

BEYOND THE NATION- STATE

THE ZIONIST
POLITICAL IMAGINATION FROM
PINSKER TO BEN-GURION

DMITRY SHUMSKY

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DMITRY SHUMSKY

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*For Innochkina,
Anat, and Ben*

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Introduction

I

IN MARCH 2017, US president Donald Trump declared that his country was dedicated to solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but not necessarily through the two-state solution. As his statement sent shockwaves throughout the world, Ahmad Tibi, one of the most prominent Israeli Palestinian Arab Knesset members, was interviewed by the liberal Israeli daily *Haaretz*.¹ In the interview, Tibi stressed that he believed in and supported the partition of Palestine/the Land of Israel into two states, an Israeli state and a Palestinian state, as the most pragmatic way to put an end to the more than century-old conflict between the two nations, both of which claim sovereignty over the same piece of land. That being said, Tibi also rose to the challenge put to him by the interviewer, Carolina Landsmann, and laid out for her what he imagined one state extending from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea would look like, in case the two-state solution did eventually get taken off the table.

This state, he explained, would no longer be the nation-state of the Jewish people, but rather what he called “a state of all its nationalities.” The privileged status of Jewish national symbols, as well as the legal-political and practical privileges that currently express the Jewish nation’s hegemony over Israel’s non-Jewish citizens in general and its Arab-Palestinian citizens in particular, would be annulled. An Arab-Palestinian citizen would be able to become prime minister just like any Jewish citizen, not only because such a state-

of-all-its-citizens would allow for such a scenario in a legal, formalistic sense, but primarily because such a state would develop a strong shared civic consciousness. Such a consciousness would view as only natural all citizens, regardless of their national belonging, being full sharers of the state's governmental sovereignty. "Can the Zionist dream be realized in the one-state format?" Landsmann asked, in what sounded like a rhetorical question. "Not in the way that you [Jewish Israelis] demonstrate it to us on a daily basis," Tibi responded. "Zionism will come to the end of its road in a one-state format."²

Tibi's answer reflects one of the fundamental assumptions in Israeli political discourse and Israeli historical and political consciousness. According to this assumption, Zionism as a national-political movement that has a continuous historical presence is exclusively and totally identified with the desire to establish and maintain a Jewish nation-state. In contrast, other models of national-political organization, like the multinational democratic model that Tibi imagines (and which he compares in the above interview to the consociational democratic regimes of Belgium and Canada),³ are seen as radically irreconcilable with Zionism's political essence as a historical phenomenon. In fact, it is not only that contemporary Israeli debates on Israel's future and character consider the idea and discourse of a state-of-all-its-nationalities to be diametrically opposed to historical Zionism's purpose and essence. Moreover, they also consider the concrete multinational demographic reality (or to put it more accurately vis-à-vis the Israeli context, the binational reality) that persists in day-to-day life in the Land of Israel/Palestine on both sides of the Green Line to be an existential threat to Zionism.

Indeed, this assumption is shared by the rival political camps that are dominant among most Israeli Jews. Namely, there is an unquestioned identification between "Zionism" as a national movement that sought to realize the Jewish nation's self-determination in Palestine, and "the Jewish nation-state," which has no room for the national collective existence of any particular national group other than the Jews and which represents the ultimate and teleological realization of the Zionist project. The vast majority of those who support the two-state solution, at least declaratively if not always in practice, and who are known as the "Zionist left" or as the "center,"

base their position on the need to avoid the formation of a binational state in which the Jewish demographic majority would be endangered. They argue that this is the way to rescue what they consider to be the political core of the Zionist idea: a mono-national state for the Jewish political collective. In his book *My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel*, the Israeli journalist Ari Shavit, a figure associated with the Israeli political center and one of the most prominent voices in favor of this approach, expressed his anxiety regarding Israel's impending binational future if the two-state solution fails and his deep sense and conviction that this binational future spells the end of the Zionist dream: "Today 46 percent of all of the inhabitants of greater Israel are Palestinians. Their share of the overall population is expected to rise to 50 percent by 2020 and 55 percent by 2040. If present trends persist, the future of Zion will be non-Zionist."⁴ It is important to note that for Shavit, this expected reversal in demographic fortunes between Jews and Palestinians is not the only thing that spells "the end of Zionism." In fact, the author believes that the substantial collective political existence of the Arab-Palestinian national group inside Israel also undermines the exclusively Jewish character of the state's public and political space. Elsewhere in his book, he writes thus about the expulsion of Arabs from Lod/Lydda in 1948: "Lydda is our black box. In it lies the dark secret of Zionism. The truth is that Zionism could not bear Lydda. From the very beginning there was a substantial contradiction between Zionism and Lydda. . . . Lydda was an obstacle blocking the road to the Jewish state and . . . one day Zionism would have to remove it."⁵

The Israeli right, for its part, opposes removal of the settlements and the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Unlike the Israeli left and center, it does not fear a one-state scenario because it believes that it would still be possible to directly or indirectly control the Palestinian population without granting it equal civil rights. Despite these differences, however, the Israeli right also sees the mono-national Jewish nation-state as the culmination of the Zionist enterprise, which it likewise believes was Zionism's singular political goal since its establishment. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular, "Zionism," as a continuous past, and "the Jewish nation-state of the Jewish people," as a present moment

that is the necessary culmination of that past, are almost synonymous. Their essential common denominator, in his view, is the denial of Palestinian Arabs' collective existence as a local national group that has relevance to the question of the Zionist state's political character. Whereas Shavit believes that Zionism had to erase the presence of the Palestinian-Arab collective political dimension because it is "an obstacle blocking the road to a Jewish state," Netanyahu denies that this presence even existed when Zionism emerged. In a speech that he gave in March 2014 at a special Knesset plenum in honor of David Cameron, his British counterpart at the time, he said that "it was the Jews' return to Zion that brought about a massive Arab migration to the Land of Israel from the neighboring countries to the modernizing and rapidly developing country."⁶

It is somewhat curious that Ahmad Tibi, Ari Shavit, and Benjamin Netanyahu, who represent such different and often conflicting political (and national) groups, do in fact agree unhesitatingly that Zionism as a movement that sought to realize self-determination for the Jews had historically always aimed for one—and only one—political format, a format that has room for the political self-realization of only one national collectivity (the Jewish one). This suggests that something more is at play here than mere ideological convenience, which would naturally lend itself to simplistic formulae and notions like those that link together the past ("Zionism") and the present ("the State of Israel") to form one deterministic totality. In fact, what may be behind this consensus is a kind of normative conceptual framework according to which there is a "natural" and axiomatic connection between "national self-determination" and "the nation-state." This perspective has long been deeply embedded in both the theoretical and the lay discourses regarding nations and nationalism.

Indeed, the second half of the twentieth century will be remembered as the Era of the Nation-State. It was during this period that the sovereign, independent nation-state model became the ultimate, self-evident means of realizing each nation's right to self-determination, and hence a fixture of international affairs. The second half of the twentieth century also saw the rise of a powerful nation-state-oriented theoretical approach that has come to dominate the interdisciplinary field known as "theories of nationalism." According to this approach, the only natural and obvious course for nationalism

and national movements, to the extent that they set themselves political goals, is to aspire to achieve an alignment between the borders of the state and the borders of the nation, insofar as these were not in alignment to begin with.⁷ Simply put, this school of thought assumes that all national movements aspire to obtain full sovereignty in the form of the nation-state. Ernest Gellner, one of the last century's central scholars of nationalism, clearly articulated this idea in his famous definition of the term "nationalism," with which he begins his influential 1983 book *Nations and Nationalism*. Nationalism, according to Gellner, is "primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."⁸ This approach, which considers the nation-state to be the essence of the normative political dimension of modern national movements, has also enjoyed for years undisputed hegemony in the study of Zionism. This is especially true in the field of Zionist historiography: since 1948, one of the most unyielding conventions that has dominated the field is that Zionism's most important goal as a national and political movement was the creation of an independent Jewish nation-state in Palestine,⁹ though researchers do sometimes reluctantly acknowledge that this goal was somewhat vague and unclear from the beginning.¹⁰

During the past two decades, theoretical research on nationalism produced by sociologists, legal philosophers, political scientists, and international relations scholars has undertaken an in-depth re-examination of Gellner's formula, as well as of the equation of the "political" and the "nation-state" in the theories of nationalism.¹¹ What characterizes this research trend is that it has gradually challenged the idea that the connection between the political claims of nationalism on one hand and the nation-state model on the other is natural and normative. More specifically, it is challenging the long-standing deterministic tendency in political science to link national self-determination with the nation-state. According to the political scientist Michael Keating—a prominent representative of the critical approach toward the nation-state-oriented scholarly paradigm—"sovereign nation-state," as we have known it since the nineteenth century, is only one possible organizing framework for realizing the political claims of a collectivity that possesses a national identity. Keating argues that nationality claims, as a rule, are

a dynamic political form that is always subject to negotiation, internal changes, and constant adaptation to changing circumstances rather than a predetermined doctrine founded on rigid principles. Furthermore, the “state” itself is also a political form that is subject to historical context. A political order can take on different forms, and thus the nationality claims and national self-determination of each particular group do not necessarily focus on obtaining an independent state. On the contrary, many national movements are not interested in a centralized state in its traditional form, preferring instead to claim other forms of self-determination.¹²

Insofar as the historiography of modern nationalism is concerned, critiques of the nation-statist deterministic paradigm actually precede the emergence of such critiques in the social sciences. In this regard, the central figure who has made an essential contribution to rethinking the history of modern nationalism with respect to the conceptions of self-determination and the collective and nationality claims was the prominent Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. His first two comprehensive, comparative works were published in Czech and German in the late 1960s and early 1970s and concern the histories of at least eight national movements of ethnic nationalities that did not have a dominant status (“non-dominant nationalities,” as he calls them).¹³ He selected these national movements from within an impressively large geopolitical territory made up of Eastern, Central, and Northern Europe, which included the Norwegians, the Czechs, the Estonians, the Lithuanians, the Slovaks, the Flemish, and the Danes of Schleswig. In the mid-1980s, when the revised version of his work was translated into English and published as a monograph by Cambridge University Press,¹⁴ Hroch came to occupy a rather central place in nationalism studies. Though a social historian at heart, Hroch did not neglect the ideological and political dimensions of the emergence of modern nationalism. His research focus was, among other things, on the social composition of the leaderships of national movements. He was interested in the ways in which elites in each movement transitioned from intellectual activities toward involving the masses, as well as in the relationship between these elites’ programs and goals and the sociopolitical changes that were occurring in the political space in which their activities took place.

Some of his later works traced the development of national-political claims as these were articulated and advanced throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, addressing ethnic national movements that operated in the Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires. In these works Hroch discovered that the desire to achieve full political independence was rather absent from these movements throughout the period in question.¹⁵ Instead of identifying these movements as states-in-the-making, as was conventional in this field, Hroch distinguished three levels of political goals: the nurturing of the particular national language and culture of ethno-national groups; the participation of these movements' representatives in the governmental institutions of both the local districts and the empire as a whole; and the establishment of territorial autonomy in regions defined as their historic homelands.¹⁶ The political meaning of fully achieving these three goals—in the event that they were indeed achieved—is that the existing imperial frameworks would be reorganized into a multinational structure rather than being dismantled into separate, mono-national units. Institutionally speaking, the basis of this multinational structure would be a complex integration of the various collective identities of different cultural, ethnic, and territorial groups. This argument, it should be mentioned, is well-supported by historical case studies on various national movements in the *fin-de-siècle* tri-imperial space in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe, as well as by the historical scholarship challenging the deterministic interpretations of the disintegration of the Habsburg, the Ottoman, and (part of) the Russian empires into smaller ethnocentric states after World War I.¹⁷

Hroch's important analytical insight that should be constantly kept in mind in any historical account of modern nationalism(s) is about how the early stages of the development of various ethno-national groups' national claims are related to the later realization of those claims. It is certainly true, Hroch argues, that from 1918 on, the political claims of the ethno-national groups that were subject to Romanov, Habsburg, or Ottoman imperial rule during the long nineteenth century were eventually realized in a fundamentally different manner than the way that they were conceived throughout that century and the beginning of the twentieth. Nevertheless, this

fact should not be projected on the ways in which we examine and analyze the patterns of national identity, culture, and politics during the imperial period. We know, for example, that the first Czechoslovakian republic was established in Central Europe following the Treaty of Versailles, and it broke up into the Czech and Slovakian nation-states after 1989. According to Hroch, this later knowledge should by no means affect our evaluation of the political feasibility of the option of Moravian identity in the specific historical context of the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. Furthermore, knowledge of these later developments should not prevent us, for example, from seriously considering the local Moravian identity as one of the substantive options that was available to the residents of Czech lands during that period, nor should it prevent us from discussing the proponents of this option and its supporters as political actors that are relevant to our understanding of the history of fin-de-siècle nationalism in Central Europe.¹⁸

II

These critiques of the teleological approach to the political dimension of modern national movements, which view them through the retrospective prism of the nation-state, did not spare the historiography of Zionist nationalism. In the past decade, several prominent researchers of Jewish nationalism and Zionism (along with a few earlier researchers) have demonstrated that the aspiration for a nation-state was not central in the Zionist movement before the 1940s. However, most of them reached this conclusion by researching relatively marginal figures in the history of Zionism, be it Simon Rawidowicz, Mordecai Kaplan, Hans Kohn, Oscar Janowsky, the Hapoel Hatzair group within the Zionist Labor movement, or Palestinian-born Sephardi-Oriental Zionists in Mandatory Palestine.¹⁹ Indeed, with a notable exception,²⁰ almost none of the critics of the impact of the nation-state paradigm on the political foundations of the study of Zionist thought and action has addressed the way that Zionism's founders thought of sovereignty, self-determination, and the state.

Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that the basic view of Zionist thought as revolving around some imagined deterministic

axis whose foregone conclusion is the Jewish nation-state has persisted to the present day. The idea that the Jewish nation-state as we have known it since 1948 was the goal of the Zionist movement all along continues to be central and dominant, both in the interdisciplinary field that has in the past years been referred to as “Israel studies” in general and in the historiography of Zionism in particular. Researchers have clearly discovered important historical examples of departures from the nation-state model in Zionism’s ideological margins. These examples are certainly important, whether we think of the essentially autonomist “work of the present” taking place in Eastern and Central Europe before, during, and after World War I;²¹ the Brit Shalom and the Ihud associations;²² or Jewish national thinkers in the United States who searched for complex approaches to Jewish nationalism in an effort to balance their dual attachments to American civic nationalism and Zionism.²³ However, the heart of Zionist ideology as a political worldview on the Jewish people’s national future and the character of the Jewish people’s self-determination in the modern world is still portrayed by the dominant historical narrative as self-evidently committed to the goal of a sovereign, separate nation-state as the normative paradigm that defines the Jewish people’s desired state of being.

The teleological view that posits the nation-state as the unshakeable foundation of historical discourse regarding the political dimension of Zionism is especially evident in studies that address in one way or another the never-ending polemic about whether or not Zionism and the state of Israel are justified, which is sometimes referred to as the debate between “Zionists” and “post-Zionists.” In the Israeli academic field, this polemic has involved historians and sociologists, political scientists and political geographers, philosophers and jurists. In the context of this polemic, the relationship between the present (the Jewish nation-state of Israel) and the past (the Zionist national movement) becomes a key component in the arguments of each of the rival sides. On one side stand those who wish to justify the existence of the state of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and who argue that it embodies the fulfillment of the legitimate political aspirations of Zionism as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. On the other side stand

those who object to the regime of the Israeli nation-state, seeing it as the result of Zionism's consistent efforts, as a nationalist movement possessing colonialist features (or as a colonialist movement possessing nationalist features), to achieve ethno-national hegemony in Palestine. Though the two sides of this debate disagree regarding their ethical evaluations of Zionist nationalism, they both agree that there is a kind of organic connection between the Zionist national movement of the prestate period and the Jewish nation-state established in 1948.²⁴

Thus, it becomes clear that the adherence to the nation-state paradigm as the primary, or even exclusive, interpretational framework for understanding Zionist ideological conceptions of self-determination is not conditioned on having a "pro-Zionist," "anti-Zionist," or "post-Zionist" stance. This observation has tremendous importance for understanding the roots of nation-state determinism in the study of Zionism. It means that the roots of this phenomenon are methodological rather than ideological, just as it is clear that the research hegemony enjoyed by this paradigm in the study of self-determination and sovereignty among non-Jewish national movements does not necessarily stem from bias toward one particular national movement or another. Indeed, the above is only one of many manifestations of what is known in the social sciences and humanities as "methodological nationalism," namely, the idea that the great power of various terms related to nationalism and their impact on shaping the wider world has led researchers to adopt them as basic analytical categories in the study of various historical and contemporary phenomena.²⁵ For the sake of conceptual accuracy and clarity, I refer to the version of methodological nationalism that concerns this book as "methodological nation-statism."

One of the main factors driving the persistence of methodological nation-statism in the study of the political foundations of the Zionist movement is embedded in what may be called the "Yishuvo-centric" character of much of the historical research on Zionism, which demonstrates a conspicuous lack of interest in the history of the very same non-Jewish national movements in Eastern and Central Europe alongside which Zionist political thought emerged. It avoids adopting a comparative approach that might lead to a reevaluation of the political content of Zionist thought against its spatial

and historical context, rather than seeing it through the prism of the later Jewish nation-state that is outside of that context.

Anita Shapira's recent book on the history of Zionism and the Jewish nation-state is a telling example of the aforementioned disregard of Zionist historiography for the critique of methodological nation-statism in the study of national movements and self-determination, as well as the persistence of nation-state determinism in the way that the history of Zionism's political dimension is understood. Shapira is a distinctly Yishuvocentric researcher and, certainly, one of the most prominent historians of Zionism today.²⁶ The book refers to the history of the 1881–2000 period as a single deterministic chronological framework, thereby blurring the boundaries between the Zionist national movement period and the state period. In doing so, the book describes the entire prestate Zionist era, including both the imperial era before World War I and the British Mandate era, as nothing more than the incubation period for the state of Israel, imagining the prestate Zionist movement as an entity that was primarily concerned with carrying the future nation-state to term. And if that is not enough, Shapira's account of the prestate movement seems to strongly resemble the "child" that it gave birth to on May 14, 1948, namely, the state of Israel. Thus, Shapira's book serves as an instructive and extreme example of the key problems with the nation-state narrative in Zionist political history.

At base, we may speak of three key problems. First and foremost is the problem of anachronism, of projecting the late onto the early, which is a fallacy that historiography should avoid at all costs. When historiography fails to avoid anachronism, we see historians identifying earlier historical concepts and phenomena as forerunners, or even exact expressions, of later historical phenomena that took place in a different historical context and that were caused by different historical circumstances, which not only did not happen in the earlier period but which the contemporaries of the earlier period scarcely could have imagined were possible. The second problem might be perceived as the flipside of anachronism: insofar as the deterministic nation-statist methodology tends to isolate components of earlier Zionist thought that are more amenable to being viewed as precursors to the state of Israel as we know it today, it also

acts as a filter toward components that do not fit this standard. Sometimes, this methodology will leave such components out of the research entirely. At other times, it will take what it considers to be normative national-political thought patterns that ostensibly sketch out the general contours of the state of Israel in 1948 and dichotomously oppose it to political thought patterns that do not align with those contours. In this way, the history of Zionist political thought is often artificially separated into trends and conceptions that are identified as belonging to the “state-in-the-making” track and ones that are not identified as such, thus suggesting that various tracks and conceptions within Zionism are fundamentally different from one another. A closer look at these phenomena in the relevant historical context, however, might cause this dichotomy to disappear of its own accord, making way for a more complex, multisided account of the national ideology of the past. The third problem is that the retrospective nation-state lens often uproots entire chapters of Zionist history from within the wider historical context of the non-Jewish national movements that neighbored the emergence and development of Zionism. Consider, for instance, the main title of the Hebrew version of Shapira’s book—“Like Every Nation”—the same words that appear in Israel’s Declaration of Independence. The problem is that Shapira completely ignores the national ambitions and claims of “every nation” in the very period when Zionist political thought was consolidating in Central and Eastern Europe. This is apparently due to the assumption that all national movements that lacked national self-determination at the time of Zionism’s emergence were actually seeking the same form of national self-determination: the totally independent, sovereign nation-state.

In reading Shapira’s book, therefore, one can get a clear sense that the nation-statist determinism has yet to be overcome in the study of mainstream Zionist ideology. The academic discourse on what David Myers calls “nonstatist forms of Jewish nationalism” (including nonstatist forms of Zionism)²⁷ demonstrates a distinct awareness of the contemporary theoretical developments in the study of nationalism and self-determination, is wary of an anachronistic reading of the Zionist movement’s past, and pays close attention to the voices of non-Jewish national movements that were contempo-

rary with the emergence of Zionism as a national movement. On the other hand, the discourse on political, or statist Zionism identified with the key figures in Zionist history is theoretically, methodologically, and historiographically stagnant. For this reason, it is high time to reexamine the history of “the political” and “the national” in Zionism beyond the prism of the nation-state by studying the most prominent representatives of the Zionist mainstream.²⁸

III

As is fitting in a book on the history of the Zionist political idea, the first chapter is dedicated to a figure that the existing historiography considers to be the first to articulate the principle of territorial self-determination in modern Jewish nationalism: Leon (Lev) Pinsker (1821–1891), the founder of the Hibat Tsiyon movement and author of the formative text of the modern Jewish political nationalism, *“Autoemancipation!”* (September 1882). As mentioned above, one of the characteristic methodological effects of viewing early Zionism and its political ideas through the lens of the nation-state as its forgone conclusion is to divide and filter out certain chapters and components of the period’s historical picture. Those chapters and components that appear to be directly connected to the narrative of the nation-state are positioned at the center of the historical picture at the expense of chapters and components that appear to lack this kind of connection. In the case of Pinsker, the result of this dividing influence is clearly evident in the way that the historiography dismantles the gradual progression of his political thought and turns it into a dichotomy between the “emancipation” period and the “auto-emancipation” period. According to this narrative, during the period before the Storms in the South (1881–1882) and the writing of *“Autoemancipation!”* Pinsker espoused the civil emancipation of Jews in tsarist Russia, but after the turning point of 1881–1882 he abandoned the civil emancipation ideology for the national territorial ideology. This latter ideology, articulated in *“Autoemancipation!”*, was meant, according to this narrative, to provide the Jews of Europe in general, and the Jews of tsarist Russia in particular, with an ideological substitute for the civil emancipation model, which Pinsker no

longer considered to be valid. This substitute, in the form of a territorial homeland as presented in *"Autoemancipation!"*, was, according to the Zionist historiography on Pinsker, a clear forerunner to the nation-state, which it sees as Zionism's political essence.

This account of how Pinsker came to write *"Autoemancipation!"*, as well as the attendant description of the booklet's content and context, became a fixture of the historiography discourse on Pinsker despite the fact that most of Pinsker's writings in the Russian Jewish press had not been available to researchers until a decade and a half ago. However, the reexamination of recently uncovered writings by Pinsker reaches conclusions that are fundamentally different from the conventional account. Unlike the way that the current account divides Pinsker's ideological path into an "emancipation/assimilation" stage (which is left out of the nation-state paradigm) and the "auto-emancipation/nationalism" stage (which is seen as anticipating the nation-state), the picture that emerges from our reexamination depicts a gradual, complex ideological development that is not in keeping with the nation-state paradigm both before and after 1881. Pinsker was a keen observer of ethno-national developments in tsarist Russia, the country of his birth, as well as in neighboring Habsburg Austria, in which he was particularly interested. On the basis of his observations, Pinsker developed a multinational conception of citizenship for the first time in the history of modern Jewish nationalism, a conception that he held to throughout his intellectual and political career. The approach was founded on the separation between "nation" (ethnic) and "land" (state, empire) as analogous to the separation between church and state in liberal Western discourse. Pinsker believed that this principle, if implemented, would allow Jews to achieve an improved version of civil emancipation both as individuals and as members of a recognized ethno-national collective. He also thought that implementing this approach would give similar rights to citizens who belong to various other ethno-national groups. Before 1881, Pinsker hoped to promote this idea by focusing on the struggle for civil and national rights of the Jews in the diaspora (the rights of "our tribe," in his words). After the Storms in the South, however, and as a response to the rise of modern anti-Semitism in Europe, Pinsker developed the idea of a national-political homeland for Jews as the best means of correcting the emancipation

process of Jews in the diaspora, which was an idea that was very much in the spirit of the multinational conception of citizenship that he had been developing. According to Pinsker, the Jews' smooth transition from the diaspora to a recognized territorial political entity would make the Jews who remained in imperial multiethnic spaces more similar to their neighbors, many of whom had national lives that were also split into a "homeland" and a "diaspora." Thus, this transition would benefit the struggle for individual, civil, and collective equal rights for Jews. Furthermore, Pinsker's prolonged commitment to the national and civil auto/emancipation of Jews living in multiethnic empires (which was where most of the world's Jews lived), as well as to a multinational conception of citizenship, profoundly corresponded to his essentially substatist position in relation to the legal-political character of the designated Jewish territory.

The approach to self-determination and the state by the founder of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), which is the focus of the book's second chapter, also clearly suffers from the shortcomings of being viewed retrospectively through the prism of the later nation-state. The very expression "Herzl, visionary of the state," which has become common not only in Israeli public discourse but in academic discourse as well, contains more than a little anachronism. Here, too, the anachronistic approach creates an artificial dichotomy that disregards certain conceptual aspects of Herzl's thought while selectively emphasizing and isolating others. First, this is expressed in the constant opposition made by scholars between two foundational documents in Herzl's political Zionism: the booklet *The Jewish State* (1896) and the novel *Altneuland* (1902). In *The Jewish State*, Herzl explicitly uses the term "state" to advance the principle of national self-determination for Jews, though without going into details about how it would be realized. Scholars consider the text to be a clear early forerunner of the Jews' nation-state that was founded in the middle of the twentieth century. In *Altneuland*, on the other hand, Herzl emphasizes the subsovereign character of the sociopolitical entity he seeks to establish in Palestine, and this has led researchers to view the book as a kind of postnationalist intellectual experiment. This conventional opposition is no less artificial than the divided representation of Pinsker's career and thought into "autoemancipation" and "emancipation." This is first

and foremost because we should not project the state-of-Israel, nation-statist model on Herzl's use of the term "state." Rather, we should understand what Herzl meant by "state" by studying the conventional meaning of the term among the national movements of the Habsburg Empire and in the context in which Herzl developed his political thinking. In fact, most of these movements clearly considered the term "state" to have a substatist meaning, referring to an autonomous territorial district that is part of an existing imperial framework. In light of the concrete spatial and historical context, the divided representation of Herzlian political thought gradually gives way to an internally coherent picture, an account that more closely reflects the political concepts and patterns of thought regarding self-determination that were common in the Central and Eastern Europe of Herzl's time.

Second, the selective nation-statist perspective completely misses one of the essential components of Herzlian political Zionism: the cultural one. To be sure, it is well-known that Herzl did not count himself among the supporters of the Hebrew language. In the society that he imagines in *Altneuland*, the old-new Jews speak the language of Goethe and Franz Joseph I of Austria, two figures that Herzl greatly admired. However, none of the researchers who have studied Herzlian thought through the lens of his being the "visionary" of today's Jewish nation-state seem to have considered the possibility that this linguistic feature of *Altneuland* is part of a fully fledged cultural approach embedded in Herzl's thought. A meticulous look at the foundational documents of Herzlian Zionism reveals that Herzl was actually no less a cultural Zionist at heart than *the* cultural Zionist Ahad Ha'am; it is just that his cultural-linguistic vision was fundamentally different from that of the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism. Herzl was no different from many leaders in newly established national movements subject to imperial rule and the cultural hegemony of the imperial language, who, like him, aspired to turn the imperial language into the primary language of their ethno-national group without giving up their sociologically distinct ethno-national identity. He firmly believed that the appropriate course of action for the Jewish nation was to adopt the Enlightenment languages of the European imperial powers. By way of comparison between Herzl's and Max Nordau's cultural-linguistic

vision and the cultural-national conceptions of the Slovenian, Czech, Lithuanian, Norwegian, and other national movements of the nineteenth century's non-dominant nationalities—a comparison that has never before been attempted in the study of Zionism—this chapter thus sheds new light on Herzlian Zionism as a cultural-national approach that is embedded in the historical context of its time. In light of this context—and in light of the latest research on the late Ottoman Empire—the connection between the cultural-linguistic dimension and the statist political dimension of Herzl's national thought will become clear.

The third chapter focuses on the political outlook of Asher Ginsberg (Ahad Ha'am, 1856–1927), the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism. It may seem surprising to include a chapter on Ahad Ha'am in a book on the history of Zionist political imagination, since it is a commonplace in the historiography of Zionist ideology, as that political thought was the last of Ahad Ha'am's concerns. The approach to Ahad Ha'am in this historiography, however, is another instructive example of the distortion that the nation-state paradigm creates in the study of the history of Zionist national thought, and any reevaluation of the ideological history of Zionism must contend with this distortion as well. Here, too, it will become clear that the nation-state methodology creates a somewhat artificial dichotomy in its representation of the Jewish national vision held by Zionism's founders. This time, the dichotomy to be overcome is between the Herzlian “Jews' state” and the Ahad Ha'amian “spiritual center.” As I mentioned above, researchers who examine Herzl's *The Jewish State* through the lens of the nation-state of Israel tend to view it as having a concrete, practical political basis. In contrast, the nation-statist lens views the “spiritual center,” a key concept in Ahad Ha'am's national ideology, as rather a detached and idiosyncratic idea, and in any case devoid of any concrete political dimensions. However, when we place the “spiritual center” model—which we should actually call the “national center” model, since this is the way that Ahad Ha'am usually referred to it—side by side with the national-territorial political thought that characterized non-Jewish national movements in the tri-imperial space at the end of the long nineteenth century, and after we support this comparison with Ahad Ha'am's own commentary on his (multi)national environment, which has never been

addressed before, we will see a political model in every sense of the term—a model firmly anchored in the accumulated ethno-national discourse and experience that had developed in the existing imperial frameworks of Ahad Ha'am's time.

By the same token, the trend of retrospectively depoliticizing Ahad Ha'am's Zionism has left one distinctly political and key text out of the historical discussion. I am referring here to the 1920 "Preface to the New Edition" of *Al Parashat Derachim* (*At a Crossroads*), in which Ahad Ha'am comments on the new situation that was created in Palestine following the Balfour Declaration. In this text, Ahad Ha'am sketches out a distinctly binational political vision for the relations between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. Zionist historiography's almost total disregard for this text—notwithstanding the one problematic attempt to examine it—is clearly related to the methodological trend of studying Ahad Ha'amian thought through the prism of the nation-state. By removing this prism from the historiographical toolkit, and by accounting for the complex connections between this text and Ahad Ha'am's national-political conceptions during the imperial period before World War I, we are able to name the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism as one of the most important and original contributors to Zionist political thought in everything that has to do with the question of self-determination and the character of the future state.

The last two chapters of the book, the fourth and fifth chapters, focus on the political approaches toward self-determination, the nation, and the state held by two figures that are universally regarded as central to the history of Zionist political ideologies: the founder of the right-wing revisionist movement, Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940), and the first Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973). These two chapters above all address the essential historiographical problem that the retrospective nation-statist paradigm produces in the study of the political thought of these two men: the almost-total disconnection of their political perception patterns in the pre-Mandate period from their political thought during the Mandate period. Here, too, as in the cases of Pinsker, Herzl, and the depoliticization of Ahad Ha'am through the comparison to Herzlian Zionism, scholars who read these figures through the lens of the nation-state perceive a divided picture of the Zionist

ideological past. The era of multinational empires—a period characterized by a political geography and national-political discourse that does not easily align with the representation of Zionism’s political dimension as a state-in-the-making—is not considered by the existing historiography on Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion to have been an important chapter to examine in order to understand these figures’ political thought. On the other hand, the Mandate period, which is considered to be more amenable to deterministic nation-statist representations, is given the lion’s share of attention. Our first task here, therefore, is to reconstruct the political thought of both men over time, before and after World War I, and to address the degree of continuity and change in their political and spatial thinking vis-à-vis the collapse of the great empires in Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Middle East.

To trace the continuum of Jabotinsky’s positions since he first expressed interest in nationalism and Zionism in 1902–1903, and until his death in 1940, one must first study a long series of Jabotinskian texts that were published in the Russian press in Odessa (and, much less, in St. Petersburg) during the tsarist period, most of which have never been researched before. What emerges from these works is a very complex national-political approach that actually resembles Pinsker’s in a number of ways. Like Pinsker’s approach, Jabotinsky’s idea centers on the principle of separating the “nation” (ethnic, territorial, or dispersed) and the “state” (which cannot be but multinational). According to Jabotinsky, every nation aspires to “social self-determination,” meaning an optimal demographic concentration in one region that is understood to be its historical homeland. Politically speaking, however, those same nations are also interested in becoming a part of a larger multinational federative state that would serve as an organizing political framework that includes all citizens. Each citizen’s national districts/communities would have the critical role of mediating their inclusion as subjects of the governmental sovereignty of the multinational federative state. Jabotinsky initially developed this idea for what he hoped would be the future character of tsarist Russia. Later, following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, he projected this vision onto the Ottoman Empire. The heart of his vision was to establish territorial self-government in Palestine that would be part of a “nationalities state”

(*Nationalitätenstaat*), which he believed the Young Turks would have to establish sooner or later. At the same time, Jabotinsky considered Austria-Hungary, the third empire of the tri-imperial space, as a definite nationalities state in-the-making and therefore as an inexhaustible source of multinational political models. He also saw Austria-Hungary as a constant point of reference for imagining multinational political frameworks that a “Jewish state” (read: district) would belong to in the near future.

As the multinational empires collapsed, Jabotinsky’s view of the Jewish political future underwent an important shift. For the rest of his life, he would speak of a Jewish state in a distinctly sovereign sense, even as he considered the idea of turning Palestine into the Seventh Dominion of the British Empire.²⁹ Nevertheless, he continued to constantly and stubbornly envision the internal civil and national character of the future Jewish state according to the same nationalities state model that he believed was supposed to have come into being in tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey and was, he believed, on the verge of being realized in the Habsburg Empire. He began to place an even stronger emphasis than before on the need to keep “the state” out of the internal affairs of its nations (the Jewish and the Arab first and foremost, but in principle every human group that would declare itself to be “a nation”) and on the need to reduce the state’s responsibilities to a mere coordinating body between ethno-national communities. At this point, the chapter examines the central paradox in Jabotinskian political Zionism: the more that Jabotinsky raised the banner of what he referred to before World War I as the nation’s “social self-determination” (the slogan “as many Jews as possible in as much land as possible,” a concise expression of his aspiration to establish a state with a large Jewish majority on both banks of the Jordan River), the more firmly he emphasized the multinational character of the “Jewish State,” which would come into being by virtue of the noninvolvement of the political apparatus with the issue of society’s national character.

As mentioned above, the existing historiography describes the prestate era as a time when the nation-state of 1948 was hidden away in the storerooms of Zionism throughout its entire existence as a national movement, far from the eyes of the Gentiles, waiting to be taken out at the right time. Consequently, the existing historiog-

raphy's depiction of Ben-Gurion's political thought contains a somewhat ironic paradox. On one hand, most of the research on the subject rightly describes Ben-Gurion as a person completely bereft of dogmatism, as someone who was acutely aware of every historical shift that was relevant to the advancement of the Zionist cause and who made sure to update his positions to align with the most recent shift. On the other hand, however, he is depicted as a person who was a lifetime adherent to the aspiration of establishing the Jewish nation-state precisely as it came into being in 1948. According to this second assumption, the wide variety of positions Ben-Gurion expressed regarding the national future of the Jewish people throughout his political career were no more than a series of tactical (or somewhat utopian)³⁰ departures from the hope of realizing the very same model, which, so the story goes, Ben-Gurion had always held secretly in his heart. This depiction attributes meta-historical foresight to Ben-Gurion, suggesting that he had the ability to predict the exact events and vicissitudes that came together during the first half of the twentieth century to form the state of Israel as we know it today. The fifth and last chapter of the book traces the continuum of Ben-Gurion's positions about the issue of Jewish national self-determination from before World War I until after the Holocaust. Before World War I, Ben-Gurion, like Jabotinsky, wholeheartedly supported the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of a revised multinational blueprint that was based on his own assessment of "what is good for the Jewish people." Furthermore, Ben-Gurion copied the idea of "decentralization" from the Ottoman context and made it a part of his vision for the future character of the Jewish state in Palestine as supported by him throughout most of the Mandate period. According to Ben-Gurion, this state should be independent and have a Jewish majority, but it should also be founded as a multinational democracy rather than a centralized mono-national state after the image of the nation-state. He believed that the Arab minority that would be formed in the future would have collective national rights rather than only individual civil rights.

Ben-Gurion's adherence to the multinational, multicollective decentralization model, which he believed to be the proper framework through which to realize self-determination for the Jewish

people, was not contingent on any *a priori* ideology. Rather, it was contingent only on what he perceived to be the essential national interests of the Jews, both before World War I and later, during the Mandate period. During the imperial period, at the end of the long nineteenth century, Ben-Gurion assumed that Palestine would continue to be part of the Ottoman Empire. He therefore espoused the idea of recognizing the national collective rights of the Jewish people both territorially in Palestine and extr territorially beyond Palestine, and both within the framework of the Ottoman state (which would become multinational) and beyond it. After the collapse of the empires, Ben-Gurion did not abandon the idea that it would be good for both Zionism and Jewish national interests that Jews should enjoy national collective rights outside of Palestine to the greatest extent possible. His approach to the relationship between the Jewish people and the world's nations was thus similar to the various approaches espoused by Pinsker and Herzl, political Zionism's founders, which outlined the reciprocal relationship between the rights of Jews in non-Jewish states and the rights of non-Jews in the future Jewish state. Ben-Gurion's vision for this future relationship was as follows: just as Jews in non-Jewish states should enjoy all civil, individual, and national collective rights as Jews, so too should the future Jewish state place the principle of safeguarding the national collective rights of all its citizens at the foundation of its constitutional political organization. This by no means meant departing from the ideological priority of pioneering and settling the Land of Israel as a contrast to "exile." Rather, Ben-Gurion supported this approach as part of his well-known method of planning and maneuvering his political strategy for Jewish existence while keeping a constant eye on the concrete political and socio-demographic reality. Ben-Gurion assumed that millions of European Jews would remain in their home countries and would deserve to be free of having their national "personality" oppressed.

Ben-Gurion held fast to this idea, which clearly required establishing a state possessing the structure of a consociational democracy in Palestine, until the second half of the 1930s and even after the Arab Rebellion of 1936. As will become clear, the beginnings of his departure from this national-political approach appear to have come after the publication of the Peel Commission's conclusions,

which called for partitioning Palestine into two states and conducting population exchanges of Jews and Arabs in both states. This was the first time in the history of Zionist thought that Zionism would imagine fulfilling the right of the Jews in Palestine to national self-determination without having an Arab presence alongside them. However, the most sweeping and fundamental change in Ben-Gurion's political thought did not occur after the Peel Commission either. Rather, it occurred only after he began receiving news about the Holocaust of European Jewry. From this point on, Ben-Gurion would no longer speak of a Jewish state that allows for the collective national existence of the Arabs, but rather only of a Jewish state that recognizes the national collective rights of the Jews only. As a result of this major development, Ben-Gurion reached the conclusion that the unwritten contract regarding the reciprocal relationship between the rights of the Jewish nation and the rights of "the goyim"—the contract that, according to his earliest writings, was intended to guarantee the existence of Jewish minorities as a group in non-Jewish states, as well as the national collective existence of the Arab minority in the Jewish state—was null and void. This dramatic turning point was clearly expressed in the Biltmore Plan of May 1942: in it, the Arabs disappeared from the civil and cultural space of the future state as a particular national group. This change meant not only a complete overhaul of Ben-Gurion's conception of the civil-political character of the future national self-determination entity, but also an overhaul of the Zionist political imagination in its entirety. This change in Zionist consciousness, as well as its power and meaning, is another important historical phenomenon that is overlooked by the retrospective approach to Zionism's history through the prism of the nation-state, in exactly the same way that this prism conceals the long and continuous series of political alternatives to the nation-state that, as we will see, were at the heart of Zionist political imagination.

CHAPTER ONE

Leon Pinsker

Auto/Emancipation

I

IN HIS EULOGY TO Leon Pinsker (1821–1891), a founder of the Hibat Tsiyon movement and the author of “*Autoemancipation!*,” written immediately after his death, Ahad Ha’am explicitly testified that the idea of founding “the national spiritual center” in Eretz Yisrael—the key concept of Ahad Ha’am’s spiritual-cultural Zionism—was delivered to him and several of his fellows by none other than Pinsker himself as he lay on his deathbed.¹ However, if the historiography of Zionism ever addressed these words of Ahad Ha’am, it has tended to regard them with considerable skepticism.² It is rather customary to elucidate Pinsker’s place in the ideological genealogy of modern Jewish nationalism in light of what follows from a diary of Theodor Herzl: “Read today [Pinsker’s] pamphlet, *Auto-Emancipation* . . . [a]n astounding correspondence in the critical part, a great similarity in the constructive one. A pity that I did not read this work before my own pamphlet was printed. On the other hand, it is a good thing that I didn’t know it—or perhaps I would have abandoned my own undertaking.”³

Indeed, it appears that this renowned entry in Herzl’s diary on February 10, 1896, just at the time of the appearance of *The Jewish*

State, was one of the decisive factors in determining the historiographical fate of Pinsker and of his pamphlet “*Autoemancipation!*”—*An Appeal to His People by a Russian Jew* (1882), a foundational tract of modern political Jewish nationalism. In his well-known study of Zionist ideology, Gideon Shimoni expressed in a precise way the conventional historiographical perception of the author of “*Autoemancipation!*” and his pamphlet: Pinsker was merely an early reflection of Herzl among the pre-emancipation Russian Jewish intelligentsia, and his essay “prefigured the essentials of Herzl’s analysis” in *The Jewish State*.⁴ The placing of Pinsker in Herzl’s shadow largely explains the dearth of historiographic engagement with this Russian Jew and his manifesto.

To be sure, Leon (Yehuda Leib) Pinsker was far from being a marginal figure in the history of Eastern European Jewry. He was born in Tomashov (today Tomaszów Lubelski), Congress Poland, to none other than Simcha Pinsker (1801–1864), a prominent rabbi and maskil at one and the same time, a linguist and scholar of Karaism, and a key representative of the Russian version of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Upon the family’s move to Odessa when Leon was still an infant, his father taught Hebrew at the reformed Jewish primary school, where religious study was combined with the teaching of Hebrew grammar, secular studies, Russian, and German. Leon attended this school and subsequently studied at the famous and prestigious Odessa high school, the Richelieu Lyceum, from which he graduated as a “candidate for the study of law” in 1844. He then taught briefly at the special Russian-Jewish school at Kishinev, part of the new educational system for Jews founded during the reign of Nicholas I with the aim of promoting the Russianization of the Jewish population. Some years later he was accepted to study medicine at Moscow University, becoming one of the first Jewish students in tsarist Russia. He received advanced training in Germany and Austria and returned to Odessa to become one of the city’s most respected people—a successful private physician who at the same time served as director of the psychiatric department of the municipal hospital. He fought in the Crimean War and received a commendation for bravery. In the early 1860s he was among those who laid the foundations of the Russian-language Jewish press. All in all, one witnesses here a prominent personality standing for a

whole spectrum of the dilemmas of acculturation, integration, and nationalism faced by the modern Eastern European Jew. And yet, scholarly biographies on Pinsker are largely lacking; only a handful of studies on his life and activity exist,⁵ and only a few studies have focused on “*Autoemancipation!*”⁶

A further outcome of the “Herzlization” of the author of “*Autoemancipation!*” is manifested in the tendency for his life story, public persona, and intellectual development as a Jewish nationalist to be viewed by means of the same long-accepted interpretational lens applied by earlier Zionist historiography in representing Herzl’s path toward *The Jewish State* and political Zionism. The essence of this lens, which contained more than a bit of ideological didacticism, reflected the paradigm shift “from assimilation to nationalism.” This is a rather dramatic tale of disenchantment on the part of enlightened European Jewish individuals with the idea of becoming integrated and involved in the social and national milieu of their countries of residence on the basis of full and substantial civil equality of rights. These individuals then direct all their energy toward political activism designed to reshape European Jewry as a particular national collectivity distinct from its European environment, thereafter leading the Jews away from extraterritorial dispersion among the territorial non-Jewish peoples toward a territorial assembly as a sovereign political nation. Ben Halpern summarized this idea in his work *The Idea of the Jewish State*, in which he stated that Pinsker, like Herzl, proposed Zionism as an ideological substitute for emancipation, which the two men saw as irrelevant both to the defining feature of Jewish status and to the solution of the Jewish problem.⁷ In its asserting that from its very beginning the modern Jewish political nationalism considered territorial sovereignty to be the only means of collective existence that was available to post-emancipation Jews in the modern world, this argument has become a cornerstone of the deterministic nation-statist paradigm that tells the story of Zionism’s political dimension as bound exclusively to a teleological drive toward the independent 1948-like nation-state. In this story, Pinsker is thus described as the first to lead the way toward the nation-state-in-the-making, and it is therefore only fitting that our research, which seeks to retrace the ap-

proach to self-determination and the state of Zionist political imagination, begins by examining his case study.

II

The somewhat dramatic narrative of a paradigm shift from “emancipation/assimilation” to “autoemancipation/nationalism,” which has guided Zionist historiography for generations, included the theme of the defining event, a decisive crossroads, as it were, from which point onward the continued civil existence of the Jews in the post-emancipation states (Herzl’s Habsburgian Austria) or the struggle for equal civil rights for Jews in pre-emancipation states (Pinsker’s tsarist Russia) no longer appeared to the drama’s protagonists to be viable alternatives for Jewish integration into the modern world. In Herzl’s case, it was the Dreyfus Affair (1894), which was for some two generations perceived by historiography to be the primary factor that motivated the liberal Viennese journalist of the Jewish faith to reevaluate his position on the “Jewish question” in so radical a manner.⁸ It is commonly thought that in Pinsker’s case this defining event was the wave of pogroms that swept over the southern Ukraine, in the wake of the murder of Tsar Alexander II, known as the Storms in the South (1881–1882). In view of the surprising dimensions of these pogroms, the tardy (at best) intervention by the police, and the continuing incitement against the Jews even in the progressive wing of the Russian press, Pinsker resolved to cease his efforts to approach the Russian people and to abandon the dream of attaining citizenship in the Russian Empire in favor of a national territorial solution.⁹

The “from-assimilation-to-nationalism” paradigm has in recent decades lost much of its analytical and interpretational capacity to explain modern Jewish history.¹⁰ In the specific case of the historiography of the Jews of Russia in Pinsker’s time—namely, Russia under Nicholas I, during the time of the great reforms of Alexander II, and during the reaction under Alexander III—we have, from the early 1980s to the present time, witnessed a continuing and fundamental undermining of this paradigm, with more and more historians moving away from Ben Zion Dinur’s and Shmuel Ettinger’s tendency¹¹

to regard 1881, and the Storms in the South, as the watershed between the eras of emancipation and of autoemancipation in the history of political trends among Russian Jewry.¹² Indeed, leading scholars of the history of Eastern European Jewry in the modern age adopted a profoundly critical approach toward the paradigm of polar trends in the historiography of nineteenth century's Russian Jewry. While keeping in mind the importance of the events of 1881 in hastening the pace of change in Russian Jewish society, these scholars discerned that several of the most significant cognitive, cultural, and political phenomena identified with the autoemancipatory, nationally oriented trends previously thought to have originated solely with the Storms in the South actually preceded that year of crisis. According to this argument, it was already at the time of Alexander II's reforms that certain parts of the Russian Jewish public had become skeptical of the capacity of liberal trends in the Russian state to promote emancipation and acknowledged the ineffectuality of the emancipation-oriented ideology of Jewish Haskalah (Enlightenment).¹³ It thus transpired that even before the crisis and reaction of the 1880s, prominent circles within the thin layer of the Russian Jewish intelligentsia and bourgeoisie had not viewed the Jews as passive objects of political and social processes driven by the forces of the external environment, but rather as active subjects who were called upon to contend with these processes through their own collective will. Or, as Eli Lederhendler put it concisely and precisely, "the call for Jewish Autoemancipation grew out of the political crisis of Russian Jewry before 1881."¹⁴

The division of the history of Russian Jewry into the period of emancipatory dreams and hopes up to 1881 and the period of disappointment and the shedding of illusions of emancipation, accompanied by a transition to independent national or revolutionary activism, has been challenged from the opposite end of the spectrum as well. In *Beyond the Pale*, Benjamin Nathans showed that despite crisis and disappointment in the wake of the Storms in the South, the Russian Jewish intelligentsia continued to entertain patterns of thought and action clearly directed toward integration into Russian society and the Russian state, alongside nationalist and radical socialist trends.¹⁵ By adding Nathans's conclusions, according to which

the period of hope for citizenship extended beyond 1881, to those of the “new historians” who emerged in the 1980s, which determined that nationally oriented trends within Russian Jewry appeared before 1881, we are able to arrive at an inclusive and complex picture of the trends and developments in the lives of the Jews of tsarist Russia as expounded in post-Dinurian historiography. This may be described by means of an expanded paraphrasing of Lederhendler’s words: “Just as the call for Jewish autoemancipation grew out of the political crisis of Russian Jewry before 1881, so did the call for civil emancipation of the Jews persist despite the exacerbation of the political crisis of 1881.”

These refreshing trends within the historiography of nineteenth-century Russian Jewry thus challenged the bipolar historiographical mold from which the dichotomous representation of Pinsker in Zionist historiography, as an assimilationist before 1881 and a nationalist after, largely derives. Yet these trends left this representation of Pinsker out of the critical discussion that they led. Among “the new historians”¹⁶ of tsarist Russian Jewry, only Steven Zipperstein has argued that Pinsker’s conversion to Zionism was less sudden than generally depicted in Zionist historiography.¹⁷ Yet the scholars of Russian Jewry who followed him refrained from continuing to explore this issue. On the contrary, as if there were a tacit agreement of sorts on a division of historiographical labor between historians of Zionism and historians of Russian Jewry, the latter allowed the Zionist historians to retain a monopoly over the representation of Pinsker and his thought. At best, if the recent studies on nineteenth-century Russian Jewry address the case of Pinsker at all, it appears that they at times reinforce the image of Pinsker’s divided biography in the form of a kind of counterparadigm, as if they were seeking to stress how different and more complex the path of ordinary Russian Jews was than that represented by the emblematic, proto-Zionist figure of Pinsker. Nathans, for example, questioned the crisis-oriented, bipolar paradigm of the annals of Russian Jews, noting the trends toward advancement and entrenchment of the processes of integration and entry to civil society. To Nathans, Pinsker’s evolving public career was a prime example of a polar transition from the integrationist to the nationalist position, which has

been incorrectly perceived to be paradigmatic of the intellectual-political transformation among his Russian Jewish contemporaries.¹⁸

Yet could Pinsker have been a more complex figure than that portrayed by Zionist historiography, as Zipperstein has contended?¹⁹ To what extent does Pinsker the symbol—the member of the educated elite who makes a paradigmatic turn away from integration into his immediate non-Jewish surroundings and toward nationalism and revolt against the status quo—reflect the real-life Pinsker? To answer this question, one must closely examine the progression of his opinions and positions before 1881 and the writing of “*Autoemancipation!*,” and after 1881, including “*Autoemancipation!*” No such study like the one I outline below has thus far been undertaken.

III

The conventional representation of Pinsker in his pre-“*Autoemancipation!*” period, as someone who advocated the assimilation of Jews as the preferred means of promoting integration and civic emancipation, became entrenched in Zionist historiography despite the fact that most of his writings of that period remained unknown to scholars. To be sure, the anonymous author of “*Autoemancipation!*” was a well-known figure among the stratum of Jewish intellectuals in tsarist Russia before becoming the leader of Hibat Tsiyon. In the early 1860s, at a time when the reforms enacted at the beginning of Alexander II’s rule appeared to the progressive forces in Russia to presage a trend toward universal civil equality,²⁰ Pinsker was one of the group that founded the first two major Russian-language Jewish newspapers, which openly raised the standard of Jewish emancipation in the country. These were the Odessa weeklies *Razsvet* (1860) and *Sion* (1861–1862). Yet the exact number and identity of Pinsker’s publications in the Russian Jewish press remained a mystery for many years. Holding a public position as head of a department in an Odessa government hospital, Pinsker was constantly apprehensive of the censor and signed most of his pieces with combinations of a few letters from his given name or surname. Asher Druyanov, the historian of the Hibat Tsiyon movement and author of the only biography of Pinsker, was able to identify with certainty only

three items written by Pinsker, all of which were published in the weekly *Sion* in 1861–1862.²¹ These were the weekly's first editorial²² and two polemical articles critical of *Osnova*, the Ukrainian monthly.²³ It was only in 1999 that a scholar of Slavic studies, Bella Vernikova, undertook a comprehensive effort to identify Pinsker's publications in the Russian Jewish press as part of her doctoral study on Odessa's Russian Jewish literature.²⁴ Thanks to Vernikova's painstaking work we now have at our disposal what may well be a complete list of Pinsker's no fewer than ninety published items, the majority of which, seventy-seven in number, predate the appearance of "*Auto-emancipation!*"²⁵ The analysis of Pinsker's civil and national perceptions offered below thus rests upon a corpus of texts part of which has never been examined.

The main body of articles that Pinsker wrote before "*Autoemancipation!*"—sixty-seven of seventy-seven—was published in the Jewish Russian weekly whose very name, *Sion* (Zion), serves to sow some initial doubt as to the contemporary assimilationist image of Pinsker. Indeed, perusal of the programmatic editor's opinion piece in the first issue of the weekly, which was known to be by Pinsker before Vernikova's bibliographical discoveries, provides evidence of the considerable complexity of his civil-political and collective vision of the future of Russia's Jews. During a period in which hopes for emancipation were dawning over the Russian Empire, so Pinsker believed, enlightened Russian Jews should aspire to the twin goals that "history had placed before them" at this time: "to become the sons of their time and [the sons of] their immediate homeland without ceasing to be true Jews."²⁶ Yet the Jews, as Pinsker saw them—to his great regret—were devoting themselves to the achievement of the first objective alone. Maskilim had severed "the vibrant link to their past and to the masses of their fellows, and had almost completely alienated themselves from their lives."²⁷ This was, according to Pinsker, a very grave political-civil mistake since, so he believed, it was impossible to promote significantly Russian Jews' equality of civil rights unless they aroused "a lively interest and identification with our nationality" among the non-Jewish surroundings and acquainted the Russian public with the special characteristics of the past and present of Jews in general and of Russian

Jews in particular. On the contrary, it was only through overt Jewish awareness of “the interests of our people” in the Russian state and an explicit emphasis on the historical continuity of the existence of the Jewish nation on the soil of the Russian Empire that the enlightened citizens of Russia could be induced to show the respect toward the Jews that was a prerequisite for stepping up the emancipatory effort.²⁸

Druyanov did not neglect the concepts “tribe” (*plemya*), “nationality” (*national’nost’*), and “nation” (*natsia*) in Pinsker’s references to Russian Jewry in his emancipatory discourse that he had previously developed. However, failing to produce a satisfactory explanation, he asserted that the 1860s Pinsker of *Sion* had somewhat incidentally “come across . . . the national question,” whereas his fundamental perception of the future of the Russian Empire and its Jews had been a cosmopolitan, supranational one.²⁹ In other words, given the dual components of Pinsker’s approach to the issue of the Jews’ self-positioning in anticipation of the hoped-for adoption of the principles of civil equality in the Russian Empire—political-civil identification with the Russian Empire (“to become . . . the sons of their immediate homeland”) and reinforcement of the Jewish collective self in real ethno-national terms (“to be true Jews”)—Druyanov chose the first of these while deemphasizing the second.

Ben-Zion Netanyahu, a historian then working mostly as a Revisionist journalist, registered a strong opposition to the interpretation of Pinsker’s civil-political worldview as movement from assimilation to nationalism. In his introduction to a 1944 translation of “*Autoemancipation!*” Netanyahu presented a vigorous argument against what he correctly defined as the conventional view, which held that the pre-1880s Pinsker was an assimilationist in the spirit of Western post-emancipatory Jews. Resting his case on the same programmatic text by Pinsker in the first issue of *Sion*, mentioned above, Netanyahu characterized the Pinsker of the 1860s as someone who held very clear Jewish national opinions.³⁰ Yet just as Druyanov had underrated the weight of the ethno-national component of Pinsker’s perception of the relations between the Jews and the Russian state, so did Netanyahu fail to attach importance to its civil-political component. His translation from the Russian of Pinsker’s key sentence cited above, which in the same breath mentioned the Jews’ attach-

ment to the Russian homeland *and* the matter of their collective Jewish identification, was inaccurate. “To become the sons of their period and [the sons of] their immediate homeland without ceasing to be true Jews” was rendered in Netanyahu’s translation as “history has imposed two duties upon the Jews, one of responding to the call of their time and native land, and one of being true Jews.”³¹ This rendition created a significant discrepancy with regard to the essence of Pinsker’s attitude toward the Russian Empire: “responding to the call of their . . . native land” versus Pinsker’s original formulation, which determines that Russian Jews should “become *the sons* . . . of their homeland”—a turn of phrase that has deep emotional significance in Russian (indicating not merely “locals” in general, but a real bond between fathers and sons).

Before turning our attention to the remaining sources of Pinsker the publicist, it would appear that we are entitled to assume, at least on the strength of the position he spelled out in the aforementioned editorial, that Pinsker held a complex, multidimensional view that cannot be reduced to an essential component on one hand and a secondary one on the other. We do not find here merely the civil-emancipatory trend as asserted by Druyanov and traditional Zionist historiographers in his wake, nor merely the ethnic-national Jewish trend as discerned by Netanyahu. Rather, we have here a civil-national vision predicated on both these trends, according to which Pinsker calls upon the Jews to become the faithful sons of the Russian state, without relinquishing their ethnic (or in his words, “tribal”) and national bonds—indeed, he himself used the word “national”—as Jews.

Pinsker was a particularly prolific contributor to *Sion*. In subsequent reports and polemical articles, he is aware that if this dual civil-national vision were to come about—and for the Jews to become the sons of the Russian homeland as an ethnic, religious, and national group entitled to nurture its singular collective heritage—a profound change would have to occur both in the regime of the Russian state itself and in the manner in which the empire’s “progressive” forces, as he put it, perceived the matter of Jewish emancipation.³² Mindful, it seems clear, of the censor in his writing during this period, Pinsker addressed the authorities in an oblique and restrained manner, staking a general claim to equal civil rights for the Jews as individual members of an ethnic-national collective with a

distinct identity within the body of Russian citizenry. This is an appropriate point at which to clarify a conceptual-linguistic issue essential to understanding the very possibility of conceiving of such a civil-political evolution under the Russian regime. In the Russian language there is a clear and fundamental distinction between two concepts, *russkiy* and *rossiiskiy*, both of which are translated into Western languages and into Hebrew as “Russian.” While the former concept means “Russian” in the sense of an ethnic people, the latter denotes a territory that explicitly refers to all the empire’s subjects, whatever their ethnic origins. By promoting the latter, civil-territorial dimension of Russianness, Pinsker outlined an inclusive and complex model for Jewish emancipation that criticized the unwritten emancipatory contract between the modern nation-state and the Jews who had been evolving in Western and Central Europe since the days of the French Revolution. According to this contract, in return for full partnership in the civil-political body, the Jews were called upon to abandon their national collective affiliation. According to Pinsker’s alternative model—which he articulated cautiously but with sufficient clarity—the emancipatory contract in the multinational Russian Empire should have a different complexion: like the other ethno-national groupings that populated the vast territorial expanse of tsarist Russia, the Jews should regard themselves as loyal patriots of the Russian state and should also gain full command of the Russian language, which would be the lingua franca of all the citizens of the state of Russia or, more precisely, of all the nationalities of the state of Russia. At the same time, they should preserve their own historical-national heritage, and the Russian state, for its part, should not regard Russianization as a means of assimilating non-Russian groups nor of converting non-Pravoslavnic peoples to Christianity.

Although the attempt to formulate a model for a multinational civil society in the Russian state was perhaps viable in the semantic and conceptual senses, we may assume that had Pinsker openly advocated it in the pages of *Sion*, the weekly would have existed for an even shorter period than the ten months (July 1861–May 1862) during which it succeeded in surviving the censor’s scrutiny. Pinsker did indeed develop an original strategy designed to disseminate this model: he criticized the policy whereby the Jews’ civil equality was

made conditional upon their assimilation to the nationality of the majority, as well as the idea of national unification of the given multinational space, but he did so without referring to the dangerous Russian Jewish context. The principal polemical genres that Pinsker adopted to serve as vehicles for this strategy were trenchant, critical surveys of the status of the “Jewish question” in the European countries in which Jewish emancipation had recently been instituted or was waiting in the wings.

Pinsker offered Hungary as an example of the problematic and unjust nature of the approach that sought to promote civil equality in return for cultural resemblance to the hegemonic national grouping. At that very time—the early 1860s—Hungarian nationalism, over which the Habsburgs had gained a Pyrrhic victory in 1848 with the aid of Russian forces, was marking up one gain after another, accumulating ever more power and beginning to regard the multinational space of the former Hungarian kingdom as a kind of nation-state in the making. This trend gained momentum following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867 and the founding of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.³³ The aggressive Magyarization (Hungarian assimilation) policy toward non-Hungarian national groups thus became a byword in contemporary Central Europe during the 1860s.

