans, 132; as employers, 149–50; centralisation, 183
 Palestine High Commission, 107; note to from J.D. Shepherd, 172 n.91
 Palestine Public Works Department, 149–50
 Palestine Royal Commission, 109, 114, 141, 145, 198
 Palestinian National Guard (al-Haras al-Natani), 219–21, 236 n.43
 Palestinians, social structure, vertical and horizontal stratification, 177–8, 180, 185, 187, 193; cultural disunity, 178–9; nationalist identity/ideology, 178–81; nature of the élite, 180; major self-identifications, 181; city/village dichotomy, 181; changed class and patronage relations, 184, 188–90; Jordanians, official policy towards, 206–10, 218, 225, 233 n.14; merchants and landowners, 92, 98, 101–3; middle classes, 21, 42, 45, 156; upper classes, 21, 45, 141–3, 174 n.156; slow down in immigration, 230; returns from abroad, 230
 Palmer, 40; occupational structure of Bethlehem, 72
 pan-Arabism, 178, 179, 187, 190
 patronage, the Taljia ('refuge'), 189; source of power, 190; *see also* clan patronage
 Paulus, C., on Jerusalem Templar colony, 43–4
 peasantry, 3, 113; and profit from trade and agriculture, 18–19; and land ownership, 22–5, 91, 114, 188; acceptance of new owners, 22; land sales, 22, 98, 104; indebtedness, 22, 23, 91, 98, 101, 108, 136; protest against European settlement, 26; remoteness from market forces, 91; taxation, 95, 136; agricultural loans, 98–9, 101, 169 n.32; lack of available capital, 99, 129; need for stability, 99–100, 126; escape from money-lenders, 101; non-agricultural, supplementary occupations, 114, 131, 149, 152, 175 n.165; and land availability, 114, 127–8; co-ownership, co-cultivation agreements, 114–22, 123, 172 n.91 (*see also* land tenure systems); farm economics, 125–35; livestock maintenance, 131–2; 'feudalism', 142; and wage labour, 143–5; the agricultural labourer, 145–53; urban migration, 144–5; impact of Second World War, 154; family size and acquisition of land or

- wealth, 155; primordial loyalties among, 177; changed social relationships, 183
- Peretz, D., and Palestinian society, 180
- Pierotti, E., French architect, 37–8
- Pizzamano, Count (Austrian Consul in Jerusalem), 35–6
- Porath, Y., 104, 189
- Post, K., class and social change in W. Africa, 155
- prices, price mechanisms, 129, 153; fluctuations, 132–3, 135–6; in Second World War, 154; price-rings, 139
- al-Qadi, Muhammad, 240 n.83
- Qaisi–Yemeni factionalism, 181–5
- Qalandya refugee camp, 231–2 n.6, 233 n.11
- Qalqilya, 211, 212, 214; and refugees, 215, 222, 235 nn.29 and 30, 236 n.44, 237 n.58, 238 n.63, 241 n.91; post-1967 War, 229
- al-Qassam, Izz al-Din, death, 195
- Qassamites, peasant warrior movement, 195
- Qibla, retaliatory operations, 218
- Ququn, Abu Hantash family of, 142
- railways, 151, 176 n.179, 188, 197; Israeli, 217
- Ramadin (Tayyaha) tribe, 214, 232 n.26
- Ramallah, 8, 147, 182, 232 n.8; urban refugees, 210; American descendants, 234 n.23; al-Shaqara family, 182
- Ramle, 33, 198, 211; soap factories, 25, 32, 38, 50; Templar colony, 44
- Rauf, F., peasant response to increased taxation, 188–9
- Red Cross, Jordanian, 212, 226, 227; ICRC, 227
- Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de, 37
- religious/communal relationships, 131; and factionalism, 181; communication of grievances, 185; *millet* system, 185, 187; ethnic divisions, 192
- religious institutions, 28; monasteries and hospices, 27, 39, 40, 50; Carmelite convent, 43
- rent, 113; as source of income, 114; and tenancy systems, 115–17, 119, 120, 128; Marxian analysis, 119–20; payment in money, 120–1, 128; per cent estimates of, 128
- Rogers, Mary, visit to a sick Nazarene, 42; on the Governor's palace, 48–9; on Nablus bazaar, 49–50
- Rosen, G., 50, 51
- Rosenfeld, Henry, occupational categories, 146
- Rummana, 213, 236 n.40
- Ruppin, Dr Arthur, 105
- Rural Property Tax, assessment, 96
- Russia, 17, 27, 40, 46; South Russia, 14; Russians in Jerusalem, *maidan* building complex, 28–9; Haifa mole, 43
- Russo-Turkish War, 16, 22