In one of his earliest reports (late July 1861), Pinsker surveyed developments on the issue of civil equality for Jews in Western and Central Europe and referred to the echoes of the debate over the emancipation of the Jews of Hungary, which had yet to achieve a privileged status within the Habsburg Empire but was well on its way to this goal. In his article Pinsker explicitly identified with the voices of the minority in the Hungarian national camp, which pointed to a fundamental defect in the way that the liberal statutes enacted in the wake of Hungary’s 1848 revolution referred to the Jews. How was it possible, Pinsker wondered together with these minority voices, that while the 1848 laws clearly implied the principle of equal rights for all the nationalities residing in Hungary, in the case of the Jews, who certainly constituted a singular nationality alongside the other nationalities, this principle was not recognized?³⁴ This query was by no means obvious at a time when the ideal of Jewish emancipation was linked to a perception of the Jews as a re-

ligious confession that lacked the characteristics not only of a separate and particularistic collective body, but also, certainly, of a nationality. It contained the seed of the critical approach toward the emancipatory ideal from which Pinsker's comprehensive civil-national Weltanschauung would grow.

Some two months thereafter, in September and December 1861, Pinsker published two articles—"The Hungarian Nationality and the Jews" and "The Situation of the Jews in Hungary"—that specifically addressed the Hungarian-Jewish issue. In them, Pinsker outspokenly presented his misgivings about the policy of linking civil emancipation to cultural-national Magyarization. In the first article Pinsker bluntly asserted that the granting of civil equality to the Jews of Hungary should not be conditional upon the sweeping adoption of the Hungarian language and culture. The Hungarians, so he believed, should be satisfied with the fact that the Jews regarded Hungary as their homeland and should respect the right of the Jews—as well as that of other nationalities sharing the fate of the Hungarian people—to retain their own religious and national attributes.³⁵

In his second article, Pinsker expressed even more sharply his opposition to what he appositely defined as the dimension of "national exclusion" in the Hungarian policy toward the non-Magyar peoples of the land. It is worth citing the key sentences of his counterattack against this phenomenon, since Pinsker here reveals his general insight into the relations between nationalities, which extended beyond the specific Hungarian-Jewish context:

They [the Hungarians] are not satisfied with unambiguous proof of the Jews' sincere identification with them and their cause—[which is] the cause of the entire *land*. They [the Hungarians] would like the Jews to be reborn as Magyars, and thereby forget that one can adopt from a different people—and this too, not all at once—[only] the external forms: clothes, way of life, customs, language, but by no means the spirit nor the character of the foreign nationality.³⁶

Pinsker's basic affirmation in these lines of civil-territorial identification with "the cause of the entire *land*" and his rejection of national-

cultural assimilation as a principle in the relations between neighboring nationalities were yet more clearly brought to the fore in the argument in which he engaged in the pages of *Sion* with the Ukrainian monthly *Osnova*. In June 1861 *Osnova* bluntly attacked what it defined as the isolationist way of life of “the Jewish tribe” in the Ukraine, which had nothing in common with the Ukrainian nation apart from the fact that the Jews had resided in the country for generations. The Ukrainian monthly went on to assert firmly that “there is nothing more harmful to a nation than the existence of other small peoples within it, which stand idly by and are indifferent toward its fate.”³⁷

In focusing its attack on the isolationism of the Jewish “tribe” from the Ukrainian “nation,” *Osnova* was thus expressing in this forceful sentence a more general perception of nationality that contrasted strongly with Pinsker’s views concerning “people” and “land” and that therefore angered him no less than the attacks on his “tribe.” And indeed, in responding to the piece in *Osnova*, Pinsker placed primary emphasis on the fundamental implications of *Osnova*’s position on the “Jewish question” for the perception of “the nationalities question” in the Russian Empire in general. In this situation, as he confronted the mouthpiece of Ukrainian nationalism rather than facing off directly with Russian nationalism, Pinsker naturally discerned an appropriate opportunity to present his perception of the future of the empire and its nationalities in a systematic manner.

Pinsker first of all found it necessary to make it clear that he would not hesitate to accept the gist of *Osnova*’s assertion with regard to the harm caused by “the existence of other small peoples within it [the nation], which stand idly by and are indifferent toward its fate,” were the word “nation” replaced by the concept “land”—“land” not necessarily in the sense of “the entire territory of a state,” he stressed, but rather in the sense of “local and regional patriotism.”³⁸ On the contrary, in a state instituting true equality between the “tribes” residing therein, it would be reasonable to demand of each group that it sacrifice some of its “tribal” interests in favor of countrywide interests or, in the case of a single region (such as the Ukraine, within tsarist Russia), region-wide interests.³⁹ Pinsker instructively drew an analogy with civil society, in which “for the gen-

eral good" each individual member must "sacrifice some of his personal interests, limit to some extent his personal freedom, and relinquish many of his singular characteristics."⁴⁰

Yet, asserted Pinsker, one could not accept a situation in which a part of the residents of a given state or of its particular regions—for example, the Ukrainian nation in the south of the Russian Empire, according to *Osnova*—"identifies itself with the whole (with the general, nationally mixed population of any state/region),"⁴¹ for this could only mean that this "part" would take control of the "whole" or, in other words, lead to the dominance of one of the nationalities, which generally enjoyed numerical superiority, over another, smaller nationality or nationalities.⁴² This, warned Pinsker, could have dire implications for the communal life of the whole population of that region. In order to illustrate these implications, he again invoked Central Europe, far distant from Russia and the Ukraine:

What would happen to the poor Slovaks, Serbs, and Croats, not to mention the Germans, were the Hungarians to adopt your theory, as they observed the Slovaks, or for example the Serbs, and all the more so the Germans to be fairly indifferent to the singular fate of the Hungarian nation, to retain their own special characteristics, and not to conceive of joining the Magyars unless they were aware of the general good, of the interests of the homeland in general including their own, what if in light of all this the Hungarians were to take advantage of their numerical superiority to declare that the existence of the Slovaks or the Germans amongst them was immensely harmful to them, and were they then to begin to exterminate them or expel them? . . . [D]o you, like the medieval inquisition, fail to understand that diversity is life, and that only death is featureless?⁴³

Pinsker's sense of the fluidity of the boundary between national-cultural uniformity and ethnic cleansing is especially remarkable for someone writing in the mid-nineteenth century. In his confrontation with *Osnova*, Pinsker articulated two original conceptual steps with regard to the reorganization of a multinational state that were altogether innovative for his time. First, eight years before another

Jewish physician—Adolf Fischhof (1816–1893), who was among the leaders of the 1848 revolution in Vienna—would set forth a multinational perception of citizenship in *Austria and the Guarantees for Its Existence*,⁴⁴ and some forty years before the Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer,⁴⁵ Pinsker proposed the idea of the separation between “state” and “nation,” or, to be more precise, between a “state” and its “nations.”⁴⁶

Second—and not entirely independently of the previous proposition—Pinsker generated a personification of ethno-national groups as collective individuals of sorts, visualizing Russia as a state that contained nationalities free to nurture their identities as long as so doing did not undermine the general civil partnership based on the territorial link to the Russian Empire. It is particularly appropriate to mention in this context the parallel that Pinsker drew between *Osnova*’s mono-national perception of the Ukraine and the Inquisition, with its religious intolerance. He perceived of the separation of nationality and state (or of “nation” and “land,” in his terminology) in terms analogous to the separation of religion and state in liberal discourse. Nationalities are, in a way, collective citizens, and just as the state should not interfere with the religious activities of individuals, which are their preserve, so too should it refrain from interfering in the national-cultural sphere, which is the preserve of the national collective. While the idea of the personification of nationalities had of course been known in Europe since the time of Herder, the “imagining” of nations, including the extraterritorial Jewish one, as collective free citizens of a single vast political entity predated the Austro-Marxist perception of personal nationality, which contested the inevitability of the bond between nationality and territory. Above all, this was undoubtedly an innovative and pioneering notion in modern Jewish nationalism.

In addition to the matter of multinational citizenship, which is the essence of the early Pinsker’s national-civil outlook, there are two further minor points to be stressed. First, he distinguished between the religious and the national dimensions among the Jews, referring to them in the sense of both religion and nationality. Second, the Pinsker of *Sion* was not only aware of the existence of those who would subsequently be known as the precursors of Zionism, but also approved of the efforts to establish a Jewish agricultural settlement

in Palestine that would be essentially different in nature from that of the old Yishuv that lived off charitable donations from the diaspora. On three occasions when writing for *Sion*, Pinsker referred favorably to the activity of Ha-hevra le-Yishuv Eretz Yisra'el (the Palestine Settlement Society) in Frankfurt on the Oder, founded by Dr. Haim Luria, assistant to Rabbi Zvi Kalisher and the publisher of his *Derishat Tsiyon*.⁴⁷ On the other hand, Pinsker dissociated himself from the idea of "reestablishing the political independence of the Jews in Palestine." He believed that it was primarily the British who were behind this idea, out of an interest in erecting a barrier against "the outbreak of Moslem fanaticism" in Syria: "this idea appears to us to be difficult to implement, utopian: it is doubtful whether the governments of those states in which the Jews reside would decide to part with this section of their subjects, without mentioning that the Jews themselves would in all likelihood refuse to agree to such a transition; and, moreover, that those who favor the idea of reviving national independence . . . assume that conversion to Christianity would be a necessary condition."⁴⁸ In parentheses one should add that herein lies perhaps part of the explanation for Pinsker's reservations in "*Autoemancipation!*" about turning the "restoring of the ancient land of Judea"⁴⁹ into the heart of his political program. It appears that Pinsker saw that this was potentially an explosive theological issue, and in any event, at least in 1861, he felt uneasy about the possibility that the Jews would become the tools of Western powers in the face of "the outbreak of Moslem fanaticism."

IV

With the closure of *Sion* in May 1862, the Russian Jewish press was muzzled for a considerable time, and Pinsker's publicist voice fell silent for some eighteen years. His silence during this period was broken only once, in June 1870, in the short-lived Russian Jewish journal *Den'*. Relying on Heinrich Graetz, Pinsker presented to the readers of this paper the story of the rise of the Himyarite Kingdom, the Jewish kingdom created in the Arabian Peninsula in the sixth century.⁵⁰ It is notable that he chose at this juncture to write about a topic of a clearly Jewish national nature. This serves to balance and to cast into question the emphatic assertion made by his biographer

Druyanov, who, on the strength of Pinsker's activity at that time in the Society for the Promotion of Enlightenment Among the Jews in Russia, concluded that during that period Pinsker had in effect advocated the assimilation of the Jews into the Russian environment.⁵¹

Pinsker took up his political writing again with renewed vigor in 1880, alongside the renaissance of the Jewish Russian-language press. In January of that year, his trenchant article titled "For Whom Does the Russian-Jewish Press Exist?" appeared in the St. Petersburg Russian Jewish weekly *Russki yevrei*.⁵² In this article he severely criticized what he regarded as the indifference shown by the Jewish Russian-language journals to "our tribal interests" and in this context referred approvingly and rather proudly to *Sion* and its strong stand against the vilification of the Jewish national character that had, according to him, surfaced in the confrontation with *Osnova*. At the same time, over the coming months and almost up to the outbreak of the Storms in the South in March 1881, all Pinsker's writing in *Russki yevrei* was devoted to a most enthusiastic retrospective survey of the era of struggle for genuine equality of rights for the Jews of Western and Central Europe, at the forefront of which stood the admired heroes Gabriel Rieser and Adolf Cremieux, symbols of Western Jewry's emancipatory era.⁵³ Thus, as in the optimistic early 1860s, now too in 1880, the final years of the era of Alexander II, during which the reactionary trend began to make its mark, we still witness to the same coupling of civil emancipatory awareness with a stand for Jewish national selfhood.

What, then, became of Pinsker's civil-national positions in the wake of the Storms in the South? As I see it, the basic national-civil model to which Pinsker had aspired ever since the beginning of his public career—equal citizenship without relinquishing collective selfhood—remained unchanged. "Has the Southern Russian rabble done away with Jewish self-awareness and independent activity?," Pinsker wondered in August 1881, as he called for the formation of a new leadership for Russian Jewry that would propose novel ways of dealing with the current crisis.⁵⁴ However, he did not abandon the previous emancipatory discourse. It often appeared as though twenty years had not passed since he wrote for *Sion*, and as though those riots that were, according to the assumptions of the Zionist historiographers, supposed to have led Pinsker to rid himself of the illu-

sion of emancipation in the diaspora had not befallen the Jews of Russia. Particularly instructive in this context is a caustically critical article that Pinsker wrote in November 1882, two months after the appearance of “*Autoemancipation!*,” on the pamphlet titled *The New Israel*, written by a radical intellectual named Emanuel Ben-Zion, in which the author demanded of the Jews of Russia that they make sweeping changes in their religion.⁵⁵ Just as in the 1860s, Pinsker asserted that the emancipation of the Jews should not be made conditional upon their foregoing the special characteristics of their way of life. The time for religious reforms would come only once all the onerous legal restrictions on the Jews of Russia had been removed. He even casually termed the Russian language “the language of the homeland”—again, as he had done in *Sion*.

How did Pinsker’s perception nevertheless change after March 1881? The answer to this question becomes plainly obvious upon reading what he wrote in the Russian Jewish press—namely, he became an advocate on behalf of Jewish emigration. From the spring of 1881 onward, he perceived emigration to be an essential means of solving the “Jewish question” in tsarist Russia as well as in other countries with large Jewish populations.⁵⁶ How did the idea of emigration from Russia become compatible with Pinsker’s continued advocacy of the principle of emancipation without assimilation within Russia? His “*Autoemancipation!*” provides an answer to just this question.

The difference between “*Autoemancipation!*” and everything that Pinsker had uttered before its publication in August 1882 lies in the recognition of the need to establish a national territorial homeland for the Jews, a territory in which the Jews would constitute a numerical majority and enjoy political autonomy. But did this idea replace the perception of civil emancipation in the diaspora in general and in the imperial diasporas in particular? This is the view taken by most readings of “*Autoemancipation!*”⁵⁷ Yet instead of examining Pinsker’s text in the context of his contemporary writing and thought, these readings view it retrospectively through the prism of the nation-state, regard it as an essay that presages catastrophic Zionism, and isolate its idea of territorial nationality. Let us therefore turn to the text itself. Pinsker clearly recognizes that the perception of the civil

emancipation of the Jews has become obsolete; he furthermore diagnoses the root cause of this failure:

Since the Jew is nowhere at home, nowhere regarded as a native, he remains an alien everywhere. That he himself and his forefathers as well are born in the country does not alter this fact in the least. . . . [*N*]ever is he considered a legitimate child of the fatherland. . . . [The] *legal* emancipation [of the Jews] is not *social* emancipation, and with the proclamation of the former the Jews are still far from being emancipated from their exceptional *social position*. . . . The stigma attached to this people, which forces it into an unenviable isolation among the nations, cannot be removed by any sort of official emancipation, as long as this people produces in accordance with its nature vagrant nomads, as long as it cannot give a satisfactory account of whence it comes and whither it goes.⁵⁸

It is this lack of homeland that is the mark of disgrace, the Jews' unmistakable trademark that indicates their special social status, different from that of all other nations, and renders them total strangers in the eyes of these nations and prevents the completion of their social emancipation founded upon reciprocal national respect. The founding of a homeland will correct this condition, turning the Jews from the ultimate homeless into people with a home. Consequently, once the Jews rid themselves of their dubious singularity as a paradigmatic people without a homeland, they will be a people like all others, like Germans in Germany and Greeks in Greece, as well as like Germans in St. Petersburg and like Greeks, Ukrainians, Tatars, Armenians, and Turks scattered throughout the Russian Empire—people who are unmistakably regarded by those around them as having a national homeland, albeit not always in the form of a nation-state.

Indeed, the founding of a national territorial homeland for Jews was, according to "*Autoemancipation!*," not intended to bring about a radical change in their actual condition of dispersal. "Land of our own" would not replace the "exile" but would pave the way for the dual options for the existence of Jews in the modern world: both in the new territorial homeland and in their current homelands:

[N]ot only is he [the Jew] not a native in his own home country, but he is also not a foreigner; he is, in very truth, the stranger *par excellence*. He is regarded as neither friend nor foe but an alien, of whom the only thing known is that he has no home. . . . The foreigner claims hospitality, which he can repay in the same coin. The Jew can make no such return; consequently he can make no claim to hospitality.⁵⁹

This is a vital point that requires clarification. The concept of “hospitality” (*Gastfreundschaft* in the German original)⁶⁰ is not used here as a metaphor for tourists visiting in a particular country but is rather an essentially legal category, since it aims to reregulate the legal status of those Jews who, after the founding of the Jewish homeland, will choose to remain in their non-Jewish lands of birth. Pinsker’s concept of *Gastfreundschaft* is strikingly reminiscent of the other concept of “hospitality,” namely, Immanuel Kant’s *Hospitalität*, from his *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795 in the wake of Prussia’s ceding to France the disputed territory to the west of the Rhine in the Peace of Basel. To Kant this concept had a primarily civil-political meaning. It denoted the status of fully equal citizens within the general concept of world citizenship that he expounded in this essay. Since Kant believed that people had no greater right to the land in any location than did their fellows, it followed that the civil status of a citizen of one land who resided peacefully in a different land should be equal to that of a citizen of the host country.⁶¹ The host country thus became, according to Kantian logic, a country that offered citizenship, and Pinsker saw things in the same light. Therefore, Pinsker’s “*Autoemancipation!*” was not a substitute for the civil emancipation of the Jews but a correction of it. By absorbing “the surplus of those Jews who live as proletarians in the different countries and are a burden to the native citizens,”⁶² the Jewish homeland would at the same time generate the vital transformation in the social status of those who remain (primarily “the wealthy” among them, in his terminology), who would from that point enjoy true equality of rights.

We should now turn our attention to a certain essential aspect of “*Autoemancipation!*” that remains obscured if not read in the context of Pinsker’s other writings, both before and after 1881. Throughout his life, from the early 1860s up to his latest articles published in the

Russian Jewish press in parallel with the appearance of “*Autoemancipation!*,” Pinsker opposed assimilation and consistently championed the right of Jews to preserve their national characteristics as an intrinsic part of the civil rights that they should demand in their current countries of residence. In other words, the founding of a national territorial homeland for one section of the people should, as he perceived it, prepare this corrected civil-national emancipation for the other section of the people that chooses to remain in diaspora. While Herzl intended his “Jewish state” to make it easier for the Jews who remained in their home countries to either assimilate completely or else maintain an exclusively religious form of Jewish identity,⁶³ Pinsker sought to help those who remained to reaffirm their national Jewish selfhood alongside their civil bonds with the states in which they continued to reside.

As someone who shaped his national-civil conception in a mixed ethnic-national environment in which the majority of “all the nations” were perceived by one another to maintain two patterns of territorial affinity—one to the immediate civil homeland and the other to the (in some cases) distant national homeland—Pinsker wished the Jews, too, to be perceived thus by their neighbors. He sought to turn the Jew from a member of an obviously homeless people into a person with a dual home, like a Greek in Odessa or a Ukrainian in Moscow. This element of “dual homeland” was extremely important to Pinsker and to the Russian Jewish context of his post-“*Autoemancipation!*” perception. It contained, in fact, a strong inclination to return in the direction of Russia, as evidenced in his sad letter of March 1884 to the publishers of the Russian collection of articles on the activity of Hibat Tsiyon in Palestine:

We are nevertheless the ancient sons of the Russian land. On her soil our forefathers were raised and died. On this soil Russia found us. We consider ourselves indigenous inhabitants of the Russian State, to which we have always been devoted as to our homeland. In equal measure to all others we think of ourselves as subjects of the Czar of Russia, in whom we place all our hopes, for whom we are prepared to lay down our lives and our property. No-one can take from us this right, however much they may try to contest it.⁶⁴

The Pinsker of *"Autoemancipation!"* thus kept hold of both homelands. On one hand he identified with the turn toward a Jewish territory, and on the other he refused to unravel the bond with the Russian Empire, defied all who questioned the right of the Jews to regard Russia as their homeland, and in so doing even implied a highly subversive argument: "On this soil Russia found us." In other words, he said, we Jews have resided for generations on land conquered by Russia—which was of course correct. Israel Bartal provided an illuminating insight in asserting that since it was not the Jews who had come to tsarist Russia but tsarist Russia that had "come" to the Jews, it would be most instructive to observe the relations between tsarist Russia and its Jews from a postcolonial perspective.⁶⁵ And indeed, Pinsker was raising an argument on behalf of the colonized and continued by demanding the national-civil liberation of the Jews in Russia alongside his advocacy of the idea of national-political liberation in the territorial homeland elsewhere. Or, through the national-political autoemancipation of the Jews who would immigrate to "a land of our own," he sought to liberate the national "personality" of Jews everywhere and from this foundation to reclaim the national-civil auto/emancipation of the Jews in the empire of his homeland, which he did not forego. To him, the national territory was thus a means of liberation also for the members of the nation located outside of it, in a multinational empire.

V

On the basis of our analysis of Pinsker's positions on the civil and national issues within the multiethnic sphere in general and on the "Jewish question" in Russia in particular from the early 1860s to the early 1880s, we can reinforce Steven Zipperstein's hypothesis that Pinsker's "eventual conversion to Zionism . . . was probably less sudden than is generally assumed."⁶⁶ Indeed, upon reading Pinsker's political writing spanning both the "emancipatory" and the "auto-emancipatory" periods in its entirety, one discerns that in the face of the crisis of 1881 his positions underwent a rather gradual development, which comprised both change and continuity. Before the Storms in the South, the tsarist authorities' regression from the politics of reform, and the radicalization of Jewish politics in Russia in

the early 1880s, Pinsker had consistently advocated a vision of multi-national citizenship in the Russian state. This was a formula that would, he hoped, facilitate the complex move toward civil emancipation of the Jews as individuals alongside reinforcement of their singular national bond as a collective juridical extraterritorial personality of sorts. With the changing of eras in Russian politics, Pinsker's civil-national outlook did indeed undergo considerable change. At this stage he abandoned the purely extraterritorial perception of Jewish nationality in favor of a new understanding according to which a recognized national territorial homeland constituted the necessary and vital condition for correcting the Jews' anomalous social status as the ultimate homeless people and for normalizing their social image in the eyes of the world's nations.

One question remains unanswered in this regard: what would have been the political status of the national-territorial homeland that Pinsker advocated? On this point, "*Autoemancipation!*" provides an unequivocal answer: be it located in Palestine or in North America, Pinsker envisioned the Jews' territorial homeland in a profoundly statist format, either as an Ottoman *pashalik* (a district administered by a pasha) or as a *territorium* in America.⁶⁷ The problem is that the Zionist historiography on Pinsker and his pamphlet is bound by nation-state determinism and therefore never seriously asks what Pinsker's statist interpretation of Jewish self-determination really means. As mentioned above, Zionist historiography designates Pinsker as the forerunner of the sovereign Jewish nation-state, so all aspects of his vision that do not align with this powerful image are left out of the research focus.

However, anyone who considers "*Autoemancipation!*" in the context of the national claims of non-Jewish ethnic groups either in the empire in which Pinsker was raised (the Russian Empire) or in the empire to which he had often looked (the Habsburg Empire) would be unable to hold to the "nation-state-in-the-making" as an interpretational framework. Likewise, anyone who considers this text in relation to Pinsker's civil-national political thought, most of which was not available to researchers for generations, would have even more difficulty in applying this interpretational framework to "*Autoemancipation!*" and its author. Rather, such an examination leads to explanations for Pinsker's statist approach that are firmly an-

chored both in his text and in the context of his time. First, Pinsker envisioned the future of the Jewish nation's territorial self-determination in the form of an autonomous region that is incorporated into a larger state institution. In this regard, he was clearly articulating the political trends that characterized the national programs and politics of the ethno-national movements of non-dominant nationalities that emerged in the imperial space of Eastern and Central Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. As we will see more than once in the following chapters, a good number of these national movements and their leaders never imagined realizing their nations' self-determination by dismantling the existing empires.⁶⁸ From the Caucasus Mountains on the eastern edge of the tri-imperial multinational space to the Slovenians and Czechs on its western edge, spokespeople of non-dominant nationalities were considering a rather flexible format of territorial self-rule, which Simon Dubnow would call "independence within empire."⁶⁹ This was not just a tactic driven by a putative fear of the imperial ruler. On the contrary, many of Pinsker's and Dubnow's contemporaries believed, in the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires—for many diverse reasons related to the specific case of each national movement—that the continued existence of the empires would offer the best political alternative for their peoples, on the condition that they became more equitable multinational frameworks.⁷⁰

Pinsker's writings, too, reflect the intra-Jewish national interests that led him to believe that the autonomist territorialist model that he advanced in "*Autoemancipation!*" was the most desirable one, and those interests become especially apparent if we consider his pamphlet's statist message in the context of the civil-national approach that he had clearly and consistently promoted in his other writings addressed above. Recall that since the 1860s Pinsker had been challenging the hegemonic tendency to exclusively identify a single ethnic nationality (*plemya*, or tribe) with a single region, regardless of whether the region in question was a state or territorial district.⁷¹ To counter this trend, he articulated for the first time in the history of modern Jewish nationalism the principle of a multinational state based on the separation between ethnic nationalism and civil sovereignty. According to Pinsker, it was impossible to imagine any kind of state other than a multinational one in the Ro-

manov and Habsburg spaces of the period, and this state would function as an inclusive, overarching, and coordinating framework. The various ethno-national groups contained within it would enjoy equal collective rights as collective legal entities whose members already enjoyed equal civil rights as individuals. Pinsker believed that adopting this civil-political approach would bring about an improved emancipation for the Jews by combining individual civil rights and national collective rights. Since he did not abandon the multinational idea after 1881, it is only natural that the political status of the Jewish territory that he envisioned would comport with the multinational imperial system and the logic of an inclusive and restrained sovereignty that would be exercised by ethnic nationalities. In other words, what Pinsker demanded of the Hungarians and Ukrainians in *Osnova* in the 1860s is also what he viewed as self-evident in his statist, autonomist conception of Jewish territorial self-determination in the 1880s.

So was Pinsker the forerunner of the “spiritual center” idea, as this idea’s creator Ahad Ha’am argued, or was he the harbinger of Herzl’s “Jewish state,” as argued by the key historians of Zionist ideology and established as the conventional view in Zionist iconography? As we saw above, “*Autoemancipation!*” does not seem to contain any substitutive vision for Jewish existence in the diaspora in terms of “catastrophic Zionism.” On the contrary, it contains a complex proposal founded on the idea of legitimating and reinforcing the collective existence of those Jews who would remain outside the territorial homeland when it is established. Thus the answer to the first question, according to which Pinsker anticipated Ahad Ha’am’s Zionism more than he did Herzl’s, is obviously the right one. However, before we revoke Pinsker’s right to be considered the forerunner to *Der Judenstaat*, we must ask ourselves the following question: could it be that Herzl’s Zionism, like Pinsker’s auto/emancipation approach, might actually turn out to be a more complex national approach than the historiographical representation that gets filtered through the retrospective prism of nation-state determinism? This is one of the questions that is addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

Theodor Herzl

A Non-Jewish State of Jews

I

IN 1960, TO MARK the one-hundredth anniversary of Theodor Herzl's birth, Alex Bein published a revised Hebrew edition of his classic biography of Herzl, a work that was first published in 1934. In his introduction to the revised Hebrew edition, Bein writes that "times have changed . . . somewhat" since the publication of the first Hebrew and German editions in 1934. As a result of these changes, the author then explains that he had to make a number of revisions to the book,¹ although Bein does not elaborate on the content of these mid-twentieth-century historical changes. However, it is enough to consider only one example of these revisions to understand their overall spirit. In both editions, Bein includes a section on Herzl's *Altneuland*, a utopian yet essentially political novel that outlines Herzl's social, cultural, and political vision for the national future of the Jews in Palestine. In the 1930s edition, Bein wonders about the dimensions and characteristics of Turkish sovereignty in Palestine as perceived by the author of *Altneuland*.² The 1960s edition, however, contains no wondering whatsoever in this regard.³ What was the historical development that made Bein remove the way that the founder of political Zionism envisioned the

Jews' future national Zionist existence under conditions of the absence of Jewish sovereignty? It would not be unreasonable to assume that this development was none other than the establishment of full Jewish sovereignty in 1948 in the form of the state of Israel. In other words, Herzl's vision for the political future of Zionism in the concrete political context of his time—an imperial reality in which Palestine's belonging to the Ottoman Empire was an incontrovertible fact—seemed irrelevant to Bein when he set himself to republishing his biography in the context of an independent Jewish nation-state. Thus, the establishment of a nation-state, an undoubtedly fundamental historical turn in the political Jewish existence and one that Bein witnessed himself, had a profound influence on his representation of the past. Specifically, this turn made him set aside questions that concern those aspects of the past reality that no longer existed at the time that he published his book a second time.

The 1960–1961 edition of Bein's book is a very early expression of the way that the nation-statist paradigm works and influences historiographical writing about Herzl and his political outlook. Since the 1960s the power of this paradigm in "Herzl studies" has only increased. This is especially true of Israeli historiography on the subject, which naturally comprises the lion's share of research on the founder of political Zionism. Like the historiography on other key Zionist figures discussed here, the study of Herzl's political Zionism, unwittingly but sometimes quite deliberately, uses the present-day Jewish nation-state as a retrospective, extremely selective prism through which to examine his Zionist worldview, despite the fact that it arose, was formed, and was intended to politically address the challenges pertaining to the very different fin-de-siècle historical context. The question of the extent and nature of Turkish sovereignty in *Altneuland's* Palestine, which Bein removed from the 1960 edition of his book, is only one of a large spectrum of issues that the Jewish nation-state lens renders literally invisible. These issues mainly concern the intentions and goals of Herzl's Zionism as part of its efforts to address the conditions of imperial space, in which most Jews lived at the time, as well as its recognition of the fact that Palestine was subject to one of its three empires. In contrast, those aspects of Herzl's political thought that can be used to form an early likeness of the contemporary sovereign Jewish state are accorded

special attention. The historiography thus re-creates and reinforces the powerful image of Herzl as the “visionary of the state,” referring, of course, to the nation-state of Israel.

Far from being limited to Israeli public discourse, this image has been increasingly used in academic literature on the subject in the past few decades. However, while this image has proved to be extremely efficient in developing national and political consciousness among Israeli Jewish citizens, its contribution to the work of historians is quite suspect. For adopting this image usually means dissociating, and sometimes even completely uprooting, Herzl’s political thought from its cultural, geopolitical, and spatial contexts at the turn of the twentieth century. This image also places Herzl’s political thought alongside the contemporary state of Israel, where the latter is not only assumed to be the intended result of the former’s vision, but furthermore serves as a kind of analytical mirror through which various aspects of Herzl’s political Zionism can be explored. Frequently, then, researchers are not interested in the connection between Herzl’s Zionist worldview and the national-political climate of his time. Instead, they may find themselves discussing meta-historical questions such as whether Herzl’s ideas have been realized in today’s Israel, or what various aspects of Herzl’s thought mean within present-day debates on the Jewish nation-state.⁴

The idea that the Jewish nation-state is the ultimate realization of modern Zionism’s political dimension not only affects what kinds of questions are asked (and not asked) in the study of Herzl’s political Zionism; more specifically, it affects the representation of the two central founding documents of Herzlian Zionism, namely, *The Jewish State* (1896) and *Altneuland* (1902). Since the first systematic analysis of these documents by the political scientist Joseph Adler,⁵ the conventional view has been to see these two texts as possessing two fundamentally different, and according to some scholars even diametrically opposed, political messages. The academic literature usually portrays *The Jewish State* in a manner befitting its title, namely, as a kind of refined expression of the Jews’ efforts to achieve sovereignty over their collective fate and to do so in the form of the nation-state. In *Altneuland*, on the other hand, Herzl clearly states that the future sociopolitical entity that he envisioned in Palestine would not take the form of a state.⁶ Thus the novel was seen as evi-

dence of a shift in Herzl's thinking when compared to the nation-state paradigm that Herzl raises, as it were, in *The Jewish State*. Where scholars disagree, however, is about what this shift means and why it happened. Adler, followed by Amos Elon, argued that the difference between the two texts reflects a deep internal shift in Herzl's conception of government and sovereignty.⁷ Shlomo Avineri, on the other hand, rejected this interpretation, claiming that Herzl's retreat from the sovereign nation-state model in *Altneuland* and toward a "vague sovereignty" was merely declarative, stemming from tactical-political considerations. To him, Herzl did not want to anger the Turkish sultan by revealing his (undoubted) aspiration for full state sovereignty.⁸ Avineri seems to believe that Herzl's aspiration for such a state is self-evident and therefore does not need to be supported by evidence. Main scholars who have studied Herzl's political thought basically agree that *Altneuland* comprises a kind of deviation—whether fundamental or tactical—from the paradigmatic model of the sovereign nation-state laid out before in *The Jewish State* and that was, according to them, the normative notion of national self-determination already in Herzl's time.⁹

Historiography's incorporation of *Altneuland* into the paradigmatic framework of the nation-state, despite its recognition of the nonsovereign components of the commonwealth that the novel describes, results in a sort of historiographical paradox, or perhaps a historiographical irony. The more that researchers seek to show how different the *Altneuland* model is from the nation-state paradigm, the more they find themselves forcing that paradigm on the *Altneuland* model. Thus, scholars describe the unequivocally non-sovereign *Altneuland* model as a kind of earlier iteration of total Jewish national sovereignty in Palestine, whether they see it as a utopian, illusive, or subversive model or alternatively as a model that is camouflaged but nonetheless essentially colonialist and hegemonic.¹⁰ In some of the scholarly literature on *Altneuland*, the insistence on applying the "normalizing" conception of the nation-state to the novel is bound up with ideological motivations and a desire to develop insights about the current situation, the contemporary realization of Zionism, and the nature of the present-day Jewish nation-state. Here we see a kind of consensus emerging among both scholars who are explicitly committed to Zionism on one hand and post-/

anti-Zionist historians on the other. Avineri, who is in the former category, sees *Altneuland* as an early depiction of the humanistic, liberal, democratic, essentially peace-loving Jewish nation-state;¹¹ anti-Zionist Palestinian historians also find the future Jewish nation-state in *Altneuland*, but they portray it as one of the first expressions of ethnocentric colonialism and the beginnings of its efforts to erase the national existence of the indigenous Palestinians.¹²

Even the analysis of *Altneuland* that Yigal Schwartz proposes in his groundbreaking book on human engineering and the crafting of space in modern Hebrew literature falls short of the mark. Though he masterfully circumvents the ideological landmines that threaten any discussion of such a sensitive and central text in Zionist ideology,¹³ he continues to adhere to the maxim that Herzl wrote *Altneuland* in an effort to imagine complete Jewish national-territorial sovereignty, while at the same time exposing the contradictions, tensions, and deviations from this vision of ultimate sovereignty. Schwartz points out the internal tension between the national-sovereign dimension on one hand and the cracks and ruptures within Herzl's conception of national-political sovereignty on the other. For example, he clearly notes the supranational, universalist features of the new society described in *Altneuland*. Nevertheless, Schwartz argues that this tension is a result of Herzl's ambivalence and hesitation about the possibility of realizing his vision of national-territorial sovereignty, an ambivalence that he argues is embodied in the apparent built-in gap between dream and reality that runs throughout the book.¹⁴

It is not my intention to argue that Herzl's political Zionist thought is free from internal tensions. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, when we use the nation-state paradigm as a lens to study an early national political ideology that emerged in spatial and geopolitical frameworks that were fundamentally different from the nation-state model, what might sometimes result is an artificial amplification of certain internal dichotomies within that ideology. In fact, the use of the nation-state lens may actually invent these dichotomies. We have already seen that there is no real justification for making a dichotomous separation between Pinsker's civil-national thought before "*Autoemancipation!*" on one hand and his post-"*Autoemancipation!*" thought on the other. The nation-state prism, however, which views the nation-state as the normative model for

self-determination, identifies “*Autoemancipation!*” as an early semblance of the Jewish nation-state, a semblance that it does not identify in Pinsker’s thought before that essay. Thus, the nation-state prism creates a false gap between Pinsker “the assimilationist” before 1881 and Pinsker “the nationalist” after 1881.¹⁵ Now we embark on a similar process of reexamination in an effort to analyze anew the foundational documents of Herzlian political Zionism. The main thrust of this process is to examine *The Jewish State* and *Altneuland* on a single continuum, in which one follows the other as two components of a comprehensive worldview. The two components often interrelate, and both are firmly connected to the author’s cultural identity. They are also connected to the geopolitical climate of Herzl’s time and place, a context that also shaped the national and spatial concepts of his (multi)national environment. In this way, we describe three central aspects of Herzl’s Zionism that are often lost on “Herzl studies” because of the retrospective distortion produced by the nation-state lens: the beginning of a linguistic-cultural dimension of Herzlian Zionism as it is expressed in *The Jewish State*, the advanced expressions of Herzlian “cultural Zionism” in *Altneuland*, and the connection between the linguistic-cultural dimension and the political dimension of Herzlian Zionism.

II

Fortunately, unlike in the case study of Pinsker and his path to “*Autoemancipation!*,” in discussing Herzl’s Zionism we need not undermine a dichotomous discourse describing a dramatic transition “from assimilation to nationalism” in Herzl’s consciousness. More than thirty-five years ago, the Canadian historian Jacques Kornberg wrote an article, “Theodor Herzl: A Reevaluation,” a landmark publication in “Herzl studies,” and later wrote a book called *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*. Both the article and the book are best known for the way they challenge the canonical story told by Zionist historiography about the decisive importance of the Dreyfus trial in “converting” Herzl to Zionism.¹⁶ However, in these important studies Kornberg also points to an apparently surprising continuity between the solutions to the “Jewish question” that Herzl wrestled with in the years before he became a political Zionist and

the solution that began to take shape in his writings in the mid-1890s and that was articulated in *The Jewish State*. Kornberg argues that Herzl had been unequivocally and irrevocably convinced that the integration of Jews into the socioeconomic fabric and civil identity of the non-Jewish environment in Central Europe, and particularly in the Austrian context, had failed a full two or three years before he wrote the embryonic lines in his diary that would grow into his famous Zionist political essay and before he witnessed the Dreyfus trial, which he covered for the *Neue Freie Presse*.¹⁷ Furthermore, Kornberg shows that the ways in which Herzl sought to address the failed integration of Jews in European society during his pre-Zionist “assimilationist” period already contained the first full-fledged signs of the Zionist-nationalist approach articulated in *The Jewish State*. At first glance, it does indeed appear that the solutions that Herzl entertained around 1893–1894—public mass conversion of Jews to Catholicism or the mass enrollment of Jews into the socialist movement¹⁸—were explicitly assimilationist ones. However, a closer look at these proposals reveals two central features that may be seen as precursors to the two goals that comprised the foundation of Herzl’s national program in the *Judenstaat* period: (1) the need to engage in collective public action to advance the collective interests of Jews, though the mass conversion solution actually amounts to collective disappearance;¹⁹ and (2) the basic desire to completely reintegrate the world’s Jews into the modern world. Despite the clear differences between the solutions of conversion and socialist movement mass enrollment on one hand and the solution of establishing a Jewish state on the other, these two central features are clearly evident in both proposals.

Chronologically, Kornberg’s study concludes at the very moment that *The Jewish State* was published and Herzlian political Zionism was born. Nevertheless, the insights that Kornberg raises about the decisive influence that “Herzl the assimilationist” had on the thought of “Herzl the Zionist” are also significant for further analyzing the contents and goals of Herzl’s national Zionist worldview from 1896 onward. Indeed, whereas the subtitle of Kornberg’s book—“From Assimilation to Zionism”—ostensibly points to a turning point in Herzl’s positions, in fact the book’s central arguments make a different case. More than any dramatic shift “from

assimilation to Zionism,” the book suggests a complex evolutionary chain of intermediate stops between the two positions. The first stage of this chain took place in the 1880s: as a member of a German Jewish family from Budapest, Herzl joined many other Jews living in the Hungarian capital who chose to immigrate to Vienna so as to preserve their German linguistic-cultural identity without interference.²⁰ At that point, Herzl believed that the only way for Austrian Jews to complement their legal emancipation with social emancipation, and thus to become a part of their European social environment, was by assimilating as individual Jews into the non-Jewish (German-speaking) sociocultural environment. For a time, he even supported the explicitly nationalist German option.²¹ From the early 1890s on, however, Herzl began to recognize the built-in malfunction in the Jews’ assimilation process vis-à-vis their environment: despite having individual equal rights, Jews were excluded from Christian bourgeois society on the basis of group belonging, and they were pushed into economic roles within the modern bourgeois economy that were both central and distinct. They comprised a group that was especially vulnerable to attack by enemies of the post-emancipatory liberal order that emerged from within modern society.²² For that reason, Herzl proposed to replace assimilation on a private-individual basis by assimilation on a collective basis (what Kornberg calls “reabsorption”),²³ exemplified by his idea of public mass conversion to Christianity. Eventually, Herzl concluded that post-emancipation Jews had to fundamentally change the way of their sociopolitical conduct in the modern world, to acknowledge the national-political underpinnings of the hardships they faced in trying to integrate into their environment, and to strive for a solution on an explicitly national collective basis in the form of “the Jewish state.” Throughout this process, however, Herzl consistently adhered to his basic approach to the purpose and essence of modern Jewish existence: the integration of Jews into European civilization, even if it would be through a kind of back door in the form of a social-political entity established by Jews far from the European environment.²⁴ In other words, Herzl’s intention in proposing his national-political solution was to make Jews a modern European nation.²⁵ This was no different from his agenda during his explicitly assimilationist period, when he believed that the Jews must

become a European nation by becoming “Germans of the Mosaic faith.”

As far as the cultural identity of Herzl himself is concerned, he was consistent about his connection to the German language and culture and held a fundamentally positive view of the influence of Western European cultures on the modern Jewish experience both before and after he became a Zionist. Likewise, his apparent indifference to any kind of particularistic Hebrew identity is well-documented. The historiography on Herzl, however, views most of these phenomena as somewhat secondary byproducts of the profound assimilation that Herzl had undergone before his “conversion” to Zionism. For the historiography, these byproducts only illustrate the power of the cultural inertia that Herzl carried over from his assimilationist past, an inertia that continued to influence his thought almost unconsciously, even as he wrote *The Jewish State* and *Altneuland* and attended the Zionist congresses. The historiography has never considered that these phenomena might be fundamentally and operationally meaningful to Herzl’s cultural vision. On the contrary, the dominant approach of Zionist historiography has for years been to portray Herzl’s Zionism as culturally neutral, in other words as an ideology that lacks a cultural vision. Just as the accepted subtextual meaning of “cultural-spiritual Zionism” among most historians who study the topic is that this type of Zionism has no political dimension worthy of study, so the accepted subtextual meaning of “political Zionism,” and particularly views espoused by its founders Herzl and Max Nordau, is that this Zionism lacks any commitment to a particular cultural worldview. Indeed, many studies on the controversies and polemics between Herzl and Ahad Ha’am, as well as between the followers of each figure, earmark the cultural dimension exclusively for Ahad Ha’amian Zionism while presenting Herzlian Zionism as lacking any significant cultural agenda.²⁶ Likewise, the conceptual alternative that Gideon Shimoni once proposed regarding the distinction between “political Zionism” and “cultural and/or spiritual Zionism,” according to which Herzl’s “functional approach” would be distinguished from Ahad Ha’am’s “organic approach,”²⁷ also revolves around the idea that Herzl’s Zionism did not possess (“organic”) internal values or cultural content. Accordingly, the latter is viewed as having been committed first and foremost to

the more mechanical (though also more important) matter of securing a charter, regardless of what the cultural character of the future entity might be.

As we will see in the next chapter, which includes consideration of Ahad Ha'am's polemical response to the publication of *Altneuland* ("The 'Altneuland' Controversy"), Ahad Ha'am himself had no doubt in his mind as to the existence of a distinctly cultural dimension to Herzl's national worldview. Indeed, it appears that Herzl was no less a true "cultural Zionist" than Ahad Ha'am, except that his cultural vision was fundamentally different from that of the founder of cultural-spiritual Zionism. Herzl actually sketches out the first outlines of his cultural vision in *The Jewish State*, a text that is usually not considered to have a cultural message when viewed through the retrospective lens of the nation-state, which isolates those aspects of the essay that concern sovereignty and self-determination while neglecting others. In the text's consideration of the experience of post-emancipation European Jews, Herzl distinguishes between two different types of Jewish integration into the European environment: socioeconomic and political integration on one hand and cultural-linguistic integration on the other.²⁸ While Herzl believed that the Jews' socioeconomic and political integration had completely failed²⁹—and this is why he believed that Jews had to be removed from Europe and territorially and politically concentrated in a national-political homeland—he regarded the Jews' cultural integration, and particularly their linguistic integration into the cultures of the European nations that had emancipated them, as an impressive success. It was therefore only reasonable that the same process of European acculturation and enlightenment would continue in their new political homeland with even greater force, which would mean continuing to adhere to the linguistic commitments of the acculturation era. Furthermore, Herzl concluded that modern Jews need their own country precisely because that would allow them to continue to practice the European cultural patterns that they had held to up to that point.

To articulate this idea, Herzl coined a term that appears as the title of one of the subchapters in *Der Judenstaat*: "Die Verpflanzung" ("The Transplantation"; the translation appearing in the English edition—"transmigration"—is far less precise).³⁰ According to Israel

Bartal, the term's meaning in a broad context of the phenomenology of earlier Jewish nationalism(s) refers to the co-optation of the prenatal, profoundly diasporic Jewish past experience into the formation of new national identities.³¹ In the case of Herzl's "transplantation" concept, the connection between (Central) European Jews' recent past and their new national future is readily apparent: "We shall give a home to our people . . . not by dragging them ruthlessly out of their sustaining soil, but rather by transplanting them carefully to a better ground. Just as we wish to create new political and economic relations, so we shall preserve as sacred all of the past that is dear to our people's hearts."³²

It is here that we see the heart of Herzl's cultural vision: the intentional creation of a kind of dual homeland. The old homeland is incorporated into the new homeland; the old home is built into the new one. Furthermore, among the most essential aspects of the old homeland that must be reincorporated into the new homeland, if not the most essential, are the languages that Jews spoke in Herzl's post-emancipatory present. Elsewhere in *The Jewish State*, Herzl writes that language is "the beloved homeland of our thoughts."³³ The use of the term "homeland," with all its emotional and national-ideological meaning, leaves no room for doubt that Herzl did not have a purely instrumental approach to the Jews' language use patterns. On the contrary, he saw them as an integral part of what he defines (above) as "their sustaining soil" that must be taken into consideration when "transplanting them carefully" into new ground.³⁴ Herzl did not see the European Enlightenment and Haskalah languages as an acquired characteristic. Instead, he saw these languages, which had paved the way for Jews to enter the modern world, as an organic national element of the modern Jewish experience. This was the same way that the imperial leaders and cultural figures of European nations saw these languages in Herzl's time, the very same nations whose Enlightenment cultures had such a decisive impact on the cultural milieu of Herzl and other maskilic Jews.

Herzl's cultural program did not end there, however. After Enlightenment values and European culture were transplanted from the old homeland to the new one, Herzl believed that it would be necessary to continue to inculcate those values within the "Jewish state" through education, particularly among those Jews who had

not yet undergone an adequate European acculturation process. Here, too, he makes his position clear in *The Jewish State*: “We shall give up using those miserable stunted jargons, those Ghetto languages which we still employ, for these were the stealthy tongues of prisoners. Our national teachers will give due attention to this matter.”³⁵ Herzl obviously refrains from openly declaring his desire to Germanize the Jews in their new homeland; nevertheless, at least in the case of Yiddish, one of the “miserable stunted jargons” that Herzl admonishes, his longing for linguistic purification and standardization clearly calls for converting Yiddish into proper German. This aspect of Herzl’s cultural vision illustrates the limitations of the linguistic-cultural pluralism that many scholars attribute to Herzl because elsewhere in *The Jewish State* he writes that each person would keep their native language in the future Jewish homeland and that the most useful language would thus eventually become the state language anyway.³⁶ In the case of Jewish languages that originated in the pre-Enlightenment and pre-emancipation era, however, Herzl was uncompromising. Here we see a fascinating resemblance between Ahad Ha’am’s and Herzl’s cultural visions: just as the former strongly opposed the idea of using Jewish hybrid languages such as Ladino and Yiddish as national languages, seeking instead to replace them with Hebrew,³⁷ so did Herzl wish to be rid of those same languages, except in the name of a different kind of linguistic homogenization. More specifically, Herzl supported the adoption of the same imperial languages that had served as the Jews’ Enlightenment languages, operating under the assumption that one of these would become a common language for all Jews living in their new territorial-political homeland.

It is important to stress that the similarity between Ahad Ha’am’s zealous national-linguistic support for Hebrew and Herzl’s cultural-linguistic approach in *The Jewish State* is not limited to their shared disgust with “the jargons.” Herzl’s use of the term “our national teachers” confirms the national-cultural nature of his proposal to disseminate the European Enlightenment languages among the Jews, which he seems to have delegated to a kind of education ministry under *Der Judenstaat*. Later in this chapter, we will return to this ostensibly paradoxical aspect of Herzlian Zionism, namely, the Jewish national collective dimension of his program that was actu-

ally driving his effort to strengthen the Jews' cultural-linguistic link to European imperial cultures. For now, it suffices to make one basic point that should guide any analysis of Herzlian Zionism: there was no necessary tension between Herzl's national-political program, which called for Jews to be concentrated in a territorial homeland far removed from Europe, and his cultural program, which demanded that the Jews would continue to inculcate European cultural patterns in their future way of life in that homeland. This lack of tension is due to the fact that acculturation into the imperial cultures in general, and into the German culture of Habsburgian Austria in particular, was a key sociological characteristic of profoundly *Jewish* collective cultural experience in those regions. In the context of the Czech-German national conflict, for example, as in many other parts of the Austrian multinational periphery, the loyalty of significant segments of local Jewish society to the *Staatsprache* was derogatorily identified as a distinctly Jewish characteristic. Herzl, for his part, never wished to deny this phenomenon's "Jewishness"; instead, he opted to reject the negative connotation that the non-Jewish, non-German environment associated with the Jewish empire-oriented acculturation(s).³⁸

III

How would the inculcation of advanced European culture be successfully accomplished under "the Jewish state"? In *Altneuland*, Herzl outlines this process step by step. Indeed, despite "Herzl studies" scholars' aforementioned efforts to identify a dramatic difference between *Altneuland* and *The Jewish State*, there is no discernable difference between the two insofar as the cultural dimension of Herzl's Zionist vision is concerned. On the contrary, the two texts comprise a coherent, consistent worldview clothed in convincing literary garb, in which every stitch of fabric is essential to understanding the larger complexity of Herzl's cultural approach. This leads us to challenge yet another somewhat simplistic assumption that most Herzl scholars either believe to be true or have yet to seriously reconsider. I am referring here to the tendency to excessively discount *Altneuland*'s literary value, sometimes to the point of ridiculing its content.³⁹ Most of these critics' arguments about the

novel's artistic-literary dimension are certainly irrefutable. Nevertheless, in their enthusiasm to point out *Altneuland's* aesthetic shortcomings as a literary work, researchers routinely ignore the novel's instrumental advantages, advantages that are illustrated by the undeniable efficiency with which the novel clearly and accurately delivers the key cultural and ideological messages of Herzlian Zionism. First and foremost, this efficiency is illustrated dramaturgically from the outset of the plot in a series of dialogues between the main characters. In part, this efficiency actually stems from the very same schematic features that cause these critics to discount the novel in the first place. Regardless of whether Herzl was a "mediocre playwright"⁴⁰ or not, this dimension of his work is extremely important. Without considering this aspect of the novel, it is impossible to decode the geocultural roles that Herzl embeds in each of *Altneuland's* main characters or to understand the nature and role of the future national entity as was perceived by his Zionist political vision.

The very first pages of the novel contain the goals and modus operandi of the very "transplantation" system that Herzl proposes in *The Jewish State*. He believed that this system would make it possible to transplant (European) culture, progress, and modernity into the Jewish homeland. This transplantation process progresses on a kind of a fascinating geocultural flow chart whose different stages are represented by the three key protagonists. One of these characters is an assimilated Viennese Jew named Friedrich Loewenberg, who clearly represents middle-class German Jews like Herzl himself. Loewenberg meets two other main characters: David Littwak, an Eastern European Jewish child from a starving Galician migrant family, and Mr. Kingscourt (formerly [Adalbert von] Königshoff), a Christian Prussian nobleman who has lived in the United States for many years, made a fortune, and become deeply integrated into Anglo-Saxon culture.⁴¹ The Eastern European child begs for alms at Friedrich's favorite café, and the latter tries to help him as much as he can. The child dreams of going to Palestine, which he describes as "our country [where] [w]e can be happy."⁴²

Mr. Kingscourt, who had grown weary of life as a result of an unrequited love, buys himself an island in the Indian Ocean where he can retire. He publishes an advertisement in a newspaper to find an "educated and desperate" companion who will join him and keep

him company on the island. Friedrich is desperate as well, to the point of being on the verge of suicide, and he has reached this state because of having a broken heart, like Kingscourt, but also because of his failed socioeconomic integration into the non-Jewish bourgeois society⁴³ (the failure that Herzl had pointed out in *The Jewish State*, as mentioned above). Friedrich thus responds in the affirmative to Kingscourt's ad, and they are about to set sail from Trieste, the Habsburg port city, to someplace far away from the European mainland. On the eve of their voyage, Kingscourt offers his Jewish companion a large sum of money so that Friedrich can make good on his financial affairs before their departure. Friedrich secures Kingscourt's lukewarm permission to secretly donate this sum to the Galician Jewish child's family.⁴⁴ It is at this point in the novel that the first in a series of illuminating dialogues between the book's protagonists takes place. These dialogues illustrate the way Herzl imagined that his vision would be realized, and what existential meaning this vision would have for the future national Jew: "Well, and have you performed your good works?" Kingscourt asks Friedrich, referring to the donation that Friedrich was about to make to the Littwak family. "It would be fairer to say, your good works, Mr. Kingscourt. The money was yours," Friedrich responds.⁴⁵ Thus Friedrich, and more importantly the novel's author, emphasizes that the Western European Christian is a key partner in the rescue of an Eastern European Jewish child who dreams of returning to Palestine.

On their way to Kingscourt's desert island, the two travelers decide to make a short detour and disembark in Palestine. The detour is a result of yet another fascinating dialogue between them, in which Kingscourt persuades his friend to visit the country: "I say, Dr. Löwenberg, haven't you any desire to see your fatherland before you say farewell to the world?" the Christian Kingscourt asks. "My fatherland! You don't want to turn back to Trieste?" wonders Friedrich, the assimilated Central European Jew, for whom it is clear that his "fatherland" is Austria-Hungary. "God forbid! . . . Your fatherland lies ahead of us—Palestine,"⁴⁶ Kingscourt says, thus determining the identity of Friedrich's fatherland.

Importantly, this is the same Kingscourt who had donated, albeit unenthusiastically, a significant monetary sum to the family of an Eastern European Jewish child for whom it was quite clear that

his “fatherland” is Palestine. As this dialogue continues when the two disembark in Palestine, Kingscourt’s central role in the novel becomes increasingly apparent: “If this is our land,” Friedrich remarks upon seeing Ottoman Palestine, “it has declined like our people.” In an attempt to encourage Friedrich, Kingscourt says, “This country needs nothing but water and shade to have a very great future.” Friedrich asks, “And who is to bring water and shade here?” “The Jews!” Kingscourt responds.⁴⁷

It appears that Kingscourt not only reminds an assimilated Jew what his people’s former land is, but also points to what his future land would be. And if that isn’t enough, when the two set sail from Jaffa, leaving behind the land of “poor Turks, dirty Arabs, [and] timid Jews,”⁴⁸ this same Prussian American Christian character gives the Jewish future its name, which is also the name of the novel: “‘You Jews!’ said Kingscourt, half prophesizing, half guiding his Jewish companion, ‘. . . could establish the experimental land for humanity. Over yonder, where we were, you could create a new commonwealth. On that ancient soil, Old-New-Land!’”⁴⁹

Twenty years later, the two decide to travel to Europe to see whether anything has changed in the world since their retirement. On the way, they once again make what is supposed to be a short visit to Friedrich’s “fatherland,” once again at Kingscourt’s insistence. Kingscourt’s prophecy, it turns out, not only has been completely fulfilled, but has been exceeded. Palestine has become *Altneuland*, a new sociopolitical entity that did not exist twenty years beforehand and that now embodies the very best of the old world that was familiar to the two visitors from their recent European past. In the interim, European Jews have enhanced and developed the scientific, technological, and cultural systems that arose at the end of the nineteenth century in Central Europe, Western Europe, and North America.

Kingscourt and Friedrich disembark in Haifa, where they encounter none other than David Littwak, the same Galician *Ostjude* who had once dreamed of going to Palestine and who now appears to have fully realized his dream, becoming one of the new society’s key leaders. It is hard to overestimate how important Friedrich and David’s ensuing dialogue is to understanding the ideological and cultural foundations of Herzl’s Zionism. The once humiliated and op-

pressed Eastern European Jew introduces himself: "Oh, you won't remember me. My name is David Littwak." "The little fellow from Café Birkenreis," replies the astonished Friedrich, who had previously acted as a middleman between this member of a poor Eastern European Jewish family and the Christian "mysterious philanthropist" of Central/Western Europe. "Yes, sir. He whom you rescued from starvation, with his parents and sister," David replies. Embarrassed, Friedrich says, "Please don't mention it." "On the contrary, it will be mentioned a great deal," David says with finality. "Whatever I am and what I have, I owe to you."⁵⁰

In considering the encounter between Kingscourt, Friedrich, and David Littwak on the former's second visit to Palestine, Shlomo Avineri argues that this is one of the kitschiest and most embarrassing parts in the plot. From this encounter on, Avineri proposes to distinguish between "two parallel strands [of the novel's plot]: one is a personal story and another the story of the new society that has come into being in Palestine."⁵¹ He appears to view the personal dimension of the plot as irrelevant to understanding the new *Altneulandian* society. Other *Altneuland* researchers, including prominent literary scholars, likewise do not see this first encounter between the European travelers and the old-new Jew, nor the resulting dialogue between them, as being particularly important. Though both the encounter and the dialogue do contain a healthy dose of kitsch aesthetically speaking, they nonetheless perfectly illustrate the instrumental dimension of the novel's plot in communicating the origins, founding circumstances, and goals of the *Altneuland* initiative, which is a project that comprises the essence of Herzl's political thought.⁵² This is particularly true of David's last two comments in the aforementioned dialogue: "it will be mentioned a great deal," and "Whatever I am and what I have, I owe to you." These comments clearly echo what Friedrich himself told Kingscourt at the beginning of the novel about the donation that he gave to the Littwak family to save them from starvation, namely, "It would be fairer to say, your good works, Mr. Kingscourt. The money was yours."

Thus, the symbolic construction of *Altneuland's* Palestine, and what it can tell us about Herzl's national worldview, begins with a monetary donation given by a Christian Western-Central European devotee of progress, modernity, and Western culture. With the help

of an assimilated Central European Jew like Herzl himself, this donation finds its way to an Eastern European Jewish child's family. The child has two dreams: to study and to go to Palestine, and David Littwak manages to realize both of these dreams with Kingscourt's money. He acquires a state-of-the-art German education and becomes a key promoter of the Zionist national project in Palestine. Kingscourt is an enlightened Westerner, and his economic wealth clearly symbolizes Western cultural capital, especially since David converts this money into Western knowledge that prepares him for Altneuland's establishment and its aftermath. Furthermore, the very essence of the Altneuland project amounts to realizing Kingscourt's semiprophetic, semi-instructive statement, which he delivers to the Jewish people via Friedrich when the two depart (for good, as it turns out) from the old Palestine of "Poor Turks, dirty Arabs, [and] timid Jews": "You Jews . . . could establish the experimental land for humanity . . . Old-New-Land!" Of course, David and his fellow nation builders carried out their mission unaware of the fact that an enlightened Western Christian had prophesized its realization, just as he, David, was not aware, upon meeting Friedrich and Kingscourt in Haifa, that it was not only Friedrich who was responsible for lifting him out of poverty, giving him access to Western acculturation and helping him found an Altneuland in Palestine. However, since our aim is to explicate Herzl's worldview rather than conduct a literary analysis of the novel's plot, what is important for us here is that the author himself was well aware of the hidden driving force behind the entire Altneuland initiative and that he reserves this driving force role for his non-Jewish protagonist.

It is essential to fully grasp that the symbolic role of Kingscourt's cultural capital, represented in the beginning of the novel by his economic capital, is not limited to an isolated rescue of one Eastern European Jewish family that eventually finds a central place in the establishment of Altneuland. On the contrary, the Christian, enlightened, Western-Central European Kingscourt's character and power are actually driving the entire project from start to finish. We are informed of this by David's somewhat vague response to Friedrich's request not to mention his act of charity: "it [Friedrich's donation of Kingscourt's money] will be mentioned a great deal." What is the "it" that stems from Friedrich and Kingscourt's generosity?

What is this “it” that David promises here to discuss at length during his guests’ visit to Altneulandian Palestine? The reader would be hard-pressed to find any single detail in the novel that is directly and specifically related to the Littwak family’s fate following Dr. Loewenberg’s (and Mr. Kingscourt’s) wondrous good works. What most of the ensuing chapters *do* “mention a great deal” and in great detail is the glorious establishment and wondrous day-to-day functioning of the old-new Jewish society. Thus, it is Altneuland itself that is the clear symbolic product of non-Jewish Western capital investment in the Western education and acculturation of European Jews. If we then add to this the fact that even the name of the old-new land, and of the novel itself, was first uttered by a non-Jewish Western-Central European philanthropist, then we must conclude that the Christian Western-Central European Mr. Kingscourt-Königshoff is himself the most central protagonist in Herzl’s novel, just as Christian Western-Central European Enlightenment civilization, exemplified by the imperial cultures of Herzl’s time, is the essential backbone of Herzl’s Zionist imagination.

The Hebrew literary scholar Yigal Schwartz is the only researcher so far to insist on the key role that Herzl reserves for his non-Jewish hero Adalbert von Königshoff-Kingscourt. According to him,

Kingscourt is . . . the character that Herzl holds in the highest esteem. . . . Kingscourt drives all the major developments in the plot: he is the “mysterious philanthropist” who pulls the Littwak family out of destitution; he is the one who prevents Friedrich’s suicide; he is the one who insists that the two visit Palestine before sailing to the desert island; he is the one who turns Friedrich into a “cast-steel man”; he is the one who insists that they return to Palestine before traveling to Europe.⁵³

What Schwartz does not sufficiently stress, however, is that Kingscourt’s centrality is not limited to the novel’s plot. Rather, it reflects a deep ideological layer in the novel, one that sheds light on the most fundamental intentions of Herzlian Zionism. Schwartz argues that Kingscourt is an example of the “outside witness” archetype,

common in the utopian genre, “Which embodies the authority whom the author values the most.”⁵⁴

Kingscourt’s character, however, is much more than that. He is no mere “outside witness” of the realization of the *Altneuland* vision. As we have seen, Kingscourt is a key behind-the-scenes player who symbolically contributes more to fulfilling the vision than any other protagonist in the novel. He is certainly “the authority whom the author values the most,” in Schwartz’s words. Indeed, the guided tour that Littwak and his Jewish comrades give to Kingscourt (and to Friedrich) feels almost like a kind of surprise inspection by the Jewish settlement project’s senior supervisor. Kingscourt, however, is no mere external supervisor. Rather, he is more like an investor who seems to be checking what became of his investment, whether the territorial project that he named twenty years ago has advanced in the interim, and if so, to what extent. It is clear, of course, that Kingscourt is not aware of his symbolically central role in establishing *Altneuland*, but again, what is more important for us is that the author most certainly *is* aware of it. Moreover, Kingscourt is unequivocally at home in *Altneuland*, and he enthusiastically points out more and more aspects of European culture that were “transplanted” from the old European soil into new ground according to the very same *Verpflanzung* notion that Herzl articulates in *The Jewish State*. These transplanted components of European culture were then enhanced by the *Altneulandian* Jews without losing their unique European identity. *Altneuland*, then, is as much the land of the Christian Germano-American Kingscourt as it is the land of David Littwak and Friedrich Loewenberg. Herzl’s *Altneuland* is the land of both Jews and non-Jews, but only to the extent that both underwent European acculturation.

The first to identify Kingscourt’s centrality to the vision articulated in *Altneuland*, and to notice the clear emphasis that Herzl places on sharing cultural ownership over Zionism’s future homeland with non-Jews, was none other than Ahad Ha’am. In the next chapter, we will elaborate in detail on the response of the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism to Herzl’s novel and on the way that this response is connected to the political dimension of Ahad Ha’amian Zionism. For now, we mention only one of the most perceptive aspects of Ahad Ha’am’s critique of *Altneuland*: blaming Herzl for the

fact that even in the land-of-the-Jews, the founder of political Zionism perpetuates Jewish obsequiousness toward the cultures of Europe. Ahad Ha'am was shocked and incensed to discover that *Altneuland's* Palestine clearly features German, English, and French cultural elements, while uniquely Jewish cultural elements, such as Hebrew language and culture, are obscured and pushed aside.⁵⁵

Ahad Ha'am was certainly right about the fact that Herzl's *Altneuland* clearly emphasizes European—and particularly German—cultural patterns at the expense of Hebrew language and culture. Nevertheless, in his attempt to decipher this phenomenon, Ahad Ha'am makes the same mistake that most scholars who study *Altneuland* make to this day. Ahad Ha'am believed that Herzl's decision to mold the old-new Palestine's cultural experience using non-Jewish cultural elements betrays his vision's continuity with post-emancipation Western European Jewry's assimilationist tendencies, and with the assimilationist values of Herzl's own prenational period. Most of the scholarship on the novel, including Yigal Schwartz's aforementioned study, also tends to view Herzl's unfailing loyalty to the cultural and language patterns of the non-Jewish environment as remnants of a cultural retreat from "the Jewish" and toward "the non-Jewish," or at least as a kind of nostalgia for Altneulandian Jews' Western and Central European cultural past.⁵⁶ On the other hand, however, the *Altneuland* protagonists are clearly striving to renaturalize the cultures of the Christian Germans, French, and English in Palestine, viewing them as a part of the Jewish identity frame. Furthermore, the Altneuland commonwealth is also explicitly open to absorbing Western Christian individuals, who, as Schwartz pointed out, the Altneulandians want to integrate into the "Jewish tribe" so as to expand and strengthen the national "genetic bank" of the new Jewish collective entity.⁵⁷ These two facts force us to ask whether Herzl even considered the distinction between Jews and non-Jews to be valid in the context of the relationship between the old-new Jewish nation and languages, cultures, and ethnic groups of Western Christian civilization. Max Nordau's acerbic response to Ahad Ha'am's critique of *Altneuland* is helpful in this regard, since alongside his indiscriminate verbal abuse and rancorous attacks against Ahad Ha'am, Nordau's response contains an argument that sheds much-needed light

on the profundity and meaning of the connection between Herzlian Zionism and European culture:

[Ahad Ha'am argues that] "Altneuland" is too European . . . everywhere "Europeans, European customs, European inventions. Nowhere, a typical Jewish trace." Indeed, "Altneuland" is a piece of Europe in the middle of Asia. Here, Herzl has pointed out precisely what we want and what goal we are trying to achieve. We want the reunited and liberated Jewish people to remain a cultural people to the extent that it has already reached this level, and to become a cultural people to the extent that it has not reached as yet. *By this, we do not imitate anybody, we merely utilize and develop what is ours. We have contributed to European culture even more than our share; it belongs to us as much as to the Germans, the French, the English. We shall not allow anyone to invent an antithesis between Jewish, our Jewish [culture], and European.*⁵⁸

This statement is the very essence of the cultural imperative in Herzlian political Zionism. Nordau, clearly articulating Herzl's position as well as his own, was not only incensed by Ahad Ha'am's reservations about adopting Western and Central European cultural patterns and languages as part the Altneulandian vision; he was far more disturbed by the fact that Ahad Ha'am labeled the cultural patterns and languages of "Europeans" as non-Jewish elements. In Nordau's and Herzl's eyes, the opposite was the case. According to Herzl, it was not the Jews who passively and obsequiously assimilated into the cultures of the European powers. Instead, the Jews actively absorbed the European cultures as a matter of collective choice, and these cultures thus became Jewish collective assets in precisely the same way that they belong to the European Christian nations. Consequently, Nordau and Herzl believed that the importation of imperial Enlightenment cultures from Europe and their implantation in Palestine are a national project in every sense of the term. They denounced any attempt to portray this strategy as a retreat from Jewish nationalism, arguing that these are attempts to ridicule or discount the national values of an entire people. In other

words, Nordau and Herzl considered their polemic against Ahad Ha'am's negation of the authentic "Jewishness" of imperial cultures and languages on which the post-emancipatory European Jewries were raised to be a national-cultural war in the full sense of the word. Likewise, Ahad Ha'am and his followers viewed their struggle for the linguistic hegemony of the Hebrew language, and against European linguistic-cultural influence on the new Jew, as a battle over the future cultural makeup of the Jewish nation.

Nordau and Herzl thus sought to redefine the cultural and linguistic patterns of Central and Western European Jews: these patterns, which Jews had acquired in the previous few generations, were now to be seen as assets that belong to Jews as a distinctive national group in the same way that they belong to Christian national groups. In so doing, Herzl and Nordau were above all articulating the everyday experience that characterized the cultural biographies of Central European German-educated Jews like themselves. Both were born and raised in the cultural milieu of the Austrian Empire's Hungarian district, and though they lived there at a time when German language and culture were steadily losing their hegemony to Hungarian language and culture, they nevertheless remained loyal to *Deutschtum*. Strikingly, however, although they were deeply entrenched in German imperial culture, they never lived in a homogeneously German socio-national environment. Herzl lived in Vienna, a city whose cultural makeup was changing as it increasingly became a multinational immigrant city.⁵⁹ Even when he was a member of the "Albia" Burschenschaft with German university students, Herzl's daily and social life was primarily conducted within the world of German-speaking Jews who had no serious social ties with Christian German society.⁶⁰ He would later describe this experience as a "new ghetto" in his pre-Zionist play of the same name. It is this very experience that Herzl critically describes as a German-Jewish bubble and a socioeconomic trap in the first pages of *Altneuland*, when he tells the story of Friedrich Loewenberg's hardships.⁶¹ Likewise, though Nordau never wavered in his deep connection to "German-ness," whether before or after he became Herzl's collaborator in the political Zionist project,⁶² he nevertheless lived in Paris, even farther from German society than Herzl. Thus we have before us a fascinating and complex sociological case study of a German cul-

tural experience that is disconnected from broader German national and social life and that is instead lived within a particular social milieu of German-speaking Jews. In other words, though the participants of this collective social reality never defined it as a “national” Jewish one, it was nonetheless a collective experience “of Jews” on the objective sociological level. Before these participants became political Zionists, this kind of experience (people who conduct themselves as a group but either dare not define themselves, or else do not know how to identify themselves with a sense of collective pride) had no “ideological” label by which it could be defined. Following their “conversion” to Zionism, however, they found a collective self-definition for their experience that was aligned with the spirit of the times (“nation,” *Volk*). They were thus able to express their cultural loyalty to “Germanness” while also identifying collectively, publicly, and without a trace of an inferiority complex as a Jewish nation possessing proudly a (Central and/or Western) European culture.⁶³ It was then that they began to search for ways to give this experience a concrete territorial foundation in the form of a national political initiative. In *The Jewish State*, we saw that Herzl is rather vague and ambiguous about the national importance of embedding the languages and cultures of the Jews’ recent pasts in the new homeland (“transplantation” [of the old culture into new ground; but what is that old culture?]; “Our national teachers will give due attention to this matter” [referring to the erasure of pre-Haskalah Jewish languages, the “jargons”; but to make way for which languages?]). In *Altneuland*, however, Herzl is far more explicit: the dominance of German in Altneuland is unequivocal, and Nordau’s response to Ahad Ha’am’s criticism confirms Herzl’s cultural intentions beyond a doubt.

It is important to keep in mind that the sociocultural phenomenon described above was far from a rare occurrence in the European imperial (multi)national landscape, nor was it unique to the Germano-Jewish experience. In the academic and public discourses in Israel, and sometimes in the historiographic discourse, the German Jewish milieu of this period is usually portrayed as a rather idiosyncratic phenomenon because it is viewed retrospectively in light of the cruel fate of German-speaking Jews in the twentieth century. This portrayal contributes to the view that Herzl’s continued adherence

to cultural “Germanness” even after he adopted Zionism is rather strange and inexplicable, thus leaving it insufficiently studied or understood. However, we see very similar phenomena in the histories of national movements of European non-dominant ethnic groups during the nineteenth century, particularly in the Habsburg monarchy where Nordau and Herzl developed their version of Zionism. For nations whose “own” particular languages had not yet become culturally influential enough in their collective life to be used for communication, it certainly appears that many key national leaders, especially in the early stages of their national movements’ development, believed that their nations’ cultural-linguistic links to the imperial ruler should become a part of their nations’ authentic cultural heritage and essential cultural values. These leaders thought that such a move would only be natural and would benefit them collectively and nationally. Jacob Aall, for example, a key early-nineteenth-century Norwegian national leader, rose to prominence at a time when no written Norwegian language existed and when Norway was politically and imperially subject to the kingdom of Denmark. Aall believed in maintaining the cultural (and even political) links with Denmark and thought that the Norwegian people should continue to use the Danish language. He argued that maintaining this link aligned both with the Norwegians’ immediate interests and their concrete collective past, given that the Danish language was the Norwegians’ language of Enlightenment.⁶⁴ The Slovenian national leaders Franc Miklošič and Karel Dežman, both key activists in the “Young Slovenians” group during the 1848 revolutions and major figures in the emergence of Slovenian nationalism in mid-nineteenth-century Austria, had similar views. To the chagrin of the Slovenian language revivalist movement, they believed that the way to integrate Slovenians into the European cultural world as a national group was to adopt German as the language of high culture.⁶⁵ They accorded Slovenian a secondary role, in much the same way that Yiddish is viewed in *Altneuland*. In another example, the first leaders of the Czech national movement, raised on German culture during the first half of the nineteenth century, just as Herzl and Nordau were raised on this imperial culture during the second half of that century, insisted that the link to German was an integral and even essential part of the *national collective* history of the Czech people.

The great Czech historian František Palacký (1798–1876), the founder of the first Czech national party (the “Old Czech Party”), who unsurprisingly wrote his famous multivolume work on Czech national history in German, considered the “contact and conflict” with *Deutschtum* to be the most essential feature of the Czechs’ history as a distinct historical collectivity.⁶⁶ He believed that the Czechs were a basically bilingual nation, “Czecho-German.”⁶⁷ Heinrich Fügner, founder of the Czech gymnastics organization Sokol (Falcon), which in the late nineteenth century was one of the key institutions that comprised the radical Czech national party (the “Young Czech Party”), came from a Bohemian German-speaking family. He never imagined a scenario in which the Czechs as a particularistic collective entity could become a monolingual group that completely divorced itself from German. In one of his letters to his daughter, he described himself as “a German-speaking Prager.”⁶⁸ In the same vein, the Lithuanian national movement of the third quarter of the nineteenth century also contained certain factions that believed that inculcating the Polish language and emphasizing the long-standing link of Lithuanian history to the Polish monarchy amounted to an authentic Lithuanian national strategy and that it should be pursued as a way of nurturing Lithuanian national group consciousness.⁶⁹

The existence of distinct enclaves of sorts, of national identity within imperial cultural spaces, or within the culture of the dominant majority, was of course not confined to European contexts. In the Ottoman Empire of the late nineteenth century, for example, we encounter Shimon Moyal (1866–1915) and Nissim Malul (1892–1959),⁷⁰ two important Zionist figures whose cultural-national approaches clearly paralleled those of Herzl and Nordau. Both were Arab-Jewish intellectuals, well-known and prominent Zionist activists in the Sephardic Jewish community of Ottoman Palestine, and enthusiastic champions of the Zionist idea among Jews in the Arab districts of the Ottoman Empire. Neither concealed the depth of his attachment to the Arabic language and Arab culture. At one and the same time, they both considered themselves to be members of an ethno-religious national (Jewish) group that was both socially and nationally distinct from the Muslim (and Christian) Arab environment and also insisted, being Zionists, that the Jews had a right to territorial self-determination in Palestine under the multinational

Ottoman Empire. As they imagined the Jewish nation's future in Palestine, however, they projected onto it the contents of their own concrete linguistic-cultural experience, in which the Arabic language and Arab culture had central roles.

Keeping in mind the issues of language and nationalism in the case of Herzl and Nordau, it is particularly intriguing to consider one of Malul's most incisive texts, published in the Jerusalem-based Sephardic Hebrew daily *Ha-Herut* in June 1913.⁷¹ In his article, Malul defends his position about the need to teach the Arabic language to members of the new Zionist Yishuv, regarding it as no less than a Jewish national mission. He found himself furiously attacked by the writer and journalist Yaakov Rabinovitch (1875–1948),⁷² of the *Hapoel Hatzair* daily newspaper. The following is an excerpt from Malul's text that can help us understand the operative national aspects of Herzl's cultural thought by way of comparison:

Two paths lie before us: A) either to nullify the study of the Arabic language . . . becoming a nation unto itself here in the country, . . . “The People shall dwell alone,” that sets itself apart from all the peoples in Ottomania, that will not be considerate in the least [with] the people living in the land [Palestine], and we will destroy the entire outer wall . . . ; B) or we find strength in the Arabic language and teach it to our children. . . . [I]f we wish to make our home here in this country as the land of the past and the future, we must teach the language of the land and consider it higher than the other languages. . . . And as for the concern that teaching the Arabic language and our intermixing with the land's people will cause us to lose our nationalism—it is founded in absurdity. Those who argue thus forget the purpose for which we came here, forget why each of us left his land and his country and the home of his father and why we bring the best part of our strength to invest it amongst the ruins of the country, forget that we have come here to build up a new nationhood . . . to remove the heart made of stone and place beneath it flesh that *feels*. . . . It is not true—as Mr. Rabinowitz says—that I call for unilateral intermixing and it is assimilation. . . . My goal is innocent and simple: to strengthen

the Yishuv's walls from within by having it grow stronger from without.⁷³

The resemblance to the linguistic-cultural perspective of Herzl and Nordau seems self-evident in this passage. Both Malul's and Herzl's Zionism sees no contradiction whatsoever between Jewish national identity and the idea of maintaining and deepening the links of the Jewish collective experience to the dominant language and culture of the immediate environment and recent past. Moreover, just as Herzl and Nordau see the project of inculcating and embedding German language and culture (along with the other primary languages of European Enlightenment at the time) as an expression of the Jewish people's national collective will, so does Malul adopt a passionate and explicitly nationalist rhetoric to argue for the need to teach the Arabic language to the new Jewish national Yishuv in Palestine. The reader will remember that Herzl viewed language as the Jews' "beloved homeland of . . . thoughts," and indeed, the incredible way that German spread throughout *Altneulandian* Palestine, both as the language of high culture and as an everyday language, is one of the main reasons that its Jewish residents felt at home in their homeland. Similarly, Malul believed that it was a matter of cultural-national rootedness to connect with a language that had served as the language of childhood, of education, and of everyday life for him and for other Arab Jews. Malul's seemingly vague references, such as "the entire outer wall" and "to strengthen the Yishuv's walls from within by having it grow stronger from without" were expressions that he used to outline his vision for the Arabic cultural environment and Arabic language's national role vis-à-vis the new Zionist Yishuv. The Arabic linguistic environment is obviously the homeland of his thoughts, and in imagining the Jewish national future in Palestine, Malul saw Arabic as a kind of overarching domain within the multinational Ottoman state. This domain is intimately familiar to him and other Arab Jews on both cultural and everyday levels, but this proximity poses no threat to Jewish collective existence in Palestine (which, needless to say, includes at its center the Hebrew language in which Malul wrote the article).

Thus, this abstract comparison of Herzl and Nordau's national-cultural approach to that of Malul clearly shows that the two resem-

ble each other. More specifically, both approaches propose to incorporate the Jews' linguistic links to their imperial environment and/or culture into Jewish national collective identity. Interestingly enough, it appears that Malul himself was well aware of the relevance of comparing himself to Herzl and Nordau as far as their approach to the cultural-linguistic aspect of national identity is concerned:

There is no requirement that the nationalist knows his language, the nationalist is a nationalist through his national feelings and not his language, the nationalist is a nationalist through our national deeds. And if we agree that there is no nationalism without language, we must . . . tell our brothers in Europe working for the sake of the Palestinian Yishuv, investing both their energy and financial resources, and first and foremost Dr. Max Nordau—that they are not nationalists because they do not know the Hebrew language.⁷⁴

Herzl proposed to link Western and Central European civilization in general, and certainly *Deutschtum* in particular, to the Jewish collective experience, as part of the Jews' transition to the remote Middle Eastern empire. Herzl's linguistic vision thus proposed to continue the Jews' enlightenment through the medium of European languages, but to do so in a homeland far removed from Europe. What political conditions did he believe were necessary to realize this linguistic-cultural vision? How did Herzl imagine the construction of the "outer wall," in Malul's terms, at a time when the building materials that Herzl's Germano-central Zionism considered necessary remained in Central Europe? To answer these questions, we should address the principal issue of the political dimension of Herzl's national imagination when put in its contemporary spatial context.

IV

In his criticism of *Altneuland*, Ahad Ha'am points to the apparent absence of Hebrew from the public square, from everyday life, and from cultural life in Altneulandian Palestine. Nordau's caustic re-

sponse to the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism peremptorily and impatiently brushes off this concern, arguing that the latter's suggestion that Hebrew is absent from Altneuland "is a pure invention of Ahad Ha'am."⁷⁵ Only a few lines later, however, Nordau unequivocally states that Central and Western European cultures (and languages) would be at the center of the collective national-cultural life of the Jewish people's new order in Palestine. It appears that Nordau did not dare to openly confirm Herzl's intent to marginalize Hebrew in the old-new society before a readership of Eastern European Zionists. Herzl himself, however, was much more open and clear in his February 1896 diary entry, at the same time that *The Jewish State* pamphlet was published: "[M]any Zionists [are] in favor of Hebrew. I think . . . [i]f we establish a neo-Hebrew state it will be only a New Greece. But if we do not close ourselves off in a linguistic ghetto, the whole world will be ours."⁷⁶

In a couple of short sentences, Herzl laid out two general goals whose adoption by political Zionism, he believed, would align with his cultural vision of continuing to promote the modern Jewish nation's inculcation and reproduction of European Enlightenment cultural patterns and languages. The first option clearly represents what Herzl considered to be the undesirable path that is not aligned with his vision: a separate ethno-cultural nation-state like "a New Greece." The second goal somewhat vaguely and indistinctly hints at Herzl's desired model: a basically open space encompassing "the whole world." We should recall that "the whole world [that] will be ours," in Herzl's eyes, refers to the cultural world of the European empires. In other words, to avoid becoming another "ghettoized" Greek nation-state, the "Jewish state" had to find concrete ways of practically reconnecting to the European linguistic and cultural landscapes.

It is extremely important to realize the fact that Herzl's clear misgivings about the separatist Greek model of a unitary linguistic-cultural nation-state in no way contradicts the contents of *The Jewish State* or of the term *Judenstaat*. Indeed, most of the neighboring non-Jewish national movements of the Habsburg imperial space in Herzl's time used the term *Staat* with explicitly statist intentions in their national political programs and positions. The Czech national movement of Herzl's time fought for a "Czech state" in the

Habsburg political arena: in the words of their national program, they fought for a *Staatsrecht/Statni pravo* for the Czech nation. What this practically meant was simply a bid to achieve national territorial autonomy within the existing imperial framework, like “the Hungarian state” within the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy.⁷⁷ This was also the case with the Croatian and Slovenian national movements, the Austrian-Galician faction of the Polish national movement, the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia and Sub-Carpathian Russia, and the Romanian national movement in Hungarian Transylvania.⁷⁸ Aurel Popovici, one of the latter movement’s prominent leaders, wrote an influential book in 1906 called *Vereinigte Staaten von Groß-Österreich* (United States of Great Austria). In this book, Popovici proposes to reorganize the Habsburg monarchy into a multinational federative state that would be more equal than the existing German-Hungarian model. Of course, *The Jewish State* did not as yet elaborate on the form of self-determination that Herzl meant by the term “state,” both because he had not yet decided whether Zionism should aim for Palestine or Argentina⁷⁹ and because Herzl focused on the rather abstract notion of the Jews’ sovereignty over their collective fate irrespective of where this sovereignty would be located geographically. Nevertheless, in trying to understand what Herzl meant by “state” in *Der Judenstaat*, it is incumbent upon us to be mindful of a certain fact that most historical discussions of Herzl’s text have ignored, namely, that the conventional, assumed meaning of the term “state” in the immediate (multi)national context in which Herzl was raised and lived referred to an autonomous district and not a sovereign nation-state.⁸⁰

And lo and behold, the sociopolitical commonwealth described in *Altneuland* completely breaks with the nation-state model that Herzl refers to as “a kind of new Greece,” thus confirming beyond a doubt that Altneulandian Palestine is a substate entity. Altneuland belongs to open geopolitical spaces in which “the whole world,” meaning the transnational European Enlightenment world, becomes its citizens’ cultural asset. Herzl clearly states that Altneuland is a district of the Ottoman Empire,⁸¹ just as the Transylvania envisioned by Popovici and the Czech lands envisioned even by the radical Czech nationalists were imagined as districts of the Habsburg Empire. This fact, however, does not explain how Herzl thought

that a Jewish political collective that speaks and thinks in the European Enlightenment languages would be established in the Middle East. If anything, we seem to be even farther from an answer to this question. After all, the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish Muslim empire that appears far removed linguistically, culturally, and geographically from the very “whole world” that Herzl refers to in his diary.

As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, the question as to the meaning of Palestine’s relationship to the Ottoman Empire has garnered (almost) no serious scholarly attention because of the powerful distortion caused by the retrospective nation-state paradigm, which assumes that the nation-state was the overarching goal of Herzlian Zionism. Herzl’s laconic assertion in *Altneuland* that the old-new commonwealth would be subject to the Ottoman sultan is thus usually seen as an essentially tactical move, designed to avoid confrontation with the Ottoman authorities who were concerned about separatism and suspicious of any sign of territorial nationalism. This conventional view is so widespread that it has been adopted by both sides of an often ideologically loaded historiographical debate on Zionism. Scholars who espouse this view can be committed Zionist scholars, like Shlomo Avineri and Anita Shapira, or Palestinian scholars, like Muhammad Ali Khalidi.⁸² Both sides consider Herzl’s allusion to the Ottoman arena to be a historically unimportant move aimed at quietly paving the way for the establishment of either a just and peace-loving Jewish nation-state or else a colonialist and plundering Jewish nation-state.⁸³ Derek Penslar, in his seminal methodological article on Herzl and the Palestinians, critically demonstrated the ways that Herzl’s relationship to the Muslim Middle East has been studied in both pro-Zionist and pro-Palestinian historiographies. Though the two rival schools of thought diverge ideologically, they are identical in their one-sided approach to this aspect of Herzl’s thinking. Penslar suggests that researchers not view Herzl’s dialogic approach to the Ottoman state as a smoke-screen, and that not doing so opens up the possibility of taking a fresh look at the topic.⁸⁴ Indeed, upon tracing the way that *Altneuland* cautiously hints at the way that Herzl imagined the Ottoman Empire in the near future (in 1923, when Mr. Kingscourt and Friedrich Loewenberg reappear in Palestine to witness the rise of

Altneuland), it becomes increasingly clear that Herzl had a coherent worldview of the matter.

A key character that can help us understand this issue is Reschid Bey, David Littwak's Muslim friend and a voluntary member of the Altneuland commonwealth. The literary and historical scholarship on *Altneuland* usually sees Reschid Bey as the Arab archetype in Herzlian thought.⁸⁵ Academic discussions of this character are frequently accompanied by statements that address contemporary Israeli issues, such as whether and to what extent Herzl anticipated the emergence of the Zionist-Palestinian national conflict (or not), and whether and to what extent this character reflects Zionism's colonial ambitions and Eurocentric paternalism. However, this is yet another incredible example of the anachronistic approach to Herzl's novel, an approach that ignores both the literary text itself and the political and geocultural contexts in which it was written and to which it was addressed. In fact, nowhere in Herzl's book does Reschid Bey—who is indeed ethnically Arab—identify himself as belonging to the Arab collectivity. Instead, he introduces himself and sees himself as Muslim first and foremost. More concretely, the character has three central attributes: (1) he was born and raised in the Galilee; (2) the language he uses for daily communication is Turkish (as this is the language with which David Littwak addresses Reschid Bey when the reader meets him for the first time); and (3) he possesses a somewhat deist view of Islam that emphasizes its universal dimension, a view that resembles the secularized conceptions of religion that characterized the rationalist trends of European Enlightenment. We see this last aspect of the character in his moving peace speech about the interfaith brotherhood that prevails between Jews and Muslims throughout Altneulandian Palestine, a speech that is actually designed to portray Islam as a refined and rational monotheism in the spirit of Lessing, namely, a religion whose cornerstone is religious tolerance.⁸⁶

That is to say, when Herzl imagined the Ottoman-Palestinian region two decades into the future, he imagined a native of Palestine who has been acculturated into the Turkish-Ottoman imperial culture and who sees himself as an enlightened Muslim. It is more than plausible, then, that Herzl was quite familiar with the discourse of Ottoman modernity that had been dominant toward the end of

Abdul Hamid II's reign. Reschid Bey, it appears, is an exact embodiment of this discourse, which was being disseminated widely by Ottoman intellectuals in several European languages, especially in French. In his groundbreaking article "Ottoman Orientalism," the historian Ussama Makdisi gave a detailed and in-depth account of the strategies that the Ottoman state used in its last decades to construct a Muslim-Ottoman imperial identity.⁸⁷ On one hand, Ottoman officials challenged what they considered to be distorted European representations of Islam, arguing that Islam in general, and the Turkish-Ottoman state in particular, was more tolerant of other religions than Christian Europe.⁸⁸ Thus, they argued that Turkey had no less of a right to be recognized as a cultural superpower than any Western or Central European state and to become a full partner in the imagined world of the European Enlightenment. On the other hand, however, they positioned themselves vis-à-vis their own native "oriental" populations as Ottomans possessing an enlightened form of Islam. Consequently, they believed that it was their mission to "redeem" the "ignorant and fanatical" Kurds, Druze, and Arabs from their ignorance and fanaticism by assimilating them into the Turkish-Ottoman Islamic civilization, which was marching forward on its unique Islamic path toward modernity.⁸⁹

As a native of an Arab province who underwent linguistic Turkification and adopted an enlightened Islamic identity, Reschid Bey truly embodies the modern Islamic imperial ideal that the Ottoman orientalists had in mind.⁹⁰ As a Muslim possessing Turkish-Ottoman imperial culture, however, Bey is also an analogy for precisely what Herzl hoped would happen in the Jewish context, as per his Jewish national ideology: the creation of a(n) (old-)new Jew who would be Jewish but would also continue to be steeped in imperial culture in general, and, it was hoped, German in particular. Moreover, at the time that Herzl wrote *Altneuland* it was certainly possible for him to imagine that the Ottoman Empire of which *Altneuland* is a part, and whose clear representative is the enlightened Muslim Reschid Bey—a character that seems almost identical to Lessing's Nathan the Wise—would eventually become a welcome partner in a Europe-centered geopolitical space. This is precisely what the Ottoman orientalists of Herzl's time wanted, and this was also the explicit aim of the cultural aspect of Herzlian Zionism.

There is still a question as to the concrete role of the European world outside of Palestine in Herzl's vision and as to how the essential link between Altneulandian Palestine and its cultural sources would be formed. The European continent is indeed the most noticeable present absentee in the novel's second half, as Mr. Kingscourt and Friedrich Loewenberg visit an old-new land that is presented to them as an enhanced version of Europe itself. On one hand, it is clear that Palestine, where masses of Jews had immigrated, is the focal point of the story. No less clear, however, is the fact that the cultural homeland of the Zionist commonwealth is Europe and that there are no signs of any disconnect from this homeland that in any way resembles a move from an "exile" to a "Zion." On the contrary, it turns out that "Zion" is *not* a territorial category in *Altneuland*. Instead, it seems to be a somewhat extraterritorial category that includes not only Palestine but also a kind of constant movement between the European continent and Palestine. We learn this in one of the more important parts of the novel, when Joe Levy, the man who had organized the mass immigration of Jews to Altneulandian Palestine and who had served as Altneuland's "general manager," talks about the way that the Altneuland project was fatefully planned and executed:

[I organized the] Ship of the Wise . . . to visit "Old-New-Land" prior to the Return of the Jews. Its very appearance in the Mediterranean waters was to herald a new era. . . . I chartered a fine modern steamer, the "Futuro." . . . The ladies and gentlemen whom we invited for that six weeks' spring tour of the eastern Mediterranean belonged to the intellectual aristocracy of the whole civilized world . . . without distinction of race or creed; . . . poets and philosophers, inventors, explorers, investigators and artists of every type, political economists, statesmen, publicists, journalists. . . . It was as if the spirit of the times were speaking to the Jewish people from the "Futuro" at the very moment when we were about to re-establish ourselves as a nation. The words that came from the ship were treasured and taken to heart by us. But it was when our honored guests actually trod upon the soil of Palestine that their comments were particularly fruitful and stimulating. The Ship of the Wise sailed along our coast.

The passengers traveled about the country in large groups or small as they preferred. . . . The groups formed themselves naturally for the expeditions on shore; but so delightful was the spirit on the “Futuro” that some of the passengers rarely left the ship at all. . . . There is a story, which I do not vouch for, that one accomplished writer never left the ship for a moment, declaring, “This ship is Zion!”⁹¹

The explicit use of the national keyword “Zion” obviously points to the fact that the story of the ship-that-is-Zion is actually a symbolic center of Herzl’s Zionist novel. Despite this fact, this part of the novel has almost never garnered scholarly attention. Yigal Schwartz, one of the few researchers to study this part of the novel,⁹² argues that the identification of the ship “sailing in the Mediterranean Sea . . . a kind of Ahasver, that eternal wandering Jew,” with “Zion”—a term that was supposed to represent the Jewish territoriality that would result from the realization of the political Zionist project—attests to a kind of inherent contradiction in Herzl’s Zionist vision, which he explains as a gap between dream and reality and a built-in tension between the territorial and the extraterritorial.⁹³ This is a somewhat artificial dichotomy, however, one that can be valid only if we assume that Herzl’s national ideal was a stable hermetic territory in the form of the nation-state, and consequently that the residues of his diasporic past were the obstacles that kept hampering his advance toward that goal. This assumption is not supported, however, by what we have learned here from Herzl’s and Nordau’s national-cultural thought. On the contrary, they believed that the cultural glue that would bind Altneulandian Jews together and make them one united collectivity was actually made in Europe. This is why “Zion” is not represented as just a static territorial entity; rather, it is (also) portrayed as a ship that occasionally (every twenty-five years) delivers up-to-date European cultural values to Altneuland’s citizens. This compound representation comprises a coherent whole that clearly meets the criteria of Herzl’s national thought, which envisions the Altneulandian sociopolitical entity as Jewish in form and Central European (preferably German) in content.

In addition to the representation of “Zion” as a ship that sails between the European continent and Palestine, and stands for the

connection between the Altneulandian territorial project and the European geocultural and geopolitical landscapes, there is another moment toward the end of the novel when the plot even more powerfully expresses the dual character of Herzl's conception of a national identity holding onto Palestine's territorial element on one hand and the European extraterritorial element on the other. Friedrich and Mr. Kingscourt decide to stay in Altneulandian Palestine, but in the last pages of the book, Friedrich says something rather surprising—that he would like to run over to Europe. Mr. Kingscourt is shocked:

“How’s that, you moody fellow? Are you already fed up with the land of your Hebrew ancestors?” “No, indeed, my dear Kingscourt. Your wish to remain here makes me only too happy. I can at least try to become a useful member of society. . . . Nevertheless, I want to turn over to Europe for a bit and observe the conditions there. It is impossible that no radical changes should have taken place in Europe in these twenty years. Realizing as I do that all we have found here is merely a new arrangement of things that existed in our day, I am inclined to think that something similar has happened in Europe. . . . Old institutions need not go under at one blow in order that new ones may be born. Not every son is posthumous. Parents usually live along with their children for many years. It follows that an old social order need not break up because a new is on the way. Having seen here a new order composed of none but old institutions, I have come to believe neither in the complete destruction nor the complete renewal of a social order. I believe . . . in a gradual reconstruction of society. . . . We decide to alter a floor, a staircase, a wall, a roof, to install electricity or water supply only as the need arises, or when some new invention wins its way. The house as a whole remains what it was. So I can imagine the continued existence of the old state even if new features have been added. That is what I should like to seek in Europe.”⁹⁴

And finally, he concludes as follows: “That is the coexistence of things in which I believe.”⁹⁵

Friedrich Loewenberg, Herzl's cultural double, simply and succinctly presents the essential dual logic of Herzl's Zionism: the constant effort to merge and blend between the old and the new. In the "Altneulandian" part of the novel, when Littwak and his friends lead Loewenberg and Kingscourt on a tour of their new-old country, the back and forth between "old" and "new" plays out in the local Palestinian arena. The "new" is represented by the institutional, economic, and educational infrastructure established by the Jewish immigrants, and the "old" is represented by European cultural values and ideas. In the last chapter of the book, however, Friedrich's long and important monologue cited above takes the "old/new" duality and projects it onto a broader spatial arena. Now it is Altneulandian Palestine in its entirety that comprises the "new," whereas the "old" is the European continent in the concrete sense, and most likely Herzl's beloved Habsburgian Central Europe, which the Viennese Friedrich Loewenberg was probably headed for. Friedrich stresses that he has no intention of leaving the Palestinian (old-)new society for Europe. What is clear, however, is that Europe is described as the "old" to Palestine's "new" and that this term is analogous to terms like "parents" (who do not usually die immediately following the birth of a son) and "house" (which remains the same even if its contents change). Thus, the concrete European continent enters Herzl's spatial imagination as a kind of second home for the Altneulandians, an old homeland that need not disappear from either their consciousness or their lives, in a manner that befits Herzl's conceptualization of the "old."

In defending his intention to travel to Europe, Friedrich assumes somewhat vaguely that Europe had also undergone certain changes comparable to those that occurred in Altneuland ("It is impossible that no radical changes should have taken place in Europe in these twenty years"). Earlier in the novel, however, Herzl actually clarifies this point through a comment made by one of Altneuland's citizens, who explains that at least one major—and indeed radical—shift took place in Europe since Friedrich and Kingscourt's departure to their desert island, a shift that was profoundly linked to the establishment of the old-new land in Palestine:

Only after those Jews who were forced out of Europe had been settled in their own land, the well-meant measures of

emancipation became effective everywhere. Jews who wished to assimilate to other peoples now felt free to do so openly, without cowardice or deception. There were also some who wished to adopt the majority religion, and these could now do so without being suspected of snobbery or careerism, for it was no longer to one's advantage to abandon Judaism. Those Jews who felt akin to their fellow-citizens in everything but religion enjoyed undiminished esteem as adherents of a minority faith. Toleration can and must always rest on reciprocity. Only when the Jews, forming the majority in Palestine, showed themselves to be tolerant, were they shown more toleration in all other countries.⁹⁶

Unlike Pinsker, who rejected assimilation as an option, and who did not hesitate to talk about the collective rights of Jews as one of many "tribes" within a multinational empire, Herzl never imagined that Jews could exist as an autonomous cultural group in European states. Culturally speaking, Herzl believed that there was only one path for modern Jews to take: the path of the Enlightenment and acculturation into Western and Central European cultures through their languages, the same languages that were decisively shaping progress and modernization. However, he also believed that there were several civil-political options that would allow Jews to proceed on that cultural path and that one option does not necessarily need to preclude the others. Indeed, the above quotations in no way denigrate "assimilated" Jews who choose to remain in their European homelands. On the contrary, Herzl considered this option to be not only legitimate, but also valued and honorable, because this option would become possible only as a result of the realization of his political Zionism, thus comprising yet another part of that vision. Herzl's vision, thus, certainly resembles Pinsker's civil-political thought in his "autoemancipation" period insofar as it legitimizes several patterns of Jewish civil-political integration into the modern post-emancipation world and proposes an explicitly nonrevolutionary approach to improving the civil-political status of Jews in that world.⁹⁷

Herzlian Zionism shares another key feature with Pinsker's civil-political vision of the future of the modern Jewish nation, a feature that invariably characterized the thought of central figures associ-

ated with Zionist ideology both before and after World War I—which is the preoccupation with what kinds of non-Jewish states would a part of the world Jews continue to live in after Zionism’s realization. Like Pinsker, Herzl also believed that the status of non-Jewish minorities in Altneulandian Palestine would affect the civil status of Jews in European countries. Furthermore, Friedrich’s expectation to see the “new” emerging alongside the “old” in Europe, and sometimes even within it, gives us some sense as to what Herzl’s wider political vision was for the Middle East’s and Europe’s geopolitical spaces.

CHAPTER THREE

Ahad Ha'am

Neither a "Spiritual Center"

nor a "Jewish State"

I

IN 1920 ASHER GINSBERG (Ahad Ha'am, 1856–1927), the founding father of spiritual Zionism, responded to the Balfour Declaration, focusing specifically on the meaning of its key concept ("national home"). Here Ahad Ha'am lays out his national-political vision for Palestine by offering his interpretation of this concept:

A people's historic right to a land populated by others has no other meaning than this: the right to return and settle in the land of their fathers, to work and develop its resources undisturbed. . . . However, this historic right does not cancel out the right of the rest of the land's residents, who press their claims by virtue of the concrete right that comes from working and residing in the land for generations. This land is presently their national home as well, and they also have a right to develop their national resources to the best of their abilities. This situation makes Palestine a joint home of different nations, each of which is trying to build its own national home.

In such a situation, it is no longer possible for the “national home” of one of them to be complete and encompass every aspect of this term. If you do not go about building your home in a field empty of people, but rather in a place where there are other homes and residents, then of course you can only be the sole ruler inside your own gates. There, inside, you can organize your belongings as you see fit. But beyond your gates, all residents of the area must work together, and the overall leadership must be agreed upon for the benefit of all.¹

The text succinctly captures the twofold approach to the two peoples of Palestine central to Ahad Ha'am's political thinking: self-rule on the national-cultural level and binational partnership on the state level. This passage appears in the “Preface to the New Edition” (the third edition, 1921) of his famous *At the Crossroads* and was also included in the opening pages of “All Writings of Ahad Ha'am,” alongside the two previous prefaces from the 1895 and 1902 editions of *At the Crossroads*. Given the obvious salience of this text to readers, one would assume this text would be rather difficult to ignore as a (valuable) historical source on Ahad Ha'am; however, most of the historical scholarship on Ahad Ha'am has yet to give this text any serious consideration.²

This disregard should come as no surprise. Precisely because of the fact that the text is explicitly political, that it was written in response to a formative event in political Zionism's history, and that it unequivocally addresses the political future of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, it breaks with the existing historiographical framework on Zionism, which insists on assigning Ahad Ha'am a decidedly nonpolitical role. In the study of Zionist thought, scholars usually impose a clear-cut distinction, if not an outright dichotomy, between “political Zionism” and “spiritual Zionism” (or in later historiographical terms, “cultural Zionism”; subsequently, I refer to this latter form of Zionism as “spiritual-cultural” for clarity). Thus, the research literature portrays Ahad Ha'am, the founder of the latter “nonpolitical” spiritual-cultural Zionism, as a figure that was wholly uninterested in political thought and in planning the Jews' political future in Palestine. At the same time Theodor Herzl, the author of *The Jewish State* and the founder of political Zionism, is portrayed as

his polar opposite, almost as a kind of political Zionist archetype.³ By opposing Ahad Ha'am to Herzl "the political Zionist," the former's thought is depoliticized even further, making it impossible to incorporate into the historiographic discussion the explicitly political elements of Ahad Ha'am's thought, such as those expressed in the "Preface to the New Edition," according to which Palestine is the national home of two nations.

Where does the dichotomy between Herzl "the political Zionist" and Ahad Ha'am the "nonpolitical Zionist" come from? It cannot be justified solely by the fact that Herzl founded the Zionist movement's institutions and worked tirelessly to secure a charter for Jewish settlement, while Ahad Ha'am was dedicated to writing about the condition of Judaism and refrained from systematic political activities. After all, Leon Pinsker, the first Zionist figure that we studied, was by no means a paragon of political leadership. Steven Zipperstein rightly considers Pinsker to be a paradigmatic example of the Russian Jewish leadership's failure in the late nineteenth century.⁴ From the moment that he became Hovevei Zion's leader in the early 1880s, Pinsker did everything he could to avoid day-to-day movement politics, a characteristic that makes him more similar to Ahad Ha'am because the latter was also reluctant to engage in day-to-day political issues.⁵ Moreover, Ahad Ha'am himself stressed his unequivocal ideological affinity to Pinsker in his eulogy to him, claiming that it was Pinsker who, while on his deathbed, gave him the idea of making Palestine the Jewish people's "spiritual center."⁶ As the chapter on Pinsker briefly explains, however, the historiography of early Zionist ideology actually portrays Pinsker as a figure who foreshadowed Herzlian Zionism (or political Zionism), the very same Zionist approach that the historiography diametrically opposes to Ahad Ha'am, thus reinforcing the depoliticization of Ahad Ha'am's spiritual-cultural Zionism.

When a particular historiographical interpretation imposes itself on a historical phenomenon despite certain evidence to the contrary, it is only reasonable to suspect that this interpretation is driven by a predetermined historiographical conception that is considered to be obvious and therefore in no need of explanation. After all, is there really any other way to describe the reluctance of the historiographical literature to accept Ahad Ha'am's own assertion that his

Zionist thought has Pinskerian origins?⁷ We are here once again face-to-face with the shortcomings of the retrospective Jewish nation-state paradigm that has served, and continues to serve, as the lens through which key scholars of Jewish nationalism have studied the political thought of Zionism's founders. Indeed, the degree to which scholars of Zionism describe a given Zionist figure as "political" is often determined by that figure's ostensible commitment to the Jewish nation-state doctrine. In other words, Zionists whose thought clearly centers on a Jewish nation-state that resembles the post-1948 nation-state in which most Zionist historiography was produced are immediately portrayed as Zionists whose thought's political dimension is beyond dispute. On the other hand, however, Zionists whose national thought does not appear to revolve around the sovereign nation-state are only rarely described as "political." When their political ambitions are acknowledged, they are usually described in terms of internal power struggles within the Zionist movement, and almost never in relation to their national thought.⁸

The historiographical tendency to view Herzlian Zionism (with Pinsker as its forerunner) as fundamentally political, and to create a binary opposition between it and Ahad Ha'am's spiritual-cultural Zionism, is an obvious example of this pattern. Pinsker, and certainly Herzl, used concepts in his national discourse on the Jewish people's future that clearly resemble the same "nation-state" concept that is familiar to any observer in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first. On the other hand, the "spiritual center" concept that Ahad Ha'am uses to envision the Jews' national future and that he believed would strengthen the Jewish national identity of diaspora Jews appears rather odd when compared to the territorial nation-state category. This is the reason that Ahad Ha'am is excluded from the "political" realm of Zionist history. We might at most encounter studies on him that either portray the Zionist leader's penchant for politics as a hunger that he would never succeed to satisfy, or indulge in gossip-tinged analyses of his various minor power struggles within the world of Jewish and Zionist nationalism.⁹

In Ahad Ha'am's case, the nation-statist teleological paradigm does not just depoliticize Ahad Ha'am's Zionist outlook. Somewhat paradoxically, it seems to be trying to push him in the opposite direction at the same time, namely, to impose the nation-state para-

digm on him and his thought regardless of any evidence to the contrary. This effort is part of an attempt to incorporate Ahad Ha'am into the overarching story of Zionist history, this time not as somewhat of an oddball figure, but rather as an imagined collaborator in the long-term effort to establish a Jewish nation-state. After all, it is beyond dispute that Ahad Ha'am made a central contribution to the revival of the new Hebrew culture, the same culture that would come to dominate the future nation-state. Consequently, it is quite impossible to leave him out of the nation-state paradigm.

Steven Zipperstein's discussion of the "Preface to the New Edition," one of the only existing—and definitely the most thorough—academic analyses of the text, clearly demonstrates the way that the historiography portrays Ahad Ha'am and illustrates the interpretive power that the nation-state paradigm gets from being seen as the normative criterion for evaluating the goals of Zionism during its prestate period. It appears in Zipperstein's biography of Ahad Ha'am, which is rightly considered to be the best ever written about the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism.¹⁰ Despite the fact that Ahad Ha'am's preface sketches out a dual national home model in Palestine, one that differs fundamentally from a nation-state model based on Jewish political dominance, Zipperstein tends to view this text as a precursor to the Jewish nation-state. In the text, Ahad Ha'am clearly writes that "the 'national homes' of the land's different nations can ask no more than national freedom in their internal affairs, while the leadership of matters pertaining to everyone in the land must be determined by all the 'heads of household' together, if the relations between them and their cultural condition are adequate for this; or, if this parameter is lacking, then by an outside custodian that would make sure that no nation's rights are violated."¹¹ Furthermore, Ahad Ha'am never for a moment doubted the justice of this arrangement, saying:

It seems that the [British] government believes that a nation that comes here only in the name of the moral power of a historical right to build its national home in a land populated with others, and that has no massive army or enormous fleet to "justify it," such a nation possesses nothing more than what is theirs by right, truthfully and justly, and not

what the world-conquerors take for themselves by force, inventing various "rights" for themselves to cover up for their deeds.¹²

According to Zipperstein, however, in his 1920 preface Ahad Ha'am stated almost explicitly, despite his occasional comments about the need to deal justly with the Arabs, that he deeply regrets the fact that the Balfour Declaration leaves an opening for opposing national claims¹³ and hopes that afterwards, when the Jews prove that their plans are not directed against the Arabs, it will be possible to transfer political power over the land to its legal owners: the Jews.¹⁴

Zipperstein's reading of Ahad Ha'am's text is clearly erroneous, but this does not by itself explain the unusual gap between the text and Zipperstein's interpretation. The latter is no random error; it clearly reinforces the classic pattern of Zionist historiography of trying to correct the dichotomous opposition that it itself created between Ahad Ha'am's spiritual center and the nation-state, and to do so by portraying Ahad Ha'am as a nation-state adherent at heart, even if only potentially rather than in practice.

Shlomo Avineri's foundational work on the history of Zionist thought is another straightforward example of this pattern. On one hand, Avineri stresses how unusual Ahad Ha'am's spiritual center concept was in the context of the national-Zionist world of his time.¹⁵ On the other hand, however, Avineri argues over and over throughout his chapter on Ahad Ha'am that, like Herzl and Pinsker, the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism ultimately wanted a sovereign nation-state.

Thus, in Ahad Ha'am's case, the nation-state paradigm serves a double function. On one hand, it emphasizes the clear disjuncture between Ahad Ha'am's spiritual center vision and the nation-state model, which it considers to be the superior one. After all, Ahad Ha'am's model is strikingly different from the nation-state model because it is clearly made up of two elements: the national-territorial and the national-diasporic. On the other hand, however, the nation-state paradigm acts like a filter in the same way that it did with Herzl and Pinsker, emphasizing—or in the case of Zipperstein, inventing—those aspects of Ahad Ha'am's thought that might be persuaded to align with the characteristics of the present-day Jewish nation-

state. The result is that Ahad Ha'am's historiographical representation is sometimes quite schizophrenic: he is portrayed as an intellectual and moral voice that is critical of political considerations and the glorification of governmental institutions, and he is also portrayed as a believer in Jewish ethno-nationalism and a figure who was focused exclusively and ethnocentrically on the particular interests of the Jewish people.¹⁶

To correct the scholarship on the (non)political Ahad Ha'am, and the erroneous readings and analytical missteps caused by the nation-state paradigm, we must once again undertake a careful reconstruction, this time of Ahad Ha'am's political thought and writing, and to place them back into the historical and political contexts of his time. As we proceed, we will constantly refer back to our re-examination of Pinsker's and Herzl's nationalisms, given that Ahad Ha'am's political thought was clearly in dialogue with both of them.

Our discussion of Ahad Ha'am's political views and his "Preface to the New Edition," the text that mostly clearly and eloquently expresses them, is also an important chronological landmark for this book and its key arguments. The "Preface to the New Edition" is actually the first time in the book that we are encountering a text written after World War I and the collapse of the large trination imperial space, the political space in which most Zionists had imagined the national revival of the Jews. Thus, we are here faced for the first time with a very important issue in the history of Zionism's basic approach to the state and the nation: what changed, and what remained unaltered, in the Zionist political imagination following World War I and the disintegration of the three multinational fin-de-siècle empires? The truth is that most historical studies of Zionist thought find it difficult to answer this question because of the same retrospective distortion caused by viewing the Zionist past through the lens of the post-1945 and post-1949 realities in Eastern-Central Europe and the Middle East. This lens often causes researchers to project World War II's aftermath on our understanding of World War I's aftermath, thus portraying the pre-Versailles and pre-Balfour Declaration imperial past, along with the Zionist political thought of that past, as largely irrelevant to understanding the national-political thought of prominent Zionist figures in the inter-war period. To really answer this question in Ahad Ha'am's case re-

quires asking a key question that has never been asked before by historians of Zionism dealing with the founder of spiritual-cultural Zionism: given that the "Preface to the New Edition" is the latest and most fully formed articulation of Ahad Ha'am's worldview on the political future of Palestine and its nations, what is the relationship between this text and Ahad Ha'am's national-political thought before World War I?

II

It is well-known that Ahad Ha'am never wrote his own "*Autoemancipation!*" or *The Jewish State*. He did not have an organized political doctrine that he could have presented in a systematic and coherent fashion. Most of his overtly political writings are to some extent reactive; they are responses to meaningful political events like the Balfour Declaration or to debates and dialogues with prominent national-political thinkers, figures whose writings and worldviews had a formative effect on the foundations of Jewish and Zionist nationalism's discourse in Ahad Ha'am's time. Therefore, if we want to reconstruct Ahad Ha'am's political thought throughout his intellectual career and use it as the backdrop for his response to the Balfour Declaration, in which he envisioned establishing two national homes in Palestine, then the best and most efficient way to do this would be to closely trace his great debates with the two most central figures in the world of modern Jewish nationalism at the time, Theodor Herzl and Simon Dubnow—both of whom were deeply preoccupied with the question of the Jewish people's national future—and to do so with reference to the wider national context of the period. The two debates that we examine are Ahad Ha'am's "Altneuland debate" with Herzl and his debate (which would be more accurately called a dialogue) with Simon Dubnow. Likewise, we must also address Ahad Ha'am's interpretation of Pinsker's "*Autoemancipation!*" Yet, we should not ignore Ahad Ha'am's nonpolemical texts, which he wrote to address issues of Jewish culture and identity. These texts can supplement aspects of his worldview that were forgotten in the heat of the debates. Before we begin, however, we should clarify the basic contours of the non-Jewish national environment as a frame of reference that Ahad Ha'am used when corresponding with his ideolog-

ical opponents. The basic assumptions of this environment guided both his and his opponents' attempts to imagine future possibilities for Jewish national existence.

In 1907, Ahad Ha'am published a short article called "Words and Concepts" in the *Hashiloach*.¹⁷ In the article, Ahad Ha'am sought to clarify what he meant by "spiritual center," the concept that was at the heart of his Zionist national thought. He explained that the "spiritual center" that he sought to establish would in no way be an "economic center" for the Jewish people. Rather, it would be a spiritual center only, spreading its spiritual-cultural influence among those Jews who would go on living outside of it. The spiritual center would serve as the most important source of national identification for these Jews, whereas their current places of residence would naturally continue to serve as their primary economic centers. At the same time, this spiritual center would also clearly have to be a socio-economic and national entity in and of itself; it would not be some club for "a dozen *batlanim*, whose business shall be spiritual nationality."¹⁸ To flesh out what his vision for a national-spiritual center would look like, Ahad Ha'am needed comparable examples taken from the Jews' national environment. He obviously assumed that this environment's key features would be apparent to his readers and would thus make it easier for them to understand the substantive and functional aspects of his vision. One of Ahad Ha'am's adversaries who wondered about what "spiritual center" meant was an anonymous writer in one of Warsaw's Jewish journals,¹⁹ so Ahad Ha'am used the Polish nationalism of his time as a rhetorically convenient example to clarify what he meant by spiritual center. To understand the matter aright, Ahad Ha'am argued, that Jewish writer in Warsaw had only to go into the street and ask any intelligent Pole:

"What is Warsaw to the Polish people as a whole? Is it a spiritual centre of the nation, or a spiritual and economic centre?" The answer, I think, would have been something like this: "For the Polish people as a whole this city is certainly a spiritual centre of their nationality. Here the national characteristics find their expression in every department of life, the national language, literature, and art live and develop; and all this, and what goes with it, influences

the spirit of the Poles, binds them, wherever they may be, to the centre, and prevents the spark of the nationality in the individual from becoming buried and extinguished. But an *economic* centre of the nation? My good sir! How could Warsaw be an economic centre for all the millions of Poles who are scattered over different lands, and whose economic lives depend on entirely different centres, where Polish economic conditions do not count at all?"²⁰

At the same time, of course, "besides spiritual things, [there are] many factories and shops and other material things [in Warsaw], without which it could not develop its spiritual side."²¹

Ahad Ha'am is here directly referring to the complex national experience of the Eastern European Jews' non-Jewish neighbors in the imperial context, and he does so to portray his spiritual center vision as a reflection of a normative, widely accepted form of national existence. This reference, however, does require some explanation. As we have seen, Pinsker's and Herzl's political perceptions must be understood against the backdrop of the multinational imperial context and the political claims of the national movements of their neighboring nations, some of which were relatively dispersed throughout the geopolitical space of Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe, some of which were more concentrated in one region—and most of which challenged the hegemonic structures of the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires without calling their existences into question. Recall that Pinsker's national "territory," if it were established in Palestine, was intended to be a *pashalik* in the Ottoman Empire, and its role would have been to indirectly restore the national-social status of Jews living outside of it. This restorative effect was intended first and foremost for those Jews who were living in the multinational imperial space, for whom this "territory" would create a normalizing resemblance between the Jews and their neighbors, whose national experience was also divided into a territorial homeland and imperial diasporas.²² The "Jewish state" that Herzl fleshed out in *Altneuland* was a province of the Ottoman Empire; Herzl believed that this province's openness to the hegemonic imperial cultures, and above all to German culture, was tremendously important for the Jewish people's culture and identity. Ahad

Ha'am, like Pinsker and Herzl, also considered the multinational imperial framework to be a permanent fixture of the geopolitical reality that he intended his Jewish national vision to be a part of. In this reality, different nations sought to preserve and reinforce their particular identities while simultaneously maintaining economic relationships and day-to-day cultural loyalties within spaces that were shaped by a slew of different group identities. When we seriously consider this reality, we discover—with the help of Ahad Ha'am's own text—that his spiritual center had clear parallels in the lives of neighboring peoples in the imperial world. Indeed, it appears that the spiritual center idea was not at all disconnected from the concrete reality of Ahad Ha'am's time. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the existing historical literature on Ahad Ha'am, which mostly disregards the history and characteristics of Eastern and Central European nationalism at the time, usually preferring to ask retrospective questions, such as whether and to what extent the contemporary state of Israel resembles the vision of spiritual-cultural Zionism's founder.²³

If Ahad Ha'am's imaginary of Warsaw's Pole had really been asked about the state of the Polish nation only a few years before "the Great War," and specifically about whether he was satisfied with having a spiritual center in Warsaw,²⁴ he probably would have responded with a unequivocal "no," for the Polish population of Congress Poland, which was then ruled by tsarist Russia, suffered greatly under the Russian yoke. In Austrian Galicia, however, matters were rather different. The status of the Galician Poles under Austro-Hungarian rule was very similar to the de facto status of the empire's two hegemonic nations, the Germans and the Hungarians, at least when it came to their dominant position vis-à-vis the Ukrainian population. Unlike the Warsaw Pole, the Galician Pole of Ahad Ha'am's time was quite satisfied with his nation's condition in Galicia, with its economic center in Habsburgian Austria and its spiritual center in Warsaw, though he may have hoped that Poland would eventually unite and become one autonomous unit under Habsburgian rule. During World War I, this vision of a kind of Austro-Hungaro-Polish federation was actually a fundamental part of the national-political program of the Polish national movement in Galicia.²⁵

Over the course of the long nineteenth century, other national movements in the multiethnic imperial space envisioned a national future that was even more similar to Ahad Ha'am's spiritual center than that of the Galician Poles. The Romanian national movement in Transylvania considered the Romanian state to be a spiritual center, and at the same time, it struggled for broad territorial autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian state without seeking to exchange the Habsburgian economic center for the Romanian one.²⁶ The national movement of Ottoman Greeks, which represented the flourishing Greek bourgeoisie in Istanbul and Anatolia, also preferred to identify remotely with the Greek nation-state while at the same time struggling for expanded extraterritorial autonomy in the Ottoman Empire.²⁷

To be sure, these different examples of national consciousness and experience that emerged in the multinational space of Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Mediterranean basin certainly differed from one another in certain ways, some more fundamental than others. Indeed, Ahad Ha'am's notion of a spiritual center, as put forth in the aforementioned text and others, was not strictly analogical to the national-political imaginations based on the socio-demographic situations of the Poles in Congress Poland and Galicia, or with the Romanians in Transylvania, or the Greeks in Anatolia, or any of the other national movements mentioned above. At base, however, the above examples were driven by the same logic as Ahad Ha'am's spiritual center in their attempts to plan their national futures and national lives. Before the Versailles Peace Conference and the establishment of the new nation-states, this logic was widely accepted as mainstream among most ethno-nationalisms in the above regions. It was based on the idea of establishing two centers of national life for each ethno-national group: a primary territorial center and a secondary extraterritorial center located outside the primary center, which would remain significant for the nation's existence as a whole, despite its secondary status.²⁸ The Romanian and Greek national movements had already established nation-states and were focused on winning autonomy for their diasporas, whereas Ahad Ha'am could only dream of establishing a territorial national center in Palestine that would buttress the Jewish diaspora's identity, though as we shall see, he did not envision it as a separate nation-

state. In any case, the complex coexistence of these two forms of national identity, the territorial and the extraterritorial, was then still the accepted norm.