- Safad, 26–7, 43; ethnic structure, 47–8, 85 nn.171 and 172
- Salt, 32, 139
- Samara family, businessmen, 174 n.156
- Sammuniya, Templar settlement, 24 *samutis*, 17
- Sardinia, shipping, 43
- Sarona, Templar colony, 44
- Saudi Arabia, royal family, 196
- Sawer (Department of Agriculture), and tariff policies, 97
- Scopinich (Austrian Consular Agent), 46, 85 n.166
- Second World War, 5, 101, 151, 153–4
- Sephardim, 30, 31
- Shailalin, of Tayyaha federation, 214
- Shanin, Theodore, 'logic' of peasant economies, 127
- al-Shaqara family of Ramallah, 182
- Sharett, Moshe, former PM, and murder at 'Ajjur, 235 n.33
- Shemen Oil company, 97, 140, 151, 164

- Shumayyil, Shibli, 187
 Sinai, Bedouin, 53
 Slade, Sir Arthur, 37
 Smith, B., and Palestine trading rights, 93
 social scientists, preoccupation with units of analysis (*hamula*), 179
 Société de Batignolles, 38
 South Africa, 144
 South America, 20, 40
 Spain, Carlists/Liberals peasant faction, 184
 Stone of Moses (Dead Sea), 40
 Strickland, C.F. terracing of hill areas, 131
 Suez Canal, 53
 Suq al-Khan; *see* Khan al Tujjar
 Sur Bahir, land losses, 205, 231 n.6
 Surif, 224, 231–2 n.6
 Sursuq family, 2, 24; ‘protector’ role, 24–5
 Sursuq, Niqula, 24
Survey of Palestine, 154
 Switzerland, exports to Palestine, 20, 21
 Syria, 3, 15, 50, 53, 56, 108, 133; position of Palestine, 11, 55, 97–8; balance of trade, 11, 19; Hauran grain, 13; cotton-growing, 14; exports, 24, 46, 137, 140; market day, 41–2; imports, 51; and world capitalist economy, 90; Greater Syria boundaries, 92; role of money-lender in rural economy, 103; Qaisi and Yemeni affiliations, 181; and national consciousness, 185–6; and communalism, 186
 Szereszewski, R., concept of a ‘separate Jewish economy’, 5–6
 Tadmur, 139
 Taha, Sami (of PAWS), assassination, 196
 al-Taiyiba, resettlement village, 224, 231 n.5
 Tamini family, 138
 Tamini, Abd al-Rahim Effendi, 174 n.138
 Tanzimat, in Ottoman period, 188; elimination of tax-farmers (*Multazims*), 188; stabilising results, 188; and taxation, 189
 Taqqu, Rachelle, Haifa harbour project, 149
 Tariffs, instruments of economic policy, 97; *see also* customs duties
 tax-farmers, 18, 19, 22, 188, 200 n.21; sursuqs, 24; Beiruti, 46–7; urban merchants, 95, 100; abolition, 95
 taxation, 4; and agricultural surplus, 18, 95; and land tenure, 21–2; under the Mandate, 95, 136; on land and its products, 95; source of revenue, 95, 117; and costs of production, 96, 132; and roadways, collection, 123, 183; price variations and payment, 135–6; payment in kind, 188; Tanzimat reforms, 188
 technology, 129, 130, 139
 Tel Aviv, 110
 Templars, 3, 19, 23, 26; colonies, 23, 36–7, 43–5; invectives against Circassians, 86 n.176
La Terre Sainte, European settlers in Palestine, 1850s–1870s, 28; *croissade financière*, 38
 terrorism, terrorists (*fiḍa’iyyun*), against Israel, 216, 218; reprisal raids, 216, 218, 220, 235 n.33; chain reaction, 222
 Thomson, W.M., on a Nazarene market-day, 41–2; *The Land and the Book*, 47, 53
 Third World (peripheral economies), socio/economic effects of incorporation into world capitalist economy, 88; analysis of historical change, 89
 Tiberias, 13, 23, 43, 109; urban development, 26–7; Jewish holy city, 47–8; Tiberias–Beersheba mountain road, 112
 al-Tira, 149
 tithes, 96, 128, 135, 157
 trade and industry, 11, 18–19, 112, 138–41

- trade unionism, 144, 145, 154–5, 194, 195; *see also* Histadrut
- Transjordan (Amman), 8, 49, 50, 111; Circassian settlements, 48, 86 n.176; international border with Palestine, 139; East Bank Transjordanians, 206
- transport and communication, importance in urban/rural relations, 111, 113; and inland trade, 112; commercial use of lorries, 112, 147, 148; and prices, 135; by rail, 111, 188; by road, 111–12; by camel, donkey or mule, 112, 147; compulsory labour, 112–13; owner-driver contracts, 148; Tanzimat reforms, 188
- Trieste, pilgrims from, 27
- the Triangle, 180
- Tristram, H.B., cotton-growing, 14, 50