One can hardly understand the deeper meaning of Ahad Ha'am's political debates with the other Jewish nationalist figures of his time, as well as the political and political-social dimension of these debates, unless one reconstructs them while keeping in mind their imperial geopolitical and geocultural contexts as addressed above—the very same contexts in which his spiritual center idea was rooted. We begin with the “Altneuland debate” that Ahad Ha'am began in 1903 by publishing his critical review of Herzl's novel in *Hashiloach*.

As we saw in the previous chapter, *Altneuland*'s utopian vision of the Jews' political future can be understood only if we remember one key fact, which becomes clear if we read the novel in the context in which it was written, but which either disappears or seems implausible if we read the novel retrospectively from the standpoint of our own time and context. I am referring here to the fact that Herzl wanted to establish a national sociopolitical entity in Palestine as part of a broader geocultural vision of open and overlapping political spaces, which he believed would reinforce the existing political and cultural geography of Europe and the Mediterranean basin at the time. Recall that the Ottoman Empire that rules Altneulandian Palestine had successfully inculcated Turkish imperial culture among Palestine's Arab residents; we know this owing to the fact that Reschid Bey, the novel's Muslim protagonist, speaks Turkish.²⁹ This development corresponds precisely to the Altneulandian Jews' success in maintaining and even enhancing their connection to the imperial and hegemonic cultures in which they were raised and whose values they absorbed. The non-Jewish imperial languages and cultures, particularly German, that were sociologically identified with Jews in Central and Eastern Europe³⁰ had become fully Jewish languages in Altneuland. In the Jews' European past, acculturating into the European imperial cultures in general and German culture in particular might have appeared obsequious or self-effacing. Herzl, however, portrays the continuation and deepening of this process in the context of Altneulandian self-rule as a national collective decision to be a part of the global transnational and transimpe-

rial cultural milieu. Nordau, for his part, goes even farther than Herzl in advancing this vision.³¹

Thus, we see that Herzl's geocultural vision was driven by the logic of acculturation, and even of outright cultural assimilation; according to his vision, cultures and languages inferior to the status of the imperial cultures and languages would be acculturated/assimilated into them. It is thus no coincidence that Hebrew is given a ceremonial and culturally unimportant role in *Altneulandian* Palestine,³² or that Arabic is totally absent from the novel. Indeed, *Altneuland* was culturally intended to symbolize the marginalization of a particularistic Hebrew culture (which Herzl had compared to closing oneself off in a linguistic ghetto like "a new Greece")³³ to make way for imperial cultures that are shared by all the empires' nations regardless of ethno-linguistic boundaries.

Only when we place the basic elements of Ahad Ha'am's polemical response to *Altneuland* and its author in the political and geocultural contexts of the turn of the twentieth century, and only when we compare it with Herzl's aforementioned vision put into that context, do we begin to understand the concrete political meaning of the criticism that Ahad Ha'am leveled against Herzl's worldview, and to discern the basic contours of the political alternative that he proposed in response. Unfortunately, not a single study of the "Altneuland debate" has tried to explain the debate's different sides by referring strictly to the debate's historical context in the pre-nation-state era. Ever since Shulamit Laskov's classic article "The *Altneuland* Dispute,"³⁴ the overriding pattern has been to uproot the debate from its imperial geopolitical context and reimagine it as if it were concerned with the desired character of a future independent nation-state. Laskov ends her article with a statement that clearly reflects this approach: "Therefore, it appears that the vision of both figures [Herzl and Ahad Ha'am] was realized in the state of Israel, even if not in full."³⁵ Indeed, existing historiography does not focus on the debate's connection to the Russian imperial space (in which Ahad Ha'am wrote), the Habsburgian imperial space (in which Herzl wrote), or the Ottoman imperial space (in which both were interested). Instead, it mostly revolves around what the debate means for the present-day Jewish nation-state.³⁶

In any event, the future of the Jews in their own nation-state was certainly not what was on Ahad Ha'am's mind when he read *Altneuland*, just as the nation-state framework was not on Herzl's mind when he imagined the Jews' future in his novel. What *was* on Ahad Ha'am's mind was that the array of empires and imperial cultures that Herzl laid out did not have room for a particular Hebrew culture. Ahad Ha'am had been working to create just such a culture for a decade and a half before the novel's publication together with the Hebrew "Republic of Letters" that he had helped establish in Russian Odessa. His harsh attack on the absence of Jewish ethno-linguistic particularism in Altneulandian Palestine should therefore be read as a defense against the imperial cultural hegemony that Herzl wished to impose on Jewish national collective life. Ahad Ha'am embarked on this defense—and this is the most important point—while it was fairly self-evident for him that the future entity in Palestine would continue to be subject to the contemporary empire in some way.

In Herzl's novel, the Altneulandian Jews, who continue to be part of the imperial order, infuse the sociopolitical framework that they established with hegemonic cultural content and values that originated in the cultural-linguistic worlds that had so far facilitated the progress of the Jews, and various other ethnic groups in the European imperial space, toward modernity. Herzl meant this fact to attest to the mutual openness of European (and profoundly German) culture toward the Jews on one hand and the openness of Altneuland's Jews toward European culture on the other. The Altneulandian Jews thus succeed where the Austrian Christian liberals had failed (primarily because of anti-Semitism, according to Herzl):³⁷ they are able to establish a modern multireligious society that is based on an affinity with the German language—to Herzl, the undisputed language of modernity in Central Europe—and open to all who wish to be a part of it "regardless of religion or nationality." And that's not all. The old-new land of these culturally European Jews continues to maintain close ties with their old homelands, the very European world in which Altneuland's culture is rooted. Altneulandian Jews look to that world for guidance, and they travel there themselves every once in a while, both to measure their achievements against the rate of European progress and to constantly reaffirm their modern European identities.

Ahad Ha'am, however, saw Herzl's call to join the community and language of European Jewish modernity "regardless of religion and nationality" as the exact opposite of openness and pluralism. When the "regardless of religion and nationality" slogan in its Altneulandian version is addressed to a person like Ahad Ha'am, one of the creators of modern Hebrew culture and a figure who dreamed of building a society that speaks and creates in Hebrew, then that slogan has no other meaning than to deny Ahad Ha'am's right to cultural difference. Ahad Ha'am understood that the obvious precondition for realizing this "regardless of religion and nationality" slogan as perceived by Herzl is the unhesitating acceptance of the imperial cultures in general and the Austro-German culture in particular, including the adoption of German as the Altneuland community's day-to-day language. Herzl had already met this condition long before by virtue of his sincere German-centric cultural identification, and he thus considered it to be a way of affirming the inclusion of postassimilationist Jews like himself. Ahad Ha'am, however, belonged to a small minority of the world's Jews who linked modern Jewish identity to the Hebrew language rather than to a non-Jewish imperial language; they considered this precondition to be blatantly exclusive.

Ahad Ha'am's incisive critique of the Altneulandian vision crescendos when he discusses the novel's description of a Passover holiday feast in Tiberias, attended by the Muslim Reschid Bey and three Christian priests, one Protestant, one Catholic, and one Orthodox. This plot event comprises the climax of the novel's approach to the notion of tolerance:

The Seder's time had come, and all members of the household and their guests sat around the table, including Rashid the Musulman and the three priests of the three Christian religions. All of them eating *matzas* and drinking "cups" in love and brotherhood. And Hopkins [the Protestant priest] reminds his fellow priests of bygone days, when Passover was a source of interreligious hatred and strife, and that now they are all seated together in peace in the home of a Jewish man on Passover eve! Blessed is the eye that has witnessed this! It's a shame, however that the author did not inform us

whether Father Ignaz [the Catholic guest], for instance, had also invited David, his friends, and the rabbi of Tiberias to the Franciscan monastery during *their* Passover eve.³⁸

Ahad Ha'am uses razor-sharp irony to point out that the novel reproduces the hierarchical relations between the Jews and the cultures of the imperial Christian superpowers (as well as the Muslim superpower, given that Reschid Bey was not a member of an Arab minority in a Jewish nation-state in the context of the novel, but rather the Turkish-speaking representative of the Ottoman Empire that ruled Altneulandian Palestine!). He also correctly observes that Herzl was reproducing the same power relations that characterized the post-emancipation experience of Western and Central European Jews like himself and inserting them into Altneuland, the Jewish branch of European culture in the Ottoman Empire. Like in Vienna or Berlin, the Jews of Altneulandian Palestine always have to prove how much they have internalized the Enlightenment's universal values, and to do so, of course, using particular European languages. At the same time, however, the European Enlightenment cultures have nothing to prove; as far as they are concerned, they already passed the Enlightenment "test" when they emancipated the Jews and gave them the linguistic-cultural tools to join the European cultural world. Herzl thus intended his Jewish national territorial entity to make good on the unwritten contract between the European Enlightenment and the Jews, according to which the Jews must give up their particular collective identity and adopt hegemonic European cultural mores. This aspect of Herzl's thought highlights how irrelevant Ahad Ha'am's Hebrew language and culture was to Herzl's modern Jewish national project.

Looking at the "Altneuland debate" from our present-day perspective, when the existence of an institutionalized national Hebrew culture in the Jewish nation-state of Israel is not only undisputed but even obvious, Herzl's linguistic-cultural vision of a Palestine that speaks and creates in the languages of the large empires of his day may seem somewhat strange and idiosyncratic, whereas Ahad Ha'am's response may appear to be an overreaction or an exaggeration. The fact is, however, that many small nations and national minorities were waging uphill battles in the vast fin-de-siècle empires

for their right to join the modern, enlightened world without having to give up their national languages, which were often portrayed as “tribal” and “barbaric” languages that would unnecessarily hamper progress. In that context, it was much harder to imagine a modern Hebrew-speaking territorial unit than to imagine a collectivity of Jews speaking the Zionist Organization’s official language at the time. In the previous chapter, we saw that Herzl’s hope of establishing a Jewish national political entity with German cultural-linguistic links was not much different from the positions held by several leaders of non-dominant nationalities’ national movements. Like him, these leaders also regarded the adoption of the ruling imperial language or the dominant culture as a move that would best serve their peoples’ interests. Furthermore, when a new ethnic nationalism emerged in the imperial linguistic context, it was not immediately clear which language would come out on top—the imperial language or the ethno-national language. Indeed, it was not clear at first whether Lithuanian would overcome Polish (in the case of Lithuanian nationalism),³⁹ Norwegian would overcome Danish (in the case of Norwegian nationalism),⁴⁰ or Slovenian would overcome German (in the case of Slovenian nationalism).⁴¹ In each of these national movements, “formerly assimilated” figures would sometimes argue in favor of their ethno-national group continuing to maintain links with the hegemonic culture, just like Herzl did in the context of the Jewish national movement.

What was Ahad Ha'am's alternative to this hegemonic relationship? Did he only want to reverse the relationship and imagine Jewish hegemony over non-Jews? This is how Max Nordau understood Ahad Ha'am's criticism of *Altneuland*. As a person who had never experienced a form of cultural life that was not bonded to an imperial culture, Nordau believed that Ahad Ha'am's rejection of the “regardless of religion and nation” slogan stemmed not from the latter's desire to preserve Hebrew collective difference in an imperial world that disregards ethnic and religious boundaries, but rather as evidence of Ahad Ha'am's bid to impose a particularistic Hebrew culture on a multiethnic region and its political institutions. Nordau's interpretation led him to imagine a rather horrific scenario, one that shocked him to his very core: “Ahad Ha'am does not want tolerance. The foreigners should perhaps be killed, or should at

least be expelled like in Sodom and Gomorrah. The idea of tolerance disgusts him. . . . He cannot conceive of the idea of freedom. He imagines freedom as a ghetto in which coercion operates in reverse, in which coercion remains in all its cruelty, except that now it is directed not at Jews but at non-Jews.”⁴²

Several researchers who use the nation-state paradigm to study the “Altneuland debate,” and who insert Ahad Ha'am's criticism of hegemonic imperial culture into the discourse of the present-day Jewish state, portray Ahad Ha'am's approach as a form of political ethno-nationalism in the exact same way that Nordau did.⁴³ The model that Ahad Ha'am proposed as an alternative to Herzl's model, however, was neither a “Jewish state” model in the “Jewish nation-state” sense, nor a “spiritual center” model in the apolitical sense. In his answer to Nordau, Ahad Ha'am hinted at the basic contours of his proposed alternative: both sides, Jewish and non-Jewish, who share a joint political living space, must find a path forward that “allows both of them to live according to their desire and custom, to create social life for themselves according to their preference, to band together when banding together is felicitous to them both, and to separate from one another, each to their own path and preference, when separation is more felicitous to them.”⁴⁴ To reconstruct Ahad Ha'am's approach to this issue more concretely, we should refer to his dialogue with his close friend Simon Dubnow, whose own program was one of the most prominent alternatives to Herzl's vision. Before we do that, however, we must understand a few more basic elements in Ahad Ha'am's national thought so that we can more precisely locate it within the range of possibilities for Jewish national existence that were being proposed at the time.

III

According to the internal logic that drove Herzl's geocultural vision, the realization of Zionism meant that Palestine would become a European country. It would not be metaphorically or abstractly European; on the contrary, it would be European in the most concrete way imaginable. It would adopt Europe's languages and day-to-day cultural patterns, and it would institute a sort of ritualized travel between Altneuland and its European mother continent.⁴⁵ This in-

ternal logic entailed a total rejection of the “new Greece” political model (the independent nation-state model)⁴⁶ and an affirmation of a political model of open imperial spaces. Ahad Ha'am staunchly opposed Herzl's geocultural vision. He believed that the Congress Poland model (“Warsaw” in his words) in tsarist Russia was a model that the Jews should seek to realize in their own national lives.⁴⁷ Congress Poland was a political unit possessing a national majority that spoke and created in Polish and that served as a national center for “the great many Poles” who were dispersed throughout Eastern and Central Europe. True, this model was linguistically and culturally closer to the “new Greece” model than to the idea of a Germano-Jewish colony in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Ahad Ha'am's cultural vision was also inherently opposed to the idea of a territorial nation-state and inherently conducive to the imperial spatial imagination.

Ahad Ha'am opposed the idea of mass Jewish territorialization in the form of an independent nation-state because he firmly believed that the historical continuity of the Jews as a collective was a supremely important national value. He believed that to radically detach the present from the recent past, thereby disrupting the continuum of national development and utterly changing the character and key attributes of the Jewish way of life that had formed over many generations, was tantamount to abandoning Jewish national identity. Five years before Herzl's appearance on the world stage with the rise of territorial political Zionism, Ahad Ha'am had already expressed clearly “anti-Herzlian” positions in his frequent debates with Eliezer Ben Yehuda and Moshe Leib Lilienblum. Ahad Ha'am's anti-Herzlian approach was particularly clear in his responses to the idea of implementing a massive shift in the Jews' national experience, converting them from a diasporic people to a territorial people. Ahad Ha'am did emphasize that the mutual relations between the Jewish people and the world's nations had changed drastically over the course of the nineteenth century and that these changes showed no signs of slowing down. In light of these changes, he stressed that the Jews should under no circumstances give up their national future. As a negative example, he referred to the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* movement, arguing that it busied itself with delving into the Jews' history at the expense of planning their

future. In contrast, Ahad Ha'am believed that the growing openness between Jews and their cultural environment "when the people's condition has improved and it has been able to 'refresh its strength amongst strong and healthy peoples'" actually represented a real opportunity for a national-cultural revival. However, he also maintained that

much worse than that one [from Wissenschaft des Judentums who gave up on the future] is . . . another sect that wishes to bring about redemption by means of a *future that has no past*; that believes that after thousands of years of history it is possible for a nation to begin everything anew, like a newborn: to make for itself a new national country with a new national life and new national objects. This sect forgets that a *people*, meaning a national "I" in its historical form, *it* is the one that wants to exist, *it* and not another, to exist just as it is, with its memories and its hopes, and that if *it* could have become *not-it*, then it would have realized through many other ways before.⁴⁸

According to the view that Ahad Ha'am articulates above, the idea of assimilation (becoming *not-it*) is no different from the notion of revolutionizing the Jewish people's socio-demographic situation and its very geopolitical existence by eliminating the diasporas and implementing national territorialization instead. Both call for radically changing the Jewish people's collective identity. The new territorial people would no longer be linked to the national-cultural past, which is firmly rooted in the extraterritorial experience. It would be radically different from and foreign to the existing sociological collectivity known as the Jewish people, just as the Germans, French, or Russians who absorb "assimilated" Jews do not become Jewish peoples in any sense of the term.

Ahad Ha'am was not engaging in mere theoretical bickering when he compared the complete territorial concentration of the Jews to the idea of ending their collective existence. His concern about the continued existence of the Jewish collectivity in political-territorial form was, for his part, historically and empirically well-

founded. Just as Simon Dubnow argued that the territorial-statist stage of national development contained the threat of cultural extinction because the new state might be destroyed,⁴⁹ so was Ahad Ha'am deeply concerned about turning the Jewish collectivity into nothing more than a political-statist institution for the simple reason that such institutions are often destroyed or dismantled at one point or another in human history. If, however, a national diaspora that is culturally and emotionally connected to that autonomous territorial center would continue to exist, then, Ahad Ha'am believed, this would guarantee the collective survival of the Jewish people regardless of any historical shift that might occur to its territorial institutions in the future.

No territorial revolution in the Jewish people's collective character was needed, according to Ahad Ha'am, in order to secure the kind of continuity and renewal that he wanted for the Jewish people's modern national existence. What he did think was needed, however, was to amend the Jewish people's internal character. He believed that this was the main instrumental role of the "national center," which would be able to shift the emphasis from the national diaspora to Palestine, not as a goal in and of itself, but as a way of strengthening that diaspora's existence. This is the deep meaning of Ahad Ha'am's decision to compare his spiritual center vision to the Polish national experience of his time. This is also why he was so enthusiastic and identified so thoroughly with Pinsker's *"Autoemancipation!"*⁵⁰ Ahad Ha'am believed that a national model that works in the same way that he imagined the Polish model worked, namely, a model that consists of both a clear demographic concentration in an autonomous "national center" and a diaspora that identifies and is identified with that center, was the most desirable and suitable way forward for Jewish national life. What appealed to him about this model was that it was located midway between the existing precarious situation under which the Jewish national diasporas lacked a clear national center and the equally precarious notion of total territorialization, which went against the "national historical 'I.'" This is exactly the double model that Pinsker proposed in his own essay. Pinsker believed that the establishment of a territorial homeland for the Jews was a way to elevate the Jews' status in their neighbors' eyes

and to grant them an enhanced form of emancipation: rather than being members of an exterritorial people that most considered to be homeless, they would come to resemble their neighbors in the multinational space by possessing a recognized national territorial district. In the same way, Ahad Ha'am wanted his spiritual center in Palestine to enhance the cultural condition and identity of other segments of the Jewish people who chose to remain outside of that center.⁵¹

In the absence of the supraethnic imperial frameworks of Ahad Ha'am's time, it would have been impossible to imagine fully implementing his national model without causing the Jews to be considered a "fifth column" in their home countries. After all, his vision called for establishing a Jewish national center in Palestine that would be demographically comparable to the Poles' spiritual center in Warsaw, maintaining constant and concrete links between that center and diasporic concentrations of Jews and legitimizing the cultural affinity and identification of those Jewish concentrations with that center. The imperial frameworks, on the other hand, were constantly connecting, bridging, and incorporating different patterns of self-rule and collective rights. Here is where we see the deep conceptual and dialogical connection between Ahad Ha'am's spiritual-cultural Zionism and the *political* dimension of Dubnow's national autonomism. Dubnow, after all, was one of the most prominent spokesmen of Jewish nationalism to imagine the Jewish national future within multinational imperial frameworks.

Much has been written about the public ideological exchange between Ahad Ha'am and Simon Dubnow. It began with Ahad Ha'am's 1898 article "Three Steps,"⁵² in which he responded to Dubnow's second "Letters on Old and New Judaism," and ended with Dubnow's 1914 article "Negation and Affirmation of the Diaspora in Ahad Ha'am's Thought" in the thirtieth volume of *Hashiloach*.⁵³ This public discussion was accompanied by constant personal correspondence between the two men.⁵⁴ As a rule, the historiography still portrays this exchange as a somewhat paradigmatic debate between the Zionist "negation of the diaspora" approach and the autonomist "affirmation of the diaspora" approach, though the same exact historians are also usually surprised to discover how sim-

ilar the two positions are. It is not within the scope of this chapter to go into detail about these two figures' exchange on the future of the Jewish diaspora—I focus specifically on this matter elsewhere.⁵⁵ What is important to emphasize here is that the scholarship's opposition, if at times hesitant, of Ahad Ha'am the "diaspora negater" to Dubnow the "diaspora affirmer" is fundamentally mistaken. Apart from the fact that there was no one closer to Ahad Ha'am intellectually and personally than Dubnow, the former constantly reiterated the following position in both his personal letters to the founder of the "national autonomy" doctrine and his two main public articles responding to Dubnow.⁵⁶ According to Ahad Ha'am, though the diaspora is subjectively negative, and though every Jew hopes that it will end on some level (an argument that Dubnow agreed with!),⁵⁷ the Jewish people's "desire for national life" objectively necessitates that the Jewish people struggle for the right to a healthy, rich national life wherever Jews find themselves. Ahad Ha'am believed that not only must the Jewish people "affirm the diaspora in principle," but they must also make every effort "to the very limits of what is possible" to put this affirmation into practice and secure the necessary conditions for diaspora Jewish national life to flourish and develop.⁵⁸ The main difference between the two positions is that Dubnow did not consider "working the land of Israel" to be more or less important than "national work in the diaspora," whereas Ahad Ha'am believed that the constant renewal of Jewish life in the diaspora would be impossible without establishing a national center in Palestine. In one of his letters to Dubnow on the subject, for example (September 22, 1907), he states his position thus:

In all the places . . . in my article where I appear to be negating diaspora work, if you examine them closely you will see that they were meant only in the following sense: to prove that *without a center in Eretz Israel*, this work will not be able to quench our thirst for a complete national life, and therefore the *nationalists* must build up their nationalism guided by the belief in the possibility of a *Zionist* center. . . . I see no "internal contradiction" in my views on the matter, I see only *the accentuation of the value* of both types of work toward our

overarching goal, namely to give our people back their national lives to the fullest extent and to release our national spirit from its enslavement to foreign peoples.⁵⁹

The resemblance between Ahad Ha'am's and Dubnow's ideological views was not limited to their basic belief that every concentration of Jews in the world that has a "desire for national life" also has the right to a full national collective existence. In fact, the more one follows how Ahad Ha'am differs from Dubnow on the matter of "accentuation of the value" and the greater relative importance of "work in Eretz Israel" versus "diaspora work," the clearer Dubnow's gradual effect on Ahad Ha'am's vision for the future "center in Palestine" becomes. Fascinatingly, Dubnow's political concepts and views, which served him in his struggle for Jewish national autonomous rights in the diaspora, slowly seep into Ahad Ha'am's discourse on the nature of a spiritual-national center in Palestine, over the course of the dialogue between them. Before appraising Dubnow's influence on Ahad Ha'am's political thought, however, we must first make a conceptual correction regarding Dubnow's political ideas. It is well-known that Dubnow believed in full national and cultural autonomy for the Jews in tsarist Russia and continued to struggle for this even after World War I in the part of Eastern Europe not ruled by the Soviet Union (Lithuania first and foremost). He also developed a comprehensive ideological worldview that went far beyond the Eastern European context, an approach that called for Jews to assert their rights to collective self-rule wherever they lived.⁶⁰ Partly because Dubnow's struggle for Jewish national autonomy in the diaspora ended in utter failure, and partly because of the Zionist historiographic tendency to oppose political Zionism to spiritual-cultural Zionism, whose political character is portrayed as doubtful at best, Dubnow's cultural nationalism is usually portrayed as an apolitical nationalism, thus reaffirming the binary opposition between the "cultural" and the "political" in the history of Jewish nationalism.⁶¹

There is no more problematic distortion of the history of Jewish nationalism than the portrayal of Dubnow's nationalist doctrine as nonpolitical. This is so not only or even primarily because he established a Jewish political party (the *Folkspartei*, the Jewish People's

Party).⁶² Rather, this is above all because implementing Dubnow's worldview would have entailed fundamental political changes in the civil and national characters of the home countries of the Jews whose rights he was fighting for. Had any state acceded to Dubnow's demand to give its Jewish citizens national self-rule as an extraterritorial minority that was widely recognized as homeless, then it goes without saying that that state also would have had to give national, territorial, and extraterritorial collective rights to all its "less homeless" national groups, thus becoming a federative multinational state. Indeed, Dubnow did not limit himself to discussing only internal Jewish cultural-educational issues. He often raised the issue of the civil-political character of existing non-Jewish states, explicitly seeking to undermine the hegemonic mono-nationalism of these states' political regimes.⁶³ From now on, historians would do well to unequivocally include Dubnow's cultural nationalism under the label of "political nationalism," given that his political thought and activism were aimed at reorganizing the existing states on a different civil-national basis than the one that obtained in Dubnow's time. This is no mere semantic matter, but a conceptual change that the historical context demands, a change that will allow us to consider a broader range of political alternatives that were proposed in the context of Jewish nationalism before the nation-state became the dominant paradigm.

After conceptually clarifying the political aspect of Dubnow's nationalism, we are now able to discern those political elements in Ahad Ha'am's Zionism that actually originated in Dubnow's thought, or in other words, those elements that Ahad Ha'am adopted and developed over the course of his fertile exchanges with the founder of Jewish national autonomism. As mentioned above, Ahad Ha'am differed from Dubnow when he argued that most of the Jewish national effort should be diverted away from fighting for Jewish national rights in the diaspora and toward establishing a national center in Palestine. He made this argument both because he believed that such a center would be the pinnacle of the wholeness of the Jewish national experience and because he believed that only such a center could significantly strengthen the large concentrations of diaspora Jews and make a meaningful contribution to their culture and identity. In "Three Steps," the article that began his exchange with Dub-

now, Ahad Ha'am argues that Jewish nationalism must secure a Jewish majority in Palestine because only then "would our national lives develop as we want them to, *without shrinking and reducing ourselves to some limited occupations*; and then there will also be hope for the rest of the nation who are dispersed in different countries, because this national center's spirit will influence them and give them the strength to live *in its life*."⁶⁴ This statement begs the following questions: what form of political governance should be established in Palestine after a Jewish majority is secured? Given that Ahad Ha'am himself stressed that the restoration of a national center by means of a Jewish majority would allow diaspora Jews to share "*in its life*," what economic and political conditions did he believe would best facilitate this kind of partnership?

Ahad Ha'am himself actually gave us the answer to the first question in "Three Steps," the same article quoted above. The answer emerges within a broader discussion on the desired character of any state (or district)⁶⁵ in which several national groups reside: "Regarding all the more important aspects of life in a state—educational, legal and social arrangements, language and higher education, etc.—different nations cannot all rule at the same time, so that each brings its preference to bear on them, and all their preferences will be mixed up."⁶⁶ Ahad Ha'am meant to illustrate the problematic political situation faced by national minorities in Habsburg Austria, for instance, where two peoples would often be living "one inside the other." In such a situation, the minority would be forced to obey "the preference of the majority" without being able to enjoy a full national life. Could it be, however, that Ahad Ha'am had some alternative in mind for this undesirable situation, in which "different nations rule at the same time" "regarding all the more important aspects of life in a state"? And Ahad Ha'am does in fact propose an alternative to the undesirable model of a multinational state forced to surrender to the logic of a single nation-state, one that he considered to be far more efficient: the Swiss model. In this model, several peoples reside "side by side" and not "one inside the other."⁶⁷

Ahad Ha'am clearly references the Swiss example in order to respond to Dubnow's autonomist challenge by rephrasing and adapting it to his national center vision, a vision that requires securing a Jewish majority so that "our national lives develop as we want

them to.” Responding to Dubnow, Ahad Ha'am incorporates Dubnow's principle of extraterritorial self-rule into his vision for Palestine, the very same principle that Dubnow was busy promoting in his struggles to secure Jewish national rights and to change the character of the Jews' home countries. Ahad Ha'am does so by reimagining the Jewish majority in Palestine as a national group that governs only its own internal life. Like in the Swiss model, Palestine would thus be Jewish only insofar as it would be a Jewish autonomous district alongside other peoples that would be concentrated in their own national districts. Both the Jewish people and the other peoples would exercise self-rule in all domains that are essential to shaping their collective cultural identities without their preferences being “mixed up.” Nevertheless, they would still all be in one overarching political framework, just like Switzerland.⁶⁸

We find another explicit articulation of the link between Ahad Ha'am's territorial autonomist vision of Palestine as a national center and Dubnow's extraterritorial autonomist view of the national rights of diaspora Jews in a 1903 letter that Ahad Ha'am sent to a Jewish nationalist activist from Tbilisi, at the time when Ahad Ha'am was in constant correspondence with Dubnow about Jewish national rights. In response to the activist's question about the concrete meaning of the national center that he envisioned in Palestine, Ahad Ha'am succinctly lays out his basic vision for the Jewish national Yishuv. He explains that when the Jews become the majority in the country, and when they achieve ownership over most of the land, what will emerge is a new form of the very Jewish national entity that the autonomists were demanding in their struggle for Jewish national rights in the diaspora.⁶⁹ In this letter, Ahad Ha'am thus confirms much more clearly and explicitly than in his “Three Steps” article that he considered the extraterritorial political model that Dubnow was promoting to be relevant and essentially reproducible in the national territorial collective that he envisioned in Palestine. This is how the diasporic, autonomist nucleus of Dubnow's doctrine of Jewish self-rule, and his call to institutionalize the idea that Jews would rule only over other Jews, gets a new lease on life in territorial form by being incorporated into Ahad Ha'am's vision for Palestine.

The fact that Ahad Ha'am compares the future territorial na-

tional center in Palestine to a Swiss canton necessarily brings us back to the second question that we raised earlier: what are the necessary conditions for such a canton to exist? (Recall that this canton must also maintain concrete national-cultural links with diaspora Jews.) In other words, if we imagine Palestine as a Swiss canton, then what would be the corresponding "Switzerland"?

Ahad Ha'am issued a clear answer to this question in January 1911, in the early days of the rule of the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire. During that period, the empire's many nations were still in the grips of euphoria, sincerely hoping for the implementation of democratic reforms and that the empire would be reestablished as a multinational federative state.⁷⁰ Ahad Ha'am's response to this development appeared in Warsaw's *Hatzefira* in the form of a kind of open letter to "Ottoman Jewry" at a time when the community's internal conflicts were worsening. Like his other explicitly political texts, this text has not garnered significant scholarly attention as a result of Ahad Ha'am's depiction as an "apolitical" figure:

In this time of trouble, an opening for hope has appeared to us in the East, in the Ottoman state. The new spirit that comes to rule over this state will lift it higher in its development and make it able to sustain a more numerous people than at present, and a great many exiles from among our people can find a place in it, both for its benefit and for their benefit. New communities will be founded there, and the old communities will increase in quantity and quality, and all will be able to rise higher and higher without interruption, and later on this state will become the center of Jewry that we so desire. Because a few things make it quite suitable for this. This is where the land that was the cradle of Jewry and the source of our people's spirit is located; this is where an Eastern spirit will be dominant, which is closer to our people's spirit than the Western one; this is where our people have always lived in peace, preserving the spiritual assets of our people pure-heartedly; and this is where there are no massive and powerful cultures like in Europe and America that gobble up all who come near it like jackals. For all these

reasons and more, our eyes have remained fixed on this state in the past few years.⁷¹

It thus appears that Ahad Ha'am's "Switzerland" is none other than the Ottoman state. Indeed, earlier elsewhere, polemically recalling Lilienblum's use of the Swiss example in connection to political Zionism, Ahad Ha'am had compared the future Jewish state to one of the "small states, like the lands of Switzerland."⁷² This demonstrates that Ahad Ha'am was thinking of the term "state" in its subsovereign sense, a fact that he did not fully explain in "Ottoman Jewry." Like Pinsker in *"Autoemancipation!"* and Herzl in *Alt-neuland*, and like many leaders of national movements among non-dominant nationalities in the imperial spaces of Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Mediterranean basin, Ahad Ha'am saw the future Jewish national entity in Palestine as a "state within a state," an autonomous country within an existing imperial structure.

To Pinsker, it was quite obvious that the Ottoman Empire would continue to rule Palestine as one of its *pashaliks* in the event that territorial autoemancipation were to happen there. This substatist vision of the future Jewish national self-determination dovetailed with his restraining interpretation of the one national group's sovereignty as such, which should not go, according to him, beyond self-rule and come to dominate other groups. Herzl, for his part, considered expansive and open imperial spaces to have a kind of facilitative role in spreading and inculcating Western and Central European culture among the Jews of Palestine. And Ahad Ha'am considered the (Ottoman) empire to be the most efficient political framework in which to realize his vision of a national center, including the most central aspect of that vision: the existence of links and mutual relationships between the territorial entity in Palestine and the Jewish collectives beyond it. Therefore, though Ahad Ha'am's program appears from the vantage point of our own time to be rather abstract and detached from the concrete geopolitical context, Ahad Ha'am himself considered it to be a workable model in a political reality in which Palestine was part of a much larger political domain. He hoped that masses of Jews would immigrate to the new Turkish state, settle both Palestine and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, ex-

pand the existing Jewish communities, and even establish new ones.⁷³ This is how Ahad Ha'am imagined that his flexible double model for Jewish national life would become a reality. And if both the Jewish ethno-national territorial center and its exterritorial diasporas were in one political framework, then both the Jews of Palestine and the diaspora Jews would become citizens of the same state, thus turning contacts between the center and the diasporas into a routine matter.

Ahad Ha'am did not elaborate on the civil-political details that would make it possible for both forms of national life, the territorial and exterritorial, to coexist among the Ottoman state's Jews after "a great many exiles from among our people . . . find a place in it." Nevertheless, he did sketch out the basic contours of the future state and its Jewish collectivity's system of identities and loyalties as desired by him. These contours clearly show that Dubnow's autonomist political concepts left their mark on Ahad Ha'am's thought in the course of their forthright exchange. Recall that Dubnow challenged the mono-national view of the state and sharply criticized the emancipation lawmakers' demand that the Jews give up their collective identity and their right to linguistic and national-cultural difference in exchange for civil and political equality.⁷⁴ In precisely the same way, Ahad Ha'am now argued that the Ottoman Jews, both in Palestine and beyond it, must separate between citizenship and nationality and must teach themselves to be "sons of the *Jewish people* and the *Ottoman state*."⁷⁵

It is certainly possible that Ahad Ha'am may not have borrowed the separation between civil loyalty and ethno-national identity from Dubnow. After all, the text about "Ottoman Jewry" is not part of his exchange with Dubnow, during which he addressed Dubnow's ideas directly. We also saw that Pinsker, in his critical discussion of "The Jews and the Hungarian Nation,"⁷⁶ uses the same separation between the supraethnic meaning of "state" and the collective ethnic meaning of "nation" as an echo of the separation between church and state in classic liberal discourse. Ultimately, Ahad Ha'am's is just one more expression of a multinational political worldview on citizenship and ethnic identity whose various ideological elements had long circulated throughout the imperial spaces of Central and Eastern Europe before World War I. These elements directly and ex-

PLICITLY affected the political thought of Zionist leaders, some of whom were younger than Ahad Ha'am, as we will see later in this book. In any event, what is clear is that in Ahad Ha'am's vision during the Young Turks period, just like in Pinsker's idea of multinational citizenship in his debates with the Ukrainian *Osnova*, and just like in Dubnow's national autonomism in his "Letters on Old and New Judaism," the multinational state was the paradigmatic political framework for realizing the national collective rights of the Jews. Obviously, any state that would allow its Jews to identify themselves as "sons of the *Jewish people* and the *Ottoman state*" would need to allow members of other national groups to have a multi-layered identity as well. Thus, a short time before the events that would fundamentally change the geopolitical map of the regions in which most of the world's Jews lived, Ahad Ha'am clearly adopts the still dominant political paradigm of his time, that of multinational empire, as the only framework in which his hope—expressed in the conclusion of the "Altneuland debate" for finding a way for Jews and non-Jews "to create social life for themselves according to their preference, to band together when banding together is felicitous to them both, and to separate from one another, each to their own path and preference, when separation is more felicitous to them"⁷⁷—could have been fulfilled.

World War I and its aftermath radically altered the political reality of the tri-imperial fin-de-siècle political space. The Ottoman Empire had been dismantled. The very same political structure that Ahad Ha'am and many others had hoped would be the framework in which a Jewish national territorial entity would be established in Palestine, alongside an extraterritorial Jewish national diaspora, had ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the model of several ethno-national groups that could "band together when banding together is felicitous to them both, and to separate from one another, each to their own path and preference, when separation is more felicitous to them" remained on Ahad Ha'am's mind despite this massive shift and found its expression in his autonomist binational interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, the text with which we began the present chapter. Our work so far has been to reconstruct the progression of Ahad Ha'am's political worldview before World War I and to lo-

cate it within its historical context: the multinational empires and the political imagination that Ahad Ha'am shared with the leaders and activists of non-dominant nationalities in those empires. It must now be readily apparent that the dual national home model that Ahad Ha'am proposed for post-Ottoman Palestine contains many key elements from his prewar vision, elements that he incorporated into a political space that had suddenly become severely truncated, thus granting those elements a new lease on life in the radically altered geopolitical reality. These main elements include (1) his hope of securing a Jewish majority in Palestine, which he alludes to through his continued support for unlimited *aliyah* because "they are not foreigners in this land, they are the descendants of the descendants of the land's former owners";⁷⁸ and (2) the separation between the civil-political dimension and the ethno-national identity dimension, while at the same time distinguishing between internal national self-rule in each of the autonomous national-cultural entities on one hand and a joint civil government with representatives from both "national homes" for matters that have no specific ethno-national character on the other.

Of course, we should not ignore the way that Ahad Ha'am's multinational model changed in response to the political earthquake that followed World War I. Before the war, the shared imperial space was the political frame of reference for planning the national future of the Jewish people. This frame of reference made it possible to imagine the entirety of Palestine as a Jewish national district that would be a part of a larger multinational state containing a multiplicity of national districts and national rights, both territorial and extraterritorial. However, when the relevant political frame of reference was truncated to the borders of Palestine itself, it was no longer possible to imagine it as a territorial unit because that would have led to "different nations . . . all ruling at the same time, so that each brings its preference to bear on them, and all their preferences will be mixed up,"⁷⁹ a situation that Ahad Ha'am thought was problematic to say the least, as we saw above. The alternative was to set aside the idea that Palestine would be a "Jewish state" (meaning a Jewish national district within the empire, like one of the linguistic-national cantons of Switzerland) and to reimagine it as a "binational state"

instead, as a kind of miniature version of his prewar vision for a multinational state.

Ahad Ha'am, like Pinsker and Herzl, developed his political vision of Jewish national life and the relations between Jews and non-Jews in the context of the existence of the multinational empires of his time, and in the context of various attempts to turn these empires into more equitable political structures that would be able to integrate and mediate between one's loyalty to a large geopolitical unit and one's connection to a particular ethno-national group. Because Ahad Ha'am was younger than Pinsker and lived longer than Herzl, he was one of the first prominent Zionist leaders to find themselves having to contend with the postimperial world and the massive political changes of 1914–1918 by means of using certain aspects of the political thought and experience that they had developed during the prewar geopolitical and geocultural reality. While he was one of the first Zionist leaders to confront this new reality, he was certainly not the last, as we will see in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

Vladimir Jabotinsky

A Jewish State of Nationalities

I

IN 1910, AMIDST POLISH nationalism's heated debates about "the Jewish question" in Congress Poland, and the no less heated debates revolving around "the Polish question" in the Russian Duma and the Russian press, Vladimir Jabotinsky published an article titled "Jews and Poles" in his home newspaper, the Odessan liberal daily *Odesskiye novosti* ("Odessa News"), and he concludes it thus:

There is nothing to be done against the facts: yes, there are two nations in Poland, and the Polish cities, the hubs of local culture, belong to both nations equally. One side (meaning the Poles) won't like it, and the other side will be glad; one side will argue that these people are only newly arrived, unwashed intruders in the cherry orchard, but the other side will see this is a victory for the principles of democracy [and] equality among the races of humanity. Each will feel what they will feel, but it is not feelings that are at issue here, but facts. Poland is the land of the Poles and the Jews, and as in general it is the land of all those nations that populate it: that is a fact, and it will remain a fact.¹

A decade and a half later, in 1926, Jabotinsky published an article in his new home newspaper, the Revisionist Zionist *Razsvet*, titled “On ‘Binational’ Palestine,” in which he comes out strongly against the “Brit Shalom” group and their support for the immediate establishment of a binational state in Palestine, at a time when the Jews were a small minority. In the course of his argument, Jabotinsky lays out his political vision for Palestine’s future national-legal character:

. . . the future Palestine must be founded, legally speaking, as a “binational state.” And not just Palestine. Every land that has an ethnic minority, of even the smallest kind, would need, after all, according to our deeply held views, to adapt its legal regime to that fact and become a bi-tri-national or quatra-national state. . . . The “binational state” slogan is not new. The author of these lines has long argued that Poland (referring to Russian Poland at the time) is “the land of the Poles and the Jews,” and that it should be founded, legally speaking, as a land of two peoples.²

It is worth noting that at the end of the passage cited above, the later Jabotinsky writing during the Mandate period about the political future of Palestine’s two peoples after a Jewish majority “with a dominant presence”³ is secured, chose to refer to the earlier Jabotinsky writing on “binationalism” in a completely different time and space—in the era before the collapse of the three multinational fin-de-siècle empires and in multiethnic Odessa, with an eye on Polish-Jewish relations in the western Russian Empire. This reference raises a number of questions that the scholarship on Jabotinsky and the history of Zionist thought has yet to address, such as, to what extent was the Jabotinskian political outlook of the British Mandate period related to Jabotinsky’s conception of the state and the nation before World War I? When Jabotinsky wanted to illustrate his vision for Palestine and the future relationship between its two peoples, why did he refer to a political past that was not only nonexistent and geographically remote, but whose only resemblance to Mandate Palestine was that both Congress Poland and Mandate Palestine had Jewish residents? What role did Jabotinsky’s earlier

view of the multinational Eastern European landscape play in his political thought as a whole, insofar as he can even be said to have had a comprehensive political program?

To try to answer these questions, we must first address a key issue as a necessary starting point for them, namely, the matter of the essence and content of Jabotinsky's political worldview before the collapse of the imperial geopolitical frameworks. The problem, however, is that scholars during the first few decades of historiographic scholarship on Jabotinsky were uninterested in his pre-Revisionist thought, actions, and biography. To be sure, Jabotinsky's unique place in the history of political Zionism and in his own historical context is irrevocably tied to the fact that he was the founder of Revisionist Zionism, the most prominent supporter of the Greater Israel idea, the leading advocate for declaring that Zionism's ultimate goal is to found a Jewish state with a Jewish majority in Palestine, and a stubborn opponent of Socialist Zionism in general and the Zionist Labor movement in particular. It is therefore only natural that the era during which these developments took place, namely, the interwar period, would be of greatest historiographic interest.⁴ Furthermore, the disregard for Jabotinsky's earlier work was clearly compounded by the fact that several of his important texts, which were published in the tsarist-era Russian press, ended up in Soviet libraries that were inaccessible to Western scholars for many years. The result of the combination of these factors is that the historiography on Jabotinsky in particular, and Zionist historiography in general, has for years lacked a comprehensive account of "Jabotinsky's legacy" from his Russian imperial period, including his positions on national-political issues, a topic that the historiography discusses almost exclusively within the timeframe of Revisionist Zionism.⁵

In the past decade and a half or so, we have seen two important breakthroughs in Jabotinskian studies: the first is Michael Stanislawski's 2001 book *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle*, a large part of which is dedicated to the young Jabotinsky's life and writings in Odessa (as well as Switzerland and Rome), and the other is Svetlana Natkovich's study of Jabotinsky's literary texts in their social context,⁶ which is the first comprehensive account of Jabotinsky's earlier and later works together. Both of these books give us an extremely nuanced portrait of Revisionist Zionism's founder that is far more complex than the

myriad one-dimensional, ideologically loaded portrayals that one usually finds in Revisionist historiography.⁷ Most importantly, these studies place a significant emphasis on the early Jabotinsky's intellectual and public career in late tsarist Russia, demonstrating that his espousal of the Zionist national outlook was inseparable from his aesthetic stances, which were closely related to the intellectual, literary, and cultural backgrounds of Russian and Western fin-de-siècle sociocultural and ideological discourses.⁸ However, Stanislawski and Natkovich barely address Jabotinsky's early writings on openly political and national-political matters. The almost total absence of Jabotinsky's political views from these new studies of his earlier work reaffirms, therefore, the conventional view of Jabotinsky's Zionism by existing historiography, which focuses almost exclusively on the Revisionist years of his national-political outlook during the interwar period. According to the historical account that emerges from this approach, Jabotinsky's Zionist political worldview during the 1920s and 1930s had no real antecedents in the pre-World War I period, this despite the fact that Jabotinsky had been active, as a Zionist, in various political arenas long before the interwar period. He was a key architect of the famous 1906 Russian Zionists' Helsingfors Program, which was committed to "the work of the Land of Israel" as a principle, while at the same time demanding that the Russian government grant national extraterritorial autonomy to the Jews of tsarist Russia as part of a multinational democratic state.⁹ But while the conventional historiographic account offers little in the way of a concrete past for the Revisionist Jabotinsky's "Jewish state," it clearly has a lot to say about its future in the form of the Jewish nation-state that we know today. Given that the dominant paradigm in Zionist historiography views the political dimension of Zionism as nothing less than an *a priori* focus on the establishment of a Jewish state that would grant national self-determination and national rights to its Jewish citizens alone, it presents Jabotinsky as a clear, undisputed supporter of the Jewish nation-state-in-the-making.¹⁰

However, Jabotinsky's above-quoted terse and almost ancillary 1926 reference to his 1910 writings suffices to suggest that Jabotinsky's past as a political thinker who was interested in the relations between national groups during the imperial period could be at least of some relevance to our understanding of his political thought on

those same subjects during the Mandate period. Therefore, in what follows we will reconstruct the Revisionist Jabotinsky's imperial past, and particularly the political dimension of his previous views. Indeed, reconstructing the retrospectively broken chain of Zionist political imaginations before and after World War I could be highly helpful for analyzing, describing, and explaining the political thought of other key Zionist figures during the period following the collapse of the multinational empires, as well as for placing that thought within its proper and wider historical context. In Jabotinsky's case, we will inquire as to what happened to his political thought during the transition from a period in which the Jewish national future was imagined within the vast political multinational spaces, and into the time following the collapse of those frameworks. Eventually, after reconstructing his political worldview on either side of the timeline that runs from the fin-de-siècle multiethnic empire period to the Mandate period, we will look for possible explanations of the picture that emerges.

II

Stanislawski convincingly shows that it is impossible to point to a specific historical moment in which Jabotinsky became a Zionist.¹¹ What certainly is possible, however, is to point to the moment when Jabotinsky first started to form his national-political worldview regarding the issues of national self-determination and statehood. It was at some point after the events of the Revolution of 1905 and before the Third Russian Zionist Conference in Helsingfors (Helsinki), Finland, in 1906. We find the first condensed and comprehensive expression of his approach to the "state," the "nation," and the relationship between them in his 1906 preface to the Russian edition of *Staat und Nation*¹² ("State and Nation") by Karl Renner (1870–1950), the intellectual, jurist, and leader of Austrian social democracy.¹³ In this essay, Renner lays out the main points of the national-political Austro-Marxist program¹⁴ and proposes a comprehensive approach to attaining full civil and national equality and to reorganizing the legal-political relations among the national groups of any multinational state, particularly in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The basis on which Renner proposes to reorganize a multi-

ethnic empire like Austro-Hungary—an idea that Adolf Fischhof had laid out beforehand, albeit less precisely¹⁵—is to combine territorial autonomy, which would be granted to groups that are concentrated in particular territorial districts and comprise a national majority there, with personal autonomy, which considers every national group, regardless of where its members are located, to be a legally recognized “collective entity.” Renner believed that this arrangement would safeguard national collective rights and develop the national identity of each group as an integral and essential part of each individual’s civil rights.

In his preface to the book, Jabotinsky argues that Springer (read Karl Renner) approaches the “national question” from an exclusively legal vantage point and that this weakens his arguments somewhat because it places too much emphasis on the principle of extraterritorial personal autonomy. Jabotinsky posits that, sociologically speaking, no “living nation” would be satisfied with this kind of autonomy alone, and that each nation would strive to fully achieve what he called “social self-determination”: the concentration of most of its members in a given region.¹⁶ This, he believed, is part and parcel of a predetermined and inevitable process that always accompanies the development of a capitalist economy and whose end point is “that distant moment in which the terms ‘nation’ and ‘district’ come to fully overlap.”¹⁷ Jabotinsky points out that Springer himself acknowledges this process by saying that, after all is said and done, territorial autonomy is the ultimate goal of every nation, though Renner does not sufficiently stress the powerful social component that Jabotinsky believed was the primary driver of this ideal.¹⁸ However, Jabotinsky stresses, this process should be allowed to occur gradually and naturally “by force of circumstance, and not by that of the fist. The inevitable socioeconomic struggle of the nations must be free from elements of violence, arbitrariness, and oppression, just as the class war in the West is free from these elements.”¹⁹ To avoid any kind of one nation’s hegemony over the others in the framework of a multinational state, the notion of personal autonomy (i.e., the collective political rights of any given nationality, which is perceived, in contemporary terms of organic nationalism, to be a collective personality of sorts) should form the basis of the principle of self-determination for both territorial and

dispersed nations. Or in other words, the individual's right to membership in a collective entity, regardless of that entity's location or socio-demographic circumstance, should be incorporated into the state entity's very civil-legal foundation. According to Jabotinsky, the practical translation of this principle into the reality of tsarist Russia would mean organizing national assemblies for each nation, whether territorially concentrated or dispersed; drafting specific national demands in each of these assemblies; and convening representatives from each of the national assemblies in an effort to arrive at a "solid, concrete *modus vivendi*" that would make coexistence in one political framework possible—all the while sustaining a dialogue with the general Russian democratic founding assembly that would decide all state matters that are nationally and culturally neutral, without getting involved in the particular intranational matters that would be under the authority of the national assemblies.²⁰

Jabotinsky's civil, national-political, and national-social views were multilayered and multidimensional, as the discussion above illustrates, and we should not mislead ourselves into trying to artificially and anachronistically simplify them. Let us try to understand the logic behind his approach in its full complexity, in the spirit of the definition that Jabotinsky himself proposes for the term "logic" in his article "On Nationalism," which we return to below: "The path of logic [is not] a homogenous straight line. Rather, the path of logic is a complex, tortuous line, rich in surprises."²¹ Note here that the idea that each nation's ultimate national goal is to make the "nation" and the "district" overlap *appears* to anticipate Ernest Gellner's interpretation, which defines nationalism as the attempt to reach a total overlap between the national unit and the political unit.²² It is precisely at this point, however, that Jabotinsky's logic becomes "a complex, tortuous line, rich in surprises." For even as he writes that the apex of a given nation's national ambitions is to achieve the greatest possible territorial concentration of that nation's members in a well-defined region, he also makes a sharp distinction between "nation" (or "people") and "district" on one hand and "state" on the other. Jabotinsky believed that the state can be nothing more than a means of coordination between different nations, each of which would live or strive to live in its territorial homeland, a homeland that would be a part of a larger sovereign framework. Jabotinsky did

not conceive of the state, in the sense of a political-legal entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force to guarantee the welfare of its citizens, as anything more than a supranational entity that manages and oversees the lives of its “collective citizens” of sorts, the national collectivities. These collective citizens would be organic entities that autonomously organize the lives of their members in all areas pertaining to the development of their particular national identities, while at the same time collaborating with each other to manage their shared political space.²³ It is useful to consider the similarity between this view and what we learned in the first chapter about Pinsker’s civil-political approach in his commentary on Hungarian nationalism and the Jews, and in his debate with the Ukrainian paper *Osnova* in the early 1860s.²⁴

It is crucially important to understand that for Jabotinsky, the above description of nations as collective citizens was far from metaphorical; it was an essential part of his civil-political thought and of his understanding of the triangular relationship between citizenship, nation, and state. In the same year, Jabotinsky laid out his unequivocal position on these matters in a long article titled “Our Goals,” which served as a kind of preparation for the Helsingfors Conference:

To be a citizen means to recognize that you are a part of an organic whole; this whole is not a territory but rather only a nation. Therefore, in contrast with the conventional usage of the term, it is impossible to be a “citizen of your state”; it is only possible to be a “citizen of your nation” and *through your nation* [in the sense of an ethnic nation] to be a citizen of the place in which the nation lives.²⁵

Clearly, Jabotinsky was not opposed to the idea of personal autonomy, according to which the nation is a natural, organic, and biological bond between humans (“a living nation”) that deserves legal-civil recognition regardless of its location. Rather, he embraced this principle in its upgraded form, adding the aspiration for “social self-determination” that would be achieved by a nation concentrating itself in a particular territory. But from that point, instead of drawing a straight line from this ambition to the goal of establish-

ing a “nation-state,” Jabotinsky’s logic, “tortuous and rich in surprises,” actually leads him to the “nationalities state” (he used Renner’s terms *Nationalstaat* and *Nationalitätenstaat* in a German-language quotation in his preface, and often in other writings as well). Interestingly, this surprising turn in Jabotinsky’s thought is driven by an internal logic that is actually quite sound. In Jabotinsky’s aforementioned 1903 article “On Nationalism,” in which he introduces the concept of logic as a “complex, tortuous line, rich in surprises,” he also writes that

the more diverse the orchestra, the more beautiful the symphony, because the violin does not impart what the flute does, and there are pieces that are not suited for the clarinet and must be played by the harp. The development of the sciences, arts, and poetry, that entire symphony of the spirit of human creation, needs a rich orchestra, and the more diverse and multicolored it is, the better. . . . Life does not come in a single haircut for everyone, but rather in a variety, an endless harmony of different individuals. Nationalism is the individuality of nations.²⁶

Thus, in the same way that it would be impossible to imagine an orchestra composed of a single instrument, and just as it would be equally difficult to conceive of a lone individual establishing a closed-off space disconnected from other individuals, so did Jabotinsky find himself pushed by his powerful aesthetics of diversity, which he had formulated in an early stage of his nationalism’s development, toward the multinational state model as the optimal political framework for the existence of nations, each of which would seek to concentrate itself in one national district as part of a shared and open political space. While Karl Renner concludes that each nation’s natural political ideal is to have a “national state” that reduces friction between different national groups even as he clearly supported the principle of personal autonomy, Jabotinsky, for his part, believed that the natural political ideal of nations lay in a large multinational state in which a number of territorial nations would band together in a federation, and he believed this despite his clear support for national territorial concentration.

Indeed, at the very same time that the translation of *Staat und Nation* was being published with Jabotinsky's preface, Jabotinsky also published two articles in the revolutionary St. Petersburg-based Russian daily newspaper *Radikal* titled "On Federation" and "Autonomy or Federation?" These two articles, which have only recently been found and identified as penned by Jabotinsky, lay out his vision for a multinational federative state by imagining the implementation of such a model in tsarist Russia. In the beginning of "On Federation," Jabotinsky makes the basic claim that a "multi-tribal" state cannot sustain a democratic regime without allowing each human group that sees itself as a "people" to develop "freely and multilaterally" according to its national agenda.²⁷ He laments the fact that the Russian Revolution had not given sufficient consideration to resolving the state's nationalities problem. However, Jabotinsky argues, it is precisely regarding the problem of national rights in Russia that the revolution should have promoted a radical change. To him, it is "necessary to turn Russia into a fierce and stalwart union of free nations that are true to one another. The revolution will abdicate its responsibility and betray its martyrs if it does not lay the foundations for such a union."²⁸

In the same breath that he calls for the Russian Revolution to fly the banners of a multinational "union," Jabotinsky is also quick to forestall any potential misunderstandings about the impact of multinational federalism on the future of the Russian state:

This goal [of establishing Russia as an union of nations] does not in any way resemble the infamous notion of "dis-membering" Russia. On the contrary, it is so opposed to this that I feel no need to seriously criticize this straw man. The collapse of Russia! . . . Who does this benefit? It is foolish to even suggest that any of the "inorodtsy,"²⁹ who are usually suspected of separatism, would wish to give up the political support of a large world superpower, thus finding themselves in an "independent" situation that would become an attractive destination for the Kaiser, the Sultan, or any other foreign ruler. . . . Simple logic teaches us that no people would think of quitting a strong union as long as this union, which protects that people from various kinds of external

aggression, does not forcefully stymy that people's free internal development. Only oppression by that union can force such a people to prefer breaking off, because insecurity is certainly preferable to slavery. But the liberty of nations within a state is the best guarantee of the strength of the state's unity.³⁰

Later on in the article, Jabotinsky does not dodge the case of Congress Poland and Armenia, the two negative examples that conservative circles in Russia would often use to bolster their fierce opposition to the federalization of Russia:

Opponents of this mythological "dismemberment" like to point out that the Poles or the Armenians have relatives on the other side of the border, and that if "you give them freedom," then these peoples will want to unite with their brothers living in foreign states, "or in other words, to break off from Russia." But why does such natural irredentism necessarily lead to wanting to break off from the Russian union? Why would it not lead to the opposite desire: to pull their brothers from the other side of the border into that union? There is no doubt that divided nations would want to actively reestablish their unity. But the manner and forms in which this desire will be expressed depend solely on whether or not this nation would be fully guaranteed free and multilateral development. If we take Poland as a concrete example, then we can be fully confident in our prediction that its path to national unity will depend entirely on which of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's three parts will obtain full national liberation. Only if none of them do [obtain their full independence], only then will the Polish irredenta truly (and with total justification) hold on to its wholly separatist character. But to promise Russian Poland full national equality means making the Russian union a powerful magnet for attracting valuable new elements."³¹

It is worth mentioning that Jabotinsky's assumptions about the political future appear to have been justified to some degree. As we

discussed in the chapter on Ahad Ha'am, the Polish national movement in Austrian Galicia espoused the federative Austro-Slavic option during World War I, while at the same time seeking to free Congress Poland and unite it with the Austrian federation that it believed would be established following the victory of the Central Powers.³² Insofar as the Austrian part of Poland is concerned, it actually enjoyed a very high degree of de facto self-rule, a fact that made breaking off from the Austrian Empire unpopular among the Galician Polish public.³³ Despite Jabotinsky's hopes, however, the Russian regime insisted on maintaining its autocratic and oppressive character and could therefore scarcely compete for the hearts and minds of Poles "on the other side of the border." Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Jabotinsky's analysis, which posits that it is possible—and sometimes even preferable—to have "national liberation" as part of a broad multinational framework, was an analysis that faithfully reflected the basic national demands of many national groups within the tri-imperial space of that time.

As demonstrated by more and more studies appearing in recent decades on nationalism and the fin-de-siècle multiethnic empires, one should not be suspicious of the non-dominant nationalities' national movements, their leaders, and the federative, "moderate" demands that they made of the existing empires, thinking that they made these arguments disingenuously while they secretly worked to accumulate enough power to secede from their respective empires.³⁴ This somewhat simplistic, historiographic approach was once favored by many Western historians whose work, whether they were aware of it or not, sought to retroactively justify the Treaty of Versailles and the division of the empires into nation-states.³⁵ Indeed, if we are to reject these suspicions with regard to the non-Jewish territorial national movements, all the more should we trust that the Jabotinskian federalism proposed in *Radikal* is both coherent and authentic. First of all, the Zionist Jabotinsky had no separatist aspirations in tsarist Russia. Second, the federalist position that Jabotinsky lays out above was in no way a moderate stance. Quite the contrary, it contains an argument that the authorities could have easily interpreted as an implicit threat: namely, that if Russia is not reestablished as a federation of free peoples, and if the conditions of national oppression and subjugation persist, then the oppressed na-

tions would be justified in seeking to secede from the larger state.³⁶ Indeed, it appears that the Russian censors did not, in fact, consider *Radikal* and its contributors to be exemplars of moderation. The daily ran for only six days, between January 15 and 21, 1906, until the authorities banned its publication, confiscated most of the issues, and sentenced M. S. Margolias, the chief editor, to a year in prison.³⁷

The paper's last issue, published on January 21, 1906, was the one that angered the authorities and led to its closure. In it, Jabotinsky published another article on the federative question, one in which he distinguishes "autonomy" from "federation," arguing that there is clearly some confusion about these terms and that the public is unable to tell them apart:

Autonomy and federation are sharply distinct from one another by virtue of the way that they come into being. In the case of the first, the state gives up some part of its sovereign rights and grants them to one of the parts that comprise it: that is called autonomy. In the case of the second, a number of independent political units join together to form a union between them and give up some part of their sovereign rights, granting them to that larger union: that is called a federation. Autonomy comes into being from the top down, federation—from the bottom up. Autonomy—withdrawing from the general public. Federation—joining the general public. Autonomy—a result of a centrifugal process. Federation—a result of a centripetal process.³⁸

What did Jabotinsky think about the Russian case in light of these insights? He believed that local struggles for autonomy under a multinational state would not contribute to that state's stability. On the contrary, such struggles would lead to constant haggling between the state and its different nations, which would cause mistrust between the two sides that would only grow over time:

Autonomy, then, is an incomplete thing, constantly tying its own hands: it is simply an unfinished version of the federative structure, a craven substitute that does not provide suf-

ficient stability to either party. It is thus much wiser to begin directly with a federation. . . . It is not Russia that needs to “grant the gift” of autonomy to its peoples, but rather it is those peoples, using the alliance between them, that need to reestablish Russia themselves, using their collective will, each of them apart and all of them together, they are the ones that are supposed to arrive at the conditions for a shared state union, which, once adopted, would be expansive for all and no one will be constrained. Whoever says “democracy” is saying “self-determination.” The founding principle of any democratic worldview . . . is that every person as an individual and every group develop their lives for themselves. . . . They themselves will figure out what to do and how to do it. If we translate this principle to the level of relations between nations, then we inevitably arrive at a federative structure. The nations should not receive their liberty from a central authority: they must determine the borders of their liberty themselves, by mutual agreement, thus constituting the central authority. Whoever says “national self-determination” is saying “federation.”³⁹

We cannot know for sure whether it was Jabotinsky’s article that led the tsarist authorities to shut down the newspaper. In any event, what is clear is that Jabotinsky’s proposed multinational democratization of Russian political space was fully aligned with the name of this St. Petersburgian daily (“Radical”). By calling for the reestablishment of the Russian regime as a kind of social covenant among all of its national groups, Jabotinsky was in fact implicitly undermining the very legitimacy of the existing tsarist regime. Self-determination for each nation, total freedom for national groups that will “themselves . . . figure out what to do and how to do it,” the idea that Russian political sovereignty is a consequence of the sovereignty of Russia’s peoples—these were certainly subversive ideas in the deepest sense of the word as far as the existing regime was concerned. In fact, it was even radical when compared with a significant portion of the Russian factions that fought to change the autocratic regime during the Revolution of 1905.

However, it is noteworthy that Jabotinsky’s vision for a multi-

national democracy is centripetal rather than centrifugal, as he explains in his commentary on the term “federation.” His vision’s main thrust is to reshape the shared space, and not to divide it into truncated units in the form of a *Nationalstaat*. He was clearly thinking of the self-determination principle in its substatist sense, similar to Chaim Gans’s analysis of patterns of self-determination.⁴⁰ According to Jabotinsky, the essence of national self-determination is embodied in each nation’s freedom to give up a part of its national freedoms and bestow it unto the state, just as individuals must give up some of their liberty as part of a democratic state’s social contract. Jabotinsky uses the individual as a metaphor for describing the national group yet again in his article “On Nationalism.” His use of this metaphor is another tool that we can use to understand why the idea of a nation seceding from the larger political framework was not and could not have been conceivable to Jabotinsky. Just as it would be unthinkable for the individual personality to secede from the sociopolitical framework that it shares with other individuals, so it would be impossible to imagine a collective personality’s secession from the national-political framework that it shares with other national groups.

The Helsingfors Program that was raised during the Third Conference of Russian Zionists in 1906 did not incorporate Jabotinsky’s federative vision for Russia. At least superficially, it seems to have adopted a more moderate and reserved position: participants opted for “autonomy” rather than the “federation” that Jabotinsky sought in his *Radikal* articles and in the discussions that preceded the conference resolutions, the latter of which, as mentioned above, he had played a key role in drafting. On the basic ideological level, however, the program reflects the positions of the radical wing of the Zionist movement in tsarist Russia, whose most prominent representatives included Jabotinsky and Yitzchak Gruenbaum. While the Helsingfors Program views the Russian state as a “foreign land” for the Jews, proclaiming that it seeks to concentrate the Jews territorially in their Palestinian homeland as Zionism’s ultimate national goal, at the same time it dedicates most of its practical recommendations to involving Zionism in internal Russian politics. Namely, the program proposes to struggle for Jewish national autonomy during what seemed at the time, because of the unfulfilled hopes of

the Revolution of 1905 to democratize the Russian state,⁴¹ to be the cusp of fundamental changes in the Russian autocratic regime:

Recognizing that according to Article II of the Basel Program, the organization of the Jewish people for independent national action comprises one of the most important means of fulfilling Zionism's goals because it bolsters Jewry's strength in the diaspora and grants it new cultural, material, and political means in the war for creating a proper national life in Eretz Israel; recognizing, furthermore, that national organizations can develop in diaspora countries only if they are recognized by the state, which is possible only if the regimes of these countries are democratic regimes—the Third Conference affirms the natural enlistment of the Zionist masses in the liberation movement of Russia's territorial nations, finding it necessary, given the changes taking place in the Russian regime, to unite Russian Jewry in an effort to attain recognition for Jewish nationalism and its right to self-rule, approved by law, in all matters pertaining to Jewish national life. In light of this decision, the Zionist Federation of Russia will back the following program: (a) democratization of the state regime along strict parliamentary lines, broad-ranging political freedom, the autonomy of national districts, and guarantees of the rights of national minorities; (b) full and total equality for the Jewish population; (c) the guarantee that minorities would be represented in all state, district, and local elections that would be conducted through a general, equal, direct, and secret voting process, regardless of gender; (d) recognition of the Jewish nation as its own entity with the right to self-rule in all areas of national life; (e) the convention of a pan-Russian Jewish national congress to lay the foundations for a national organization; (f) the rights of the national languages in the schools, in the courts, and in public life; (g) the right to exchange the day of rest on Sunday with a day of rest on Saturday, anywhere and everywhere.⁴²

Jabotinsky's federative multinational approach to states that govern several different national groups served as a first-rate con-

ceptual tool for imagining the political future of the space that Palestine was a part of at the time. His first opportunity to apply this vision to Palestine came a short time after most hopes that the Russian Jewish intelligentsia had nurtured regarding the democratization of the Russian regime after the Revolution of 1905, the Hel-singfors Program included, had dissipated in the face of the reactionary surge of 1907. Indeed, it was only a year after the failure of the First Russian Revolution that the Young Turk Revolution erupted in the Ottoman Empire.

III

The Turkish revolution's impressive initial successes, which included defeating the tyrannical rule of Abdul Hamid II and establishing a constitutional regime, certainly electrified many liberal circles in Western and Central Europe, while its no less powerful effect was to inspire a great deal of jealousy among the Russian intelligentsia.⁴³ For almost four years from 1909 to the end of 1912, Jabotinsky invested significant intellectual and journalistic efforts to voice his support for and identification with the new regime in both the Jewish and non-Jewish Russian press, as well as his hopes for, not to mention his near-total confidence in, the political future of the Ottoman Empire and the Zionist nationalism within it. Jabotinsky thus took the political worldview that he had developed in Hel-singfors on the basis of Austro-Marxist theory and projected it onto the empire to the south, an empire that would be host to the territorialization of the Jewish people, which he naturally believed to be the ultimate aim of the Zionist movement.

Jabotinsky's first articles on the situation in postrevolutionary Turkey are above all overflowing with admiration for the relatively peaceful transition that they brought about, and for what he considered to be the calculated and level-headed conduct of the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress in facing the challenge of reshaping the regime and the new political reality. As he expresses this sentiment, Jabotinsky also hints at an ironic comparison between the Young Turk Revolution and the Russian Revolution of 1905:

These naïve, ignorant, and fanatical people turned out to be much wiser and more tactful than many of their neighbors. . . . They did not allow themselves to spin out of control. They never for a moment thought that they had to say some new word, to show rotten Europe what needs to be done and how, etc. They looked at things soberly and simply: if we are the last to reach the starting line, then it is not the others who should learn from us, but rather it is we who should learn from the others, and to implement in our country only what has proved itself abroad—and even that not right away!—“Others were not successful because they wished to bring happiness to the world,” said one young Turk, “whereas we succeeded because we just wanted Turkey to have a constitution.”⁴⁴

When writing about the new Young Turk state, Jabotinsky naturally focuses most of his attention on the Jews' condition in Turkey and on the “nationalities question.” Jabotinsky believed that it is not the Turks who should learn from the Europeans, but the other way around. He says as much in his longer-than-usual article in *Odesskiye novosti* titled “Jews in Turkey,” which was published in parts over two issues of the newspaper:

Even under the old regime, Christians and Jews were often accepted to high-ranking state office. . . . Turkish Jews enjoy the same rights as all other subjects to move about freely, are accepted into institutions of higher education without restriction, are allowed to buy real estate wherever they like, participate in municipal self-administration, and are not under any legal or administrative pressures. This completely exempts them from the need to struggle for equal rights like their fellow tribesmen in neighboring states. Their only demand, which aligns completely with the intentions of the young Turkish politicians, is the acceptance [of Jews] into military service. But the term “equal rights” is not limited to equality between individual citizens. In this fanatical Turkey, even after considering all the old regime's nightmares,

the principle of equal rights was interpreted so broadly that nothing like it can be found anywhere in all of cultured Europe. Turkish law sees Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians etc. not only as individuals, but as cohesive groups officially known as “millet” (“nation”). Every nation that the state recognizes enjoys far-reaching self-rule in its internal affairs, and to this end it has a robust organization [based on] the principle of elections. . . . As a rule, Europe has a mistaken opinion about Muslim fanaticism. Truth be told, this fanaticism has a lot more in it about the sanctity of the Other than European tolerance.⁴⁵

Putting aside Jabotinsky’s flowery, idealizing rhetoric, he was not mistaken that at least in terms of the rights available to them, the legal status of Ottoman Jews was far more firm than in European countries, and certainly more than in tsarist Russia. There was indeed a rare combination of almost full individual equality (since 1856) and collective rights in the form of the Jewish millet and its autonomy (the Jewish millet law of 1864), which was not limited to the domain of religious practice.⁴⁶

Still, the question remains: what is the link between these facts about the diasporic past that Zionism wished to overcome, the contemporary condition of Jews and of Zionism in the new Turkey, and the territorial ambitions of modern Zionism? In another article titled “The National Question in Turkey,” published in 1910, Jabotinsky fleshes out the concrete links that he sees between the Turkish-Jewish past and the conceptual foundations of his Zionist political worldview:

The Ottoman Turks have never demonstrated nationalist fanaticism. . . . One of the reasons for this [is] a feature that is deeply embedded in the Turkish character— . . . level-headedness that should be compared to the English [level-headedness]. A real Turk never acts in a hotheaded manner. . . . As a result, coexistence among the various peoples of Turkey, [as early as in] the time of the sultans, developed in [such a marvelous] manner that Europe should have learned from Turkey. Indeed, it is learning. Rudolf Springer’s theory

is considered to be the cutting edge in the young science of national rights, and it says that all members of a given nation, regardless of where they are, should be organized into a “personal” alliance possessing a legal-public character and have the right to conduct their national-cultural affairs independently. This cutting edge European science has been implemented in Turkey since the time of Mehmed the Conqueror.⁴⁷

It thus appears that Jabotinsky identified the collective autonomy system of the Ottoman millets as a forerunner to Karl Renner’s personal autonomy principle, which Jabotinsky had adopted as the basis of his broader national-political worldview and of his approach to the legal-political dimension of Zionist politics, while at the same time stressing its territorial aspects. As mentioned above, Jabotinsky saw the category of the nation in explicitly Rennerian terms, namely, as a collective personality that deserves legal-political recognition as an integral part of each individual’s rights. In the Jewish case, Jabotinsky saw the Jewish nation’s personal autonomy as a foundational Archimedean point for both the Zionist political imagination and Zionist policy; it was with the help of such personal autonomy that Jabotinsky hoped to channel the consciousness and life of the Jewish collective “personality” into the territory of Palestine. He thus believed that the fact that Jewish collective life had enjoyed legal standing in Ottoman Turkey could very well facilitate Zionist national activities in Palestine in the near future. In the same way, because he considered the recognition of collective rights to be a foundational principle of the relations between the Turkish government and its ethno-national-religious groups, he optimistically assumed that his federative approach, which was not implemented in tsarist Russia, could find practical expression in the Ottoman state. Jabotinsky’s political imagination was brimming with confidence about the multinational future, and he imagined that the Zionist territorial vision for Palestine and the general federative multinational vision for Turkey fit together rather harmoniously.

Jabotinsky lays out his dual vision for both a multinational Ottoman Empire and a Zionist Palestine in a long article titled “The New Turkey and Our Chances,” which spans six issues of the

St. Petersburgian newspaper *Razsvet* (Dawn) in January–February 1909. Jabotinsky's analysis of interethnic relations in postrevolutionary Turkey certainly does not ignore the first signs of the Turkish leadership's support for the Turkification of public space as they took over the empire.⁴⁸ However, Jabotinsky does assume that the Young Turks would sooner or later understand that the Turkification of the state's population is pointless for demographic and cultural reasons and that they will decide to reestablish the empire as a nationalities state on their own. Jabotinsky bases this assumption on a comparison between the situation in Turkey at the time and the situation in the Habsburg Empire between 1848 (the "Springtime of the Nations" that undermined the country's old regime; in other words, an event that is comparable to the Young Turk Revolution) and 1867 (the establishment of Austro-Hungary as a constitutional monarchy and the annulment of the feudal order's last vestiges in the country). He rightly estimates that the Germans made up no more than 36 percent of the empire's general population and more than half of the population of Cisleithania (the Austrian part of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy).⁴⁹ And that is not all. Between 1848 and 1867, German culture had a dominant influence on large sections of Austria's non-German peoples. Nevertheless, Jabotinsky writes, "Today Austria has long ago stopped being a German country, and Germans have long since gotten used to seeing themselves as one of the empire's nations, all have long since acknowledged that the non-German cultures are equally valuable, and many consider the question of a federation to be a matter of time."⁵⁰

Jabotinsky believed that the fact that the Habsburg monarchy had undergone these changes over two generations made it even more likely that the Ottoman state—which, he had no doubt, would continue to exist for many more years to come⁵¹—was about to undergo the same changes. Jabotinsky points out that the Ottoman Empire's ratio of Turks to non-Turks is even lower than the ratio of Germans to non-Germans in the Austrian Empire of the mid-nineteenth century: "7–9 million versus 24–28 million, meaning less than a third."⁵² Furthermore, most of the Ottoman state's non-Turkish peoples had a very well-developed national culture, like the nations located in the more European parts of the empire, or at the very least they had a high likelihood of developing a na-

tional identity, as in the case of the Arabs. After considering this reality, Jabotinsky declares that “the development of national relations in Turkey will soon cause the Young Turks’ supporters to come to terms with the inevitable nationalization of these peoples, with their hopes for self-determination, self-rule, and [territorial] concentration.”⁵³ In other words, the federative model would therefore soon be adopted in the Ottoman state, the same model that was being postponed by the Russian autocracy’s stubbornness and whose adoption in Austria-Hungary, he believed, was “a matter of time.”

Jabotinsky’s analysis of the Arab space, the part of the Ottoman Empire in which Zionism wished to concentrate as many Jews as possible, is worthy of special attention:

The impression held by the author of these lines (based on the opinions of others more than on his personal familiarity with this matter) tends toward the view that the Arab movement, in any serious sense of the term, does not yet exist, and the necessary intelligentsia is not yet present for this, there is not enough unity between the disparate half-wild tribes at the heart of the Arabian peninsula and the Muslims and Christians of Syria, there is no habit of conducting solidarity actions of the entire nation, and there is no clear understanding of the need for such solidarity. All of that, however, will come soon enough, because there is wonderfully fertile ground for it—a continuous territory, growing numerical strength, an ancient culture, a magnificent history, consciousness of the superiority of religion, and finally the total absence of assimilation, even in the embryonic sense. . . . When the Arabs awaken, they won’t even need to waste their time with repairing the fractures caused by assimilation, namely, the negative labor that devours so much of the fire of peoples that seek to resurrect themselves: the Arabs will be able to get to the point right away—national work and the struggle for power.⁵⁴

What does Jabotinsky see as the expected consequences of these developments?

The national relations in the Ottoman Empire contain the beginnings of state dualism in its Austro-Hungarian version. Will these beginnings lead to Turkey's transformation into Turkey-Arabia,—this will depend on many more ever-shifting factors so that it is quite impossible to consider ahead of time; but the trend in that general direction does exist, even though the Arabs themselves may as yet be unaware of it; it stems from an objective state of affairs, and it is inevitable that it will appear.⁵⁵

It is important to realize that Jabotinsky actually saw the development of Arab nationalism as a positive step when considered in the context of his hope that the Ottoman state would gradually become a multinational federation. This is because the more multinational the Ottoman space became, the more quickly the Young Turks would set aside their plans for Turkification and agree to implement multinational federative reforms. According to Jabotinsky's vision, what he imagined as the "Austro-Hungarian" phase in the empire's Turkish-Arab relations would comprise a necessary step toward the establishment of a federation of Ottoman nations, which he hoped would one day include the Jews of Palestine.

Let us go back for a moment to Jabotinsky's comparison between Ottoman Turkey and Austria-Hungary. There is no doubt that he greatly exaggerates the degree to which Austrian Germans had resigned themselves to the challenge to their dominant position in Cisleithania.⁵⁶ However, his assumption that a multinational federation in Austria was only "a matter of time" certainly reflected the prevalent mood of many groups in both the dual monarchy and beyond.⁵⁷ This mood prevailed to a large extent because of a growing trend of multinational compromises on the provincial level that began in Moravia between the Czechs and the Germans in 1905 and that was about to come into effect in 1909, just as Jabotinsky was writing these lines, in Bukovina between the Romanians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Jews (who were not included in the final agreement because of the fierce objections of assimilated Jews in Vienna, who believed that this was an attempt to put the Jews back into a "ghetto").⁵⁸ Without ignoring how severe tensions had become in Austro-Hungary at the time, the mood of the political discourse

during the years before World War I, and especially in the Austrian part of the empire, did impart a certain optimism about the state's future. It is possible that Jabotinsky picked up on this optimism because he was clearly interested in developments in Austro-Hungary as far as its nationalities problem was concerned.

Furthermore, Jabotinsky's projection of the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* model on the Turkish-Arab situation demonstrates his in-depth understanding of the processes that were taking place in the Arab space. A short time after the Young Turk Revolution, many Arab national associations arose in the Arab provinces, a number of the most important of them demanding to reorganize the Ottoman state as a dual Turkish-Arab federation while referring directly to the Austro-Hungarian model.⁵⁹

What was Jabotinsky's vision about how Zionism's political agenda would fit together with the various national trends whose eruption he anticipated in the Ottoman space? He believed that the Zionists' first task was to quash once and for all the widespread misunderstandings among the Young Turks about the idea that Zionism's political ambitions amounted to nothing more than a call for "separatism." Jabotinsky considered this to be a prejudiced and unfounded notion caused by a lack of information and familiarity with the goals and orientation of Zionist policy.⁶⁰ He thus believed that Zionists must therefore try to squelch these misunderstandings in the most tactful and sensitive way possible. However, he also thought that Zionism should certainly not hide its ultimate goal from the Turkish authorities—"Territorial autonomy as a necessary foundation of our self-determination"—though this was, in any event, a distant goal. What Jabotinsky believed that Zionists should emphasize as clearly as possible was the basic ideological "crux" of "Zionism's formula," which is embedded in the term "Jewish state":

This term [*Judenstaat*] was popularized by Herzl; until now, we have used it in the spirit of the convenient "Schlagwort" doctrine without giving a precise account of the link between its literal meaning and our thinking. I doubt if even Herzl himself ever took this term seriously in its full concrete meaning. But in all the subsequent developments in Zionist thought, theory, and even propaganda, the idea of a

“state” in its literal sense played almost no part. Our entire critique of the Jewish reality was not based on the fact that we are politically powerless, but on the much deeper *social* fact that we are dispersed. The full pathos of our ideal was never focused on sovereignty, but rather on the idea of a *territory*, a compact Jewish society in one continuous space. *That* was always our movement’s foundational thought, *that* is what we considered to be of greatest moment, even to the point that it alone amounts to the normalization of the Jewish people. Theoretically speaking, *Zionism*, such as it is, would have been entirely fulfilled as far as we would have been concerned, if the Jews were to wake up one morning to find themselves in the same situation as the Poles in Poznań or the Latvians in Russia—in the condition of being a nation that is not only stateless but oppressed as well, but that is nonetheless *territorial*; our struggle for self-determination at that point would not have been *Zionism* in the usual sense of the term. The uniqueness of *Zionism* when compared to other national movements is that it is explicitly social in character. . . . Its goal . . . is not a Jewish state but Jewish collective life.⁶¹

Later on, when Jabotinsky finally allows himself to imagine the era “after *Zionism*,” in other words when the Jews will have achieved a demographic situation similar to that of the Poles in Poznań or the Latvians in Russia, even here he explicitly distrusts the idea of total political independence: “We cannot know, or even speculate about that very distant time [a time in which Jews would become the majority in Palestine], about how international relations will look, how the Ottoman Empire will look, and what would be best for a small country [like Palestine]—whether [to be in] the situation of contemporary Serbia or in the situation of any state in the United States.”⁶²

Not only is it quite clear that Jabotinsky’s last question was rhetorical, but also that it is no longer necessary to wonder whether he really meant what he wrote, or whether he secretly hoped to be rid of Turkish tyranny. Three years previously, in his radical federalist articles in *Radikal*, Jabotinsky assumed that if Russia were able to allow its various national groups to reestablish it as a multinational

federation, then none of the national groups in tsarist Russia—not even the Poles of Congress Poland—would benefit if they seceded from the Russian state.⁶³ In the case of Ottoman Turkey, he had no doubt that a democratic federation of Ottoman peoples would be established thanks to their tradition of tolerance for intergroup difference (the millet system) and thanks to the Turkish “level-headedness that should be compared to the English [level-headedness].”⁶⁴ Thus, a Palestine with a Jewish majority, in which Zionism would fulfill its social aspirations (or more precisely, “social self-determination,” as he defines the term in his introduction to *Staat und Nation*), would become a part of a large and flourishing superpower like one of the states of the United States.

Jabotinsky was wrong. As we now know, the Young Turks went on to adopt more extreme nationalist positions and became increasingly opposed to federative initiatives. Their opposition grew in direct proportion to and sometimes in response to efforts by the European states to undermine the Turkish state’s stability from without and to gobble up more and more of its territory.⁶⁵ Jabotinsky found it difficult to ignore this reality. Nevertheless, for most of the time between the Young Turk Revolution and the eruption of World War I, he tried to keep up his optimism, even as it cracked and fractured over the years. He berated the Young Turks for their cruel suppression of the Albanian revolt in June 1910.⁶⁶ He castigated them again for not compromising with the Albanian rebels ahead of time, but rather doing so only under pressure from the superpowers, a move that he believed was sure to embolden them even further to meddle in Turkey’s internal affairs.⁶⁷ He admitted that the Young Turks failed to address Arab national demands, which led to an uprising in the Arabian peninsula in January 1911, which he expected would lead to further deterioration in Turkey’s internal affairs.⁶⁸ And he condemned the persecution of the Greeks in Istanbul.⁶⁹

At the same time, he enthusiastically seized onto any development that seemed to herald the stabilization of relations between national groups in the Turkish Balkans;⁷⁰ he celebrated what he saw as a lull in the tensions between Russia and Turkey, which “freed Europe, the Balkans, and above all Russia itself from the threat of massive and severe disturbances”;⁷¹ and he defended the Young Turks by arguing that it would have been surprising if they had not

made the mistakes that they were making, that they would probably make many more mistakes, and that eventually, “if the foreign meddling will not interfere or undermine everything, then Turkey will proceed along the road to the free and unique development of all the [national] elements, which as a consequence will gradually accustom them to loving and appreciating their shared homeland, which promises each of them the full breadth of national liberty.”⁷²

By the end of 1912, during the First Balkan War, it became clear to Jabotinsky that his “American dream” for a Turkish nationalities state was not on the verge of being realized. It appears that the turning point for him was the Greek occupation of Salonica. On November 16, 1912, Jabotinsky published an article titled “Salonica” in *Odesskiye novosti* in which he does not hide his sorrow and pain at what was taking place in Ottoman Turkey, and particularly at the loss of Salonica, which was the heart, soul, and symbol of the Young Turk Revolution.⁷³ He ridicules the arguments of the Greeks and Macedonian Bulgarians about “historical rights” in Salonica, saying that these kinds of debates are fundamentally unresolvable: “The Greeks think that anyone who is inclined toward Greek culture is a Greek, even if his mother tongue has Slavic origins, whereas the Bulgarians think that anyone whose mother sang him lullabies in Bulgarian is Bulgarian, even if he has become an extremist Greek nationalist in the interim.”⁷⁴

Jabotinsky points out that it is actually not the Greeks, nor the Bulgarians, nor the Turks who comprise the majority in the city, but the Sephardic Jews, who make up 75,000 of the 120,000 residents of Salonica.⁷⁵ Under the Ottoman state, the city’s Jews flourished and thrived, but the current arrival of the Greeks is expected to bode ill for Salonica’s Jews. After all, Jabotinsky argues, the city’s small Greek community does everything in its power to fight against the Jewish majority: the Salonican Greek press calls for a boycott of Jewish businesses, incites the surrounding Greek villages against the Jews, and is deeply interested in the Beilis trial in Russia.⁷⁶ At the end of the article, Jabotinsky argues that if Salonica can no longer be under Turkish rule, then it is best that it be a neutral city, certainly as far as most of its Jewish residents are concerned: “If the affairs of the world were decided by justice, then before giving Salonica to this group or the other, it would have only been right to ask the residents

themselves what they prefer. And then most of those residents would have responded that they do not want to live under Greek rule or under Bulgarian rule, but rather they want the city to be neutral. And that would certainly have aligned with Europe's interests."⁷⁷

In February 1916, at the height of World War I, Jabotinsky published an article in *Odesskiye novosti* with an unambiguous title, "Back to the Charter." In it, he expresses his profound disappointment at what he calls "our failed romance" with the Young Turks and pins his hopes on Britain.⁷⁸ At the same time, it appears that he did not abandon the idea of a *Nationalitätenstaat* and continued to consider a multinational federation to be the most efficient and appropriate model for a region that is home to several national groups. In December 1915, Jabotinsky published an article in *Russkiye vedomosti* (Russian News) titled "The Vienna Programs," which was dedicated to Austria-Hungary's internal problems and its postwar future.⁷⁹ In the article, he celebrates the prewar Austro-Hungarian state as a fertile ground for the flourishing science of *Nationalitätenrecht* (nationalities law), all the while justifying his discussion of these issues with the need "to know the enemy's political plans." He also expresses deep disappointment at the fact that the scientific-theoretical discussions on the issue of national collective rights have not matured into a multinational federative structure, which should have rightfully replaced the dual hegemony of the Germans and the Hungarians. He blames this failure of Habsburg multinational thought on the Hungarian side, which to his mind forestalled any possibility of multinational reform and which, he believed, was the most powerful force pushing the dual monarchy into the current war because of their fear of and hatred toward the Serbs.⁸⁰ The article argues that Austria-Hungary can still pursue the path to rectifying this distorted state of affairs when the war ends by changing the discriminatory Austro-Hungarian dualism. This can be done, Jabotinsky argues, by adopting Karl Renner's principles and the Austro-Marxists' notion of personal national autonomy on one hand and the multinational federation plan on the other that Aurel Popovici, one of the leaders of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania, had proposed before the war in his programmatic 1906 book *The United States of Greater Austria*.⁸¹ This book was no less influential than Renner's *Staat und Nation* in the beginning of the previous

century among activists in the national movements of non-dominant nationalities, in both the Habsburg Empire and the multinational imperial space beyond it. In it, Popovici proposes to reorganize Austro-Hungary into national districts that would more fairly distribute internal sovereignty among the empire's different nations, thus contributing to the monarchy's stability.⁸²

It is illustrative that Jabotinsky chooses to dedicate most of his article to an enthusiastic review of Popovici's "brilliant book," a work written a decade earlier, despite the fact that he begins the article by openly declaring that the article offers nothing more than a report on the political programs of contemporary Austria-Hungary. Jabotinsky clearly believed that Popovici's work was still relevant for reorganizing the Habsburg state after the war ended. After finally losing faith in two of the fin-de-siècle multinational empires—the one in which he was born and the one whose territory contained what he considered to be his historic homeland—he found it difficult to abandon the third empire, which had served as a kind of spiritual homeland for his approach to the relationship between the "state" and the "nation."

IV

After the end of World War I, after the collapse of two of the multinational empires that Jabotinsky had long used as ideological laboratories for attempting to solve the national problem, and after the Western superpowers recognized the Jewish people's national right to territorialization in Palestine, a fundamental change occurred in Jabotinsky's political views on the desired form of Jewish national self-determination in Palestine. During the imperial period, as we saw in his programmatic 1909 article "The New Turkey and Our Chances," Jabotinsky considered the term "state" to be totally irrelevant to Zionism's political purpose, whose realization he envisioned as part of a wider sovereign-political framework in the form of an autonomous district in a federative Ottoman nationalities state. However, during the rest of his life in the Mandate period (and despite his willingness to turn Palestine into one of the British Empire's dominions),⁸³ Jabotinsky envisioned the fulfillment of Jewish

self-determination *only* in the form of a state—a Jewish state with a Jewish majority in all of Palestine, including the east bank of the Jordan River. We must nevertheless admit that there is clear continuity between his thought during the Mandate period and his pre-war, imperial-era views on the relations between the state and the nation insofar as the fundamental essence of the Jewish nation's self-determination is concerned. One expression of this continuity is that Jabotinsky projected the federative multinational vision that he had earlier hoped would be implemented in Austro-Hungary, Russia, and Ottoman Turkey onto his political vision for Palestine. More specifically, after a Jewish majority is secured in Palestine, and after the Palestinian Arabs understand, as a result of the future war between Jews and Arabs, that they cannot thwart the establishment of a Jewish majority, then at that point Jabotinsky imagined that the resulting state would be the same as the nationalities state that he envisioned for the future of Russia in his *Radikal* articles before the Helsingfors Conference. Namely, he imagined that the state would be a mechanism, simultaneously mechanical and somewhat abstract, that emerges and is concretely sustained by the voluntary association of ethno-national collectives as legal collective personalities that enjoy full-fledged internal self-rule. As a matter of fact, every time that he raised his vision of a future Jewish nationalities state, he made sure to mention the Helsingfors Program, his role in crafting it, and his unswerving adherence to it and to Karl Renner's doctrine of national personal autonomy.

Thus, in 1923 Jabotinsky wrote his most famous article, "The Iron Wall," in which he argues that Zionists should not expect the Arabs of Palestine to accept Zionism's efforts to establish a Jewish majority without armed struggle because every colonial initiative naturally encounters indigenous resistance, meaning that securing an agreement with the Arabs and living together in one state can come only after the Zionists break that resistance. Jabotinsky also begins that piece by swearing loyalty to the Helsingfors Program, whose principles would serve as the basis for the future Jewish state's form of government: "I am proud of being a member of the group that drafted the Helsingfors Program, the program outlining the national rights of all peoples living in one state. In drafting this pro-

gram, we thought not only of the Jews, but of all peoples wherever they may be.”⁸⁴

In his 1926 article “On ‘Binational’ Palestine,” Jabotinsky argues that “every land that has an ethnic minority, of even the smallest kind, would need, after all, according to our deeply held views, to adapt its legal regime to that fact and become a bi-tri-national or quadri-national state.”⁸⁵ He once again refers to the Helsingfors Program as the basis for his overarching political worldview on the relations between nations in one shared state: “We wrote the ‘Helsingfors Program’ . . . not just for the benefit of the Jews, but also as a basis for cultural coexistence between a majority and a minority.”⁸⁶ He also explicitly mentions the multinational Austro-Marxist tradition and its founding father:

We, the long-time adherents of Springer, will hold fast to our position that in Palestine too, the Jewish majority will be organized for its unique Jewish needs on the basis of personal autonomy. For example, Jewish schools, all the way up to the university level, must be sustained by taxes that will be collected from Jews by the Jewish autonomy’s institutions, and Arab schools—by taxes collected from Arabs by the Arab autonomy’s institutions. Neither will be “state schools.” Or, if it is so desired, both these and the others will be considered state schools to an equal degree.⁸⁷

In reading these texts, we see that it is revealing to consider how marginal and unimportant the role of the state was for Jabotinsky, particularly if we keep in mind that he was a supporter of “the Jewish state.” Namely, the state is just as marginal and unimportant for him here as it was in his vision for a Russian federation that was established by virtue of the shared will of its national groups. Regardless of whether the institutions of personal autonomy would be “official” or not, the state’s actual legal force would still be held by its ethno-national groups, which would act as a kind of state within a state, as bearers of collective sovereignty in and of themselves. Therefore, just as Jabotinsky argued on the eve of the Helsingfors Conference that “it is impossible to be a ‘citizen of your state,’ it is only possible to be a ‘citizen of your nation’ and *through your nation*

[in the sense of an ethnic nation] to be a citizen of the place in which the people lives,”⁸⁸ so he posits at the conclusion of his 1926 article that “legally speaking we clearly distinguish between the term ‘nationalism’ and the term ‘citizenship.’”⁸⁹

Four years later, in 1930, Jabotinsky wrote an article with a similar title—“Binational Palestine”—which may be considered as a kind of supplement for and clarification of the earlier article. He once again begins the article, almost as a kind of compulsion, by mentioning the Helsingfors Conference:

Already twenty-four years ago, in December 1906, in the conference of Russian Zionists in Helsingfors . . . the author of this article made proposals that were unanimously adopted by the assembled and which became well-known throughout Eastern European Jewry as the “Helsingfors Program.” The program may be summed up succinctly as follows: every state on earth should be rebuilt and made into a binational state. [He refers here to a “multinational” state] . . . In Helsingfors, we declared that each of those monarchies [Russia and Austria-Hungary] . . . should view each of their nations as one of the “dominant races” of the “nationalities states.”⁹⁰

He adds, however, that “the Helsingfors utopia was not fulfilled,” neither in Russia nor anywhere else, but that its principles should be implemented in the future Jewish state.

We should take a moment to examine the above two articles closely because they provide an especially revealing demonstration of a deep internal tension in Jabotinsky’s national thought, one that was apparent ever since he first clearly articulated his view of the relations between the nation and the state in his introduction to *Staat und Nation*, Jabotinsky’s *Nationalitätenrecht* bible. Ever since his very first theoretical article on the national-political question, Jabotinsky’s worldview stresses that the existential ideal of every nation is to achieve territorial concentration in a given region and to have as much overlap as possible between “nation” and “land.” Only thus could each nation avoid being dependent on the national influence of the “Other” and make its unique and creative contribution

to humanity. However, he also maintains a strict distinction between nation and land on one hand and sovereign power and coercion on the other, thus allowing for the free development of many different national groups in a given political space regardless of its size. In so doing, Jabotinsky nullifies the very possibility of achieving the desired overlap between nation and land.⁹¹ In the two articles mentioned above about “binational Palestine,” he declares numerous times that securing a Jewish majority in Palestine is the ultimate goal of the Zionist project, an argument that arises directly from how central territorial ambitions were to his national thought. His passion for Palestine and for the Jews’ rootedness in it was so great that he wrote that the Jews would become “lords” of the land upon securing a Jewish majority.⁹² Despite his multinational autonomist vision for the future state, he also assumed that “the minority will begin—and as God as my witness, we do not want this in the least—to assimilate [into the majority] to some degree.”⁹³

On the other hand, however, the total separation between the state apparatus and the institutionalized national-cultural space, which Jabotinsky envisioned in the form of at least two national groups with collective legal rights (or the complete integration between the state and *all* its national groups of citizens, which would have the same meaning), would actually benefit group heterogeneity rather than increased national homogeneity in the territorial unit of Palestine. Indeed, Jabotinsky was well aware of this. Toward the end of his second article on the “binational” matter, he admits that the “‘national’ chances of Arabs under a Jewish majority would be much greater than the ‘national’ chances that Jews would have in a state with an Arab majority. The reason is clear: Palestine is located at the center of several countries whose culture is Arab and will continue to be Arab. The Arabs of Palestine would always enjoy the advantage of having easy access to Arab influences from across the border.”⁹⁴ One wonders, however: where was the “assimilation” that Jabotinsky assumed would eventually develop? The answer is readily apparent, but it emphasizes even more forcefully how deeply anarchical Jabotinsky’s national-political approach actually is: it may be that assimilation would occur, but it is also possible that it would not. In any case, this matter is not under the state’s authority. Just as the state should not interfere in the private lives of individual citi-

zens, so it should avoid interfering in the lives of its collective citizens (the nations). However, Jabotinsky believed that a member of the minority could, if she or he wished, join the national majority. It is important to remember that despite Jabotinsky's biological essentialism about the origins of any given nation, he did not consider a member of the minority nation joining the majority nation to be in any way problematic. Indeed, even before the Helsingfors Conference, Jabotinsky believed that the Jewish nation as a collective political personality should be entirely and unequivocally secularized: "Belonging to the Jewish nation must be determined through a personal declaration regardless of the declarer's religious beliefs."⁹⁵ In other words, if Arab citizens of the Jewish state wish to join the Jewish nation, all they must do is declare that they want to join that nation. On the other hand, because Jabotinsky's state is committed to institutionalizing all of its national groups, then it would certainly be possible for non-Jewish groups, and certainly the Arab nation, which would be influenced by the Middle Eastern Arab environment, to continue to develop their particular identities while at the same time affirming the multinational character of the state's public spaces.

It appears that the internal tension in Jabotinsky's thought between "nation" and "land" on one hand and "state" on the other became deeper and deeper over time. The more he anticipated full Jewish territorialization, and the more he promoted the "evacuation" of Eastern and Central European Jews to Palestine, the more marginal he considered the term "state" to be in shaping the lives of citizens (which, as mentioned above, he saw as citizens of organic nations). Jabotinsky provided a clear and succinct formulation of his view, in all its paradoxical character, two years before his death, in an article published in the Palestine-based Revisionist newspaper *Ha-Yarden* on October 21, 1938, titled "The Social Question": "The term 'state' must be organizational and not territorial. That is the democratic approach to the essence of the state."⁹⁶

In other words, the basic elements of his view of the state, which Jabotinsky first proposed in his *Radikal* articles, and according to which the state should be a shared framework that emerges out of mutual agreements between different national groups, remained basically unchanged for more than three decades despite the massive political shifts that he witnessed and despite the increasing geo-

political prevalence of the idea of a centralized state identified with a single group—rather than the idea of the federal state—which became more and more dominant in the international vocabulary of the interwar period.

Jabotinsky offers the clearest and most precise articulation of his Jewish nationalities state in his last book, *The Jewish War Front*, published in 1940. This text, written at a time when Jabotinsky was involved in trying to pressure Britain to enlist the Jews in the war effort,⁹⁷ briefly outlines the constitution of the future Jewish state in Palestine. As in his previous writings, here too the Jewish character of the state is to be determined by the fact that most of its citizens would be Jewish, nothing more and nothing less. However, just like in Jabotinsky's earlier works, the civil-national character of that state is above all intended to reflect the right of (at least) two national groups to self-determination, the Jewish nation and the Arab nation, which would mediate between each of the state's citizens and the overarching state sovereignty: "The Jewish and the Arab ethno-communities shall be recognized as autonomous public bodies of equal status before the law. . . . Each ethno-community shall elect its National Diet with the right to issue ordinances and levy taxes within the limits of its autonomy, and to appoint a national executive responsible before the Diet."⁹⁸

It thus appears that the "Helsingfors utopia"—or more precisely, an earlier radical interpretation of the relations between the state and its nation(s) that Jabotinsky developed when he was promoting his federative vision during the First Russian Revolution—has found its way to the pages of the most prominent official text of Jabotinskian political Zionism. The Jabotinskian Jewish state is actually two states in one: the Jewish entity and the Arab entity are described as political bodies in every sense of the term, even going so far as to include a legislative and executive branch for each of them. The only practical role for the larger political framework was to serve as a coordinating mechanism, "organizational and not territorial."⁹⁹

Why did Jabotinsky stubbornly hold to a political worldview that he had developed in a particular (pre-World War I) geopolitical reality despite the fact that that reality had fundamentally changed? In a time when the notion of the territorial nation-state was flour-

ishing on the ruins of the multinational empires, why did Jabotinsky ideologically trap himself by constantly reiterating his support for the nationalities state formula as a national-social ideal?

Researchers have never asked the first question because, as mentioned above, most scholars of Jabotinskian political Zionism believe that there was no significant ideological “past” to the development of this ideology. In Jabotinsky’s case, it was terms like “Helsingfors Program,” “Rudolf Springer,” and “personal autonomy” that did not align with the nation-state paradigm. As a result, even those rare studies that make reference to these terms to describe the ideological baggage that Jabotinsky brought with him from Eastern Europe do so without addressing the obvious and subversive fact that these ideas are opposed to the notion of a Jewish nation-state that grants self-determination to only its Jewish citizens.¹⁰⁰

Given the above, it is no surprise that the scholarship on Jabotinsky has not sufficiently addressed the second question that we raised about why Jabotinsky seems to have intentionally thwarted the ideal of national territorial homogenization at every turn with his multinational proposals, despite the fact that he considered territorialization to be the ultimate aspiration of every nation. The same retrospective nation-state prism that discounts or entirely obscures the importance of multinational elements in Jabotinsky’s thought also automatically cancels out the internal contradictions in Jabotinsky’s worldview.

At the same time that the historiography pushed Jabotinsky’s national-political thought in the pre–World War I imperial past to the margins, it nevertheless sought to explain his thought during the Mandate period. One such explanation argues that the nationalities state model that Jabotinsky proposed at the time was a tactical move, particularly in the case of the aforementioned constitutional outline found in his 1940 book *The Jewish War Front*. Arye Naor, a key scholar of Jabotinskian political thought, advances such an argument in his detailed study of Jabotinsky’s approach to the future state in Palestine. Naor argues that this constitutional outline must be understood as a means of persuading his British and American readers of the need to establish “a Jewish army” that would join the Allies, and to add the establishment of a Jewish state to the list of the Allies’ war goals.¹⁰¹

Another explanation, first proposed by Yaacov Shavit, interprets Jabotinsky's national pluralism as a "utopian vision."¹⁰² Yosef Gorny develops this argument into a full-fledged historiographic approach that views all Zionist federalist approaches in the Mandate period as expressions of a "utopian realism" that combines a multinational vision of the future (the utopian component) with the day-to-day pursuit of a normative nation-state.¹⁰³

However, neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The "tactical" explanation is not convincing because it assumes that Jabotinsky was exceedingly naïve. After all, it would be quite a stretch to think that the British or the Americans would be enthusiastic about the idea of two states existing within one state—a model that was not only totally foreign to the Western conception of citizenship, but that the West also saw as a form of tribal Eastern European nationalism that they considered to be inferior to Western "political nationalism."¹⁰⁴

Moreover, it is well-known that the scale of Arab resistance to Zionism had a significant impact on Britain's attitude to Zionism and its ambitions. Given this state of affairs, anyone who argues that Jabotinsky's nationalities state was a tactical move vis-à-vis the British must assume that Jabotinsky believed that his federal ideas might have a somewhat moderating effect on Palestinian Arab nationalism. However, it was Jabotinsky, more than any other Zionist, who openly declared that what provoked and would continue to provoke Arab resistance to Zionism in the years to come was the Zionist aspiration to become a majority in Palestine, and not the form that the future state would take after the Jewish majority was secured.¹⁰⁵ In other words, he understood quite well that any Arab living in Palestine who might take the trouble to read the Russian Zionists' Hel-singsfors Conference resolutions would not be persuaded to make peace with the fact that the Arabs would be a minority in the future.

The "realist-utopian" explanation is analytically ineffective as well. To describe a particular worldview as utopian is to say that that idea is opposed to the existing reality. The fact is, however, that Jabotinsky's nationalities state and its goal of constitutionally anchoring the plurality of ethno-national groups among the citizenry of a given state were certainly aligned with the ethno-national and demographic reality that had managed to persist in most of the post-

imperial space, including the very regions that Jabotinsky had referred to in order to develop his political thought before World War I. This reality remained multiethnic for the most part. Rather, Jabotinsky was more likely to view the mono-national state idea as a utopian vision because its implementation would have meant committing large-scale ethnic cleansing that was not necessarily easy for him or his contemporaries to imagine—even though it became more and more imaginable for him toward the late 1930s.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the idea that the ethnic nation-state is a realistic notion in the pre-World War II Euro-Asiatic reality is clearly an anachronistic projection of the later period's nation-state model onto the prewar past.

Insofar as the clear paradox in Jabotinsky's interwar political thought is concerned—namely, the fact that he pursued optimal territorial concentration while at the same time constantly restricting the aspiration for Jewish national hegemony in Palestine by supporting the institutionalization of all its national groups—it is certainly possible to consider Svetlana Natkovich's latest work on Jabotinsky's literary and journalistic works and adopt her insights regarding the way he approached nonpolitical literature and thought. Natkovich argues that Jabotinsky's main intellectual theme was to affirm the irrational element in human existence and in the world as a whole. She also pointed to the fact that he constantly referred to himself as “a man without a label,” a principled aesthetic choice that was at the very core of the myriad of paradoxes that characterized his writings.¹⁰⁷

While we can readily accept this explanation, we can still consider another possibility that might be able to provide supplementary interpretive contexts for understanding the internal logic behind Jabotinsky's approach to the future relationship between Jews and non-Jews in Palestine.

V

Accounting for Jabotinsky's nationalities state approach to the future of Palestine is based on his vision regarding the desired features of and frameworks for the Jewish people's national existence after the realization of the Zionist project. More specifically, the following explanation is based on Jabotinsky's approach to Jewish national

life in the diaspora, and to the link between this issue and the nature of the political regime that he envisioned in Palestine. As early as his first systematic theoretical text—the introduction to Karl Renner’s *Staat und Nation*—we saw that it was important for Jabotinsky to stress that “personal autonomy,” namely, the institutionalization of the national rights of a national group that is dispersed beyond the boundaries of its “historic homeland,” cannot fully address the national needs of “a living nation.”¹⁰⁸ In the run-up to the Helsingfors Conference, in which Jabotinsky urged the participants to support the radical, decisive option of institutionalizing Jewish self-rule in tsarist Russia, he wrote a long article clarifying Zionist political goals in Russia in which he outdoes himself to prove that the struggle for Jewish national self-rule in Russia as part of a democratic multinational state in no way contradicts Zionism’s essence—leaving the diaspora—but is instead intended to facilitate that natural and unavoidable “exodus.”¹⁰⁹ Jabotinsky argues that achieving Jewish national autonomy in the diaspora and securing full equality, not only of individual rights but also for the dispersed Jewish national collective as a whole, should be compared to a kind of medical treatment for the unavoidable wounds caused by the marginalization and exclusion of Jews from public space, or in other words, “our goal . . . is to wash and dress wounds, . . . to strengthen and rehabilitate the strength of the people through medicinal means, strength that is increasingly exhausted on the difficult road of the exodus.”¹¹⁰

Even so, it seems that every time that Jabotinsky tries to formulate a coherent argument that resolves the tension between his activist, militant support for Jewish national rights in the diaspora and his principled endorsement of the negation of the diaspora, he fails to consider that this contradiction might deepen even further, that the metaphor of wounds that need dressing and of a people struggling to renew its strength might sometimes undermine the ideological resoluteness of his “exodus.” And indeed, we do see some cracks in his ideological commitment to the negation of the diaspora. In a 1912 article published in *Odesskiye novosti* called “The Helsingfors Program” and dedicated entirely to discussing that program, Jabotinsky writes that in the months before the Helsingfors Conference, Russian Zionists developed two different approaches to the goals of Jewish national politics in the diaspora. He gives a

short summary of the first approach, which proposes to “accumulate power,” and argues that the Jewish people must be united on the internal national level and must be given the institutional and cultural tools for organizing itself as a collective with national self-consciousness.¹¹¹ As we saw above, this is precisely the kind of approach that Jabotinsky openly supported in the months before the conference.

The second approach, which Jabotinsky describes at length in the article, argues that

even after fully realizing the Zionist ideal, masses of Jews in significant numbers would remain in the diaspora. And this is good: this will not be a result of the Jewish people’s weakness, but rather of its strength. This is because the fact of Jewish dispersal has two sides: on one hand, exile is our curse, it is our hardship, but on the other hand it contains our unique power. On one hand, because of the dispersal, we are everywhere a minority, everywhere depending on the kindness of strangers, and nowhere are we able to create a national environment for us that would align with our people’s individuality; and that is the unique reason for our unique hardships. On the other hand, however, it is precisely because of the diaspora that Jewish influence is evident in a thousand places at once, and the Jewish hand is felt in various and diverse places and fields. . . . [F]or a strong center, it is desirable to preserve a strong periphery, a bustling metropolis would only benefit from bustling colonies that are tightly integrated. Thanks to them, the future Jewish center would have unique political influence much greater than its own concrete strength; then Jewry would really have a real place among global actors. From this perspective, Jewish concentrations in the diaspora are the foundations for the future national power. They should be relieved of their demographic burden, the massive waves of immigration should be diverted to Palestine—but to abolish them, to empty them, to eliminate them is not only impossible: it is undesirable. The diaspora should not be seen as just a great hole in which we rot: it should be seen, in addi-

tion, as the long line of national positions that we held and that we should not relinquish. They will be of use to us even after the territorial concentration of the main national nucleus is realized. But for them to be useful to us, these Jewish colonies in the diaspora must possess economic and cultural strength, a national self-consciousness, a robust organization, and equal civil, political, and national rights.¹¹²

Jabotinsky is careful not to support one of these approaches over the other, as his goal in the article was to present the main trends of Zionist politics in Russia, with an emphasis on the Helsingfors Program, to the readers of *Odesskiye novosti*—which was, it should be noted, a non-Jewish Odessan newspaper. In fact, he never decided between those two options in his entire Zionist career. At least in this article, however, it is quite clear that his heart lay with the second approach, the one that believes in the continued existence of strong “Jewish colonies” in the diaspora serving as a strong periphery for a strong territorial autonomous center. His support for this approach is clear not only because of how lengthy its presentation is when compared with the first option, and not only because he discussed this approach *after* the “power accumulation” approach, thereby giving it the final word, but first and foremost because he defines it as an option that is “perhaps braver.”¹¹³

In any event, it is clear that the sympathy that he felt toward the struggle for the Jewish national minority’s rights in the diaspora, seeing it not as necessary medical treatment in preparation for an “exodus” but as a full-fledged national-political value, was a sentiment that was clearly and consistently expressed in his national thought both before and after World War I, the collapse of the Eastern European multinational space, and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. Though he never put himself squarely behind the dual national vision for the Jewish future, which was in some ways a combination of the Ahad Ha’amian and Dubnowist approaches that had become very widespread in Eastern and Central European Zionist circles after the Uganda crisis,¹¹⁴ it is clear that Jabotinsky fought against the oppression of Jewish rights in the diaspora with the same enthusiasm and radical rhetoric that he used in his debates on the “final goal” of Zionism and on Greater Israel throughout his career.

Without going back on his initial assessment that the Jews' being driven out of "foreign lands" is objectively unavoidable (what he defined as "the anti-Semitism of things"), he fully denounced the notion that undermining and violating the collective rights of Jews in the diaspora is legitimate ("the anti-Semitism of people"). Like Ben-Zion Dinur (Dinaburg), who negated the "diaspora" as a way of life on ideological grounds, and on principle, because of its constant dependence on the majority's will, but who at the same time fiercely opposed negating the diaspora in the sense of undermining the living "popular" existence of Jewish collectivities in the diaspora,¹¹⁵ Jabotinsky also found himself reaffirming the Jewish national right to exist outside of Zion based on a deep internal commitment to the Jewish people and out of *Ahavas Yisroel* for its own sake.

It is with this in mind that we can finally understand Jabotinsky's piece at the beginning of this chapter, in which he expresses his fierce support for the national rights of Jews in Congress Poland during the last days of the Russian Empire, and in which he makes the following uncompromising and radical pronouncement, a statement that angered both representatives of the Polish parties and Jewish supporters of Polonization: "Poland is the land of the Poles and the Jews."¹¹⁶ After the "Great War" ended and after the articles outlining the rights of national minorities, including the Jewish minority, were added to the Treaty of Versailles (1919), Jabotinsky ardently supported the Polish Jews' struggle for the recognition of their national rights throughout the 1920s by publishing columns in the Parisian Revisionist newspaper *Razsvet*, the same paper in which he published "The Iron Wall."¹¹⁷ During the 1930s, it seems that no Zionist leader pushed for the mass evacuation of Eastern Europe's Jews more forcefully than Jabotinsky. At the same time, however, even as he came to recognize the plain futility of continued Jewish existence in Eastern and Central Europe in the face of the rise of Nazism in Germany and the growing fascism among Germany's neighbors, he also protested fiercely against the way that Polish nationalism was threatening the very foundations of Jewish life.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, even as Jabotinsky began calling for the immediate evacuation of Eastern and Central European Jewry more forcefully still in 1939, he also deepened his view of this Jewry as "a world unto

itself,” unique and essentially distinct from the rest of the world’s Jews, both because of their shared Eastern-Central European Jewish history and because of their shared present and near future.¹¹⁹ In effect, the more he witnessed the death and destruction that increasingly ate at the foundations of Eastern and Central European Jewry, the more he uncovered a deep internal urge to imagine this Jewry getting a new grasp on life and existence.

Given these points, there is cause to suppose that Jabotinsky, like other Zionist nationalists of his time, imagined that the political regime that would be established in Palestine after a Jewish majority was secured, and the regimes of non-Jewish states that contained prominent “Jewish colonies,” would both be founded on the same political principles of the separation between “state” and “nationalities” and of a pluralism of national rights. Guided by this worldview, Jabotinsky saw the national status of the Arabs in the future Jewish state and the national status of the Jews in non-Jewish states as forming a single system in which granting collective national rights to the Arabs of Palestine as part of a future nationalities state would affirm multinational democracy as a principle, thus indirectly contributing to the struggle of diaspora Jews for their national minority rights.

For this reason, the article “On ‘Binational’ Palestine,” which we discussed above in detail and in which Jabotinsky explicitly compares his constitutional-legal vision of Palestine as a land of two nations to his similar approach to Congress Poland as a land of two nations, is the same article that contains the following clear statement by Jabotinsky: “We think that honor and justice commit us to demand that the future Arab minority in future Jewish Palestine must have everything that we demand for the Jewish minority in the diaspora lands.”¹²⁰ This should not be seen as mere rhetorical embellishment. After all, it is not only “honor and justice” that are at stake here, but actually the very same dual political view of auto/emancipation that we saw in both Pinsker’s and Herzl’s writings in different forms, and which was intended to upgrade the emancipatory rights that had been granted to Jewish existence in the modern world, while in no way pretending to offer a substitute to Jewish emancipation. Jabotinsky’s aforementioned statements should therefore be placed in the same category as both the Pinskerian idea that

the non-Jews' status in the future Jewish "territorium" would have an effect (beneficial, he thought) on the status of Jews who would remain in the diaspora, as well as Herzl's vision in *Altneuland*, which argues that after the Jews of Palestine establish a society founded on full civil equality, then the Jews who remain in Europe will achieve full emancipation in all areas of life. In the Zionist political thought that preceded the subversion of the very basis of Jewish physical existence and the destruction of European Jewry in the Holocaust, proposing upgraded civil models for the state was not seen as a utopian abstraction or mere rhetoric. Instead, these models expressed a recognition of the concrete need to implement them in both the future Palestine and in the states in which "the Jewish colonies," as Jabotinsky called them, were concentrated, in order to stabilize the political status of Jews throughout the world.

On the other hand, however, just as one could imagine the indirect positive and stabilizing effects that the Arabs' future status in Palestine would have on the condition of diaspora Jews, one could also imagine the opposite effect—that driving out Arabs as individuals and as a group might indirectly confirm the idea of marginalizing the "Other" and contribute even more decisively to undermining the individual and collective status of diaspora Jews. Without understanding how this systemic approach worked in Jabotinskian political imagination, and the way that it linked the status of Palestine's Arabs to the future of the Jewish national minorities in the diaspora, it is impossible to deeply grasp why Jabotinsky opposed the Peel Commission's recommendations (1937) to partition Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. The fact that the British partition would mean losing parts of the historic homeland was not the only thing that Jabotinsky was angry about; he was no less opposed to the Royal Commission's idea of transferring the Arab population out of the territory set aside for a Jewish state and into the future Arab state. His position stemmed from his continued adherence to the universal principle of giving each national minority collective rights wherever it may be, but also, and especially, his position stemmed from his concern that expelling the Arabs from the Jewish state might serve what he sarcastically called an "instructive precedent" for all those who threaten the existence of Jewish collectives in the diaspora.¹²¹

Jabotinsky articulates this concern in one of his last articles, “A Talk with Zangwill,” published in the summer of 1939. The article brims with deep embarrassment in light of the impending collapse of the post-Versailles Euro-Asiatic order. In it, Jabotinsky reveals his growing awareness of the resounding failure of his political vision. In the history of Jewish nationalism, Israel Zangwill, a Jewish national leader and gifted English writer, is known above all as a prominent supporter of territorialism.¹²² He believed that Jewish nationalism must secure a territory somewhere in the world that is fit for settlement, to establish a nation-state there, and to turn the Jews into a normal territorial nation “like every nation”—or, like what he believed was paradigmatic and that all nations had to adopt, namely, the “Western” territorial model of nationalism. Zangwill became a member of the Zionist movement back before Herzl’s death, at a time when Zangwill’s supporters in the Zionist Federation were hoping that a “charter” (settlement rights) in Palestine could be secured quickly. When the Uganda plan was rejected in the Sixth Zionist Congress, Zangwill broke with the Zionist movement and established the Jewish Territorialist Organization, which continued searching for a piece of land on which to settle masses of Jews, especially from Eastern Europe. After the Balfour Declaration was issued, Zangwill returned to the Zionist movement and raised an idea that he had already proposed at the turn of the twentieth century—the transfer of the Palestinian Arabs.¹²³ In literature, as well as the anthropology and sociology of ethnicity, Zangwill is known as the person who coined the term “melting pot” in its modern meaning, primarily in the American context through a 1908 play of the same name that became massively successful in the United States. The play is a paean for the assimilation of immigrants of different religions, nations, and groups into a homogenous, normative identity ostensibly free of internal complexity—the American national identity.

In stark contrast to Jabotinsky’s national thought, Zangwill glorified the model of nationally homogeneous and separate political spaces. Recall that Jabotinsky compares the existence of nations to a joint orchestra to illustrate the idea that multinational spaces are the obvious recipe for the normative existence of nations.¹²⁴ At the same time, he stresses an opposing notion, the nations’ territorial ambitions, and as a result he finds himself articulating a complex national-

social worldview rife with internal contradictions, yet one with which he felt comfortable aesthetically and that aligned with his idea of the rationality of the irrational (“The path of logic [is not] a homogenous straight line. Rather, the path of logic is a complex, tortuous line, rich in surprises”).¹²⁵

Zangwill’s approach to nations, however, was free of internal contradiction. He believed that nations progressed along a single axis that begins with complex hybrid nations and ends with simple nations possessing a homogeneous culture. He also believed that political frameworks must support these processes and not impede them. After considering the American political reality, Zangwill saw that it is possible to bring about national-cultural homogenization using social-political engineering and came up with the idea of the melting pot; when he looked at Palestine, its Arab majority and its negligible Jewish minority, he believed that the best path forward through that same homogeneity coupled with the normalization of Jewish national identity is the transfer formula.