- Trotsky, Leon, 88–9
- Tulkarm, sub-district of Nablus, 102, 165, 170 n.61, 205, 212, 229; Muslim population, 110; land ownership, 113, 174 n.156, 211, 212; commerce and manufacturing, 138, 149; economic status, 211–12; inward and outward migration, 212; refugee population, 212, 215, 223, 235 n.29, 238 n.63; Hanuns of, 142, 174 n.156, 234 n.22
- Tuma, E., 201 n.33; on al-Istiqlal party, 196
- Tuqan family, 138, 140, 168 n.15
- Tuqan, Hafiz, 168 n.15; v. Nimr, 193
- Tuqan Palace, Nablus, 48
- Turkey, Turks in Palestine, 43, 56, 111, 108, 186
- Tuwaini, Beirut businessman, 24
- Tyre (Sur), 46, 152
- Umm al-Fahm, 224
- unemployment, 143, 149, 156–7; among young people, 225, 226; Bedouin, 213; Jewish, 176 n.175
- UNESCO, 228
- UNICEF, 228
- United Nations (UN), 228; Partition Plan, 1947, 203; Israeli/Jordan complaints, 217
- United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), and frontier villages, 205, 227, 228, 231 n.2, 238 n.68, 240–1 nn.85–8; Education Department, 233 n.15; and Jordanian affairs, 209, 210, 214, 223–4, 239 n.74; transfer of ration cards, 226, 239 n.72; and refugee camps, 238–9 n.68; provision of half-rations, 228
- United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, Israeli distrust, 218
- urban economies (working classes), 6, 7, 10–12, 26–30; subsistence needs, 144, 150; proletariat, 144, 154; influx of rural workers, 144–5
- Urban Property Tax, 95
- al-Urdunn, 235, 239 n.76
- Usurious Loans Ordinance, 1926, 1934, 98
- Verney, N., use of camels, 112
- Vienna World Exhibition, 1873, 10, 40, 52
- Wadi Fukin, 216, 217, 239 n.74
- wage labour, 120, 121–3, 134, 164, 185, 198; development, 143; Arab, 143, 144, 149, 150, 180; non-unionised, 144; migrant, unskilled, 144; village distribution, 145; ex-family areas, 145–6; differentiated from agricultural labour, 146–7; urban, 149, 150; Arab/Jewish discrepancies, 150; subsistence needs, 150, 155; ex-village in Second World War, 151, 153–4, 165; effect of its option on the family, 151–3; and capital accumulation, 152; provision of surplus labour, 155; source of income, 157, 165; capitalist penetration, 177
- wages, 30; skilled and semi-skilled labour, 29, 68, 147, 164; unskilled,

- 151; Arab/Jewish, 151, 164; in Second World War, 154
- Wages Commission Report, 1928, 150, 164
- Ward, Dr R., and location of US AID, 232 n.9
- Warren, (quoted by Arif al-Arif), 30, 32, 33
- Wauchope, Sir Arthur, High Commissioner, 100, 169 n.47
- West Bank, Israeli occupation, 1967, 1, 90, 203, 204, 229; effect of Israel–Jordan Demarcation Line, 8, 156, 203–4, 207; Jordanian rule, 90, 203, 206, 222, 224, 232 n.9, 233 n.19; professional middle classes, 156; dormitory for Israeli work-force, 156–7; ‘daughter villages’, 203–4; need for new economic policy, 206, 207, 208, 232–3 nn.8, 9 and 12; West Bank/East Bank contradictions, 206–8, 232 nn.9 and 10; internal dissension, 207; emigrants and migrants, 208, 209, 210, 233 n.12; refugees, 208, 211, 212–13; and Jerusalem, 209; Bedouin, 213–14; neglect of self-defence, 218, 235 n.34; and border infiltration, 220, 221; and post-1967 building boom, 230
- Weulersse, J., 108; and the camel, 112
- Wilkansky, 130, 134, 135; economics of an ordinary ‘fella’, 162 and n.; communal expenses, 174 n.134
- Wolff, Ph., on Russian complex, 28–9
- women, as ‘earners’, 153, 165
- World Lutheran Federation, 227, 241 n.89
- Ya‘bad, 117; land losses, 231 n.4
- al-Yamun, loans to Co-operative Society, 101
- al-Yazl‘i, 187
- Yazur, peasantry, 26
- Yemeni faction, 181–5
- Zaidan, 187
- Zaidanis, 47
- Zarqa, 222
- Zeine, Z., Arab separatism, 186
- Zimpel, Austrian engineer, 37
- Zionist movement, 5, 186; and a national home in Palestine, 90, 92; and Jewish immigration, 144, 179; and a Jewish proletariat, 154; ideological manipulation, 178, 179; frontal assault on Arab society (1948), 180; land purchases, 184–5, 194; anti-Zionism, 190, 191
- Zir‘in, purchase of *musha* land, 171 n.71
- Zububa, land losses, 231 n.4