In 1939, Jabotinsky felt that the world was moving in the direction of Zangwill’s ideas and saw the Peel Commission’s idea of partition as clear evidence for this trend. Notwithstanding, he refused to resign himself to this state of affairs, though he did so less forcefully than in the past, as he was losing the last of his energies in the face of all that was happening around him. It is at this point that Jabotinsky recalls a conversation that he had with Zangwill in the summer of 1916:

“If they give you a ‘charter’ for Palestine,” he [Zangwill] asked, “what do you think of doing with the Arabs?” I gave him the usual orthodox reply: in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan, there is room probably for six or eight millions, there are altogether a half a million Arabs (according to the statistics of those days) so they cannot disturb anybody; and they will be given all the most liberal minority rights in accordance with our Helsingfors programme. “These are empty words,” replied [Zangwill]. “I know that in your Eastern Europe there are ten nationalities in every district, and you consider it normal; we in the West consider it a disease that permits of no cure. Permitting such a situation in our Jewish

country means scratching out our own eyes. . . . If we get Palestine, the Arabs will have to ‘trek.’”¹²⁶

Jabotinsky was not persuaded by this reasoning in 1916, nor was he persuaded by it at the end of the 1930s, when he saw the Peel Commission proposing to implement the idea of national-political homogenization by partitioning Palestine.¹²⁷ In 1916, his main argument against Zangwill was a moral one, which Zangwill responded to by accusing Jabotinsky of suffering from “grandmotherly sentimentalism.”¹²⁸ In 1939, however, as the ethno-demographic reality after World War I, including the population “exchange”¹²⁹ between Greece and Turkey, seemed to be becoming increasingly “normalized” in Zangwillian terms, Jabotinsky ran out of moral arguments. One of his last remaining arguments was an ideological-aesthetic one:

Zangwill’s ideas on this question may be logical, but are too far removed from my own conceptions. My generation grew up in the spiritual atmosphere of old-Russian enthusiasm for freedom; you may attack it and call it all kinds of names—liberalism, anarchism, fatalism—but I prefer it. I can well imagine that progress must sometimes be carried out with the aid of a military operation; but not with the aid of police; especially in the question of human wanderings.¹³⁰

His other remaining argument is yet another reference to the question of diaspora Jews: the Zangwillian method that Jabotinsky identified in the Peel Commission’s partition plan may be adopted by “enemies of ours in other countries.”¹³¹

A year later, however, Jabotinsky finally and unhesitatingly admits the failure of the Zionist autonomist politics in Eastern and Central Europe during the interwar period in his last book, *The Jewish War Front*. Jabotinsky never again saw the struggle for the national rights of Jewish collectivities in these regions as a political means of advancing Jewish national interests.¹³² In the book, he finally concedes that his dream of large “Jewish colonies” serving as a powerful periphery for the autonomous territorial center was truly gone. Recall, however, that it is in this very book that Jabotinsky

develops his dual autonomist model into a fully fledged constitutional proposal. Jabotinsky thus translates the Jewish national minority's struggles into universal language, just like in the Helsingfors period, when he expressly meant his federative approach to apply to both Jews and non-Jews. Now these struggles got a new lease on life in the form of the national rights that Jabotinsky's vision would grant to the Arab minority in the future Jewish majority state, after the *aliyah* of masses of Jews from the countries on the front-lines of the new world war.¹³³

CHAPTER FIVE

David Ben-Gurion

Jewish States, Non-Jewish States

I

DAVID BEN-GURION RESPONDED to the November 29, 1947, United Nations decision to partition Mandate Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state with an related article titled “To the Founding of the State.”¹ Among other topics, the article concerns the internal cultural-political complexion of the two states that the partition plan called for establishing, each of which, it assumed, would continue to have a national minority belonging to the other state’s nation. Even though each of the two minorities would live under the rule of the other nation’s majority state—or, as a third alternative, “in the international territory of Jerusalem”—Ben-Gurion believed that the cultural and educational needs of each of the former two national populations of Mandatory Palestine must be addressed regardless of their location and that it was therefore necessary to establish “two cultural autonomies” in Eretz Israel,² and to do so “just as it was in the Mandate era or in the era of Turkish rule.”³

It is not surprising that Ben-Gurion identified certain aspects of the Mandate-era reality, which had only recently held sway in the lives of Palestine’s residents, that it would be best to preserve so as not to un-

necessarily undermine the cultural lifestyles of the inhabitants. It is not nearly as obvious, and is even a bit astonishing, that he would refer to Ottoman Turkey as a relevant source of historical experience that might be able to offer political-cultural tools for reorganizing the relations between post-Mandate Palestine's different ethnic groups. How is it that Ben-Gurion believed it appropriate to bring up "the era of Turkish rule" in an article that he published at the moment of the inception of a form of Jewish political sovereignty that is considered to be the complete antithesis of "the era of Turkish rule"? And what does this decision say about how important Ben-Gurion's political experiences and thought during his Ottoman-era Zionist activism were to his political imagination and worldview during his subsequent public career?

The vast majority of historical research on the first Israeli prime minister portrays the Ottoman period of his work as a marginal and unimportant part of his political journey. To be sure, it is well-known that shortly after immigrating to Palestine (1906), and particularly on the eve of and during World War I, Ben-Gurion, along with his friend and Poalei Zion party comrade Yitzchak Ben-Zvi, clearly espoused the political vision in favor of turning Palestine into a Jewish national district under an Ottoman nationalities state. Nevertheless, most historians who have mentioned these facts have not given them proper consideration. The authors of the major biographies on Ben-Gurion who do mention his pro-Ottoman stance do so without trying to understand this position's roots.⁴ Matityahu Mintz explains Ben-Gurion's position in purely theoretical terms pertaining to the ideological context of internal Zionist socialism, totally disregarding the non-Jewish environment of that period: he argues that Ben-Gurion's approach is a transformation of Poalei Zion's Marxist worldview, which was committed to the territorial integrity of the new Turkey that emerged after the Young Turk Revolution and that considered this position to be a part of a larger Zionist-socialist vision for the modernization of Palestine and the Jewish people.⁵ Yosef Gorny sees Ben-Gurion's pro-Ottoman position as an example of the "activist-historical" worldview of the Poalei Zion party in Palestine in general, and of Ben-Gurion in particular, an approach that is characterized primarily by its adaptability to historical circumstances.⁶ Gorny's opinion reflects an important and use-

ful historiographical interpretation of Ben-Gurion that we will address more comprehensively in what follows.

In his groundbreaking book on modern Jewish nationalism, *Cossack and Bedouin: Land and People in Jewish Nationalism*, Israel Bartal first proposed to see the autonomist pro-Ottoman stance of the Poalei Zion party in Palestine before and during World War I, including Ben-Gurion's stance, as part of a coherent and internally logical national-political worldview. More specifically, Bartal shows that although the aspiration to Jewish national territorialization was essentially central to Poalei Zion's idea of Eretz Israeli district autonomy under an Ottoman state, the very notion of (*territorial*) Jewish national autonomism in Turkish Palestine, as pronounced by both Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi, was deeply, explicitly, and somewhat surprisingly linked to Karl Renner's, Otto Bauer's, and Simon Dubnow's ideas of *extrritorial* national self-rule.⁷

Bartal's insights do well to place Ben-Gurion's early Zionist thought within its historical and spatial contexts. They give us a good basis for continuing to develop and expand the historical and ideological contextualization of Ben-Gurion's political thought before, during, and after World War I. It is worth mentioning, however, that Bartal focuses mainly on the "Great War" period and on the book authored by Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi titled *Eretz Israel Past and Present*, when there are actually a good number of other relevant texts authored by Ben-Gurion (and Ben-Zvi) that were written both before and during the war. Furthermore, Bartal's research still leaves us the task of providing as comprehensive an account as we can of how Ben-Gurion's worldview during the Ottoman period relates to his later political imagination.

II

Most scholars rightly believe that David Ben-Gurion saw Palestine as his only national homeland in the most existentially possible terms. Ben-Gurion made the radical choice of immigrating to Palestine at the age of twenty, thus divorcing himself of what he saw as an atrophied diaspora existence that was devoid of any national or personal purpose for a Jew with a Zionist consciousness. We should add, however, that it is not just that Ben-Gurion considered Pales-

tine to be his homeland, but also that he considered Palestine to be an integral and inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire. He believed that both the “new” and “old” Jewish Yishuv in Palestine were deeply connected both politically and nationally to the rest of Ottoman Jewry.⁸ The idea of seeing Palestine as the Jewish national home, while at the same time making an intellectual and even emotional effort to imagine the Turkish state as an expanded civil-political home that would contain the emerging territorial homeland of the Jewish nation, became more and more firmly rooted in Ben-Gurion’s mind following the Young Turk Revolution, which took place only two years after he immigrated to Palestine. Ben-Gurion came to increasingly support this idea against the backdrop of the euphoric and vibrant atmosphere of that time, which characterized non-Jewish national movements as well, and he endorsed this idea while explicitly and constantly referring to the condition of non-Jewish nations in the Ottoman state.

In one of his first articles in *Ha-Abdut*—the official mouthpiece of the Poalei Zion party in Palestine—titled “To Clarify Our Political Situation” and published in 1910—Ben-Gurion complains that Ottoman Jewry in general, and the Zionist Yishuv in particular, was not fully aware of what it meant that Turkey was transitioning from Abdul Hamid’s tyrannical rule to a democratic constitutional regime. As the state implements full and equal rights, as it does away with the old regime’s severe limitations on the freedom of speech, and in light of the fact that Turkey is a “multinational state . . . where each nation is different from the other in race, language, culture, socioeconomic structure, and national matters,” so will the collective and sometimes contradictory demands of the different nations rise to the surface; among them “the hope of self-determination is growing.”⁹ “Until the national question is properly resolved,” Ben-Gurion continues, “there will be a hard war and fierce competition among the different nations.”¹⁰ That is why Ottoman Jews, and above all the Zionists of Palestine, should be quick to engage in the political struggle for “their political and national rights” just as the state’s non-Jewish national movements had done.¹¹ They can do this effectively only if they choose to come together and organize into a pan-Ottoman “national-political federation” that would be able to defend Jewish national collective interests throughout the Ottoman

Empire, and first and foremost in Palestine itself. In Palestine specifically, Ben-Gurion believed that this organization could help deal with “propaganda in Christian Arab newspapers against the Jewish Yishuv.”¹²

Ben-Gurion’s article does not go into concrete details about how Zionists should struggle for the national rights of Jews in Palestine and the Ottoman state, or how they should curb hostile propaganda in the Arab press. He does, however, stress what he believed should *not* be done under any circumstances: to call for “the aid of the representatives of foreign governments”¹³ (recall that he, like Ben-Zvi, was a subject of tsarist Russia). He emphasizes this because he identified a deeply held interest that was shared by both the new Zionist Yishuv in Palestine and the new Turkey: just as “one of the main causes of the Turkish revolution, and one of the greatest aspirations of the new regime, is the Turkish people’s strong desire to free themselves from the yoke of custodianship and slavery that the European governments imposed on the Ottoman state during the reign of Abdul Hamid,” so does Zionism aspire to advance an independent Jewish politics without having the existence and future of the Yishuv be dependent on foreign powers.¹⁴

In another article published in the same year and titled “Our Social-Political Work,” Ben-Gurion is even more vehement about his opposition to the Zionist Yishuv leadership’s tendency to pin their hopes on international Zionist activity for the Yishuv that focuses exclusively on European countries while almost totally neglecting the internal Ottoman public arena. He believed that Zionism’s political goals—“Reviving of the Hebrew nation in Palestine by creating a large Hebrew Yishuv that possesses recognized national-political rights”¹⁵—can be achieved only by “the Jews of Palestine and Turkey,” or, as he decisively puts it: “Achieving political rights and defending political interests is the prerogative of the citizens of the state itself.”¹⁶ Here Ben-Gurion points to two concrete approaches that the Zionists of Palestine, and particularly the Poalei Zion party, must adopt as part of their political struggles within the new Young Turks Ottoman state: (1) to increase organized Jewish involvement in internal Ottoman politics; to aspire to become Ottoman citizens (Ottomanization) in Turkey; to engage in public activity “as both state citizens and as Jews”; to advance the Yishuv’s

agenda, the national collective rights of Jews in Palestine, and the national rights of Jews outside of Palestine from within the Ottoman parliament; and (2) to cooperate with all Jewish workers throughout the Ottoman state and with “the workers belonging to other Ottoman peoples,” in order to struggle together in a single national and social pan-Ottoman front to secure “the national and political rights that our progress and development in Palestine demand” and “the right to freely unionize and strike, labor laws and so on.”¹⁷

In “To Clarify Our Political Situation,” we see that Ben-Gurion mentions the fact that the Ottoman state’s various nations hope to achieve “self-determination,” hinting that there is a “proper resolution” to the “national question” in Turkey but not expanding on that point.¹⁸ It is Ben-Gurion’s comrade Yitzchak Ben-Zvi who offers the more detailed proposal on the matter in the fall of 1910 in a programmatic article called “Our National Claims in Turkey.” Here Ben-Zvi lays out the basic contours of the national-political vision of the Poalei Zion party’s Palestine-based wing in light of the rise of the constitutional Young Turks rule.¹⁹ This text, written fewer than four years before the outbreak of World War I—the war that would put an end to the Ottoman Empire—is beaming with optimism about the future of the Ottoman state as a nationalities state. Ben-Zvi recognizes that most of the tri-imperial space (except for tsarist Russia, which “is still being stubborn”²⁰) is on its way to redistributing internal governmental sovereignty among the various nations within the existing political frameworks. This thinking is similar to what Jabotinsky was writing at the time, and it was also in the spirit of the political discourse espoused by an increasing number of national movements among non-dominant nationalities in the multinational imperial space, primarily in Austria-Hungary and, beginning in the summer of 1908, spreading to Ottoman Turkey as well. According to Ben-Zvi, in Austria and the new Turkey “all nations,” “all the oppressed masses,”²¹ have elected to fly the standard of national claims and national liberation in an effort to nurture their cultural nationalism, to win recognition of their right to self-rule in the districts in which they are concentrated, and to win recognition of their right to be equal partners in managing the empire’s affairs. The basic ideological foundation of this vision, which Ben-Zvi argues was adopted

by “all the oppressed nations of the multinational countries,”²² was initially articulated by “the social democracy in Austria in its conference in the city of Brno.”²³

Like Jabotinsky, Ben-Zvi and the Palestine-based wing of the Poalei Zion party also considered the multinational federative program adopted by the Austrian Social Democratic Party in its 1899 conference in the Moravian capital to be the basic ideological frame of reference for imagining the future of the multinational empires in the Euro-Asiatic space, in which most of the world’s Jews lived on the eve of World War I. In the spirit of key Austro-Marxist intellectuals like Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the Brno resolutions spoke of the need to reorganize Austria-Hungary according to the principle of granting territorial autonomy to nations that were territorially concentrated in districts recognized to be their “historic homeland” and according to the principle of personal (extraterritorial) autonomy for dispersed minority nations.²⁴ Ben-Zvi certainly exaggerates when he declares that these Austro-Marxist principles were accepted by “all the oppressed nations of the multinational countries.” We saw, for example, that one of the key supporters of the nationalities state in Austria-Hungary was the Transylvanian Romanian leader Aurel Popovici—whom Jabotinsky greatly admired²⁵—who represented a national group that was clearly territorial and that tended to prefer the principle of territorial autonomy over the principle of extraterritorial autonomy.²⁶ We may recall that Jabotinsky shared this preference; despite his identification with Renner’s spatial worldview, he believed that Renner should have placed greater emphasis on the territorial dimension of the national movements’ aspirations in multinational space.²⁷ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Ben-Zvi accurately perceived²⁸ that there was a common political foundation to many of the nationalisms in Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey (and tsarist Russia, whose civil-political development was falling behind its neighbors to the west and south) and that the core of this shared basis was that their aspiration to realize their national claims within larger existing political frameworks existed alongside their desire to reorganize those frameworks into multinational democratic states.

It is very important in this context to pay attention to the way that Ben-Zvi adopts the discourse of national normalization that in-

formed not only him but also the Zionist national position of the *Ha-Ahdut* newspaper and of the Poalei Zion party in Palestine as whole, Ben-Gurion included. As a member of the Zionist movement's radical wing, whose clear goal was to rebel against the "exile" and change the Jewish people's character, to turn it into "a nation like every nation," Ben-Zvi complains in his article that unlike "all the other masses of the oppressed nations," which rose up and are fighting for their national rights in their homelands, the Jews are standing aside and irresponsibly neglecting their national affairs. However, in this particular moment in the history of Zionist nationalism—a moment whose characteristics usually escape the notice of most key historians of Zionism—the "like every nation," or at least the majority of the national movements alongside which modern Zionism emerged and developed, did not envision their future as nation-states but rather as nations that enjoy autonomous self-rule as part of a broader sovereign framework. In the same way, the Zionist conception of normalcy articulated the need to internally amend Jewish existence in strictly subsovereign terms, ones that are fundamentally different from those of the sovereign and independent nation-state that would come to have an increasingly central role in Zionist ideology over the course of the twentieth century.

Given the kind of national-political thought that was considered by their many neighbors within the imperial structure to be normative only moments before that structure's collapse, how did the founders of the Zionist Labor movement envision the normalized political future of the Jewish people? What did they consider to be the concrete nature of the "national claims" whose realization would make Jewish existence more closely resemble the patterns of national life that prevailed among the neighboring national groups and their national movements? Ben-Zvi's approach to these questions was complex but unequivocal:

Our national claims are not the result of pure reason or mimicry; their source—reality, actual life. We already have substantial national assets in Turkey. On one hand, these assets are the *Jewish community* [*ha-eda ha-yehudit*; the Jewish millet]. It suffers from major leadership deficiencies, but in the main it is a healthy and important nucleus that is unlike

anything in the other countries and that can develop and progress by changing its leadership. On the other hand, we have concrete national assets in the cultural sense—in *Palestine*.²⁹

Ben-Zvi believed that one of the foundations on which to build the new Jewish national presence in the multinational Ottoman state should be the extraterritorial autonomous Jewish framework, the Jewish millet. He thought that it should be rebuilt as Jewish self-rule in the more “popular” sense of the term, meaning self-rule that is broad and democratic in the spirit of Ben-Gurion’s aforementioned proposal to establish a “national-political federation” of all Jews in the Ottoman state,³⁰ a proposal that Ben-Gurion would return to later on.³¹ From a Zionist point of view, however, the other important foundation was, of course, the Eretz Israeli component. But what did that mean? In defining the Zionist Yishuv in Palestine as “national assets in the cultural sense,” is Ben-Zvi saying that Poalei Zion is not intending to advance a “political Zionism” and is instead opting for “cultural Zionism” (or, alternatively, “practical Zionism”) in the spirit of the sharp divisions that often appear in Zionist historiography?³² Not in the least. Indeed, we might recall that at the very same time, Ben-Gurion was defining the goal of Zionism as a “reviving of the Hebrew nation in Palestine by creating a large Hebrew Yishuv that possesses recognized national-political rights.”³³ And what does “political” mean in the context of this approach? The term “political,” it turns out, has a double meaning in this case: on one hand, it refers to a Jewish state in the sense of an autonomous territorial district, in the same way that the word “state” is used to describe the United States, for instance in Popovici’s book about “the United States of Greater Austria,” or the way that Herzl’s Zionist thought imagines the idea of a Jewish state in Altneuland;³⁴ the other meaning, however, is more comprehensive and refers to the broader imperial state in whose framework it would become possible to realize the first meaning (the Jewish state), thus making it necessary to essentially change its civil-political character. Ben-Zvi and Ben-Gurion believed that the Ottoman state was well on its way to implementing the necessary changes following the Young Turk Revolution.

In the same way that Ben-Gurion called on members of the Zionist Yishuv to become more involved in the Ottoman state's public life "both as state citizens and as Jews,"³⁵ Ben-Zvi also considered Zionist politics in the new Turkey to have two political goals, and he articulates this Poalei Zion party view clearly and succinctly: "In our land specifically, and in our state generally, the Jewish worker, and the masses of the people behind him, will be the first to fight for his basic rights, for his *national rights*."³⁶

Like Ahad Ha'am in "Ottoman Jewry,"³⁷ and like Jabotinsky in his pro-Ottoman articles of that period, Ben-Zvi distinguishes between the Jews' territorial-national Eretz Israeli identity and their political-imperial identity as residents of the Ottoman Empire (who are openly seeking to become its citizens). This should certainly not lead us to challenge the ideological and emotional precedence that the Zionist connection to Palestine held over the Zionist connection to the Ottoman state as a whole. At the same time, however, we should not underestimate the fact that members of the Palestine-based wing of Poalei Zion wished to integrate the "Ottomanizing" process into their spatial identity as they eagerly awaited the moment when the Zionists would become Ottoman citizens. Without this process, they could scarcely imagine the future of the Jewish national Yishuv in Palestine. Note, for example, that they saw "the Land of Israel" as a concrete historical entity in whose territorial life they should immerse themselves "here and now," and it is precisely for that reason that they began to see the country both as a part of the Ottoman Empire's relatively recent history and as an essential organ in the body of a Jewish nation that had been living in that empire for hundreds of years.³⁸ Thus, the more they identified with the Land of Israel as the territorial core of the emerging modern Jewish nation, the more they found themselves identifying with "Ottoman Jewry" as a kind of internal sphere of belonging and with the Ottoman state as an external sphere of belonging. This Ottoman Jewish identity was in no way intended to disconnect Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi's Jewish national consciousness from the Jewish people living outside of the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, it is well-known that the ethos of *aliyah* (immigration to Israel, literally "ascent") and *Hagshama* (realization) was Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi's highest priority ever since the very earliest stages of their Zionist

careers. What is important to emphasize and understand here, however, is that they were keenly aware that (1) immigrants who went to Eretz Israel would not be going to Palestine alone, but also to the empire that contains it, and that is why taking root in Palestine also means taking root in the public life of the state and the empire as a whole; and (2) not all Jews in the Ottoman Empire would live in the district of Palestine forever, even in the far distant future. Instead, Jews would be moving around throughout the larger empire like other “Ottoman nations,” making the autonomous Ottoman Jewish millet institution (in its modern and democratic organizational version) all the more relevant.

One of the texts that most clearly demonstrates and illustrates the role that the internal Ottoman Jewish sphere of belonging had in Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi’s complex approach to identity is the open letter that they wrote titled “From the Ottoman Students in Istanbul,” published in *Ha-Ahdut* on December 26, 1913. In it, the two vehemently oppose the fact that the Jewish Institute for Technical Education of the Ezrah philanthropic organization chose German as the language of instruction in the Technicum (later the Technion) in Haifa and in the technical school next to it. To support their argument, the two “Ottoman students”—who were students at the University of Istanbul at the time—made reference to the cultural and educational issues that concerned non-Jewish national movements in the Ottoman state:

At a time when all of Ottomania’s nations are fighting fiercely over every clause, over every single shred of their national rights, at a time when they are dedicating their lives and sacrificing themselves for their culture and language, we must gather all our strength so as to shore up our position as a nation among the other Ottoman nations and to not be a tool at the hands of foreign governments who do not spare any means to expand their influence in Turkey.³⁹

In other words, the decision by the German-Jewish Ezrah organization’s technological higher education institute—which Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi considered to be “an act of national treason”⁴⁰—should not be tolerated not only because it essentially goes against efforts

to revive the Hebrew language in Palestine, but also because it undermines the Ottoman political affinity of the emerging Jewish nation. This is both because the decision might indirectly strengthen the unwanted influence of foreigners on the Ottoman state and because that is not how the national movements of “the other Ottoman nations” were conducting themselves.⁴¹

We should pay close attention to the way that the two “Ottoman students” position themselves when discussing what is clearly a local matter that concerns only Eretz Israel. Without doubting the fact that the Hebrew language is a matter that is clearly internal to the Yishuv, we should also take into consideration that the students chose to identify as part of Ottoman Jewry because they assumed that this would strengthen their position in the larger Ottoman political arena.

The Palestine wing of Poalei Zion naturally considered the external sphere of belonging to the general Ottoman political arena to be inseparable from the internal Ottoman Jewish sphere of belonging. That is why we see the former being expressed in an explicitly intra-Jewish text like the aforementioned student letter, in which they point to the questionable way in which the Germanization of Jewish education in Palestine might contribute to external European attempts to influence the new Turkey. The more the security situation of the Ottoman state deteriorated as the state was collapsing in its western regions, the more it sank into the 1913 Balkan War, and finally the more involved it became in World War I—the more the Eretz Israeli Poalei Zion, and particularly Ben-Gurion, identified with Turkey and its fate. As early as 1912, Ben-Gurion expressed deep concerns about the endless efforts of the Western superpowers to take more and more of the Ottoman state’s territory. The cause for this behavior, he believed, was that “the Christian world cannot tolerate that the Turks and the Muslims should rule over Christian nations” and that “the Europeans’ self-love cannot reconcile itself to the fact, even if it has already been a thousand years, that people who originated in Asia and are members of the Mongol race would grab hold and make their home in Europe.”⁴²

Following the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman patriotism in Ben-Gurion’s writings becomes especially evident, even before Turkey joined the war. On September 20, 1914, Ben-Gurion pub-

lished an article in which he responds with cautious optimism to the abolition of the capitulations,⁴³ the treaties that for hundreds of years had granted the subjects of Christian states commercial and residential rights in the Ottoman Empire without having to be subject to Ottoman law, and which, among other things, also allowed the Zionist immigrants to make their homes in the empire. Ben-Gurion welcomed this development and excitedly wrote the following:

[The abolition of the capitulations] is a valuable political event and rich with consequences for the future, which, when it comes to pass, should be given a place in Ottoman history on the same level as the war of the tenth of Tammuz [the Young Turk Revolution]. It was then that Turkey freed itself from the yoke of tyranny and internal slavery by autocratic rule—and now it frees itself from the shackles of external enslavement to foreign monarchies.⁴⁴

Later, Ben-Gurion repeats his jab at “the nations of Europe,” like the one we saw in the previous article, saying that “they could never comfortably tolerate a reality in which a Muslim monarchy extends its governance to Christian nations and lands,” and pointing to the generations-long exploitative and hypocritical approach of the European countries to the Ottoman Empire:

When the Ottomans were strong and their massive army proceeded from one conquest to the next, [the nations of Europe] bowed their heads and asked to be in their confidence and sought their help. But ever since their sun has set and their heroism has dried up . . . they did not spare any opportunity that they saw before them to hamper Turkey’s steps, to tear region after region from it, to cut down and reduce the power of its rule even in the regions that are left to it.⁴⁵

He concludes the article by directly comparing Turkey’s present situation to that of the Jewish people, the vision for Jewish national liberation, and the realization of Zionism: “With the abolition of the capitulations, Turkey is emerging from slavery to freedom. It is

becoming free from foreign financial and legal custodianship, becoming a master of its own fate, becoming totally free to act, free to organize its governmental life without obstacle or interruption, without coming up against external delays, insulting and burdensome restrictions at every turn.”⁴⁶

At the same time, however, Ben-Gurion was completely aware of the dangers that the new political situation might have in store for foreign subjects like himself, though he sincerely hoped that the recent developments would eventually reshape Ottoman state citizenship along more equitable lines and specifically that it would have a positive impact on the Yishuv’s living conditions:

Now the obstacle has been removed. The privileges of foreigners have been abolished, all residents of the monarchy have become equal. The strange situation in which the foreigner is above the citizen is no more. There is one constitution for the foreigner and the citizen. But it must be a progressive constitution, a just law. Not to *reduce* foreigners to the inferior civil status, but the opposite. The monarchy’s leadership, in freeing the land from the yoke of external enslavement, have obligated themselves to a double duty: one toward their subjects and one toward the foreigners: *mending the internal deficiencies* that we know made the capitulations regime necessary—that is the most secure guarantee for the free development of our land.⁴⁷

In December 1914, as Turkey was joining the world war, Ben-Gurion published an article in *Ha-Abdut* titled “Civic Training,” in which he focuses on the internal consequences of abolishing the capitulations on the Yishuv and emphasizes the imminent need for the Yishuv Zionists to become citizens of the Ottoman state. He begins by harshly criticizing the current situation, in which the Jewish settlers are not citizens: “The pioneers of the Hebrew people, the rebels against the diaspora who, weary of their wanderings and their moving about, came to build a homeland for their people in the fatherland, have forgotten only one little thing in the course of their work: to be citizens in the yearned-for homeland.”⁴⁸ Ben-Gurion blames “the sin of foreignness” on the bureaucratic entanglements

that had faced foreign subjects in Turkey: "It is well-known that various obstacles and obstructions were placed in the path of becoming citizens and subjects in the days of the capitulations and foreigners' rights, as well as delays on the part of consuls and government bureaucrats."⁴⁹

Be that as it may, Ben-Gurion did not consider the lion's share of the Zionist Yishuv's problem in this matter to be "external" foreignness, meaning the absence of formal citizenship, but rather the "internal" foreignness,⁵⁰ or in other words the Zionist settlers' detachment from the cultural and political life of the state that they had come to make their home:

In addition to our civic foreignness, the cultural foreignness or the civic ignorance that characterizes our Yishuv was also at work. There is nothing resembling our civic ignorance in Eretz Israel in any other Jewish community. The Yishuv has no civil-political consciousness and training. The basic points of political manners, the law book and the administrative management of Turkey, things that any simple person anywhere knows, are like a closed book to almost all the Yishuv residents. The language of the country, the language of the state, the local customs, the life of the country are foreign not only to the masses of the people but also to our intelligentsia.⁵¹

Ben-Gurion pinned his hopes on the Yishuv residents becoming citizens, believing that it would end "all of the abnormality of our foreignness" and pave the way for the Zionist Yishuv in Palestine to internally reestablish itself around a concrete connection to the political and cultural environment in new and efficient ways, and to participate in the political arena to promote the establishment of the state and of Jewish self-rule in Palestine:

Internally speaking, the process of becoming citizens would be complete only if it were to be followed by the gradual and constant work by a formal civic collective, one that directs its internal life as autonomously as a nation that is organized on the basis of the rights accorded to it by law, and which

participates—in proportion to its quantitative and qualitative weight—in the general leadership of the state through its representatives in the parliament and through the self-rule in the vilayets [the subdistricts of the Ottoman Empire since 1864] and in its cities.⁵²

It is obvious that Ben-Gurion believed that the Ottoman state would continue to exist, and thus that the basic condition for continuing the Zionist project, and all that that project implied for the aspiration for Jewish self-rule, was to try to integrate the Yishuv Zionists and the Yishuv itself into the civic life of the Ottoman state—and to do so through the internal Ottoman administrative system. It is thus no coincidence that Ben-Gurion responded positively to the new Vilayets Law that was passed a year earlier, following the revolution carried out by the Committee of Union and Progress in early 1913, which was intended to give greater autonomy to districts throughout the state.⁵³ At the same time, however, Ben-Gurion's identification with Ottoman Turkey had its own internal logic that is too entrenched to be described as mere adaptation to the historical circumstances. The fact that he correctly recognized Eretz Israel's objective and historical link to the Ottoman Empire led him to imagine the new Jewish nation that was emerging in Palestine as one of the Eastern nations standing shoulder to shoulder with Turkey on its side of the East-West divide, facing the constant threat posed by the European superpowers. He articulated his approach on the subject in an article titled "On the Question of the East," in which he analyzes the geopolitical reality created as a result of the outbreak of World War I, and in which he expresses real concern about the possibility that the Allies would win the war:

A victory for the Allies and the Triple Entente would be a victory for liberty and progress. It is in both England and France that the ideas of revolution and the rule of the people were born. Here is the homeland of free thought and the movement for popular liberation. Even despotic Russia, whether it wants to or not, will be pulled along by the general current and change the organization of its life along new foundations. These are the hopes that many pin on the

Triple Entente. But while the West believes that there is truth in that evaluation, if we discuss the situation from the East's perspective then we are forced to come to completely different conclusions. . . . France and England's liberal politics are a merchandise that is available to merchants only in their internal markets. For the external market, and particularly for the East, it is a rare luxury. In France they separate church and state internally, they close the Jesuit associations and forbid them to educate the younger generations—and they flood the East with monks and priests and gather funds for Jesuits schools. In England and the Anglo-Saxon colonies there is a popular rule whose liberty is unmatched throughout the world, and in India there is a despotic regime that strangles any free idea and any sign of popular awakening by the harshest and cruelest means.⁵⁴

Of course, Ben-Gurion could not have predicted that the Allied victory in the world war would result in an unprecedented victory for political Zionism in the form of the Balfour Declaration. It is also important to remember that Britain had a rather distrustful relationship with Zionism on the eve of the war. The Turkish historian Mim Kemal Öke shows that officials in the British Foreign Ministry saw the Zionists—and particularly the German Zionists—as a group that might increase Germany's influence in the area, and they feared a triple-sided alliance between the Young Turks, the Zionists, and Germany as a counterweight to British interests in the region.⁵⁵ In other words, Ben-Gurion's concerns about Turkey's enemies, and the possibility that new conquerors would come to the region with their own interests, was not disconnected from the political constellation that characterized the last peaceful years of the Euro-Asiatic space at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Ben-Gurion's pro-Turkish patriotic zeal, and his view that the Zionist Yishuv was an integral part of the Ottoman imperial space, did not help his case with the Ottoman authorities: he was expelled from the country in the spring of 1915 along with Ben-Zvi. Israel Bartal's aforementioned study shows that the "Ottomanization" idea of the two was rooted in the spatial and geocultural contexts of the time, that it was linked to Eastern European autonomism, and

that it was part of the notion that the Jewish nation was part of the multinational imperial experience.⁵⁶ Thus, Bartal argues that Ben-Zvi and Ben-Gurion's espousal of this view should not be seen as an example of their adaptability and self-censorship in the face of the ominous Turkish regime. If, after considering Bartal's study and after reviewing the above examples of the Poalei Zion party's worldview that the Jews were one of the Ottoman nations, if after all of this there are still doubts as to the ideological authenticity and internal coherence of Ben-Gurion's declared political vision during the Ottoman period, then we must turn to his programmatic article "Our National Rights in Turkey and in Palestine," published in the New York-based Jewish newspaper *Ha-Toren* in the summer of 1916, after he had already been deported from Palestine by the Turkish authorities and was living in the United States, far from the war in the Middle East and beyond the Turks' reach.⁵⁷ In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that it is this article, more than any other text that he wrote before or during the first stages of World War I, which most eloquently and systematically expresses his "Ottomanizing" Zionist vision.

Ben-Gurion begins his article with his assessment of the ongoing war's consequences thus far and with speculations about its impact on the "national question" and national rights. He does state that he is not so naïve as to believe "the words of the leaderships of the warring states," according to which "this war is about nothing more than defending the honor of the smaller nations and fighting their fight" in the name of "the sanctified principle of the freedom of the nations and the defense of their rights."⁵⁸ Nevertheless, he also says, "We should not doubt the reality of the fact that the national question is an important and major factor in the war."⁵⁹ It was thus clear to Ben-Gurion that the geopolitical order in the areas where the fighting was taking place would not survive unchanged and that he expected that the new order would address the matter of the Jews' national status alongside the national questions posed by "all the nations robbed of justice." The problem, he complains, is that although he is happy that "this time we did not fall behind the rest of the nations" and that "in the current global debate the issue of the Jews' national rights has been raised for discussion," it is still the case that "the Jewish public is almost completely unaware that

for hundreds of years the Jews have already been enjoying national rights in one of the more important countries for our national future—in Turkey and within it, in Palestine as well.”⁶⁰

Like Ben-Zvi in his above-mentioned article “Our National Claims in Turkey,” Ben-Gurion is referring here to the Turkish millet system, extolling it as the only possible way to secure Jewish national rights. Recall that the millet system was the ethno-religious autonomous infrastructure for the legal existence of the various ethno-religious groups dispersed throughout Ottoman Turkey, a system that was complemented by almost full civil equality in 1856.⁶¹ Ben-Gurion supports his argument by stating that “we the Jews have been blessed with a great many languages and we have become dispersed in every land, and we are a national minority in all these places—we can enjoy national rights only if they are founded not on a territorial basis, and not even based on a linguistic characteristic, but actually on a personal basis—on belonging to the body of the Hebrew nation regardless of location and language.”⁶²

“Despite all of its organic deficiencies and incompleteness,”⁶³ Ben-Gurion did not consider the autonomous ethno-national millets to be relics of the diasporic past that should be cast aside. On the contrary, he believed that the millet system was the right foundation on which to more properly rebuild the modern Jewish nation, whose rights, he hoped, would be fully recognized after the war was over. What did Ben-Gurion see in the Ottoman method of autonomous ethno-religious entities that made him believe that it should be renewed in order to secure Jewish national rights in the postwar era of the twentieth century? How does the national-legal legacy of the “sick man of Europe,” a common derogatory term for the late Ottoman Empire that Ben-Gurion himself uses in that same article, become relevant to him for imagining the relations between national groups in the era of modern nationalism? As it turns out, Ben-Gurion saw a clear similarity between the millet system and one of the most popular national-political doctrines in the multinational Eastern and Central European space at that time: “The basis of the rights of nations in Turkey, as they became established and finalized under the reign of Mehmed Fatih (the Conqueror) in the fifteenth century, is the very same personal principle of national autonomy developed by the Austrian legal scholars Springer and Bauer in their

academic essays and that was adopted in 1899 by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party in Brno.”⁶⁴

Here Ben-Gurion is repeating almost word for word what Vladimir Jabotinsky wrote in his 1910 article “The National Question in Turkey,” which we discussed above.⁶⁵ Of course, this does not mean that Ben-Gurion was writing his article for *Ha-Toren* while holding a copy of the Odessan newspaper *Odesskiye novosti* from six years earlier that contained Jabotinsky’s article. Nevertheless, this demands an explanation: here are two central figures in the history of Zionist political nationalism who shared the same world of political ideas and metaphors in the early stages of Zionism’s development, a world that was founded on viewing the Ottoman Empire as the political site in which the Jewish people’s national-political rights would be realized, while at the same time constantly referring to the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a point of comparison and source of inspiration for ideas regarding multinational reform that developed within Austro-Marxist political thought.

Recall that Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, and the Austro-Marxist *Nationalitätenstaat* doctrine spoke not only of the need to recognize the personal autonomy of nations that are spread out throughout the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also of the need to recognize the territorial autonomy of nations that comprise a majority in certain districts considered to be their historic homelands. The principle of extraterritorial personal autonomy was thus intended to complement the state’s other forms of national rights in a way that corresponds to the complex and mixed ethno-national reality, within which, as Ahad Ha’am remarked, the different nations do not only live “side by side” but (also) “one inside the other,” in other words that they are neighbors living in the same multinational districts. Ben-Gurion was well aware of the multinational challenges that the Austro-Marxists wanted to address. He empathized with the complex solution that they proposed and believed that it would be possible to easily implement it in Ottoman Turkey because of the existing legal basis provided by the millet system, which he saw as a premodern realization of the idea of personal autonomy:

In Austria, at least in the Social Democratic Party circles, they recognized the need to grant national autonomy after

the attempt to solve the national question by giving home rule to the various regions and provinces did not lead to the desired results. Territorial autonomy did not solve the national question, it fragmented it. Instead of one question that encompasses the entire state, many questions arose, corresponding in number to the number of autonomous regions. . . . The majority's rights were guaranteed, but what would be the rule for the minority, whose legal rights are undermined by the majority? And what would a part of the majority do when it found itself in a region of another national majority? And a nation like the Jewish nation, which is everywhere a minority, what will happen with it? And populations that wander from place to place within the state, could it be that each man would lose his national rights by changing his location? To correct this distortion, the socialist scholars proposed to reestablish national autonomy that would be on a personal basis, in other words to organize members of a nation, regardless of where they are, into one national association, and that this association would be recognized by the state as a legal entity that has recognized rights so as to provide for the national needs shared by the nation's members. Again, this collective would not be restricted to certain regional borders, but would instead include all the people that belong to a recognized nation.⁶⁶

We should not be misled into thinking that Ben-Gurion had become a supporter of the Bund, which had famously adopted the idea of personal autonomy, taking it from the Austro-Marxist ideology, and had implemented it in the Jewish case by turning the struggle for this extraterritorial national-cultural autonomy for Jews into the essence of its national-political demands. On the contrary, Ben-Gurion obviously considered the new Zionist Yishuv in Palestine to be the crown jewel of Jewish national life in the Ottoman state (and beyond) and as an example of an upgraded model that should continue to be developed: "The idea of national revival and Hebrew education, which are the driving force of our new Yishuv in our homeland, put Jewry/Jewish people at the forefront of the revival movement and the assertion of our national self."⁶⁷ That being

said, however, the “the work of the Yishuv” and the ideological and moral superiority of the Eretz Israeli Yishuv were intended to reshape extraterritorial national autonomy, not to deny its value. According to Ben-Gurion, the national rights of the Jewish people in Ottoman Turkey (and beyond) to return to and settle in their territorial homeland were part and parcel of the national rights of Jews living outside of Palestine. In other words, he believed that the Ottoman Jews’ right to educate their children in the spirit of Zionism, so that they would one day immigrate to Palestine and become members of a territorial nation, was an obvious part of the personal collective national rights of the Jewish “national personality” in Turkey (and beyond). That is why he unhesitatingly supported the Austro-Marxist principle of personal autonomy as a legal foundation that was essential for Jewish national life, and that is why he pinned his hopes for the postwar future on its implementation. It is certainly true that Ben-Gurion’s approach to the idea of personal autonomy was an instrumental one. He adopted it to help achieve the more important goal of territorializing the Jewish people in Palestine, which he saw as the overriding purpose of the Zionist idea. Nevertheless, adopting the personal autonomy principle had the practical and ideological consequence of promoting the reorganization of Turkey into a multinational state in the spirit of Austro-Marxism. In a seemingly paradoxical manner, realizing territorial self-determination for a nation that is dispersed throughout a multinational space entails supporting a world order that affirms the rights of extraterritorial nations and groups to develop their collective national identities, or in other words an order founded on restricting the idea of total (uni-)national sovereignty and legitimizing the existence of a multitude of both territorial and extraterritorial national identities in the same political space.

It is instructive to consider how deeply aware Ben-Gurion was of the advantages that Turkey’s multinational sociocultural and political reality presented for Zionism and the matter of Jewish national rights. In “Our National Rights in Turkey and in Palestine,” the young Ottoman Zionist Ben-Gurion was writing for an American Jewish audience in an American Jewish newspaper, and in doing so he compares the “nationalities question” in the Ottoman state to the multi-ethnic reality of the United States. It appears that the United States

did not have the upper hand in Ben-Gurion's comparison insofar as the status of the Jews was concerned:

Turkey resembles America. Here too we find a multitude of nations, a multitude of languages, a range of religions. But the resemblance is only superficial. In America, despite the first generation and the immigrant ingathering's linguistic medley, there is only one spirit, the spirit of Anglo-Saxon culture, which inundates the country's length and breadth, and only one tongue, English, that holds sway in all the schools in the state, in the administration, the press, the street, the market, in the relations between the different nations and mostly even among the various nations themselves. . . . This is not so in Turkey. There is no central, ruling culture there that has the legitimacy to impress itself on the environment's spiritual life. . . . The Turks' lack of inclination for assimilation is illustrated by the absence of Turkish assimilation among the Jews.⁶⁸

Ben-Gurion believed that the multiplicity of ethno-national groups in Turkey, and the continued legitimacy of this state of affairs, was what made the concrete sociocultural life of the Ottoman Empire's Jews possible over the generations, until the arrival of Zionism, which, he believed, would be able to harness the collective consciousness of the Jewish self-rule institutions to advance its national agenda. This, of course, depended on "the internal changes [that] would take place in the Turkish state," which stands "on the threshold of a new era."⁶⁹

Before we cross the "threshold of a new era" with Ben-Gurion, but without the Ottoman state, we should conclude our discussion of the "Ottomanization" approach with one essential conceptual observation: when Ben-Gurion envisioned the Jewish nation's post-war political future, he used the term "self-determination" in an explicitly statist autonomist sense.⁷⁰ In fact, it appears that he never imagined that the term "self-determination" could have any other meaning in a reality composed of multinational empires. The natural reason for this is that he could not imagine the massive changes that were about to take place: "Today, the Jews are not demanding

national rights in every country, and even not in every warring country. The demand for national recognition and self-determination is directed only at countries with multinational populations, those that sociology calls 'nationalities states'—such as Russia, Austria, Turkey."⁷¹ As he stood "on the threshold of a new era," Ben-Gurion was equipped with autonomist national-political concepts borrowed from the discourse of multinational reform that prevailed on the eve of World War I. Did he cast these aside as he crossed the threshold, and if so, to what extent?

III

Ben-Gurion's concerns about what would happen if the Ottoman state collapsed proved to be false. A year and a half after "Our National Rights in Turkey and in Palestine" was published, on the eve of Turkey's final collapse, the Western superpower whose intentions Ben-Gurion had previously considered to be rather questionable⁷² had granted the Zionist movement an unprecedented achievement—the Balfour Declaration regarding the Jewish people's right to a national home in Palestine, which was incorporated into the language of the Palestine Mandate that was given to Britain. This development took place against the backdrop of the massive geopolitical changes that redrew the Euro-Asiatic map in a way that was far removed from what it had been for hundreds of years. Ostensibly, there was no political perspective that was farther removed from the new reality than the vision that Ben-Gurion had developed into a systematic and detailed proposal since 1910, only a short time before the collapse of the tri-imperial space in Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Middle East into nation-states and Mandate territories: a subsovereign Zionism within a multinational empire.

Indeed, immediately after the Balfour Declaration was issued, and then throughout the Mandate period, Ben-Gurion repeatedly and explicitly stressed that he was committed to establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. At a very early stage, the Eretz Israeli wing of the Poalei Zion party issued an enthusiastic official response to the developments in Palestine and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1919).⁷³ In it, they openly declared that their intention was to establish a sovereign "Hebrew state" in which the Jewish people would

be masters of their own fate. Since then and throughout the Mandate period, Ben-Gurion consistently and unequivocally declared that Zionism's intention was to establish a Jewish state with a Jewish majority.⁷⁴ This declaration, however, did not fully spell out the Poalei Zion party and Ben-Gurion's vision for the civil-national character of that state, nor of the relations between Jews and non-Jews living in it.

In fact, the Ben-Gurionian perspective on the desired character of the Jewish nation's self-determination—in other words, the concrete meaning of the term “Jewish state”—was closer to his views during the Ottoman period than to the unequivocal model of a state governed by a single sovereign nation, which we have seen emerging throughout the Eastern and Central European space (and in the Middle East in the form of Israel) since the middle of the last century. This is illustrated, for instance, by the political speech that Ben-Gurion gave in the first session of the Jewish Yishuv's second Assembly of Representatives in 1926.⁷⁵ The speech was part of the debate that he was having with Shlomo Kaplansky,⁷⁶ who had proposed in the 1924 Ahdut HaAvoda Congress in Ein Harod to establish a binational parliamentary regime in Palestine, and to do this despite the Arab population's demographic advantage. Ben-Gurion begins by referring to the current state of affairs in Palestine as a starting point for sketching out the future political order in the country:

In such a country [in Palestine] with such a great multiplicity of races, ethnicities, religions, international political connections, and socio-cultural doctrines, it is impossible that there could be one law and one arrangement that would be adequate for all the country's residents. . . . This very multiplicity requires decentralization, different systems according to the unique needs of each special part of the country's inhabitants. . . . Whatever kind of government there will be in Palestine, whether it is a Mandate government or whether it would one day become a government of the inhabitants of Palestine, this makes it necessary for the central national government to minimize itself to only those governmental functions that must naturally be concentrated in

one national administration. . . . And the conclusion is that the situation in the country necessitates an autonomous arrangement for all the many habitations in Palestine, including what is most important for us, namely the autonomous arrangement for the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine.⁷⁷

Later in the speech, Ben-Gurion discusses what he considered to be the essential political meaning of his demand to establish an “autonomous arrangement for the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine” through the issue of the relations between Jews and Arabs:

We will not be able to be an *autonomous* territorial nation, which I believe that it is our goal to become—because our aim is not to rule over others, not to be a ruler nation like all the other ruler nations, our goal is that we be masters of our own fate, *no more than that and no less*—we will not realize this aspiration if we do not realize it on the level of our daily life, our economic, cultural, political, social, and public life here in Palestine. . . . *It makes no difference if we are a minority and others are the majority, or if we are the majority and others are a minority. Just relations between the nations cannot depend on that, on whether one nation is a minority and another nation is a majority.* That is the basic assumption that informs and determines the relations between us and our Arab neighbors. And we must draw all the practical conclusions from this basic assumption. . . . And that same basic assumption that we adopt for ourselves, it cannot be just for us, but rather it must be a general assumption for the entire population of Palestine, whether they are a majority and we are a minority or we are a majority and they are a minority. All other notions undermine our existence in Palestine.⁷⁸

What would it look like for the Yishuv to have an “autonomous arrangement”—which, as mentioned above, would hold even if “we are the majority and others are a minority”—and what is its conceptual basis? It appears that in terms of the arrangement’s functional institutional logic, Ben-Gurion saw no difference between extraterritorial Jewish autonomy in the diaspora and “the territorial personal-

ity of the Hebrew nation returning to its homeland.”⁷⁹ On the contrary, he considered the various historical iterations of Jewish autonomy in the diaspora, including, of course, the “millet (nation) arrangement in Turkey,” to be a basic guideline for the territorial political life of the growing Zionist Yishuv. This is because he thought that Jewish self-rule in the diaspora contained a healthy political nucleus that should be sown in Palestine’s soil—in other words, the principle that Jews should rule over Jews. Needless to say, however, Ben-Gurion and the Zionist Labor movement also believed that “the territorial personality of the Hebrew people returning to its homeland” would entail fundamental changes to the socioeconomic and cultural aspects of the nation’s character. Unlike in the diaspora, the modern Jewish national Yishuv in Palestine was supposed to become a basis for building a productive, territorial, and Hebrew-speaking nation, with all that this would mean for the more general Zionist effort to revolutionize the economic, social, and cultural character of the Jewish people—a project that is one of the most well-known parts of Zionism’s history and historiography.⁸⁰ Yet what the text above does show us is that in one essential domain, namely, in the political-governmental domain, Ben-Gurion opted for continuity with the diaspora rather than a revolutionary break from it. The new territorial Jewish nation would govern itself and itself alone in Palestine’s Jewish colonies and Jewish majority cities.⁸¹

Now the question becomes, how does this work on a practical level? Who would rule over the Arab minority that might live in towns that have a Jewish majority, and who would rule over the Jewish minority that might live in areas with an Arab majority? Here, too, Ben-Gurion did not disconnect his approach to this subject from the recent historical past: “In those places where Jews live among a non-Jewish majority, in a non-Jewish township, there we must complement our territorial autonomy by means of communal autonomy. In Austria, they also thought of the idea of implementing a personal autonomy arrangement, only as a *complement* to the territorial autonomy arrangements enjoyed by the various nations concentrated in the many provinces of the old Habsburg monarchy.”⁸² In this way, Ben-Gurion imagined the “state-in-the-making” in 1926 in the same way that he envisioned the reformed Ottoman

state ten years previously—as a nationalities state that combines the principles of territorial and personal autonomy while using the “old Habsburg monarchy” as a point of reference and an authoritative model for establishing a political framework in a multiethnic space, despite the fact that that monarchy had meanwhile ceased to exist.

Five years later, Ben-Gurion published a full-fledged political program in *Hapoel Hatzair* titled “Assumptions for Determining a Governmental Regime in Palestine.” This program became the official Mapai platform in the early 1930s against the backdrop of the 1929 riots, the Passfield “White Paper,” and the MacDonald Letter (1931).⁸³ In the program’s opening section, Ben-Gurion states what he had openly and consistently been committed to throughout most of the Mandate period: “Eretz Israel is for the Jewish people and the Arabs who reside in it.”⁸⁴ Some scholars see this statement as proof that Ben-Gurion explicitly denied the national collective rights of the Palestinian Arabs.⁸⁵ This claim, however, is rather problematic. As Ben-Gurion himself explained at different points in his career, his intention was that it is impossible to grant equal national rights in Palestine to the Jewish people and its diasporas on one hand and to the Arab nation that inhabits the entire Middle Eastern space on the other. Whereas Palestine is a national homeland for every Jew in the world, the Arabs who live outside of Palestine (unlike the Arabs who live in Palestine) have no national rights there.⁸⁶ Insofar as concerns the type of rights that Arabs living in Palestine would enjoy under a final political arrangement, in the event that a Jewish majority would be created, Ben-Gurion believed that they should not only enjoy individual rights but also the autonomous rights of a recognized national collective. Even in those places in his political program where he discusses the Jewish national collective’s national rights and the content of Zionism’s primary political goal, he clearly continues to develop and amend the autonomist territorialism of the mid-1920s, which focuses on establishing a national Jewish autonomy that is part of a decentralized national government:

Palestine would become a federal state whose subsections will be: (1) the municipal government of the village and the city, which is completely independent; (2) cantons that comprise autonomous states within the federal Palestinian gov-

ernment. Every continuous habitation of no less than twenty-five thousand people is able to become a free canton. Every canton is able to write its constitution for itself. No canton can pass a law that restricts or violates the rights and equality of another canton's residents. Every citizen has equal rights in all the cantons; (3) the national autonomy would have complete authority in the areas of education, culture, and language, according to the constitution that would be passed by the founding assembly.⁸⁷

It should be stressed that the essence of Arab national autonomy proposed in the program means much beyond merely self-ruling educational and cultural affairs. After all, the basic administrative units of the imagined future "Eretz Israeli" state are national territorial cantons—indeed "states within the state" of sorts—containing national parliaments and executive bodies,⁸⁸ rather than extraterritorial communities subject to the sovereignty of a Jewish majority.

Ben-Gurion was not the only figure in the Mandate-era Zionist Labor movement who spoke in autonomist terms about the Jewish nation's self-determination in Palestine.⁸⁹ Berl Katznelson, the ideological mainstay of the Zionist Labor movement, gave a long political lecture in the Third Mapai Congress, February 5–8, 1931, only days before the MacDonald Letter was published, in which he argued that Zionism must work toward an equitable model of joint binational sovereignty in Palestine, and to do so as a matter of principle.⁹⁰ This was the antithesis of the "national state" view in its entirety, regardless of whether the proposed state would be Jewish or Arab.⁹¹ In the process of presenting this vision, Katznelson openly and concretely discusses the prewar autonomist roots of his Zionist political thought:

National autonomism is not new to us. Its roots in Jewish history run deep. Modern socialist thought since the days of Synopticus-Springer-Renner had raised the idea of a *nation-alities state* versus a *national state*, and made sure to define the laws of national autonomy, its content and its domains. In the days of the Haskalah, the term "Kahal" was seen as a monster, a target for all manner of denunciation. The awak-

ening of Jewish thought restored Jewish autonomism its dignity (Dubnov, Zhitlovsky), the Jewish socialist movements fought for the national autonomy's right to its assets. After the world war, there were those Zionist voices who argued that national autonomy in Palestine is nothing but a diasporic relic, a deferment of redemption. Despite all of its territorialist feeling, the workers' movement in Palestine never discounted the importance of developing tools for autonomous Jewish life, even in the days of great political hopes. . . . The workers' movement did not only consider national autonomy as a Jewish privilege, but also as a means of organizing and providing for the national needs of *every* national group in Palestine.⁹²

Like Ben-Gurion five years previously, Katznelson emphasizes that alongside the "deep territorial roots," which reflect the fundamental social-national change that the Zionist Labor movement aspires to with regard to the reestablishment of the Jewish collective as a nation rooted in the soil of the Palestinian homeland, there are aspects of the Jewish past that he and his movement wished to preserve and readopt on a territorial basis—namely, the idea of Jewish self-rule. No less important, of course, is the fact that he mentions Karl Renner's thought ("Synopticus-Springer-Renner") and the Austro-Marxist nationalities state doctrine of the turn of the twentieth century, considering it to be a relevant ideological infrastructure for shaping the nature of the future political regime and the relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Importantly, he mentions this more than a decade after the collapse of the geopolitical structures in which the *Nationalitätenstaat* vision emerged as an alternative to the *Nationalstaat*.

Like the research on Jabotinsky,⁹³ most research regarding Ben-Gurion's "Ottomanization" approach,⁹⁴ as well as the existing historiography on Ben-Gurion and the Mandate-era Zionist Labor movement, does not consider the nationalities state Zionism that he espoused at the time to be part of a coherent political worldview. The most common explanation that these researchers propose is that Ben-Gurion's multinational models were essentially a calculated tactical-pragmatic move. Shabtai Teveth, one of the most important

Ben-Gurion scholars, argues that the “federalist Palestine” plan that Ben-Gurion proposed in the early 1930s was clearly a tactical maneuver to gain some time for the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine to grow and strengthen.⁹⁵ Joseph Heller repeats this argument almost verbatim: the idea of a Jewish-Arab federation of cantons in Palestine was nothing more than a “tactical plan in terms of its content and goals; and like all of Ben-Gurion’s plans, it was intended to guarantee that the process of accumulating power would continue.”⁹⁶ It should be mentioned that such arguments are presented with no supporting historical documents or sources authored by Ben-Gurion himself, nothing that would indicate that his multinational autonomist plans were mere talk devoid of any strategic political thinking. To this “tactical” school of thought, it seems obvious that those plans were intended to help the Yishuv navigate politically in the 1920s and early 1930s between Arab demands on one hand and British policy on the other. More than anything else, they argue that the plans were intended to be alternatives to the British proposal (1920) and the British-Arab proposal (1928) to establish a joint legislative council for Jews and Arabs,⁹⁷ one that would have reflected the demographic power relations in Palestine at the time and that would have thwarted Jewish immigration through legislation, thus helping to maintain the Arab majority in the country.

The other explanation proposed for Ben-Gurion’s Mandate-era multinational autonomist worldview is Yosef Gorny’s “utopian realist” argument, which, as we may recall, he also proposes for understanding the Jabotinskian multinational models of that period.⁹⁸ Like in his approach to Jabotinsky, Gorny considers Ben-Gurion’s multinational vision for Palestine to have a utopian dimension that is disconnected from the concrete historical reality of that time. At the same time, he also identifies a realist dimension in that utopian vision: the latter had the function of giving Ben-Gurion and others the internal motivation necessary to address the challenges of the day-to-day political reality.⁹⁹

Even if we assume that Ben-Gurion (and Berl Katznelson) adopted the multinational autonomist approach for tactical reasons, or, as Gorny argues, because their utopian aspirations made it easier for them to confront the major political difficulties that they faced, there are still several fundamental historical questions that are left

unanswered: why did representatives of Ben-Gurion's Zionist faction, rightly considered to be the most realistic and conscious of the "spirit of the times" in the Zionist movement, continue to refer to political approaches from the bygone imperial era, including pre-World War I concepts like "national personality," "millet," and "nationalities state"? Furthermore, why did they consider extraterritorial patterns of Jewish autonomy to be a relevant political model for Zionism, alongside their undisputed commitment to turning the Jewish people into a territorial nation? How does the Zionist revolutionary Berl Katznelson, for whom the most important thing was the Jewish nation's new territorial way of life in Palestine, turn to Simon Dubnow, the founder of Jewish national autonomism, as a useful source for borrowing pieces of national-political ideology?¹⁰⁰ It is not just that the existing historiography offers no answers to these essentially "diasporic" questions, in a sense that they relate to the pre-World War I space of the multinational empires far beyond the framework of the Yishuv, but that it never poses them in the first place. This historiography in general, and the historical study of the Zionist Labor movement in particular, is characterized by a Yishuvocentric mindset that discusses the phenomenology of the worldviews and political metaphors held by Yishuv figures that immigrated to Palestine from the multinational empires in a way that disconnects those worldviews and metaphors from the contexts in which they originated, all the while betraying a total lack of interest in the non-Yishuv past and broader context of modern Jewish history in Eastern and Central Europe at the time of Zionism's emergence.¹⁰¹

It is certainly true that Ben-Gurion's and the Zionist labor party's "historical acumen," which key historians of the subject rightly stress, did not fail them this time either. As we noticed in the previous chapters, however, the post-World War I geopolitical reality in the formerly imperial space was actually quite different from how it appears if it is observed through the retrospective lens of the arrangements that were implemented in that same space after World War II. Though the prewar multinational-political frameworks did disappear, the concrete ethno-national socio-demographic reality remained essentially the same, except in extreme cases like the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey. Even the new (and

old-new) nation-states that arose in many parts of the postimperial space were *de facto* multinational states, though as a rule, ethnocentric policy made sure that most states would guarantee the self-determination rights of one particular ethnic nation, or else one particular group of ethnic nations. Given that the post-World War I space that had only recently belonged to the multinational empires continued to have a clear multinational character, it is no wonder that ideas which developed within that space and which were intended to address its problems (and which were even practically implemented in various ways as part of the provincial compromises of the Habsburg monarchy on the eve of the war) would still be seen as worthy of practical consideration by contemporaries of that period.

Furthermore, despite the dramatic impact that the geopolitical shifts of 1914–1918 had had on Jews living in formerly imperial spaces, the new reality of the 1920s and early 1930s did not in any way suggest that Jewish national autonomism and the issue of Jewish national minority rights had become irrelevant in the new order. On the contrary, there were some—including Dubnow himself in the 1920s—who believed that the fact that Jews had been recognized as a national group deserving of collective rights under the new world order was a serious achievement,¹⁰² particularly considering that such recognition had never taken place under the imperial frameworks of Eastern-Central Europe, except for exceptional cases like the Bukovina Compromise (and even that held for only a short time).¹⁰³ Of course, the postimperial nation-states were unenthusiastic, to say the least, about meeting the conditions of the Minority Treaties, seeing those conditions as a threat to their national sovereignty. The idea of giving national rights to Jews—ethnocentric Europe's ultimate foreigners—was something that they considered tantamount to an injury to their national honor. As far as supporters of Jewish nationalism in those nation-states were concerned, however, the war was far from over, and the first among these Jewish nationalists were the local Zionist parties and leaders. Thus, while the pioneering Zionism in Palestine struggled to reshape the Jews into an “autonomous territorial nation,”¹⁰⁴ the Zionist movement's diasporic wing in Eastern and Central Europe continued to fight for the Jewish national minority's exterritorial autonomous rights in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic countries.

The Jewish ethno-demographic reality in the diaspora was what had initially led Ben-Gurion, at the time that he wrote “Our National Rights in Turkey and in Palestine,” to recognize the overriding functional value of extraterritorial Jewish self-rule in the Ottoman Empire as a basis for developing Jewish national collective consciousness and the “national personality,” and to see this extraterritorial Jewish self-rule a starting point for shaping a pioneering national identity that is oriented toward Palestine. That same reality continued to exist after World War I, though certainly not unchanged, in postimperial Eastern and Central Europe. Under the new post-World War I political order, Ben-Gurion could thus continue to believe that it was a positive step to recognize the *political* rights of diaspora Jews as a group—while emphasizing, of course, that Jewish territorial existence had ideological precedence as a core value vis-à-vis the diaspora both *socioeconomically* (balanced class structure) and *culturally* (the national language)—just as he did on the eve of the Ottoman state’s collapse. To be sure, he did negate the diaspora as a deficient social pattern for Jewish life—but at the very same time he clearly continued to believe that it was essential to maintain the legal-political and institutional infrastructure of the national collective experience of diaspora Jews. Indeed, without this infrastructure, without the conditions that would be amenable to developing Jewish Zionist nationalism within the diasporic Jewish “national personality,” it would be unclear as to who was meant to benefit from the Zionist project that the pioneer wing of Zionism had been working to establish in Eretz Israel. Ben-Gurion undoubtedly understood this, as evidenced by the speech that he gave as part of his fierce opposition to dismantling He-Halutz in the Soviet Union, in which he expressed regret for what he believed was the Zionist Labor movement’s neglect of the national struggle in Soviet Russia.¹⁰⁵

It is obvious that a political regime that would have granted national rights to the Jewish “national personality” in the diaspora would necessarily have had to be closer to a nationalities state model than to a national state model; a regime that would be as uninvolved in the “national personality” of its citizens as possible; a regime that would have federative, decentralized foundations as opposed to state centralization. And it does indeed appear that when Ben-Gurion

said, in his autonomist speech at the second Assembly of Representatives in 1926—“*It makes no difference if we are a minority and others are the majority, or if we are the majority and others are a minority. Just relations between the nations cannot depend on that, on whether one nation is a minority and another nation is a majority*”¹⁰⁶—he was referring not only to current and future Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, but also to the desired relationship between the Jewish nation and non-Jewish nations outside of Palestine:

What we demand for ourselves, we demand also for others, what we want others to give us, we are prepared to give to others. We do not want to suffer injustice *in the diaspora*, to have our rights oppressed and to be robbed of justice, and we cannot and do not desire to do that to others in our country; *we do not want foreigners to rule over us and our fate*. . . . We who come humbly and sincerely before the entire world to *demand total national equality for ourselves* are thus committed to put this demand to ourselves as well.¹⁰⁷

Anyone who reads the above speech by Ben-Gurion through the prism of the latter’s well-known statements during the period after the establishment of the state of Israel—such as “what matters is not what the Gentiles say, but what the Jews do,” or “UNO-Shmuno”¹⁰⁸—would be hard-pressed not to interpret the speech as tactical or utopian-realist in character. Historians, however, must examine the speech in its historical context, a period in which the Zionist movement was fighting on two fronts for two different forms of national collective rights—one in Palestine and the other in the Eastern and Central European diaspora. If we examine the speech in that context, it becomes clear that Ben-Gurion was articulating a strategic political approach to asserting the Jews’ national rights. Note, for example, that what stands behind Ben-Gurion’s abstract, somewhat colorful phraseology objecting to “injustice, to have our rights oppressed and to be robbed of justice” in the diaspora is the same decentralized autonomous model that he had proposed for Palestine and that then corresponded to what he considered to be desirable and valid in other places where Jews “demand

total national equality.” This model is thus the same political idea that Jabotinsky proposed,¹⁰⁹ according to which the rights of Jews and non-Jews comprise a single system. Like in Jabotinsky’s case, this political vision gives us a context-based geopolitical explanation for the support that we saw Ben-Gurion expressing for the multinational model: the establishment of a political regime in Palestine that would be in the spirit of a nationalities state would affirm the general principle that all national collective rights are equal, thus indirectly bolstering the struggle for the national rights of the Jewish “national personality” in Eastern and East-Central Europe.

IV

In 1932–1936, Ben-Gurion participated in talks with several contemporary Arab leaders from both Palestine and other countries. In these talks, he proposed to join the Jewish state, which would possess a Jewish majority, to an Arab federation.¹¹⁰ We should not, however, take this to mean that he gave up on his vision for a federative “decentralized” state. On the contrary, he continued to simultaneously seek a Jewish state with a clear Jewish majority while at the same time envisioning the political character of that state’s citizenship and internal self-rule in federative terms. Furthermore, his support for this idea was not restricted to those years alone; he espoused this vision even after the Arab Rebellion of 1936. Thus, on February 7, 1937, Ben-Gurion lectured before the Thirty-Fifth Zionist Labor Federation Council, five months before the Peel Commission would publish its recommendations on partitioning the country, and in his lecture he reiterated his commitment to a “Jewish state” while at the same time emphasizing, “The Arab residents of the land deserve all the civil rights, all the political rights, not just as individuals but also as a national collective, just like the Jews of Palestine.”¹¹¹ During his ideological debate with the Hashomer Hatzair leadership the next day, Ben-Gurion reiterated his support for the 1926 autonomist decentralization plan and quoted directly from the core of the plan, which concerns the matter of equality of the national collective rights of the Jewish people that live and settle in Palestine and the national collective rights of its Arab residents, under the future po-

litical regime.¹¹² He fiercely and explicitly rejected Ya'akov Hazan's argument that Ben-Gurion was intending to invalidate the national collective rights of the Arabs in the Jewish state:

Both of us [Mapai and Hashomer Hatzair] are committed to *political* equality between the two groups [the Jewish and the Arab], meaning equal representation in the central government's institutions. Hazan's argument that "B.G. [Ben-Gurion] is saying to only guarantee '*civil rights to the Arabs*'"—is drawn from the best kind of imaginings that Hashomer Hatzair gets carried away by from time to time, when they seek to accuse party members. No one in the party invalidates or doubts the rights of the Arabs as a national collective.¹¹³

The Peel Commission's conclusions, published in 1937, recommended partitioning western Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state by transferring 225,000 Arabs out of the Jewish state's territory to the Arab state's territory and 1,250 Jews from the Arab state's territory to the Jewish state. These recommendations comprised a watershed moment in the history of the Zionist political imagination. Though some argue that the Zionist movement had always contained transferist trends and visions for a Jewish Palestine that is "cleansed" of any Arab presence—an argument that is politically useful for propaganda against Israel—it appears that the opposite was true for most of Zionism's existence as a national movement, and that this position lacks any historical proof.¹¹⁴ On the contrary, unlike Israel Zangwill, whose commitment to Zionism was tenuous, to put it mildly, Zionism's most prominent leaders hardly imagined the Jewish nation's political future in Palestine without it existing alongside an Arab national collective with collective rights under one joint political framework. This was especially true after the Balfour Declaration and the emergence of an organized Arab-Palestinian national movement. The Zionist movement's mainstream factions certainly ignored the unwillingness of the Palestinian Arabs to turn from being a majority to being a minority. They did so because they saw Palestine as the historic national homeland of the Jewish people and thus believed that it was unnecessary to ask the current inhabitants for permission to return to that homeland.

However, there is a wide gulf between this position and the idea that Palestine as a country would be devoid of the Arabs' national life as a population with its own collective consciousness.

This wide gulf began to grow narrower in the Zionist consciousness, and particularly in Ben-Gurion's consciousness, after the publication of the Peel Commission's vision of implementing a maximal separation between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. It was this development that caused the Zionist leadership to imagine Jewish national life as uni-national, without Arabs living alongside Jews as a national collective. It is at this point that we see the first signs of a historical turning point in Ben-Gurion's consciousness.¹¹⁵

In contrast with the prevailing myths in today's Israeli public discourse, subscribed by some historians as well,¹¹⁶ Ben-Gurion did not consider the Peel Commission's idea of dividing the country into two uni-national spaces to be the final word on Zionism's realization. Rather, the historical sources on what Ben-Gurion was thinking at the time tell a different story. Only weeks after the Royal Commission had published its recommendations, Ben-Gurion told attendees of the Poalei Zion World Congress in Zurich:

The Jewish state that is offered to us now [in the partition territory], even if the necessary and possible amendments that are beneficial to us are made to it, is not a Zionist goal—we cannot solve the Jewish question in this territory. *However, it might be useful as a decisive step on the road to achieving the greater Zionist aim.* It would take the shortest amount of time to establish the concrete Jewish power that would bring us to our historical goal.¹¹⁷

A short time later, on October 29, 1937, Ben-Gurion laid out his “steps to the realization of Zionism” in light of the Peel Commission's decisions:

Establishing a Jewish state according to the partition plan, in other words, in one part of the country, does not entail the complete realization of the Zionist aspiration because only in all of Palestine would it be possible to solve the full breadth of the Jewish question. The proposed state could

therefore be nothing more than a stage, one of the stages, of Zionism's realization. And we should see two periods: (a) the establishment and foundation period; (b) the spreading-out period. By establishing the Jewish state, we do not give up our right to return and settle all parts of the land, and our settlement will never be restricted to the limited borders of the state. . . . The possibilities for expansion would not be possible unless all the efforts, actions, and relations of the Jewish state are directed toward building up and creating power and establishing neighborly relations in anticipation of our spreading out in the country, *based on our Arab neighbors' desire and consent, and in cooperation with them.*¹¹⁸

In other words, when Ben-Gurion imagined Jewish sovereignty spreading throughout the entire country, he still envisioned a joint political framework with "the Arabs." But what would the regime of a Jewish state where Jews and Arabs live together look like? Did his political worldview still have room for the institutionalized self-rule of both nations in the future state, as it did only a short time beforehand? The negative answer to this question was not unequivocal, but the change in his thought was growing increasingly clear:

The Jewish state will need to behave toward its Arab citizens *as if they were Jews*, in other words not just to give them equal rights in all areas of life, in the legislature, in the state bureaucracy, in the state services, in the economy, in culture—but rather to constantly take steps to *equate* the life conditions of the Arab minority with the economic and cultural conditions of the Jewish majority. Obviously, this will not happen at once. Such a wonder is beyond the state's ability and beyond the Arabs' capabilities. However, the Jewish state will not be true to its Zionist aim if it does not intentionally and constantly aim to raise the quality of life of the Arab minority to the cultural, social, and economic level of the Jewish majority—through compulsory education, medical and sanitation services, legislation that defends the industrial and agricultural worker, development of a professional union and economic cooperatives, with no racial

division, among the workers, the farmers, the free professionals, the craftsmen and industrial workers and Jewish and Arab merchants.¹¹⁹

We should not misinterpret Ben-Gurion's opening words: "The Jewish state will need to behave toward its Arab citizens *as if they were Jews*." At the beginning of that year, this sentence could have referred to the idea that both Arabs and Jews would have political rights as national collectives in the Jewish state,¹²⁰ but in the context in which these words were written, the intention was actually to blur the national distinction between Jews and Arabs and to have the state ignore that difference. There is no mention here of the matter of the Arab collective's national autonomy or the state's recognition of its collective national rights. Furthermore, since the 1920s and until a short time before the Peel Commission's recommendations, Ben-Gurion had imagined a federative regime based on the principle of decentralization. Now, however, he proposes an entirely different model, an explicitly centralized nation-state that becomes increasingly involved in the lives of its citizens, both Jews and Arabs, in all areas.

In his long text titled "The Conduct of the Jewish State," Ben-Gurion dedicates a separate section to the subject of "The Jewish State and the Minorities."¹²¹ In this section, Ben-Gurion says that "the state's management of the Arabs' transfer to the neighboring Arab countries of the transferees' own free will does not amount to discrimination." Although he uses the term "national minorities" twice, he does so without referring to the national identity of those minorities. In addition, even the wording of the subtitle "The Jewish State and the Minorities" is enough to present the state's Arab citizens as a fragmented entity lacking a collective national will, a collection of ethnic groups bereft of an institutionalized national representation. It is indeed no coincidence that Ben-Gurion made sure not to use terms such as "nation" or "national" in describing the rights of the Arab minority: "The Arab minority will be able to use the Arabic language not only in its educational, religious, and ethnic institutions, but also in all state institutions." Unlike in his earlier model of federative consociational democracy, Ben-Gurion no longer considered the Arab citizens' particular institutions to be

national institutions. This is no mere semantic shift. In the context of a multiethnic space, the term “national” embodies an explicitly political meaning, namely, the collective self-rule of a collective legal personality that comes together with other collective personalities to shape the state’s character and governmental sovereignty. This state of affairs does not follow from the model that Ben-Gurion was beginning to sketch out: “Alongside the active defense of the rights of minorities in all areas of economic, political, and cultural life, the state will strive to inculcate a shared state consciousness among all its citizens and will develop any action and organization whose intention is to put an end to the divisions among the races and ethnicities in all general state matters.”¹²²

A multinational approach that sees citizenship as mediated by autonomous national entities has been replaced by a nonethnic civil approach that, in a Jewish state, can be identified only with a Jewish public domain. Up to that point, the term “Jewish state” had referred to a state possessing a Jewish majority in which the Jewish nation governed only its own internal affairs while sharing sovereignty with the Arab national minority in all matters that went beyond each nation’s particular national interests. Ben-Gurion’s article “The Conduct of the Jewish State” is the first time that we have a vision in which the Jewish nation has exclusive control over the state’s institutions.

The Peel Commission’s conclusions marked a turning point in Ben-Gurion’s political imagination. It was the Biltmore Program, however, that marked the turning point in his political thought, and in the history of Zionist political thought as a whole. The program was passed in May 1942 by the American Zionist Conference in New York, and it declared “that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated into the new democratic structure of the world.” It was approved by the Zionist General Council in Jerusalem in October of that year, becoming the official political program of the Zionist movement.¹²³

It is instructive to consider how fiercely Ben-Gurion tried to persuade his audiences in his lectures over the course of the three years following the Biltmore Program’s publication—first among them being his opponents in Hashomer Hatzair, who supported a binational state as an alternative to the Biltmore Program, but also

those who disagreed with him in Mapai—that the program contained no innovations when compared with Zionism’s earlier approaches.¹²⁴ However, these very efforts are themselves an adequate demonstration of the fact that the program’s connection to earlier Zionist views of Palestine’s political nature, and of the relations between Jews and non-Jews, was actually far from obvious and that many Zionists sensed that the new plan did indeed contain some innovations. The total symbolic erasure of Palestine’s Arab presence, and the declaration that Palestine as a whole would be a Jewish commonwealth, was actually a fundamental break from the past, certainly insofar as concerns Ben-Gurion’s federalist positions during most of the Mandate period.¹²⁵ This impression becomes only clearer as we examine what he meant when he called for an “Eretz Israel as a Jewish commonwealth,” and how he envisioned its national-civil political future.

In one of the speeches he gave to advocate for the Biltmore Program (July 1943, in a meeting of the Zionist General Council), Ben-Gurion emphasizes the deep continuity between it and the “Jewish state” that he spoke of in his prewar Zionist thought. He then goes on to describe the Jewish “commonwealth” vision for Palestine as a mono-national state, vaguely promising “autonomy to all ethnicities in the country in their internal affairs—religious, educational, and so on.”¹²⁶ He repeats this latter point succinctly toward the end of his political speech at the Fifty-First Zionist Labor Council in March 1944, almost as a perfunctory side comment: “In Palestine, there are Arabs and other non-Jews—we cannot imagine a Jewish state that does not have full and total political, civil, and national equality for all its residents and citizens and not just individual equality, but also communal equality: full autonomy in all matters of language, religion, culture, and the like.”¹²⁷

It is easy to see just how different the idea of a Jewish state as a federative multinational state composed of cantons¹²⁸—a vision that Ben-Gurion first proposed in the early 1930s and to whose autonomist foundations he remained loyal until early 1937—is from the idea of “communal equality” and “communal autonomy” for “Arabs and other non-Jews.” Though this equality is termed national “and not just individual equality,” it is not national equality in the political sense of the word. This arrangement does not grant the Arab

minority the authority to engage in self-rule so as to develop their collective national identity and mediate their individual civil rights through the legal “national personality,” an arrangement that was intended to prevent the hierarchization and stratification of the rights of different groups of citizens.

In Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Twenty-Second Zionist Congress on December 10, 1946, titled “The Jewish State Soon in Our Time”—in which he espouses “our full rights in the entire country” while still expressing willingness to agree to a tactical compromise in order to establish a state according to his “stages” approach¹²⁹—the process of erasing the Arabs as a national-political factor in the Jewish national space of the nation-state was finally complete. The part of the speech that addresses the question “What is a Jewish state?” does not even mention the politically toothless “communal autonomy” that we saw above. Instead, Ben-Gurion gives an even more dominant place to the centralized all-encompassing nation-state that strives to “develop the population” and promote progress among its citizens, first and foremost among “the vast majority of the Arab population.”¹³⁰

The disappearance of “communal autonomy” from the vision for this new kind of Jewish state should not surprise us. Unlike national autonomy, which Ben-Gurion had considered in his nationalities state period to be a modern national institution that was meant to be a part of a federative state that incorporates the civil life of all its national groups, the idea of communal autonomy was above all religious autonomy. Ben-Gurion considered this to be an outdated relic from the Middle Ages that is devoid of political content and redundant in modern life, while at the same time identifying modernity exclusively with the centralized state’s institutions, which grant collective political expression only to the Jewish national group.

The change that occurred in Ben-Gurion’s political thought from what it had been at the beginning and in the middle of the Mandate period to what it had become during the last years of the Mandate era is not surprising. Rather, Ben-Gurion has a well-earned reputation in the historiography for being an exemplar of a kind of statesmanship that is firmly anchored in the shifting historical circumstances and that is able to adapt itself to them using a first-rate strategic political intuition. And is it not Ben-Gurion himself who

states in one of his speeches on "Zionist Policy" (1941) that "every time, Zionist policy faces new problems and new circumstances such that the answers that it gave yesterday are not appropriate for today and the answers that it gives today will not be appropriate for tomorrow"?¹³¹ Indeed, if there was one "doctrine" that Ben-Gurion adhered to throughout his career as a statesman, it can be summed up in one sentence that he himself uttered in his "Responses" to comments made by representatives at the Twenty-Second Zionist Congress: "'Only thus' is an anti-Zionist expression."¹³²

That being said, it is precisely because he was so obviously aware of how essential and necessary it is to be politically flexible and opposed to dogmatism in pursuing Zionist policy that it is so amazing to consider how Ben-Gurion refused to acknowledge the change that gradually encompassed the essence of the Jewish state idea—a change that began during the period after the Peel Commission recommendations were published and that became more entrenched during World War II in the form of the Biltmore Program. After all, the change was obvious not only because of the political vision and content that he espoused during and after the Biltmore Conference, but also because of the tremendous rhetorical efforts that he invested in trying to prove that no essential change in his approach had occurred. The more he stressed that the Biltmore Program did not mean he had changed his views from what they had been in the past, the more obviously he ignored the multinational federative approach that he had supported in the 1920s and 1930s. Ever since the second Assembly of Representatives in 1926, and until a short time before the Peel Commission published its conclusions, Ben-Gurion would mention the same principles time and again as a guideline for envisioning the political future of Palestine. In his ideological debate with Hashomer Hatzair in February 1937, he was still quoting what he had said in 1926: "It makes no difference if we are a minority and others are the majority, or if we are the majority and others are a minority. Just relations between the nations cannot depend on that, on whether one nation is a minority and another nation is a majority." He quoted and reaffirmed his support for these words, stressing the principle of granting national collective autonomy to Palestine's Arabs in the future Jewish state.¹³³ After the Peel Commission published its partition plan, and certainly after he

began to promote the Biltmore Program, we no longer see Ben-Gurion referring to these principles. Naturally, this is simply due to the fact that the nationalities state idea, which he had espoused in different versions for more than two decades as the proper constitutional framework for realizing Jewish self-determination, was no longer suited to the changing historical circumstances.

Though Ben-Gurion firmly and stubbornly denied the fact that his political approach had clearly changed with the Biltmore Program, he did hold true to his habit of addressing the broader contemporary historical context of his political ideas; and as part of this tradition he did point to several major changes in the historical reality that served as the backdrop for the Biltmore Program, which, ostensibly, “did not contain . . . any innovation”¹³⁴ when compared with his earlier views. It was first and foremost the Holocaust of European Jewry that Ben-Gurion considered to have fundamentally changed the worldwide relationship between the Jewish people (in the sense of the extraterritorial “national personality”) and the world’s nations, and it was in light of the consequences of this event for the relations between Jews and non-Jews that the Biltmore Program and its vision for a Jewish state appeared. After “all the horrible truth of the Holocaust that came upon us will be discovered by the world in all its abysmal tragedy,” Ben-Gurion wonders in one of his “Biltmore speeches,” “do we not have the right this time to demand rectification for our historical indignity, for the discrimination that all the nations have committed against us, and to demand that they give us the same status as all the other nations?”¹³⁵

What is the deep meaning of the thing that happened “this time” that gave the Jews the right to demand rectification for their historical indignity and to demand that they be given “the same status as all the other nations”? In other words, what had changed in the relations between the Jewish people and “all the other nations” that made it necessary to demand that a Jewish state be established in all parts of Palestine that bears not a single vestige of a non-Jewish national collective entity? Here we must recall the complex notion according to which the national rights of the Jews in Palestine and the Jews of the diaspora exist in a single system with the rights of non-Jews living throughout the nations of the world and in Palestine. This view was the foundation on which Ben-Gurion

based his vision for the political future of Palestine, at least since the 1920s:

What we demand for ourselves, we demand also for others, what we want others to give us we are prepared to give to others. We do not want to suffer injustice *in the diaspora*, to have our rights oppressed and to be robbed of justice, and we cannot and do not desire to do that to others in our country; *we do not want foreigners to rule over us and our fate*. . . . We who come humbly and sincerely before the entire world to *demand total national equality for ourselves* are thus committed to put this demand to ourselves as well.¹³⁶

This approach was at the core of Ben-Gurion's autonomist vision for Palestine's political future, and it required guaranteeing a multiplicity of national collective rights in every country where Jews and non-Jews lived together side-by-side—"It makes no difference if we are a minority and others are the majority, or if we are the majority and others are a minority"—and this approach was suited to a different geopolitical and ethno-national reality: the post-World War I multinational sociocultural reality in the Euro-Asiatic space, the reality that was inherited from the large empires of the turn of the century and that survived despite the massive political changes that focused on uni-national ethnocentric sovereignty, a reality that was still the foundation of daily life for millions of Jews. Following the extermination of millions of Jews by non-Jews, however, Ben-Gurion considered this approach to be completely invalid. It is indeed no wonder that he avoided referring to the notion of the relations between Jews and non-Jews as a single system, given that it had become an unsatisfactory solution in his eyes. It is also no wonder that "We and Our Neighbors," a 1931 collection of his articles in which the multinational autonomist approach to Palestine's future was a central theme, was not reprinted after the state's establishment, unlike, for example, "From Class to Nation," or even some of his early Ottoman-era works. The unwritten contract between the Jews and the world's nations—not dominating the collective personality of Jews in the diaspora in exchange for not dominating the collective personality of Arabs in Palestine—that Ben-Gurion

had espoused as an alternative to the unwritten emancipatory contract, according to which the Jews must give up their collective difference in exchange for equal civil rights, was a contract that had become null and void in Ben-Gurion's eyes, having been violated by the Gentiles. Instead, a new contract appeared: in exchange for exterminating millions of European Jews and erasing the collective Jewish personality from the lands of the European diaspora, the Jews must be given a state that would express the Jewish national identity alone. Or, in Ben-Gurion's words, "The one reward—if there can be any reward for the massacre of six million Jews . . . [is] singular: *establishing a Jewish state soon in our time!*"¹³⁷—a Jewish nation-state that, as we have seen, has no room for incorporating the national identities of the Palestinian-Arab national collective. The Palestinians are thus supposed to pay that "one reward" for "the massacre of six million Jews" in Europe.

The changes that Ben-Gurion identified in the post-World War II global political reality, and in the context of which he laid out his Biltmore model for the future Jewish state, did not concern only the relations between Jews and non-Jews, but also the matter of the existing states' civil-political character, changes that he believed would have far-reaching, fundamental, and decisive consequences for the continued collective existence of Jews in the diaspora:

We are on the cusp of a new era in human history: *the state* is spreading its wings over more and more of those living in its borders, that is the central fact of our time. . . . This ostensibly brings security and welfare to the nations, to the Jewish people living in the diaspora this fact means a final blow to its global unity, the destruction of its specialized economic positions, the erasure of its national image. For hundreds of years, the Jews comprised a kind of state within a state: in their social life, in their professions, in their manners, in their religious rituals. In the modern state, this uniqueness—both economic and spiritual—is increasingly threatened, and there is a doubt as to whether the Jewish people would continue to exist as the Jewish people without its own state framework. The more the state's rule spreads and strengthens among the residents' lives, the more the foundation of Jewish collectivities in the diaspora countries

and the modicum of partial independence that we have achieved in the diaspora are destroyed and ruined.¹³⁸

It is important to note that the basic logic of Ben-Gurion's Zionist vision regarding the Jewish people's national future, and its position within the national life of non-Jewish nations, did not fundamentally change since he first advocated for his "Ottomanization" doctrine before American Jews in *Ha-Toren*, in the above-mentioned article "Our National Rights in Turkey and in Palestine." In 1916, in the last days of Ottoman Turkey, Ben-Gurion believed that the multinational empire was "on the threshold of a new era," and in August 1945, he witnessed the destruction of the integrated multi-ethnic reality in the formerly imperial spaces, including the destruction of the Jews, which were seen as a "state within a state," a symbol of multiplicity that threatened the modern tyranny of uniformity. In both 1916 and 1945, Ben-Gurion wanted the Jews to become a nation like all other nations, to achieve a normative national-political life. But whereas in the era of multinational empires most of the relevant "[every] nations" alongside which Zionism emerged and developed envisioned their future as part of large federative national frameworks, in the mid-1940s the idea of the centralized state, hopefully ethno-national but in either case uni-cultural, seemed to have decisively entrenched itself as the normative political model. The triumph of national homogenization trends and the implementation of ethnic cleansing in those spaces certainly contributed as well. During the Ottoman period (and during the early post-Ottoman period, in which the "right to self-determination" and "minority rights" were used interchangeably, given the persistence of the multinational sociocultural reality), Ben-Gurion was attentive to the spirit of the times and envisioned the Jewish national future as part of a nationalities state model of one kind or another. The world after the ethnic cleansings and genocides of the late 1930s and 1940s, however, was a world in which the link between "state" and "nation" (singular and exclusive) had become much more obvious than it had been in the past. In this reality, Ben-Gurion adopted a new national-political model for the Jewish people, a model that was in the spirit of the times. In so doing, he was indirectly affirming the final blow to Jewish life in the diaspora, a blow that he identified as part of the new global political orientation.

Conclusion

Zionism as a historical phenomenon is commonly described as having two fundamental characteristics: one temporal and one spatial. Temporally, Zionism is usually characterized as a revolution.¹ The Zionist movement is described as seeking to fundamentally change the face of the Jewish people so that it would no longer resemble the Jewish collective entity that preceded it. Spatially, it is generally agreed that Zionism wished to normalize the status of the Jewish people and transform it into a national group like all other nations in the modern geopolitical space.² The Hebrew title of Anita Shapira's book uses the phrase "As All Other Nations" (*ke-chol am ve-am*), taken from the Israeli Declaration of Independence, to allude to this normalizing goal.³ If we combine, then, these temporal and spatial characteristics, we arrive at one of the most widely held arguments about Zionism, both in the historiography and in the public discourse regarding Zionist history: that in order to turn the Jews into a nation like all other nations, modern Zionism had to radically change the contemporary Jewish existence.

This claim is well-suited to the way that Zionism's history appears when observed through the prism of the (Jewish) nation-state model that emerged in the mid-twentieth century after the two world wars. The mid-twentieth century, after all, was a period in which the nation-state model quickly became the universal, normatively accepted articulation of the principle of national self-determination. However, after removing the retrospective nation-state lens, we have

good reason to at the very least reconsider this argument. A close examination, anchored in the changing historical contexts, of the political thought and self-determination patterns expressed by the founders of modern Zionism from Pinsker to Ben-Gurion suggests that the aforementioned claim is only partially valid.

Political Zionism hoped to make Jews resemble “every nation” in all aspects of the human experience, because it found that the “anomalous” extraterritorial character of Jewish existence made it difficult for Jews to integrate into the modern world. However, one key question should be raised in this context that was almost never addressed in the historiography of Zionist political thought:⁴ what was “every nation” whose experiences comprised the environment in which the idea and discourse regarding the national self-normalization of the Jewish collective emerged? And is it justified to refer to Zionism’s efforts to make the Jews resemble “every nation” as a “revolution”?

And indeed, it was only reasonable and natural that the Zionist political thought that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century in imperial spaces saturated with multiple nationalities would be anchored first and foremost in the national political discourse that obtained in its close environs. This is also true of Zionism’s approach to the idea of national collective normalization, which it developed above all by observing national-political developments in the Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman imperial spaces. These were the spaces where most of the world’s Jews lived when Zionism emerged, one of which even contained the Zionists’ territorial destination of choice. It is certainly undeniable that Zionism had a lot of work to do when it came to the socio-demographic aspects of normalizing the status of Jews when compared with their Ukrainian, Lithuanian, German-Austrian, Slovenian, Czech, Greek, and Polish neighbors. To be sure, the constant internal multiethnic immigration that characterized the ethno-demographic conditions of the fin-de-siècle multinational empires was already transforming an increasing variety of ethno-national groups into “Jews.” These communities, some of whom lived far from what had been known as their historic homelands, were extraterritorial to some degree. Nevertheless, it is clear that what accentu-

ated the dramatic difference between the national circumstances of Jews when compared with that of non-Jewish nations in all three imperial spaces had to do with the former's extensive dispersal, as well as with the absence of a concrete, widely recognized historic homeland. To rectify this state of affairs, there was a need to acquire a homeland and to concentrate as many Jews in it as possible. And indeed, it became necessary to adopt a revolutionary strategy with regards to both the socio-demographic dimension of Jewish national existence and its socioeconomic aspects, being that it is impossible to sustain a national-demographic population concentration without a national economy. There is therefore no doubt, socio-economically speaking, that Pinsker's and Herzl's ideas—as well as those of Ahad Ha'am, who saw himself as Pinsker's successor and emphasized the importance of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine—were revolutionary ones.

However, as far as the surrounding national-political space was concerned, political Zionism did not need a revolution to normalize the status of the Jewish people. Indeed, most of the nations that neighbored Jews in Central and Eastern Europe—and more importantly, the nations in whose environments the founders of political Zionism operated—were “Jewish” in one essential respect: like the Jews, the imperial rulers deprived them of the right to rule over themselves as well. As Miroslav Hroch puts it, they were “non-dominant nationalities.” Most of those nations were certainly dissatisfied with the hegemonic oppression that they were subjected to by the imperial nations, or alternatively by nations that achieved de facto regional hegemony (as in the case of the Poles in Galicia vis-à-vis the Ukrainian population). Nevertheless, most of the national-political demands raised by most of those nations' national movements were not revolutionary. Instead, their national demands, and their discourse regarding the national self-determination that they sought, were territorial-autonomist in orientation and often driven by a clear unwillingness to bring about the empire's collapse.

This was not a façade, but rather a move that stemmed from a deep recognition that their nations' continued belonging to a wider political framework had many economic, cultural, and security advantages. Of course, demands of this kind were not usually seen as moderate by imperial rulers, and the more the latter held staunchly

to their hegemonic positions, the more the leadership of the non-dominant nations radicalized their demands. Nevertheless, in the last decade before World War I, a growing number of people, particularly in the Austrian part of the Habsburg monarchy, were hoping that they were on the cusp of multinational reform. Multinational compromise arrangements, despite all the local difficulties they raised in each specific case, reinforced the idea among the period's contemporaries that the empire was headed for compromise and political reform in the spirit of a multinational federation. In any event, the possibility that the empires would collapse—not only the Habsburg Empire, but also the Ottoman and Russian empires—was not particularly attractive to the leaders of small nations, even on the very eve of World War I. Rather, it was actually the possibility of a more egalitarian multinational state that emerged as the best possible scenario according to the national-political discourse of that period. And if the national leaderships of non-Jewish territorial nations, nations whose members were concentrated in their historic homelands, preferred the federative multinational state rather than the nation-state as a “final goal,” is it any wonder that the political Zionists chose to work toward a political program that was in the spirit of their neighbors' autonomist territorialism?

Uttering Herzl's words in the longest and most important monologue of *Altneuland*, Friedrich Loewenberg says, “an impossible future state on the improbable ruins of existing society, . . . a decline of civilization, . . . only a coward would envisage.”⁵ In this monologue, Friedrich speaks passionately, almost reverently, about the proper way to go about building the “new world” whose likeness he saw in *Altneuland*'s Palestine: to incorporate the old within the new. But why are the destroyers of the old order described as cowards? Is it not the other way around? Is it not the case that those who hold on to the remnants of the old are the fainthearted ones, while those who resolve to destroy the old once and for all are those who are truly courageous? It appears that Herzl was much more *Ahad Ha'am*ian than the founder of spiritual Zionism himself was willing to acknowledge, and that Herzl's approach actually provides yet another substantial reason to set aside the clear-cut dichotomy in the historiography of Zionist ideology between “political Zionism” and *Ahad Ha'am*. Herzl believed that the impatience with and disregard

for the old that so characterized the discourse and practice of Eastern and Central European revolutionary movements were signs of weakness, and this was a view that was shared by political Zionists, including Pinsker and even Ben-Gurion, for most of his tenure as the leader of Zionism as a national movement.

It would have been easier to avoid dealing with the old, to erase it completely and to erect the new without the burden of an onerous legacy. But what should the leader of a national movement do if the nation that he wishes to represent is not interested in totally destroying the old? What should Croatian nationalism do with the many Croats who want to win “political rights” for the Croatian people but who simultaneously feel at home in Habsburg Vienna? What should a responsible leader of the Romanian national movement do, if he wishes to be attentive to the Romanian public in Transylvania, when the average Romanian does not necessarily want to join the Romanian nation-state, actually feels quite at home under the Habsburg monarchy, and only desires an end to Hungarian oppression and broader territorial self-governance rights in the Transylvanian district? And what about the Ukrainian in tsarist Russia who suffers the cruel cultural and economic oppression of his people at the hands of the Russians, who is offended by the humiliating imperialist distinction between “Big Russians” (Russians) and “Little Russians” (Ukrainians), but at the same time feels at home in both Moscow and St. Petersburg, not only in Kiev? Political Zionism did not wish to destroy the old world completely, and political Zionists shared this view with the national movements of the smaller nations within the fin-de-siècle empires. Instead, it sought to insert the new Jewish national society into preexisting political frameworks. Of course, these frameworks had to undergo fundamental changes and essential internal reforms so as to become a national-civil home for all the national groups that they governed. But they should under no circumstances be abolished.

The Zionist national movement’s reformist and patently non-revolutionary trend had long developed alongside its social revolutionary trend and was deeply rooted in concrete Jewish collective experience. The moderate orientation of its non-Jewish neighbors’ political demands, which were likewise raised in the context of the fin-de-siècle imperial frameworks, was also driven by deeply rooted

intranational factors. More than anything else, however, this moderate trend stemmed from a fundamental internal logic within modern nationalism. For the past few decades, theoretical research on nationalism has been embroiled in heated debates between the modernists and the primordialists and ethnosymbolists. Though these debates have lost some of their former fire and zeal, they are still very much ongoing, pitting modernist theoreticians who view nationalism as a totally new historical phenomenon against primordialists and ethnosymbolists who emphasize the links and continuities with the ancient ethnic past, its memories, values, and symbols.⁶

In contrast, some researchers have never presumed to develop one single theory that satisfactorily and completely addresses the phenomenon of nationalism, opting instead to focus on individual case studies.⁷ Their research teaches us that in many cases it was neither the hope for total renewal nor the longing for a primordial past that drove nationalist thought, imagination, and action. Rather, it was often the need to address and negotiate the recent past that commanded the attention of national movements.⁸ If we go by the all-encompassing “theories of nationalism,” we should expect the recent past to be an obstacle to nationalism: the theories predict that national movements will seek to overcome and totally erase the recent past, whether for the sake of “the new nation” or alternatively for some heroic distant past. Like all national movements, Zionism certainly had a heavy dose of both the hope for total renewal and nostalgia for the primordial past. However, insofar as Zionism’s political imagination is concerned, it was actually the incorporation of the recent past and its concepts that was centrally important.⁹

One of the key concepts and ideas that political Zionism was more than willing to inherit from the recent Jewish past was the concept of autonomism, or in other words, of Jewish self-rule. Political Zionism gladly inherited the idea that Jews should rule over Jews, and only over Jews. Historically, this concept was extraterritorial and communal in character and an essential part of the premodern Jewish experience. Modern political Zionism, however, adopted it anew with the intention of translating it into a form of regional-territorial self-rule. For better or for worse, Zionism was neither able nor even interested in being able to imagine total sovereign rule of Jews over non-Jews precisely because of the persistence of

the autonomist element inherited from the recent past. Those whom Herzl called cowards would have preferred to keep their distance from this element of the past, to shake it off completely to build a brand new Hebrew world. Indeed, it is also well-known that the “Canaanites,” a later movement that did wish to disconnect completely from the Jewish past, eventually found itself outside the Zionist camp. The political Zionists, on the other hand, saw the Jewish self-rule element as one of the past’s most valuable assets. And what better way to preserve it in its new territorial form than to be a part of a large multinational federative state? After all, it was just such a state that the leaders of the non-Jewish national movements that neighbored Zionism in fin-de-siècle Eastern and Central Europe had hoped for and worked to create.

It is now necessary to take Zionism’s complex temporal continuity with the recent Jewish past, driven by the Zionist political imagination’s renewed adoption of the principle of Jewish autonomy in territorial form, and add to it Zionism’s complex spatial continuity with the concrete Jewish present. Just as political Zionism did not eschew important parts of the recent past, it also reincorporated the concrete possibility of Jewish diasporic life in the contemporary modern world beyond the borders of the territorial-political homeland, despite the fact that it regarded this type of Jewish existence as ideologically inferior. From the perspective of Zionist social ideology, it was certainly possible to philosophize about “the negation of the exile” and to fight against the diasporic elements of national life in Palestine. We must remember, however, that Zionism’s political imagination, whether we are talking about Pinsker, Jabotinsky, or Ben-Gurion, had always viewed diaspora Jews as an organic part of the Jewish national body that should under no circumstances be severed.

More importantly, political Zionism in no way sought to limit the range of possibilities that were available for modern Jewish existence; on the contrary, it sought to give Jews the freedom to choose between a number of different options. For Zionism, this was the deeper meaning of what sovereignty over the Jews’ collective fate meant: the sovereign right to make a voluntary choice about how to live in the modern world. Political Zionism considered this to be the choice that had heretofore been denied to the Jews. Hence, Pinsker’s

territorial homeland was (also) intended to facilitate the enhanced emancipation of Jews outside its borders, just as the Jewish polity in Herzl's *Altneuland* was to have an indirect emancipatory function for Jews who remained in the diaspora, despite the fact that Herzl, as opposed to Pinsker, believed that Jewish communal religious existence alone, and not Jewish ethno-national existence, had a legitimate place outside of the territorial homeland. This type of thinking is the basis for the logic that guided political Zionism's approach to the Jewish national political future throughout most of its existence as a national movement. Its underlying logic was that the rights of Jews and the rights of non-Jews comprise a single system and that there is a reciprocal relationship between the rights of Jews in non-Jewish states and the rights of non-Jews in the Jewish state. Given that the Zionists were opposed to non-Jewish hegemony over Jews in non-Jewish states, they felt it necessary to oppose Jewish hegemony over non-Jews in the Jewish state. The practical implications of this principle were twofold: (1) the Jewish state would not be a centralized nation-state that institutionalizes the national rights of only one nation among its citizenry, and (2) the non-Jewish states in which Jews lived would likewise pull back from the hegemonic mono-national approach that had long oppressed the Jewish national "personality." These two implications applied whether the Jewish state were to become a district in one of the empires or whether it were to become an independent postimperial state, as was envisioned during the interwar period. This idea demonstrates another signature feature that was consistently central to Zionism as a national political movement: its reformist orientation was directed not only inward, toward the Jewish collective, but also outward, toward the civil and political character of non-Jewish states both during the imperial period and after the empires' collapse.

World War I and the collapse of the fin-de-siècle empires brought about fundamental changes to the multinational political and geopolitical space in which the Zionist political idea was born, and in which it was to be put into practice, and one of these changes was the Balfour Declaration, issued by Palestine's new rulers. Here was a document that spelled unprecedented potential for promoting the Zionist political project, whose aim was to secure territorial self-rule in Palestine. Despite this development, however, the loyalty of Zi-

onist political thought to the nationalities state model of the imperial period not only failed to disappear, but was actually reinforced and reinvigorated. Although Zionism's most prominent representatives, for example, Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion, are widely known to have differed on a range of important topics, they reincorporated the old *Nationalitätenstaat* idea into their political thought, taking it from the vision for a multinational Ottoman state and copying it onto their vision for the future state in Palestine. They began to imagine this state as one that possessed a Jewish majority but that nonetheless was constitutionally structured as a multinational democracy.

This continuity with the past was a result of the fact that many of the key features of the imperial past persisted after World War I, sweeping changes notwithstanding, and that these features became even more relevant for the Zionist diplomatic strategy under the new geopolitical conditions. First, while the institutional political frameworks in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East underwent fundamental changes, the basic multinational and multi-ethnic character of the concrete social experience in these spaces persisted. Given this state of affairs, the argument in favor of a nationalities state, according to which the establishment of a multinational state in a multinational space is all but inevitable, remained commonsensical and valid. Second, and even more important, the status of the Jewish national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe was being eroded. This was true for both the old and the new ethnocentric states that were founded on the ruins of the imperial order in Central and Eastern Europe. Precisely given this state of affairs, the old Zionist political idea of reciprocal rights and the giving up of hegemony over non-Jews in the future Jewish state was seen as a way of indirectly reinforcing the logic of the multinational state, as well as a way of shoring up the civil status of diaspora Jews. Thus, the reciprocal rights idea regained center stage in Zionist political thought on the future of Jewish self-determination and became a critically important principle. This is why Zionist leaders began to reference older concepts with regard to the character of the longed-for future Jewish state. They referenced names and ideas that had originated in the way that the multinational reform of multi-ethnic spaces had been imagined and conceptualized in the recent

past: Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Austro-Marxism, and the Turkish millets. They even mentioned the notion of “Old Austria” as a relevant source for multinational political models. By the same token, the “diasporic” autonomist idea—which was rooted in the premodern Jewish past and which political Zionism adopted from the very beginning as a political principle of the highest order—received a new lease on life, especially in the writings of those most identified as the architects of the new territorial social way of life, like the leaders of the Zionist Labor movement in Palestine. Zionist labor leaders, including Ben-Gurion and Berl Katznelson, produced a straightforward and illuminating translation of the idea of exterritorial autonomist Jewish self-rule into the principle of Jews not dominating non-Jews. They made this principle the cornerstone of the Jewish political future in Palestine, which they imagined as a “nationalities state” (Katznelson) and as “decentralization” (Ben-Gurion). The conventional historiography tends to view these models by virtue of the deterministic prism of the nation-state and therefore sees them as mere stratagems on the road to the yearned-for yet clandestinely held goal of the state of Israel as it has existed since 1948. The nation-state lens would at best characterize these models as utopian elements that filtered into Zionism’s realistic political approach. Needless to say, the nation-state lens always assumes that the latter approach had permanently aimed for the nation-state as the ultimate and most desirable model. In this way, the nation-state lens not only misses the authentic intranational autonomist dimension at the heart of Zionist territorial political thought, but it also misses the role that this idea had in outlining a vision for the political character of non-Jewish states, being that Zionism expected the latter to eventually accept the principle whereby one ethnic group should never dominate another.

Beginning in the 1930s, the many post–World War I *de facto* multinational nation-states began to collapse. The golem created by the Treaty of Versailles on the ruins of the multinational imperial space not only failed to solve even one of the national problems of the pre–World War I era, but it actually exacerbated them. The idea that different national groups are unable to live together in one country, and that trying to do so is a recipe for political instability, became more and more widespread in international discourse. To

put it more precisely, the idea became more widespread among the Western states that dictated the orientation and spirit of international discourse. As this opinion became more dominant, the logic of partition, unification, and population transfer in the pursuit of ethnic purity increasingly took root in the Euro-Asiatic domain. By the end of World War II, this logic would evolve into the principle of a one-to-one correlation between nation and territory, or what Simon Dubnow had earlier defined as *cujus regio, ejus natio* (the subject nation like the ruling nation), paraphrasing the Peace of Westphalia.¹⁰

The specter of ethnic cleansing reached Mandate Palestine and Zionist political discourse in the form of the Peel Commission's recommendations. The commission recommended partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state almost entirely on the basis of the idea of population exchange. The idea did not appear beforehand in the political Zionist imagination, even after the Arab Rebellion of 1936. Note, for example, that on February 7, 1937, five months before the publication of the Peel Commission's recommendations regarding partition, Ben-Gurion gave a speech at the Thirty-Fifth Zionist Labor Federation Council in which he upheld his commitment to "a Jewish state," while at the same time emphasizing that in this future state "the Arab residents of the land should be accorded all the civil rights and political rights not only as individuals but as a national collective, just like the Jews of the Land of Israel."¹¹ When the Peel Commission published its recommendation to partition Palestine on the basis of nationality through ethnic unification, Jabotinsky was horrified; he immediately recognized that the recommendations were based on the logic of ethnic cleansing. He not only opposed the plan because it would mean losing parts of the Land of Israel; he opposed it because he feared that expelling the Arabs from the Jewish state might serve what he sarcastically referred to as an "instructive precedent," a boon for all those who sought to undermine the right to exist of the diasporic Jewish collectivities.¹² Ben-Gurion, as opposed to Jabotinsky, was not prone to being anxious about historic transformations; instead, he preferred to join them. This is why the publication of the Peel Commission's recommendations coincided with the first time that Ben-Gurion began to imagine the future of Jewish self-determination in

Palestine without an Arab presence alongside it as a national collectivity.

But it was the decimation of the Jewish minorities in the Holocaust of European Jewry that led to the final and lasting turning point in the Zionist political imagination's approach to the future national political character of Palestine. As the unprecedented dimensions of the destruction in Europe became increasingly clear, the Zionist movement came to adopt the very political model that it had historically criticized and even fought against—the Jewish ethnocentric nation-state that should be of the Jewish nation alone and that would therefore have no place for the Palestinian Arabs as a national collective. Indeed, ever since its inception, the Zionist national movement was a movement whose diasporic branch was a constant thorn at the side of nation-states like Poland; a movement that established itself in both Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine not as “a nation-state in the making” but rather as “self-rule in the making”; and a movement whose leadership produced such a massive multitude of ideas and programs that they could be organized into a true encyclopedia of multinational federative thought. Nevertheless, the Zionist movement adopted the nation-state model at the Biltmore Conference (1942), and ever since 1948 it set itself to building a state whose institutions recognize only one nation and extend that nation's hegemony over a land occupied by two nations.

“I have no part in the approach [of those who] view the fulfillment of Zionism in the likeness of the new Polish state, except that in this version the Arabs will be in the position of the Jews, and the Jews in the position of the Poles,” Katznelson said in 1931 during a speech in favor of an egalitarian nationalities state.¹³ “There will be many transfers in Europe . . . and we, after what has happened to us in the world . . . want to rule [over Palestine],”¹⁴ he stated in a speech a short time before his death in 1944.

The Zionism that Katznelson represented in 1931 and the Zionism that he represented in 1944 were two fundamentally different political Zionisms. The Zionism of 1931 was a political Zionism that espoused the idea of not controlling non-Jewish people. It was a movement that constantly searched for political formulas that would anchor this principle in the future of Palestine, viewing it as no less important than insisting on the right of Jews to freely immi-

grate to Palestine. Those elements were totally absent in the Zionism of 1944. Some of the Zionist scholars of Zionism might find it difficult to accept this distinction because it undermines the perceived continuity of Zionist political history, a continuity that is at the center of their self-image as Zionists and that Anita Shapira believes extends from 1881 to 2000 and beyond.¹⁵ There is no avoiding undermining this continuity, however. As Yosef Haim Yerushalmi taught us in his book *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, the more Jewish historians study their people's past using the chisel of criticism, the more they inevitably undermine the perceived continuity of that past.

Yerushalmi, as we remember, underscored the deep and unbridgeable contradiction between modern Jewish historiography and traditional collective Jewish memory. Professional historians, he argued, seek to understand the historical past in totality, even if they frequently focus directly on only one of its components. No document, topic, or historical aspect of the studied past is a priori unworthy of the historian's attention. Traditional collective Jewish memory, on the other hand, is highly selective, perceiving "Judaism" as something entirely preordained, subject to a predetermined definition at whose core lies the belief that divine providence plays an active role in determining Jewish history. Thus, certain memories that have the capacity to reinforce this theosophical conception retain their vitality while the rest either fade away, are repressed, or are cast aside in a process of natural selection as it were. And then along come historians to interfere with this process, and sometimes even to turn it on its head. In the picture of the past that they draw, they are liable to include those fragments of Jewish history that constantly call into question its assumed uniform and one-to-one representation, which Jews in the premodern era always imagined as part of their consciousness of the past.¹⁶

And yet, this subversive tendency to dissect the Jewish past, which, according to Yerushalmi, is inherent in the critical methodological essence of modern Jewish historiography since the days of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, has all but bypassed the engagement of Zionist historiography with the annals of the political dimension of historical Zionism. In fact, it appears at times as though Zionist nationalist historiography, which traces the history of the conscious-

ness and the political aspirations of mainstream Zionism before 1948, frequently functioned rather similarly to religious collective Jewish memory as analyzed by Yerushalmi. In this comparison, the role of the ancient deterministic belief in the divinity's active intervention in Jewish history is replaced by the presupposition regarding the deterministic attachment of political Zionism to the model of a sovereign Jewish nation-state. Indeed, just like traditional Jewish memory, which tended to be highly selective with regard to the Jewish past in accordance with the theocentric perception that guided it, Zionist historiography was prepared to include in the narrative of the history of the Zionist political idea and imagination only those components of Zionism's past that could be connected to form a uniform linear progression that led to the establishment of a single-nation Jewish state. In doing so, it sifted out, repressed, or cast aside from the historical narrative all other components of the Zionist past that disturbed this imagined continuum, such as the *Nationalitätenstaat* model widely acclaimed by early political Zionists. This book thus offers the first attempt to include the statist patterns of national self-determination within the historical picture of political Zionism's consciousness and ideology. It thereby for the first time confronts the historiography of Zionism with the dilemmas with which Yerushalmi grappled when he declared in no uncertain terms that, by the very nature of their trade, Jewish historians who are true to their profession must call into question the myths of the continuity, timelessness, and uniqueness of the Jewish past, and may well find that they themselves must break with that past.

With remarkable intellectual fortitude Yerushalmi declared that, the welcome professionalization of history as a scientific academic discipline notwithstanding, he believed that "the burden of building a bridge to his people remains with the historian," adding that "the lingering suspicion that a conscious responsibility toward the living concerns of the group must result in history that is somehow less scholarly or 'scientific'" was nothing but "a mythology of modern historians."¹⁷ Consequently, Yerushalmi viewed with some ambivalence the fundamentally subversive enterprise of the critical Jewish historian seeking to wade ever deeper into the past of the Jewish people. On one hand he expressed a deep-seated apprehension that modern Jewish historiography would be unable to play a bridging

role between the past and the present, a mission that he regarded as being inaccessible to the historian owing to the latter's professional commitment to dwell on the complexities, tensions, and constant temporal transformations in the Jewish past. On the other hand he tended, nevertheless, toward an optimistic assessment of the importance for current endeavors of exposing the cracks in the continuum of the Jewish past: "Perhaps the time has come to look more closely at ruptures, breaches, breaks, to identify them more precisely, to see how the Jews endured them, to understand that not everything of value that existed before a break was either salvaged or metamorphosed, but was lost, and that often some of what fell by the wayside can become, through our retrieval, meaningful to us."¹⁸

And when he comes explicitly to address the issue of how the link between the past and the present reflects on Israel's sovereign national situation, Yerushalmi moves extremely close to the dilemmas that the present study is likely to stir up: "As a result of . . . national sovereignty in Israel Jews have fully re-entered the mainstream of history, and yet their perception of how they got there and where they are is most often more mythical than real. Myth and memory condition action. There are myths that are life-sustaining and deserve to be reinterpreted for our age. There are some that lead astray and must be redefined. Others are dangerous and must be exposed."¹⁹

And so, in the wake of Yerushalmi and to paraphrase him, we may permit ourselves to ask whether, in the aftermath of the unprecedented cataclysm in Jewish and human history between 1939 and 1945, the Zionist conceptions of a *Nationalitätenstaat*—the alternatives proposed by political Zionism to the nation-state—were "lost," or perhaps "fell by the wayside," and could perhaps "become, through our retrieval, meaningful to us"? Are these the type of conceptions "that are life-sustaining and deserve to be reinterpreted for our age"? Or do they "lead astray" and need to be "redefined"? And then again, are they even "dangerous" and as such deserve to be rejected out of hand?

It is difficult to propose a solution to these dilemmas with any confidence. On one hand, we observe the ever-increasing pervasiveness of a binational existence between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea resulting from the repeated failures of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the constant expansion

of the Israeli settlement enterprise beyond the Green Line. Contemplating this development, one is sorely tempted to pluck the *Nationalitätenstaat* formulae from the Zionist past, to rescue from oblivion the repressed and deliberately forgotten attachment to mainstream Zionism, and to place them squarely on the Israeli and international agenda as old-new federative alternatives to the apparently no longer viable two-state solution.

Yet on the other hand, precisely in light of Yerushalmi's strong conviction that historians shoulder "a conscious responsibility toward the living concerns of the group,"²⁰ the historians of Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be well-advised to beware of such temptations. After all, following many generations of a bloody national conflict and given that despite Israel's ongoing control over the occupied territories both Israelis and Palestinians continue to live alongside one another in separate institutional constellations, it is by no means certain that an attempt to reapply the binational models that occupied a central position in the political imagination during the Ottoman and British Mandate periods would meet the current "living concerns" of the two peoples. On the contrary, if one is to seek in this book insights relevant to the future political complexion of the area that lies between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, one of the most pertinent would be this: Zionism's conceptions of national self-determination were never subject to a single static political model but were rather reformulated at each given point in time in line with changing historical circumstances. Thus, during the late Ottoman period the spokesmen of the central trends in Zionism envisaged the realization of the Jewish people's national self-determination in terms of an autonomous province within the great multinational empire. During most of the British Mandate period the Zionist picture of a political future reflected the model of a multinational democracy within a single state with a Jewish majority that extended over the entire territory of mandatory Palestine. And yet nowadays, when despite the ongoing march of globalization the nation-state model is still perceived to be of existential relevance to many worldwide, we may conclude that Israel's political consciousness would do well to embrace the notion of the division of the Land of Israel/Palestine into two nation-states.

Nevertheless, even once this for the time being imagined division of the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea has been finalized, we may assume that the repressed memories of the binational political conceptions advocated by political Zionism in the past will not be consigned to the garbage bin of history. On the contrary, they are likely to resurface, if only because within the state of Israel itself two national collectives—the Jewish and the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel—continue to live side by side.

In this context it is interesting to note that the political models of multinational citizenship, the fundamental elements of which closely resemble the prestate Zionist notions of *Nationalitätenstaat*, are nowadays articulated primarily by the representatives of Israel's Palestinian-Arab citizens. Thus, ironic as it may seem, it is in fact Ahmad Tibi's vision of Israel as "the state of all its nationalities," referred to at the beginning of this book, that is profoundly in line with the central principal aspects of Zionist political imagination of the prestate period.

Notes

Introduction

1. Landsmann, "Nisui makhshavti-politi." Available in English at <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.774936>.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Shavit, *My Promised Land*, 398.
5. Ibid., 108.
6. Eldar, "'Ha-emeth' shel Netanyahu."
7. See, for example, Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 9; Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, 21; Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 3; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, 9–10; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6–7; Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, 3; and Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 4–5.
8. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.
9. Although not all the historians who addressed the topic explicitly used the term "nation-state," with many using the less formal "Jewish state," they all had in mind a sovereign entity in which the synonymy of the terms for the (Jewish) state and the (Jewish) nation was taken for granted. This represents precisely the conventional conception of the nation-state in international relations: Keating, *Plurinational Democracy*, 6–7. See Heller, *The Zionist Idea*, 224; Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, 19; Dinur, *Ba-Mifneh ha-Dorot*, 68; Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, 95; Ettinger, "Yichuda shel ha-Tenuah ha-Leumit ha-Yehudit," 20; Vital, *The Origins of Zionism*, vii–viii; Katz, *Leumiyut yehudit*, 5–6, 10; Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 13; Kolatt, "Haim ha-Yishuv be-Eretz-Israel hu Hagshamat ha-Leumiyut ha-Yehudit," 234; Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 4; and Engel, "Ha-meser ha-kaful," 75.
10. Almog, "'Am Levadad Yishkon' ba-Metsiyut u-va-Historiographiya," 52.
11. The following are some central works in the multidisciplinary studies of nationalism that have challenged the inevitability of the link between

- (political) nationality and the nation-state: Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*; Keating, *Nations Against the State*; Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity"; Gans, *The Limits of Nationalism*; Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups*; and Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism*.
12. Keating, *Nations Against the State*, 15–22; Keating, *Pluranational Democracy*, 6–12, 22–28.
 13. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationale Bewegungen bei den kleinen Völkern Europas*; Hroch, *Obrození malých evropských národ*.
 14. Hroch, *Social Preconditions*.
 15. Hroch, "National Self-Determination"; Hroch, *Comparative Studies*.
 16. Hroch, "National Self-Determination," 70–72.
 17. Rudnytzky, "The Image of Austria in the Works of Ivan Franko," 253; Hassassian, *A.R.F. Revolutionary Party 1890–1921*, 10; Biondich, *Stjepan Radić*, 121; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*; Silber, "Gibbush Havanot." For the revision of the deterministic, nation-state-oriented interpretation of the destruction of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires see Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*; Deák, "Comparing Apples and Pears," 239; Deák, "The Habsburg Empire"; Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 7–8; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*; Hagen, "The Russian Empire," 59, 68; and Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire."
 18. Hroch, *Comparative Studies*, viii, 195–196.
 19. Myers, *Between Jew and Arab*; Pianko, *Zionism and the Roads Not Taken*; Loeffler, "Between Zionism and Liberalism"; Chazan, *Metinut*; Jacobson and Naor, *Oriental Neighbors*, 28–31. See also Ezra Mendelsohn, who showed in his earlier research on Eastern European Zionism in the interwar period that binational or multinational models were, in principle, aligned with the political interests of Polish Zionists: Mendelsohn, "Zionist Success and Zionist Failure," 172. For the recent valuable accounts of diaspora Jewish nationalism, see Karlip, *The Tragedy of a Generation*; and Rabinovitch, *Jewish Rights, National Rites*.
 20. Bartal, *Kozak u-bedui*, 152–169.
 21. Silber, *Leumiyut Shona, Ezrakhut Shava!*
 22. Shumsky, *Zweisprachigkeit und binationale Idee*; Heller, *Mi-'Berith Shalom' le-'Ichud'*.
 23. Pianko, "'The True Liberalism of Zionism'"; Loeffler, "Between Zionism and Liberalism"; Segev, "Herzl ve-Tokhnit Basel."
 24. See, for instance, Pappé, "The Square Circle," 43; Gavison, "The Jewish State," 7; Gelber, "The History of Zionist Historiography," 54; Zand, *Matai ve-ech humtza ha-am ha-yebudi*, 268; Yakobson and Rubinstein, *Israel and the Family of Nations*, 88–89, 192; Yakira, *Post-Zionism, Post-Holocaust*, 125; and Jamal, "Neo-Zionism and Palestine." See also Gans, *A Just Zionism*, 54, n. 4; 29–31, n. 10; and Gans, *A Political Theory*.
 25. For a critical discussion of methodological nationalism in the social sciences—which can likewise apply to the humanities, especially when it comes to

the history of national movements—see Wimmer and Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond”; and Wimmer and Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and the Study of Migration.” See also Amelina, Nergiz, Faist, and Glick Schiller, eds., *Beyond Methodological Nationalism*.

26. Shapira, *Israel*.
27. Myers, *Between Jew and Arab*, 15.
28. Just as Shlomo Avineri in *The Making of Modern Zionism*, so too I have naturally faced the dilemma of speaking of the key figures in Zionist history without mentioning Chaim Weizmann. Like Avineri, however, I am also convinced that Weizmann, for all his stature and importance as a statesman, can hardly be viewed as a thinker (*ibid.*, ix), while the present study deals with the constant interplay between the elements of political imagination and political thought in Zionism.
29. See Arie M. Dubnov, “‘Ha-Medina she-ba-Derekh’ o Imperiya Maka Shenit?,” 5–36.
30. See Shumsky, “Brith Shalom’s Uniqueness Reconsidered,” 348.

Chapter One. Leon Pinsker

1. Ahad Ha'am, “Dr. Pinsker u-Makhbarto,” 45.
2. Zipperstein, *An Elusive Prophet*, 78.
3. Patai, ed., *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, vol. I, February 10, 1896, 299.
4. Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 87.
5. Klausner, *Sefer-Pinsker*; Druyanov, *Pinsker ve-zmano*; Zipperstein, “Representations of Leadership (and Failure) in Russian Zionism.”
6. Dinur, *Hibbat Zion*, vol. 1, 62–69; Netanyahu, “Introduction”; Vital, *The Origins of Zionism*, 122–132; Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 73–82; Ginsburg, “Politics and Letters,” esp. 179–183; on Pinsker and the role of the German language in early Jewish nationalism, see Volovici, “Leon Pinsker’s *Autoemancipation!*”
7. Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, 15, 80.
8. Bein, *Theodore Herzl: A Biography*. The perception of the Dreyfus trial as a revelatory event in Herzl’s Zionist evolution was already contested more than three decades ago by Jacques Kornberg: Kornberg, “Theodore Herzl: A Reevaluation”; and Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*. For a brief bibliographical sketch of the main trends within the Zionist historiography on Herzl during the 1914–1993 period, see Goldstein, “Herzl’s Place in Zionist Historiography.”
9. Dinur, *Hibbat Zion*, 62–63; Klausner, *Sefer-Pinsker*, 22; Druyanov, *Pinsker ve-zmano*, 149, 193ff; Ettinger, “Yichuda shel ha-Tenua ha-Leumit ha-Yehudit,” 16–17; Vital, *The Origins of Zionism*; Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*.

10. On the origins, rise, and decline of the “from-assimilation-to-nationalism” paradigm, see Frankel, “Assimilation and the Jews in Nineteenth Century.”
11. Dinur, *Be-mifneh ha-dorot*, 64–65; Ettinger, “Yichuda shel ha-Tenua ha-Leumit ha-Yehudit,” 16.
12. Although Jonathan Frankel was the most prominent proponent of the crisis perception of modern Jewish history and regarded 1881 as the decisive turning point in the history of Russian Jews, in his work one can already find clear reservations about the presentation of emancipation, enlightenment, and integration as phenomena that hastened the disintegration of the inner unity of Jewish society and of “tradition.” See Frankel, “Crisis as a Factor in Modern Jewish Politics,” 45. See also Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*.
13. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa*, 139–150; Stanislawski, *For Whom Do I Toil?*, 146–147; Bartal, *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, 141–142. Bartal had raised this argument challenging the 1881–1882 crisis-oriented paradigm as early as 1981, in the framework of his doctoral dissertation: Bartal, “Halo-yehudim u-khevrata,” 2–3.
14. Lederhendler, *The Road to Modern Jewish Politics*, 155.
15. Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*.
16. Frankel, “Assimilation and the Jews in Nineteenth Century.”
17. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa*, 141.
18. Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 193.
19. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa*, 141.
20. Baron, *The Russian Jew Under Tsars and Soviets*, Bartal, *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, 102–111.
21. Druyanov, *Pinsker ve-zmano*, 61.
22. *Sion* no. 1, July 7, 1861.
23. Lev Pinsker, “‘Osnova’ i vopros o natsional’nostyakh”; Lev Pinsker, “‘Osnova’ i ‘Sion’ pred sudom russkoi zhurnalistiki.”
24. Vernikova, “Russko-yevreiskiye pisateli Odessy vtoroi poloviny XIX”; and see in particular her bibliographical essay devoted specifically to the attribution of Pinsker’s writings in the Russian Jewish press: Vernikova, “Atributsiya statei L’va Pinskera.”
25. For the complete list of Pinsker’s publications in the Russian Jewish press as composed by Vernikova, see Vernikova, “Atributsiya statei L’va Pinskera,” 80–87.
26. *Sion*, July 7, 1861.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Druyanov, *Pinsker ve-zmano*, 64. Compare to Breiman, “Ha-Mifneh ba-Makhshava,” 205–206. Unlike Druyanov, Breiman completely overlooks the salience of Jewish nationally based categories in Pinsker’s editorial in the first issue of *Sion*.

30. Netanyahu, "Introduction," 34–36.
31. Ibid., 34.
32. *Sion*, July 7, 1861.
33. Evans, *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs*, 245–265.
34. Lev Pinsker, "Yevrei v Avstrii," *Sion*, July 21, 1861.
35. Lev Pinsker, "Vengerskaya natsional'nost' i yevrei."
36. Lev Pinsker, "Polozheniye yevreev v Vengrii" (emphasis added.)
37. Lev Pinsker, "'Osnova' i vopros o natsional'nostyakh."
38. Lev Pinsker, "'Osnova' i 'Sion' pred sudom russkoi zhurnalistiki."
39. Ibid.
40. Lev Pinsker, "'Osnova' i vopros o natsional'nostyakh."
41. Lev Pinsker, "'Osnova' i 'Sion' pred sudom russkoi zhurnalistiki."
42. Ibid.
43. Lev Pinsker, "'Osnova' i vopros o natsional'nostyakh."
44. Fischhof, *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes*.
45. The significant difference between Pinsker on one hand and Fischhof and the Austro-Marxists on the other lay in the fact that while Pinsker perceived the Jews to be one of the nationalities of the empire that would have to uphold its right to maintain its national-cultural character, the latter called upon the Jews to assimilate. See Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, vol. 2, 143–178; Cahnman, "Adolf Fischhof and His Jewish Followers"; and Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 198–228.
46. To be sure, Pinsker was not the first to articulate the innovative perception of reorganizing a multinational empire as a *Nationalitätenstaat*. He was preceded by József Eötvös (1813–1871), a prominent Hungarian statesman who scathingly criticized the trend toward aggressive Magyarization in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire and who in 1859 published in German his most important work, *Guarantees of Austria's Power and Unity* (*Die Garantien der Macht und Einheit Oesterreichs*), in which he proposed several formulas for multinational decentralization of the empire. Given Pinsker's deep interest in Hungarian affairs, it is quite likely that he was familiar with this essay. On Eötvös, see Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, vol. 2, 93–99; and Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 179–191.
47. Lev Pinsker, "Yevrei Palestiny i nedavniye raspri mezhdu nimi"; Pinsker, "Obschestvo zaseleniya Palestiny yevreyami-zemledelet'sami"; Pinsker, "Yevrei-zemledelet'sy v Palestinye."
48. Lev Pinsker, "Obschestvo zaseleniya Palestiny yevreyami-zemledelet'sami."
49. Leon Pinsker, "Auto-Emancipation," 94.
50. Lev Pinsker, "Stranitsy iz istorii yevreyev."
51. Druyanov, *Pinsker ve-zmano*, 83.
52. Lev Pinsker, "Dlya kogo suschestvuiut yevreisko-russkiye organy?"
53. Lev Pinsker, "Cremieux v Damaske v 1840," February 13, 1880; February 20, 1880; February 27, 1880; March 5, 1880; March 12, 1880; March

- 19, 1880; April 2, 1880; April 23, 1880; May 21, 1880; July 2, 1880; Lev Pinsker, “Gabriel Rieser i yego epokha,” September 2, 1880; September 12, 1880; November 12, 1880; November 26, 1880; December 3, 1880.
54. Lev Pinsker, “Nashi predstaviteli.”
55. Lev Pinsker, “Yevrei-reformatory.”
56. Lev Pinsker, “Nashi predstaviteli”; Lev Pinsker, “Konferentsiya po emigratsionnomu voprosu”; Lev Pinsker, “Chteniye ravvina, d-ra Vertgeimera”; Lev Pinsker, “Novaya komissiya ob uregulirovanii emigratsii i novye punkty.”
57. See above notes 6–7.
58. Leon Pinsker, “Auto-Emancipation,” 81–82.
59. Ibid., 81.
60. Leon Pinsker, “*Autoemancipation!*,” 8.
61. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 20–23.
62. Leon Pinsker, “Auto-Emancipation,” 99.
63. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 178.
64. Lev Pinsker, “Pis’mo k izdatelyam.”
65. Bartal, *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, ch. 5, esp. 66–67.
66. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa*, 141.
67. Leon Pinsker, “Auto-Emancipation,” 102. It is crucial here, however, to refer to the German original, for the term “ein suzeränes Paschalik” was mistranslated by David S. Blondheim as a “sovereign Pashalik” (!), thereby confusing “suzerainty” and “sovereignty”; see Leon Pinsker, “*Autoemancipation!*,” 30.
68. Hroch, “National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective,” 65–82.
69. Semyon Dubnov, *Pis’mo o starom i novom evreistve*, 81.
70. Rudnytzky, “The Image of Austria in the Works of Ivan Franko,” 253; Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 210–215; Hassassian, *A.R.F. Revolutionary Party 1890–1921*, 10; Biondich, *Stjepan Radić*, 121; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*; Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*; Deák, “Comparing Apples and Pears,” 239; Deák, “The Habsburg Empire”; Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 7–8; Hagen, “The Russian Empire,” 59, 68; Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire,” 30–44; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.
71. See notes 38–41 above.

Chapter Two. Theodor Herzl

1. Bein, *Theodor Herzl: Biographiya*, viii.
2. Bein, *Theodor Herzl: Biographie*, 554
3. Bein, *Theodor Herzl: Biographiya*, 322.
4. For a notable example, see the series of essays published following the centennial of the *Jewish State*’s publication and of the First Zionist Congress (1897). These essays plainly consider the Jewish nation-state as a

- point of departure for studying Herzlian Zionism: Elboim-Dror, “Herzl as a Proto-‘Post-Zionist’?”; Sagi and Stern, *Herzl Az ve-Hayom*; Conforti, “East and West”; see also Gorny, *Anshei Kan ve-Achshav*, 116–136.
5. Adler, *The Herzl Paradox*.
 6. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 79.
 7. Adler, *The Herzl Paradox*, 86–87; Elon went so far as to define this development as “a dramatic departure in Herzl’s political thinking” and as “a development that set him apart from, and above, most nineteenth-century nationalists.” See Elon, *Herzl*, 348. See also Pawel, *The Labyrinth of Exile*, 469, who also claimed that *Altneuland* “marks a sharp break with the political attitudes that inspired *Der Judenstaat*.”
 8. Avineri, *Herzl*, 185.
 9. See also Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 96.
 10. Elon, *Herzl*, 347–351; Pawel, *The Labyrinth of Exile*, 467–474; Elboim-Dror, *Ha-Machar shel Etmol, Kerech Rishon*, 70–81; Bardenstein, “Territorialism and Desire,” 102–104; Avineri, *Herzl*, 165–200; Gluzman, *Ha-Guf ha-Tzioni*, 34–66; Conforti, “East and West,” 211–215.
 11. Avineri, *Herzl*, 182–183.
 12. For example, see Khalidi, “Utopian Zionism or Zionist Proselytism?”
 13. Schwartz, *Ha-Yada’ata et ha-Aretz*.
 14. *Ibid.*, 117–118, 122, 130.
 15. See Chapter 1.
 16. The historiographical claim that the Dreyfus trial was a central factor in Herzl’s adoption of Zionism was an idea that dominated scholarship until the publication of Kornberg’s research. It was first proposed and developed by Alex Bein in his biography of Herzl: Bein, *Theodor Herzl: Biographie*.
 17. Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*, 190–200.
 18. *Ibid.*, 118–124.
 19. *Ibid.*, 115–117.
 20. *Ibid.*, 13; on the way that the Hungarian environment of Herzl’s youth shaped his Zionist worldview, see Handler, *Dori*, 106–117.
 21. Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*, 46–51.
 22. *Ibid.*, 103–111.
 23. *Ibid.*, 115.
 24. *Ibid.*, 181–182.
 25. See Raz-Krakotzkin, “Orientalism,” 250–251. See also Kornberg, “Theodor Herzl: Zionism as Personal Liberation,” 47.
 26. For example, see Elboim-Dror, *Ha-Machar shel Etmol*, 76; Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 94; and Conforti, “East and West.”
 27. Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 86–87.
 28. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 36–37, 75–77.
 29. Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*.
 30. Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, 60.

31. Bartal, *Letaken Am*, 7–19. As Bartal argues, modern Jewish national movements, including Zionism, made frequent use of cultural patterns and concepts that originated in the “recent past,” in the Jews’ unequivocally diasporic way of life. These movements sought to reincorporate those patterns and concepts as central, and even essential, elements within the Jewish national collective ethos in the new national-political landscape. Bartal demonstrates that this logic was particularly apparent in the relationship between the concepts “nationalism” and “Enlightenment,” when Jewish nationalism’s agents and spokespeople often internalized, confirmed, and even explicitly legitimated the goals and values of the Enlightenment and Haskalah era. This picture is sharply different from the way that the relationship between nationalism and Zionism on one hand and the European Enlightenment and Haskalah on the other is depicted from within the later ideological framework of the Jewish nation-state, according to which “nationalism” is usually viewed as opposed to “assimilation” and “Zionism” as opposed to “diaspora.”
32. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 75.
33. See the original, “Jeder behält seine Sprache, welche die liebe Heimat seiner Gedanken ist” (Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, 82), which was translated into English as “Every man can preserve the language in which his thoughts are at home” (Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 99).
34. As convincingly shown by Liora Halperin in the case of Jewish Palestine during the Mandate period, even while most Yishuv’s Zionists became and remained deeply committed to an emerging Hebrew culture, they remained linguistically connected to cultures that lay outside the boundaries of their pro-Hebrew community: Halperin, *Babel in Zion*.
35. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 100.
36. Ibid.
37. Ahad Ha’am, “Beit Sefer be-Yafo,” 209.
38. Herzl, “Die Jagt in Böhmen.”
39. Amos Elon, in Herzl, 348, argues that “the [novel’s] plot is simple and at times so thin it is almost trite.” David Vital writes that “*Altneuland* was poor literature: crudely constructed, of wooden characterization, psychologically superficial” (Vital, *Zionism*, 352). According to Ernst Pawel, *The Labyrinth of Exile*, 467, “*Altneuland* is an insipid and indigestible *fin-de-siècle* concoction.” Michael Gluzman, *Ha-Guf ha-Tzioni*, 42, writes that “from a literary point of view, *Altneuland* is a schematic novel, possessing an ineffectual plot and characters who lack any trace of psychological complexity.” And Shlomo Avineri, in Herzl, 168, posits that “*Altneuland* suffers from a sentimentalism that sometimes borders on kitsch [and] [i]ts frame story is artificial and forced”; elsewhere (ibid., 173) Avineri concludes that “Herzl was a brilliant journalist and essayist but a mediocre playwright and novelist.”
40. Avineri, Herzl, 173.

41. Ritchie Robertson offers an interesting interpretation of Kingscourt's character, arguing that Kingscourt is "the Gentile remade in the image of the Jew." Kingscourt represents the Jews' social mobility and ability to assume different identities in that he himself changed his career, his country of residence, and even his name: in Robertson, "The *New Ghetto*," 47–48.
42. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 26.
43. Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*, 103.
44. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 33–34.
45. *Ibid.*, 37.
46. *Ibid.*, 39.
47. *Ibid.*, 42.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, 50.
50. *Ibid.*, 60.
51. Avineri, *Herzl*, 173.
52. In that sense, one must concur with Avineri's main argument regarding *Altneuland*, which no one before him had made so decisively and clearly, namely, that it is not just a utopian novel but is above all a plan of action (*ibid.*, 165). However, to fully understand the essence of this plan, one must carefully consider the novel's personal plot line rather than casually dismissing its importance.
53. Schwartz, *Ha-Yada'ata et ha-Aretz*, 136–137.
54. *Ibid.*, 136.
55. Ahad Ha'am, "Altneuland," 307ff.
56. Elon, *Herzl*, 349; Pawel, *The Labyrinth of Exile*, 470.
57. See Schwartz's illuminating interpretation of Kingscourt's connection to David Litvak's young son, a bond that causes Kingscourt to want to stay in Altneulandian Palestine even before Friedrich considers doing so. Schwartz argues that this motif in the plot reflects Herzl's thinking on "social engineering that will save the Jewish tribe." He believes that Herzl thought that taking non-Jews from ancient aristocratic houses like Kingscourt and adding them to the Jewish people would be one of the aforementioned strategies for restoring the national gene pool: Schwartz, *Ha-Yada'ata et ha-Aretz*, 140–141.
58. Nordau, "Achad-Haam über 'Altneuland,'" quoted in Schulte, "Herzl and Nordau," 78 (emphasis added).
59. Fassmann, "Emigration, Immigration and Internal Migration."
60. Beller, *Herzl*, 11–12.
61. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 19.
62. Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle*, 75.
63. Herzl, "Die Jagt in Böhmen."
64. Burgess and Hyvik, "Ambivalent Patriotism."
65. John, "We Do Not Even Possess Our Selves," 35–36.

66. Garver, "Representative Czech Masters," 36–37.
67. Agnew, "Noble *Natio* and Modern Nation," 66.
68. Nolte, "Choosing Czech Identity," 57.
69. Valantiejus, "Early Lithuanian Nationalism." See also Blanke, *Polish-Speaking Germans?*
70. Ro'i, "Nisionotei'hem shel ha-Mosdot," 215ff; Tauber, "Yachas Ha-Leumiut Ha-Surit La'Tnuah Ha-Tzionit Ad Tom Milhemet Ha-Olam Ha-Rishona," *Historia Yehudit*, 14–17; Jacobson, "Sephardim, Ashkenazim and the 'Arab Question,'" 120–123; Gribetz, "An Arabic-Zionist Talmud"; Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*. For a hybrid Arab-Jewish identity of Middle Eastern Zionists in Mandatory Palestine, see Jacobson and Naor, *Oriental Neighbors*, 9, 11–12, 99–106.
71. Malul, "Ma'amadenu ba'Aretz."
72. Rabinovich, "Reshimot."
73. Malul, "Ma'amadenu ba'Aretz."
74. Ibid.
75. "eine freie Erfindung Achad-Haams ist": Nordau, "Achad-Haam über 'Altneuland.'"
76. Patai, ed., *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, vol. 1, February 23, 1896, 305–306.
77. Garver, *The Young Czech Party*; see also Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 223–224.
78. Biondich, *Stjepan Radić*, 121; John, "'We Do Not Even Possess Our Selves'"; Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*; Rudnytzky, "The Image of Austria in the Works of Ivan Franko," 253; Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 2, 55–57; Kann and David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands*, 331ff; Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 213–214; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*; Kuzmany, "Habsburg Austria," 55–58.
79. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 42–43.
80. Shmuel Almog was the only researcher to unequivocally stress the absence of the desire for total state sovereignty in Herzlian Zionism. However, Almog mistakenly claimed that this was an exception in the imagination of the nationalisms of the period. As I argue above, an examination of notions of self-determination in the Central and Eastern European space suggests precisely the opposite (Almog, "Was Herzl a Jewish Nationalist?").
81. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 193. It is pretty clear from *Altneuland* that in Herzl's imagination, the future link of the Old-New Palestine to the Ottoman Empire was far from being just a matter of formality. When needed in order to promote the building of the country, Joe Levy, the "general manager" of Altneuland, was "obliged . . . to hurry off to Constantinople" to arrange "a very important matter . . . with the Turkish Government" (Herzl, *Old New Land*, 231).
82. Avineri, Herzl, 184ff; Khalidi, "Utopian Zionism or Zionist Proselytism?"

83. It is worth noting that this “tactical” interpretation of Herzl’s relationship to the Turkish context is not necessarily driven by a particular ideology. This point is further demonstrated by the case of Benny Morris’s treatment of Herzl’s Zionism. Over his career, Morris has changed his ideological position significantly: he went from being a historian who is critical of the Zionist narrative to being one who is critical of the Palestinian narrative. Nevertheless, he consistently argues—despite the fact that his argument has been empirically disproved (see Hachohen and Kimmerling, “Theodor Herzl”)—that Herzl had intended to expel the Arab residents of Palestine but concealed his intention under the guise of loyalty to the Muslim empire (see Morris, “He’arot al Ha-Historiographia Ha-Tzionit,” 195; Morris, “He’ara al Ma’amaram”). Morris advances this claim while totally disregarding and expressing complete intellectual uninterest in the wider cultural, geopolitical, and national contexts of the presovereign imperial world in which Herzl lived and worked. Furthermore, he is not in the slightest bit familiar with histories of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, nor with the histories of the national movements alongside which Herzl developed his national thought.
84. Penslar, “Historians, Herzl, and the Palestinian Arabs.”
85. Elon, *Herzl*, 349–350; Pawel, *The Labyrinth of Exile*, 470–471; Elboim-Dror, “Herzl as a Proto-‘Post-Zionist’?”, 247–248; Bardenstein, “Territorialism and Desire,” 103; Khalidi, “Utopian Zionism or Zionist Proselytism?”, 58; Schwartz, *Ha-Yada’ata et ba-Aretz*, 109; Gluzman, *Ha-Guf ba-Tziona*, 64–65; Avineri, *Herzl*, 177–179.
86. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 124–125.
87. Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” See also Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*.
88. Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 789, 786.
89. *Ibid.*, 769.
90. Makdisi proposes here a complex rethinking of Edward Said’s approach. Said (*Orientalism*) identifies that the dichotomy between the rationalist enlightened Europeanness and the barbaric, ignorant (and simultaneously magical and exotic) Orient is the opposition that most decisively shapes Western cultural consciousness. Makdisi’s study of the Ottoman imperial context, however, proposes a more multidimensional account of the relationship between Europe and “the Orient”: at the very same time that educated Ottoman officials insisted on modernity’s uniquely Islamic development in “the Orient,” they also presented themselves as “Western” vis-à-vis the “orientals” within the empire while asking to join European Enlightenment culture without giving up their unique Ottoman-Muslim identity. In light of the comparison that I draw above between Herzl’s Reschid Bey and the complex orientalist discourse of the late Ottoman period, it seems necessary to reconsider whether Said’s bipolar orientalist paradigm applies to Herzlian Zionism. There is no doubt that Herzl

wanted to Europeanize the Zionist Yishuv in Palestine and that he considered Jewish settlement in the country to be the vanguard of culture against Asiatic barbarism, as he wrote in *The Jewish State* (43). At the same time, however, he wanted to carry all of this out within the framework and in the presence of the Ottoman Empire. This was in the spirit of the Ottoman Empire's complex orientalist self-conception, which was based both on its desire to be a part of Europe and on its insistence on its oriental-Muslim uniqueness.

91. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 222–225.
92. Steven Beller, who discusses the “Futuro” in his biography of Herzl, considers it to be a symbol of the world's respect, recognition, and approval of the “Jewish state.” However, he does not address the central element of the story, which is that the ship is referred to as “Zion”; Beller, *Herzl*, 104.
93. Schwartz, *Ha-Yada'ata et ha-Aretz*, 118.
94. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 288–289.
95. *Ibid.*, 291.
96. *Ibid.*, 178.
97. In this substantial aspect, I am revisiting here my earlier work on Pinsker, in which I argued for a deep difference between Pinsker's and Herzl's perceptions of the Jewish national political future (Shumsky, “Leon Pinsker,” 56).

Chapter Three. Ahad Ha'am

1. Ahad Ha'am, “Hakdama,” 9.
2. Two of the three academic biographies of Ahad Ha'am—Gottschalk, *Ahad Ha'am*, and Goldstein, *Ahad Ha'am: Biographiya*—do not refer to it at all. The same goes for the 1990 volume of *Jewish History*, which is dedicated entirely to the study of Ahad Ha'am and includes articles by a number of central scholars of Zionism: Vital, “Ahad Ha-'Am”; Reinhartz, “Ahad Ha-'Am”; Shapira, “Herzl, Ahad Ha-'Am, and Berdichevsky”; and Shavit, “Ahad Ha-'Am and Hebrew National Culture.” Foundational books on Zionist ideologies—Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*; and Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*—and the recent Shapira, *Israel: A History*, are equally silent about “Preface to the New Edition.” Ben Halpern addressed it rather briefly, and with no relation to the large context of Ahad Ha'am's writings: Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, 334–336, and the same applies to Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs*, 112.
3. For the criticism of the dichotomy between the “political” and “cultural/spiritual” dimensions in studies on Jewish nationalism and Zionism, see Pianko, *The Roads Not Taken*; and Shumsky, “Brith Shalom's Uniqueness Reconsidered.”
4. Zipperstein, “Representations of Leadership.”

5. Compare to Goldstein, “Ahad Ha-’Am: A Political Failure?”
6. Ahad Ha’am, “Dr. Pinsker u-Makhbart,” 45. See also Ahad Ha’am, “Pinsker and Political Zionism,” 61.
7. Zipperstein, *An Elusive Prophet*, 78.
8. Shumsky, “Brith Shalom’s Uniqueness Reconsidered.”
9. Goldstein, “Ahad Ha-’Am: A Political Failure?,” esp. 38–40.
10. Zipperstein, *An Elusive Prophet*.
11. Ahad Ha’am, “Hakdama,” 9.
12. Ibid.
13. Zipperstein, *An Elusive Prophet*, 309.
14. Ibid., 308. A similar interpretation of the “Preface” was proposed by Yosef Nedava, a prolific scholar of Zionism and self-proclaimed Revisionist Zionist (Nedava, “Ahad Ha’am ve-ha-beaya ha-aravit,” 100–101). Nedava goes to great lengths to disregard the fact that the idea that Jewish and non-Jewish national rights in Palestine are equal, which Nedava infers from the Balfour Declaration, is actually something that Ahad Ha’am agreed with wholeheartedly in this text. Nedava also imagines that Ahad Ha’am was deeply sorrowful at the fact that the Balfour Declaration did not recognize Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people, leaving an opening for it to become a joint site for two “national homes,” for both Jews and Arabs. Like in Zipperstein’s case, Nedava’s interpretation disregards what Ahad Ha’am himself wrote and unequivocally believed: namely, that the British government, when it decided not to grant the Jews exclusive national rights to the country and instead urged them to share their right with the land’s residents, was giving the Jewish people “what is theirs by right, truthfully and justly” (Ahad Ha’am, “Hakdama,” 9).
15. Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 112–124.
16. See Shapira, “Ahad Ha’am.”
17. Ahad Ha’am, “Milim u-Musagim.” References below are to the English translation of this article: Ahad Ha’am, “A Spiritual Centre.”
18. Ahad Ha’am, “A Spiritual Centre,” 126.
19. Ibid., 127.
20. Ibid., 127–128 (emphasis in the original).
21. Ibid., 128.
22. See Chapter 1.
23. Shapira, “Ahad Ha’am,” 214.
24. Ahad Ha’am, “A Spiritual Centre,” 127–128.
25. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 210–215.
26. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, vol. 2, 159–162; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 191–198.
27. Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire,” 39–40.
28. Shumsky, “Tsiyonut u-Medinat-ha-Leom,” 241–242.
29. That Turkish is Reschid Bey’s primary language is obvious from the scene

- in which he appears for the first time in the novel, being approached by David Littwak in Turkish. Curiously, in the English edition of *Altneuland* referred to here, the language of Reschid Bey's daily use is mistranslated as Arabic ("David called to him [Reschid] in Arabic," Herzl, *Old New Land*, 68). Compare to the German original: "David rief ihm einige Worte in türkische Sprache zu" (Herzl, *Altneuland*, 77).
30. Cohen, "Jews in German Society."
 31. Nordau, "Achad-Haam über 'Altneuland.'"
 32. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 133.
 33. Patai, ed., *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, vol. 1, February 23, 1896, 305–306.
 34. Laskov, "Ha-Riv odot 'Altneuland.'"
 35. Ibid., 53.
 36. Conforti, "East and West," 216.
 37. Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*, 107–109.
 38. Ahad Ha'am, "'Altneuland,'" 318 (emphasis in the original).
 39. Valantiejus, "Early Lithuanian Nationalism."
 40. Burgess and Hyvik, "Ambivalent Patriotism."
 41. John, "'We Do Not Even Possess Our Selves.'"
 42. Nordau, "Achad-Haam über 'Altneuland.'"
 43. Avineri, "Ahad Ha'am she-lo Ratzitem Lehakir."
 44. Ahad Ha'am, "Ha-Het ve-Onsho," 321.
 45. Shumsky, "'This Ship Is Zion!'"
 46. Patai, ed., *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, vol. 1, February 23, 1896, 305–306.
 47. Achd Ha'am, "A Spiritual Centre," 127–128.
 48. Ahad Ha'am, "Avar ve-Atid," 82 (emphasis in the original).
 49. Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, 79.
 50. Ahad Ha'am, "Dr. Pinsker u-Makhbarto."
 51. Ahad Ha'am, "Khikui ve-Hitbolelut," 86–89.
 52. Ahad Ha'am, "Shalosh Madregot," 150–153.
 53. Dubnov, "Shelilat-ha-Galut u-Khiyuva be-torat Ahad Ha'am."
 54. *Igrot Abad Ha'm*, vol. 4, 67–68, 90–92, 94–96, 180–181; Rawidowicz, *Sefer Shimon Dubnov*, 256–262.
 55. Shumsky, "Tsiyonut be-Merkhaot Kefulot."
 56. Ahad Ha'am, "Shalosh Madregot"; Ahad Ha'am, "Shelilat ha-Galut."
 57. Dubnov, *Mikhtavim al ha-Yahadut ha-Yashana ve-ha-Hadasa*, 99.
 58. Ahad Ha'am, "Shelilat ha-Galut"; *Igrot Abad Ha'am*, vol. 4, 90–92, 94–96.
 59. *Igrot Abad Ha'am*, vol. 4, 95–96 (emphasis in the original).
 60. Silber, "Dubnov, Rayaon ha-Leumiyut ha-Diasporit ve-tefutsato"; Dohrn, "State and Minorities," 161–162; Rabinovitch, *Jewish Rights, National Rites*.
 61. Gorny, "Otonomizm ke-Mahut Muvnet ba-Tenua ha-Leumit ha-Yehudit," 257. Compare to Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 108–109.

62. Greenbaum, “Shimon Dubnov ve-’ha-Miflaga ha-Amamit’ (‘Volkspartei’).”
63. Dubnov, *Mikhtavim al ha-Yahadut ha-Yashana ve-ha-Hadasa*, 21–24, 33–34, 59–61.
64. Ahad Ha’am, “Shalosh Madregot,” 153 (emphasis in original).
65. Ahad Ha’am, “Shelilat ha-Galut,” 402.
66. Ahad Ha’am, “Shalosh Madregot,” 153.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ahad Ha’am to D. Sherman, July 14, 1903, in Laskov, ed., *Ahad Ha’am*, 196.
70. Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire”; see also Arslan, *Prince Sabahattin and Liberal Thought*, ch. 2.
71. Ahad Ha’am, “Ha-Yahadut ha-Ottomanit,” 498.
72. Ahad Ha’am, “Medinat-ha-Yehudim ve-’Tsarat-ha-Yehudim,” in *Kol Kitvei Ahad Ha’am*, 138. In the existing English translation—Ahad Ha’am, “The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem,” 47—the word “lands” (*art-zot*) is omitted, thereby causing a misunderstanding of Ahad Ha’am’s sub-statist view of the future “Jewish state.”
73. Ahad Ha’am, “Ha-Yahadut ha-Ottomanit,” 498.
74. Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, 101ff.
75. Ahad Ha’am, “Ha-Yahadut ha-Ottomanit,” 498 (emphasis in the original).
76. Lev Pinsker, “Vengerskaya natsional’nost’ i yevrei.”
77. Ahad Ha’am, “Ha-Het ve-Onsho,” 321.
78. Ahad Ha’am, “Hakdama.”
79. Ahad Ha’am, “Shalosh Madregot,” 153.

Chapter Four. Vladimir Jabotinsky

1. Quoted from an article compilation published a year later on the “Polish-Jewish question” and its link to municipal governance in Congress Poland: Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Polyaki i yevrei,” 14–15.
2. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O ‘dvunatsional’noi Palestine.”
3. Ibid.
4. Yaacov Shavit, who laid the foundations for critical historical research on Jabotinsky, proposes a sharp distinction between the young Jabotinsky and the older Jabotinsky who led the Revisionist movement: Shavit, *Mi-Rov leMedina*, 208–209. The practical consequence of this assumption is that Jabotinsky’s political views during the pre-World War I period are considered to have only minor relevance to understanding his views during his Revisionist period. Thus, this assumption bolsters the historiographic tendency to focus on Jabotinsky’s interwar biography and thought without adequately addressing his recent past in the period before the collapse of the fin-de-siècle empires. See Shavit, *Jabotinsky and*

the Revisionist Movement; and Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*, 20–30. Likewise, even in the comprehensive anthology of Jabotinsky scholarship published as part of the Ben-Gurion Institute's "Iyunim le-Tekumat Israel" series, it is readily apparent that most research interest in Jabotinsky focuses on his Revisionist period, with very little integration between the pre- and post-World War I periods. See Bareli and Ginnossar, eds., *Isb ba-Saar*.

5. Apart from the scholarly literature mentioned in note 4, see the following foundational texts on the history of Zionism and Zionist ideology: Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 159–186; Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 236–249; and Shapira, *Israel*, 124–127.
6. Natkovich, *Bein Ananei Zohar*; see also Natkovich, "Pulmus 'Mashber ha-Marksizm.'"
7. See, for instance, Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman*; Schechtman, *Fighter and Prophet*; and Katz, *Jabo*.
8. Natkovich ("Pulmus 'Mashber ha-Marksizm,'" 2) criticizes what she sees as Stanislawski's "imprecise" and somewhat static use of the term "fin-de-siècle" to describe the ideological and cultural background of Jabotinsky's nationalism, when pointing out the internal changes in Jabotinsky's cultural thought and identity stances throughout the "fin-de-siècle" period itself.
9. Amir Goldstein's important recently published book offers an integrative and chronologically comprehensive account of Jabotinsky's Zionist thought in the context of anti-Semitism during the period between the First Russian Revolution and the outbreak of World War II (Goldstein, *Derekh Rabat-Panim*). Regarding Jabotinsky's early Zionist period in tsarist Russia, however, the book relies on texts that were translated into Hebrew and published in an edition of collected works by Jabotinsky's son Ari (Zeev Jabotinsky, *Ktavim*) or as part of an updated volume of Jabotinsky's ideological works published by the Jabotinsky Institute (Zeev Jabotinsky, *Leumiyut Liberalit*). Thus, the book leaves out dozens of early articles and essays that might have shed light on essential aspects of Jabotinsky's identity and national-political positions during his pre-Revisionist period.
10. For example, Shlomo Avineri adopts this approach to Jabotinsky's vision of the future state: Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 179; see also Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 260. Despite the fact that Arye Naor is more aware than most Jabotinsky scholars of the latter's complex approach to the concept of "state" and to the ideological link between his Helsingfors Conference-era thought and the pre-World War I multinational past in the Eastern European space, he nonetheless chooses to conclude his comprehensive article on Jabotinsky's constitutional outline for the Jewish state by presenting his political thought as a kind of early blueprint for the contemporary state of Israel: Naor, "Ha-Mitveh Ha-Chukati," 92.

11. Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle*, 158–159.
12. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Predisloviye.” The fact that a Russian translation of *Staat und Nation* was published by the Zionist press Kadima, and with a preface written by Jabotinsky, deserves special attention. After all, it is a well-known fact that although both Renner and Otto Bauer, his younger collaborator of Jewish origin, did not consider Jews to be a national group, their Austro-Marxist autonomism did have a decisive influence on non-Zionist Jewish nationalist movements. This was particularly true of the Jewish social-democratic Bund party, which fought for national-cultural (“personal”) autonomy for Eastern European Jewry (see Gechtman, “Conceptualizing National-Cultural Autonomy”; and Karlip, *The Tragedy of a Generation*. On the impact of Austro-Marxism on Poalei Zion’s struggle for national autonomy during the Habsburg monarchy, see Silber, *Leumiyyut shona*, 78). However, Renner’s *Staat und Nation* also served as a veritable national-political bible for more mainstream versions of Zionist nationalism. The problem is that the decisive influence of this Austro-Marxist national-political theory on Zionist political thought, the patterns and trajectories of that influence, and the ways in which the Zionist mainstream adapted and adjusted to this influence have been improperly understood, have been understated, or have gone completely unnoticed by key studies of the history of Zionist ideology (see Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, 93; and Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 168–169).
13. He also went by the pen names Rudolf Springer and Synopticus; toward the end of his life, he was elected president of the Second Republic of Austria; Barkai, “Ha-Sotzialdemokratiya ha-Osrit”; Kann, *The Multi-national Empire*, vol. 2, 159–162; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 198–213. On the influence of Austro-Marxist thought on Jabotinsky, see Naor, “Ha-Mitveh Ha-Chukati,” 53–54.
14. For a biographical overview of key Austro-Marxist figures, see Blum, *The Austro-Marxists*; for the ideological characteristics of Austro-Marxism, see Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, 119–141.
15. Fischhof, *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes*; Graetz, “Mi-Liberalism le-Tora Le’umit-Autonomistit.
16. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Predisloviye,” 6.
17. Ibid., 7.
18. Ibid., 6.
19. Ibid., 7.
20. Ibid. Compare to Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Nashi zadachi II.” Jabotinsky makes a sharp distinction here between the autonomous powers of the nations and the powers of the state as a coordinating body that represents the interests of all its citizens.
21. Vladimir Jabotinsky [Altalena], “O natsionailsme.”
22. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.
23. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Predisloviye,” 7.

24. Lev Pinsker, “‘Osnova’ i vopros o national’nastyakh”; Lev Pinsker, “‘Osnova’ i ‘Sion’ pred sudom russkoi zhurnalistiki.”
25. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Nashi zadachi III” (emphasis in the original).
26. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O natsionalisme.”
27. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O federatsii.”
28. Ibid.
29. The contemporary Russian term at the time for non-Russians, mainly for those who were not members of the Russian Orthodox Church.
30. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O federatsii.”
31. Ibid.
32. Silber, “Gibbush Havanot,” 424.
33. On the Polish nationalists’ Habsburgian patriotism, see Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 210–215.
34. For more on instances in which national consciousness was combined with links to a particular pre–World War I empire within nondominant national movements, and for criticism of the deterministic explanation for the demise of the multinational empires, see Rudnytzky, “The Image of Austria in the Works of Ivan Franko,” 253; Hassassian, *A.R.F. Revolutionary Party*, 10; Biondich, *Stjepan Radić*, 121; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*; Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*; Deák, “Comparing Apples and Pears,” 239; Deák, “The Habsburg Empire”; Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 7–8; Hagen, “The Russian Empire,” 59, 68; Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire”; and Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.
35. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*; Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, chs. 1 and 2; Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy*; Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*; Seton-Watson, *The “Sick Heart” of Modern Europe*, 4–5; Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*; Ash, *The Uses of Adversity*. It is interesting to note that the first book that appears on this list—*The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, published in 1917—was rushed by the author R. W. Seton-Watson to the publisher even before he had completed it because the former hoped that the book would “help to serve the great purpose of the War.” Though the book’s scholarly value falls far below its propaganda value, it is clear that Seton-Watson’s deterministic approach to the fall of the Hapsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires had a significant influence on generations of Western historians. For more on this, see Karpas, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, 437, n. 6.
36. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O federatsii.”
37. Ibid. On the arrest of the chief editor S. M. Margolias, see <http://my-dic.ru/dic/enciklopediya-brokgauza-i-efrona/310699-radikal-s-peterburgskaya-gazeta>.
38. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Avtonomiya ili federatsiya.”
39. Ibid.
40. Gans, *The Limits of Nationalism*.

41. Amir Goldstein (*Derekh Rabat-Panim*, 102–119) argues that Jabotinsky and his coauthors wrote the Helsingfors Program because of the dead end that the Zionist movement faced in Russia following the 1905 revolution. However, the full scale of the revolution's failure had not yet become clear in 1906; as a matter of fact, anyone who studies the radical vision for Jewish national autonomy and a multinational federation in the Russian state that Jabotinsky presented in the newspaper *Khronika yevreiskoi zbizni* (Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Nashi zadachi I," "Nashi zadachi II," and "Nashi zadachi III"—one of his many political articles that have not been translated from the Russian and therefore were not included in Goldstein's study) would be hard-pressed to ignore the clear link between the Zionist-autonomist worldview that Jabotinsky developed in the run-up to the Helsingfors Conference and his optimistic approach to the possibility of reestablishing Russia along the lines that he had presented earlier in *Radikal*. For criticism of the "the failure of the revolution" as it pertains to the Jews' educational and cultural conditions, see Horowitz, "Victory from Defeat"; on the role of the 1905 revolution in the process by which the Jews of tsarist Russia became a distinct ethno-linguistic community, see Ury, *Barricades and Banners*, 175; and for more on trends in Russian Jewish politics following the revolution, see Levin, *Mibapecha le-Milkhama*.
42. "Hachlatot ha-Ve'ida Ha-Shlishit," 98–99.
43. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Turetskiye novosti."
44. Ibid.
45. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Yevrei v Turtsii."
46. Rodrigue, "From *Millet* to Minority," 242.
47. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Natsional'nyi vopros v Turtsii."
48. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," January 18, 1909.
49. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," January 25, 1909.
50. Ibid.
51. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," February 15, 1909.
52. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," January 25, 1909.
53. Ibid.
54. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," February 1, 1909.
55. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," February 15, 1909 (emphasis in the original).
56. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy," January 25, 1909.
57. Rachamimov, "Provincial Compromises and State Patriotism"; Shumsky,

- Zweisprachigkeit und binationale Idee*, 222–224; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.
58. Rachamimov, “Diaspora Nationalism’s Pyrrhic Victory,” 7; Rachamimov, “Provincial Compromises and State Patriotism”; Kuzmany, “Habsburg Austria.”
 59. Saab, *The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire*, 225–241.
 60. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Novaya Turtsiya i nashi perspektivy,” March 22, 1909.
 61. Ibid., 8.
 62. Ibid., 9.
 63. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O federatsii.”
 64. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Natsional’nyi vopros v Turtsii.”
 65. Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire,” 36–41; see also Ülker, “Contextualising ‘Turkification.’”
 66. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Mladoturki i Albaniya.”
 67. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Albanskiye dela.”
 68. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Vozstaniye v Aravii.”
 69. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Mladoturetskiye dela.”
 70. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Greko-bolgarskiye peregovory.”
 71. Ibid.
 72. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Natsional’nyi vopros v Turtsii.”
 73. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Saloniki.”
 74. Ibid.
 75. Ibid.
 76. Ibid.
 77. Ibid. In contrast with Hillel Halkin’s new biography of Jabotinsky, in which he argues that Jabotinsky supported the national independence aspirations of the small nations of tsarist Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, both this text and Jabotinsky’s *Radikal* articles on the future of tsarist Russia tell an entirely different story that clearly rejects national-political separatism and explicitly opts for the federative multinational vision. Halkin, *Jabotinsky*, 77.
 78. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “K sud’bam yevreistva.”
 79. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Venskiye plany”; see also Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Goroskop.”
 80. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Venskiye plany.”
 81. Popovici, *Die vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich*.
 82. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, vol. 2, 159–162; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 191–198.
 83. Dubnov, “‘Ha-Medina she-ba-Derekh’ o Imperiya Maka Shenit?”
 84. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O zheleznoi stene (My i araby).”
 85. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O ‘dvunatsional’noi Palestine.”
 86. Ibid.
 87. Ibid.

88. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Nashi zadachi III."
89. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "O 'dvunatsional'noi Palestine."
90. Zeev Jabotinsky, "'Eretz-Israel Ha-Du-Le'umit," 84.
91. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Predisloviye."
92. Zeev Jabotinsky, "'Eretz-Israel Ha-Du-Le'umit," 84.
93. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "O 'dvunatsional'noi Palestine."
94. Zeev Jabotinsky, "'Eretz-Israel Ha-Du-Le'umit," 85.
95. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Nashi zadachi II." For more on the Russian Zionists' antiessentialist conceptualization of the Jewish nation as an inclusive social entity during the Helsingfors Conference period, see Taro Tsurumi's illuminating study: Tsurumi, "Neither Angels, nor Demons, but Humans," esp. 537–539.
96. Zeev Jabotinsky, "Ha-She'ela ha-Chevratit."
97. Naor, "Ha-Mitveh Ha-Chukati," 80.
98. Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Jewish War Front* (London: Georg Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1940), 217–218.
99. Zeev Jabotinsky, "Ha-She'ela Ha-Chevratit."
100. Nedava, "Jabotinsky be-Vina"; Naor, "Ha-Mitveh Ha-Chukati." See also Bilski Ben-Hur, *Kol Yachid Hu Melech*, 315–334. Though Ben-Hur does point out that Jabotinsky's vision accords the Arabs of the future state "both full equality and self-rule in areas that are national-specific" (ibid., 331), she still considers the Jabotinskian state to be a model for mono-national sovereignty, whose regime is that of a liberal democracy (ibid., 321ff)—this despite the fact that Jabotinsky's constitutional outline in *The Jewish War Front* clearly describes the Jewish state that will emerge after a Jewish majority is secured as a consociational democracy, with explicit reference to Canada and Belgium. The problem is that Bilski Ben-Hur does not mention the above work or its constitutional outline in her chapter on Jabotinsky's conception of the political future of the Jewish majority state.
101. Naor, "Ha-Mitveh Ha-Chukati," 80.
102. Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement*, 259.
103. Gorny, *From Binational Society to Jewish State*, 5–7. See also Gorny, *Anshei Kan ve-Achshav*, 166.
104. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, 58–67, esp. 60.
105. Zeev Jabotinsky, "Eretz-Israel ha-Du-Le'umit," 84.
106. Regarding the work of Gil Rubin, who claims that Jabotinsky gradually abandoned the multinational state concept in favor of the idea of population transfers, see below note 127.
107. Natkovich, "Pulmus 'Mashber ha-Marxism,'" 2–3.
108. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Predisloviye," 6–7.
109. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Nashi zadachi I."
110. Ibid.
111. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Gelsingforskaya programma."

112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. In his discussion of the Hebrew translation of this article, Amir Goldstein argues that Jabotinsky saw the second approach (which affirms the existence of strong diasporic communities) as an option that the Zionist circles may adopt (Goldstein, *Derekh Rabat-Panim*, 111). However, a reading of the source material makes it clear that Jabotinsky considered it to be the preferred approach.
114. Shumsky, “Tsiyonut u-Medinat ha-Le’om,” 241–242.
115. Dinaburg, “Eretz Israel ve-ha-Gola.”
116. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Polyaki i yevrei,” 15.
117. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Men’shinstva.”
118. Zeev Jabotinsky, “Gerush shel Kfiya—Harei Ze Pesha!”
119. Zeev Jabotinsky, “Europa Ha-Mizrachit Ha-Merkazit.”
120. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “O ‘dvunatsional’noi Palestine.”
121. Feinbrun, ed., *Devar Anshei Shem al Tochnit ha-Chaluka*, 43–44.
122. Sollors, *Beyond Ethnicity*, 66–75. See also Rochelson, *A Jew in the Public Arena*. On Zangwill’s territorialist ideologies, see Alroey, *Zionism Without Zion*, 128ff.
123. See Zangwill, “Before the Peace Conference,” 341.
124. Vladimir Jabotinsky [Altalena], “O natsionalisme.”
125. Ibid.
126. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “A Talk with Zangwill.”
127. On the basis of Jabotinsky’s private notes from November 1939, Gil Rubin (“The Future of the Jews,” 113–115) argues that following the outbreak of World War II, Jabotinsky gradually embraced the idea of the transfer of Palestinian Arabs to the neighboring Arab countries, therefore abandoning the conceptions of a multinational state and national minority rights. To fortify this argument, Rubin stresses rightly that in his last book—*The Jewish War Front*—Jabotinsky dedicated several pages to discussing the possibility of the transfer of the Arabs, writing that the departure of nine hundred thousand Arabs from Transjordan should not be regarded as a “tragedy” or with “dismay” (Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Jewish War Front*, 221). However, Rubin seems to have downplayed the fact that in *The Jewish War Front* Jabotinsky clearly favored the option of multinational democracy in Palestine over the transfer scenario.
128. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “A Talk with Zangwill.”
129. Ibid. (quotation marks were placed there by Jabotinsky).
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Jewish War Front*, 102.
133. Ibid., 216–218.

Chapter Five. David Ben-Gurion

1. Ben-Gurion, “Leyisud ha-medina.”
2. Ibid. (“or even more,” he added, “if the Christians were to want a special authority for themselves”).
3. Ibid.
4. Teveth, *Kin’at David*, vol. 1, 256–271, 305–319; Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion: Biographiya*, 54; see also Bar-Zohar’s expanded biography of Ben-Gurion: Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, vol. 1, 89; Anita Shapira does not hide her surprise at Ben-Gurion’s and Ben-Zvi’s efforts to try to blend into the late Ottoman state’s cultural and political life, but her surprise is to be expected since she approaches the Ottomanization approach without considering the historical context, and specifically the efforts of pre-World War I non-Jewish national movements at the time to achieve national autonomy: Shapira, *Ben-Gurion*, 31.
5. Mintz, “Ben-Gurion and Po’alei Zion in the US,” 55–56.
6. Gorny, “Bein Activism Histori le-Activism Achshavi.” Both Ben-Gurion’s biographers and the prominent historians of the Zionist Labor movement, like Mintz and Gorny, cannot ignore Ben-Gurion’s Ottoman period, if only because they need to be able to present a complete account of both Ben-Gurion’s biography and the history of the Poalei Zion party in Palestine, the very party that would become the forerunner of the Israeli Labor movement. Key texts on the history of Zionist ideology, however, which naturally reserve a central place for Israel’s first prime minister, make no mention at all of the Ottoman chapter of Ben-Gurion’s life and certainly do not go into detail regarding his political-ideological position at the time (see Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*; Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*; and Shapira, *Israel*).
7. Bartal, *Kozak u-bedu’i*, 157, 161, 164–165.
8. For Ben-Gurion’s perspective on the distinction between the “old” and “new” Yishuv, see Ben-Gurion, “Le-She’elot ha-Yishuv ha-Yashan” (1910). See also Israel Bartal’s classic article: Bartal, “‘Yishuv Yashan’ ve-‘Yishuv Khadash’.”
9. Ben-Gurion, “Le-Beirur Matzaveinu ha-Medini,” 291–292.
10. Ibid., 292.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 293.
13. Ibid., 295.
14. Ibid., 294–295.
15. Ben-Gurion, “Avodateinu ha-Chevratit-Medinit, 233.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 236.
18. Ben-Gurion, “Le-Beirur Matzaveinu ha-Medini,” 292.
19. Ben-Zvi (Avner), “Derishoteinu ha-Leumiot be-Togarma.”

20. Ibid., 296.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 297.
23. Ibid.
24. Barkai, "Ha-Sotzialdemocratiya ha-Ostrit."
25. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Venskiye plany."
26. Popovici, *Die vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich*; Kann, *The Multi-national Empire*, vol. 2, 159–162; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 191–198.
27. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Predisloviye," 6.
28. Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire," 36–41; Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 223–230.
29. Ben-Zvi (Avner), "Derishoteinu ha-Leumiot be-Togarma," 298
30. Ben-Gurion, "Le-Beirur Matzaveinu ha-Medini."
31. See note 52 below.
32. For criticism of the historiographic distinction between "political Zionism" and "spiritual-cultural Zionism," see Shumsky, "Tsiyonut u-Medinat-ha-Leom," 224.
33. Ben-Gurion, "Avodateinu ha-Chevratit-Medinit," 233.
34. See Chapter 2; Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation*, 191ff.
35. Ben-Gurion, "Avodateinu ha-Chevratit-Medinit," 233.
36. Ben-Zvi (Avner), "Derishoteinu ha-Leumiot be-Togarma," 298.
37. Ahad Ha'am, "Ha-Yahadut ha-Ottomanit."
38. Bartal, *Kozak u-bedui*, 157.
39. Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi, "Me-ha-Talmidim ha-Otmanim be-Kushta," 39.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ben-Gurion, "Sofer Turki al Turikya," 12.
43. Ben-Gurion, "Bitul ha-Capitulatzion."
44. Ibid., 333.
45. Ibid., 334.
46. Ibid., 336.
47. Ibid. (emphasis in the original).
48. Ben-Gurion, "Hachshara Ezrachit," 336.
49. Ibid., 337.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 337–338.
52. Ibid., 338.
53. Ben-Gurion, *Ha-Hanbaga ha-Atzmit ba-Vilayot*.
54. Ben-Gurion, "La-She'elat ha-Mizrach," 539–540.
55. Öke, "Young Turks, Freemasons, Jews."
56. Bartal, *Kozak u-bedui*, 157ff.
57. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 2, 1916; June 9, 1916; June 23, 1916.

58. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 2, 1916.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. (emphasis in the original).
61. Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic*, 149, 155–159.
62. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 2, 1916.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Natsional'nyi vopros v Turtsii."
66. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 2, 1916.
67. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 23, 1916.
68. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 2, 1916.
69. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 23, 1916.
70. Cf. Ben-Gurion, *Mi-Maamad le-Am*, 13.
71. Ben-Gurion, "Zchuyoteinu," June 2, 1916.
72. Ben-Gurion, "Le-She'elat ha-Mizrach," 539–540.
73. "Ha-Berit ha-Olamit shel ha-Poalim ha-Ivrim ha-Sotzialim 'Poale Zion,'" 566.
74. Ben-Gurion, "Mitoch ha-Vikuach," 81–82; Ben-Gurion, *Pegishot im Manbigim Araviim*, 20–25, 31–36.
75. Ben-Gurion, "Avtonomia."
76. One of the founders of the Poalei Zion world movement and director of the Technion in Haifa from 1932 to 1950.
77. Ben-Gurion, "Avtonomia," 110–114.
78. Ibid., 118, 122–123 (emphasis in the original).
79. Ibid., 124.
80. Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 3–13; for more on both the revolutionary-utopian motivations driving the social engineering trends in Zionism and the ways in which the Zionist settlement project was continuous with and linked to the European and Jewish environment, see Penslar, *Zionism and Technocracy*, 1–9, 151.
81. Ben-Gurion, "Avtonomia," 114–118.
82. Ibid., 124.
83. Passfield's "White Paper" seemed to imply that the special status that the Balfour Declaration had granted the Jewish Yishuv would be rescinded. However, the letter that the British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald subsequently sent to Chaim Weizmann confirmed that this would not be the case.
84. Ben-Gurion, "Hanachot le-Kvi'at Mishtar Mamalachti," 188.
85. Gorny, *From Binational Society to Jewish State*, 72–73.
86. Ben-Gurion, "Be-Ikvot ha-Vikuach," 185.
87. Ben-Gurion, "Hanachot le-Kvi'at Mishtar Mamalachti," 195–196.
88. Ben-Gurion, "Hanachot le-Kvi'at Mishtar Mamalachti."
89. Gorny, *From Binational Society to Jewish State*.

90. Shapira, *Berl*, 180.
91. Katznelson, “Le-She’elot ha-Mishtar ha-Medini ba-Aretz.”
92. *Ibid.*, 164.
93. Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement*, 259; Naor, “Ha-Mitveh Ha-Chukati,” 80; Heller, “Emdotei’hem,” 238–239.
94. Mintz, “Ben-Gurion and Po’alei Zion”; Gorny, “Bein Activism Histori le-Activism Achshavi.”
95. Teveth, “Ideology, Naïveté or Pragmatism?,” 79; Teveth, *Ben-Gurion ve-Arvi’ei Eretz Israel*, 197–198; Teveth, *Kin’at David*, vol. 3, 80–81.
96. Heller, “Emdotei’hem,” 209.
97. Dothan, *A Land in the Balance*.
98. Gorny, *From Binational Society to Jewish State*.
99. *Ibid.*, 5–7.
100. Katznelson, “Le-She’elot ha-Mishtar ha-Medini,” 164.
101. Anita Shapira’s biography of Berl Katznelson is an illustrative example of this approach. When discussing Katznelson’s above-mentioned “autonomist” speech at the Third Mapai Conference, she does not once refer to his efforts in the speech to anchor his proposal within the legacy of “diasporic” Jewish autonomism, nor did she ask why the speech refers to Renner and Dubnow. See Shapira, *Berl*, 180.
102. Dubnov, *Michtavim al ha-Yabadut ha-Yashana ve-ha-Hadasha*, 93, n. 1.
103. Rachamimov, “Diaspora Nationalism’s Pyrrhic Victory,” 7.
104. Ben-Gurion, “Avtonomia,” 118.
105. “Asefat ha-Mecha’a Neged Peruk ‘He-Halutz’ be-Russia.”
106. Ben-Gurion, “Avtonomia,” 122 (emphasis in the original).
107. *Ibid.* (emphasis added).
108. Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 199.
109. Feinbrun, M., ed., *Devar Anshei Shem al Tochnit ha-Chaluka*, 43–44.
110. Goldstein, “Ra’ayon Ha-Federatzia Ha-Ezorit B’Haguta shel Mapai B’Shnot Ha-Shloshim,” 52–58.
111. Ben-Gurion, “Inyaneinu ha-Medini’im,” 58.
112. Ben-Gurion, “Be-Ikvot Ha-Vikuach,” 186.
113. *Ibid.*, 187.
114. Morris, “He’arot al Ha-Historiographia Ha-Tzionit,” 195. For criticism of Morris’s approach to Herzl’s diary, see Chapter 2, note 83, above.
115. At around that period, Nir Keidar identified a significant shift in Ben-Gurion’s Zionist ideology, namely, the birth of statism (*mamlachtiyut*) and the notion that the state is the best way to realize Zionism: Keidar, *Mamlachtiyut*, 72.
116. Ohana, *Meshichiyut u-Mamlachtiyut*, 47–48; Morris, *One State, Two States*, 74–75; Shapira, *Ben-Gurion*, 107–109.
117. Ben-Gurion, “Ha-Va’ada ha-Malchutit u-Maskanotei’ha,” 154 (emphasis in the original).

118. Ben-Gurion, “Halichot Ha-Medina Ha-Yehudit,” 282 (emphasis in the original).
119. Ibid., 292.
120. See note 111 above.
121. Ben-Gurion, “Halichot Ha-Medina Ha-Yehudit,” 298.
122. Ibid.
123. On the Biltmore Conference, see Gal, *David Ben-Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State*, 186–208; Gorny, *From Binational Society to Jewish State*, 129–130; and Aharonson, *David Ben-Gurion*, 226–231.
124. For example, see Ben-Gurion, “‘Tochnit Biltmore,” 103–104; Ben-Gurion, “Ha-Mediniut Ha-Tzionit ve-Poalei Eretz Israel,” 122–124; and Ben-Gurion, “Ne’um ba-Congress ha-Tzioni ha-Esrim u-Shenayim,” 140.
125. Aharonson, *David Ben-Gurion*, 230.
126. Ben-Gurion, “Ha-Mediniut ha-Tzionit,” 272.
127. Ben-Gurion, “Ha-Mediniut Ha-Tzionit ve-Poalei Eretz Israel,” 164.
128. Ben-Gurion, “Hanachot le-Kvi’at Mishtar Mamalachti,” 191–192.
129. Ben-Gurion, “Ne’um ba-Congress ha-Tzioni ha-Esrim u-Shenayim,” 133.
130. Ibid., 114–116.
131. Ben-Gurion: “Mediniut Tziyonit,” 63–64.
132. Ben-Gurion, “Divrei Teshuva ba-Congress ha-Tzioni Ha-Esrim u-Shenayim,” 149.
133. Ben-Gurion, “Be-Ikvot ha-Vikuach,” 186.
134. Ben-Gurion, “‘Tochnit Biltmore,” 104.
135. Ben-Gurion, “Ha-Mediniut ha-Tzionit ve-Poalei Eretz Israel,” 154.
136. Ben-Gurion, “Avtonomia,” 122 (emphasis added).
137. Ben-Gurion, “Ne’um ba-Congress ha-Tzioni ha-Esrim u-Shenayim,” 113 (emphasis in the original).
138. Ben-Gurion, “Ein Lanu Atid Bli Medina,” 208 (emphasis in the original).

Conclusion

1. Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism*, 3–13
2. Ettinger, “Yichuda shel ha-Tenua ha-Leumit ha-Yehudit.”
3. Shapira, *Ke-Chol Am ve-Am*.
4. The work of Israel Bartal, who did address this question (Bartal, *Kozak u-bedui*, 157ff), is exceptional in this regard.
5. Herzl, *Old New Land*, 289.
6. See a useful overview of these debates by Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*. See also a number of central theoretical works on nationalism referred to in the introduction, note 7.
7. Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation,” esp. 3–4. See also Hroch, “National Movements in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.”

8. See, for instance, Burgess and Hyvik, “Ambivalent Patriotism”; and Sah-lins, “The Nation in the Village.”
9. Bartal, *Letaken Am*, 7–19. See also Bartal, “From Corporation to Na-tion.”
10. Dubnov, *Mikhtavim al ha-Yahadut ha-Yashana ve-ha-Hadasha*, 60.
11. Ben-Gurion, “Inyaneinu ha-Medini'im,” 58.
12. Feinbrun, N., ed., *Devar Ansbei Shem al Tochnit ha-Chaluka*, 43–44.
13. Katznelson, “Le-She'elot ha-Mishtar ha-Medini,” 160.
14. Katznelson, “Mitoch Sikha im ha-Noar be-Mikveh Israel,” 244.
15. See the introduction.
16. Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 113, 116, 120–121.
17. Ibid., 100.
18. Ibid., 101.
19. Ibid., 99–100.
20. Ibid., 100.

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- . "Avar ve-Atid." Pp. 81–83 in Ahad Ha'am, *Kol Kitvei Abad Ha'am*.
- . "Beit Sefer be-Yafo." Pp. 187–210 in Ahad Ha'am, *Kol Kitvei Abad Ha'am*.
- . "Dr. Pinsker u-Makhbarto." Pp. 43–48 in Ahad Ha'am, *Kol Kitvei Abad Ha'am*.
- . "Ha-Het ve-Onsho." Pp. 320–323 in Ahad Ha'am, *Kol Kitvei Abad Ha'am*.
- . "Hakdama le-Hotzaa ha-Hadasha." Pp. 8–10 in Ahad Ha'am, *Kol Kitvei Abad Ha'am*.
- . "Ha-Yahadut ha-Ottomanit." P. 498 in Ahad Ha'am, *Kol Kitvei Abad Ha'am*.
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